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Lifting her veil and smiling gratiously, 25-year-old Anna was leaving the Fransfontein 
Lutheran church. With badly concealed envy and grim faces, several young women 
stood outside the church and watched her. Anna’s expensive silvery satin wedding 
dress, with beautiful embroidery and lace, blazed in the bright midday sun. Josef, now 
her husband, walked by her side, not as triumphantly as she looked and clearly ex-
hausted, but with a content gaze. The wedding party slowly streamed out of the church 
and into the courtyard outside. Four couples of bridesmaids and groomsmen, all 
dressed in shades of glittering purple, followed the newlyweds. Behind them walked 
the bride’s and groom’s parents. The humble dress of the husband’s mother stood in 
sharp contrast to the luxurious textiles worn by the wedding couple and their brides-
maids and groomsmen.  
Anna’s wedding in late April 2004 was the fifth wedding that my husband, Mi-
chael Schnegg, and I attended in Fransfontein, a rural community of 137 households 
located in the semiarid former Damaraland, today Kunene South, northwest Namib-
ia, where we conducted field research from May 2003 to September 2004 and from 
July to September in both 2005 and 2006. As at the other weddings before, the mo-
ment when the newlyweds left the church and proceeded into the courtyard was filled 
with relief, joy and triumph. They had made it! Anna’s wedding pictures, my field 
notes and my memories of the day once again revive the exhausted happiness that 
reflected in the newlyweds’ faces. A few months later, Anna agreed to a life story 
interview.  
During the interview we talked about Anna’s wedding day and what happened 
after she left church as a married woman. As is common in Fransfontein, the newly-
weds proceeded to the Fransfontein fountain to take wedding pictures. Water is not 
only the most important resource in arid Namibia. It is also loaded with symbolic 
meaning and value (Hoernlé 1923). On their way to the fountain, Anna and her hus-
band Josef passed several groups of spectators who commented on the wedding. 
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Anna described the scene in the following way: “While we were passing, I heard one 
of my mother’s sister’s daughters tell another girl watching: ‘Oh, Anna, she is so 
young, and she wants to marry! She is too young! I can’t see why she should marry. 
I am not married.’” Like the unfriendly gazes of the women watching Anna and Josef 
leaving the church after their wedding ceremony, the envy of Anna’s mother’s sister’s 
daughter was hardly hidden. The likelihood that she might ever marry herself was 
small.  
Today, only about 30 per cent of the Fransfontein population 15 years and older 
is or has been married. Yet, of those 60 years and older, the overwhelming majority 
(more than 70 per cent) was married. It is only with the men and women who were 
born in the mid-20th century that marriage rates started to decline, resulting in less 
than 20 per cent of men and women in the age bracket of 20 to 50 ever having mar-
ried. One explanation for this change might be a steep rise in the age at marriage. We 
saw above that Anna’s mother’s sister’s daughter, who is several years older then 
Anna, was convinced that Anna was too young to deserve marriage. Yet an elevated 
average age at marriage is only a partial explanation and, by itself, is of rather limited 
explanatory power.  
Demographic variations like a later average age at marriage have to be understood 
as expressions of more profound underlying societal changes (Antoine 2006). Trans-
formations in Namibian marriage practices have been framed and structured by dra-
matic political economic changes in the 20th century, roughly ranging from the crea-
tion of reserves by German colonialists early in the century, over the establishment 
of homelands during apartheid and the South African annexation of Namibia, to the 
celebration of independence and freedom from colonial rule since the 1990s. During 
this time frame, marriage has changed from an almost universal practice and collec-
tively experienced rite of passage, creating social cohesion and community, to a cel-
ebration of difference and distinction by a small elite. Importantly, the appropriation 
of weddings for class distinctions commenced long before the end of apartheid and 
colonial rule. Since approximately the late 1960s and during the 1970s, marriage rates 
in Fransfontein started to decline while wedding practices became increasingly elab-
orate and expensive. Substantial political changes at that time, especially the estab-
lishment of homelands, resulted in an array of new constraints and burdens for the 
great majority of the population while the agency of a small minority was signifi-
cantly enhanced and extended. This minority rather rapidly consolidated and formed 
a local elite.  
It is this book’s central aim to describe and explain these multiple transformations 
and their interplay (i.e. changes in marriage rates but also political, material and ide-
ational transformations) and to reflect on their consequences for the already large but 
nevertheless still growing group of non-married (and probably never-to-be-married) 
Fransfonteiners. The book’s theoretical and methodological frame draws on practice 
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theory and recent reflections on the dialectics between structure and agency with 
Pierre Bourdieu’s theorizing on the reproduction of inequalities through mechanisms 
of distinctions (Bourdieu 1984 [1979]). 
Building on the work of practice theorists, I define agency – thus an actor’s ca-
pacity to reinterpret and transform relations to some degree – not as opposed to struc-
ture but as a constituent of structure (Bourdieu 1977; Johnson-Hanks 2006, 2007b; 
Ortner 1984, 2006; Sewell 1992, 2005). Structure – very loosely defined as the re-
production of patterns of relations including both ideational and material dimensions 
(Sewell 1992, 2005) – is thus to a certain degree always contested. Because structure 
both empowers and constraints agency, this dialectic dynamic continually questions 
the reproduction of structure and can modify structure and agency. Consequently, a 
focus on social practices is key for an understanding of structure and agency as well 
as their transformations.  
Approaches informed by practice theory focus on the asymmetrical relationships 
of power (Ortner 1984: 12; Wardlow 2006: 5). Sewell (2005: 145) stresses that “struc-
tures, in short, empower agents differently, which also implies that they embody the 
desires, intentions, and knowledge of agents differently as well. Structures, and the 
human agencies they endow, are laden with differences of power”. To understand the 
interplay between the changes in wedding practices and marriage rates on the one 
hand and, on the other hand, the establishment of apartheid’s homelands and the emer-
gence of localized elites, a closer look at the varying degrees of empowerment for 
different actors and groups of actors within specific structures and time periods seems 
to be especially important. By combining participant observation (which elicits in-
formation on how actors maintain, transform and reinterpret relations within struc-
tures) with life narratives (providing insight into women’s and men’s motivations, 
perceptions and legitimizations of their actions and life events), I grasp central facets 
of actors’ agencies. I also reflect on how life narratives are not “objective” sources 
on the course of people’s lives but are always framed by processes of memory and 
the current lifeworlds of the narrator. 
Structures that frame the agencies elicited in such a way are multidimensional, 
that is historical, economic, political, social, normative, demographic and ritual. The 
attempt to pay attention to multiple structures and their entanglements has been in-
spired by Bourdieu’s (2008) analysis of French bachelors in rural Béarn and their 
difficulties of marrying. I try to capture the historic dimensions (and the differences 
of power within these) through the elicitation of the political economic history of the 
region and of how these macrostructures are reflected at the level of the household 
and the individual as, for example, in terms of the distribution of wealth and educa-
tion. I also consider normative and social structures, especially in terms of gender, 
reproduction, family and kinship. Further, and in this I follow Emile Durkheim (1930) 
and Jennifer Johnson-Hanks (2007a), demographic rates like marriage rates are also 
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considered as structures “evoking certain forms of action from individuals without 
individuals necessarily being aware of the rates or explicitly orienting their action 
toward them” (ibid: 3). However, similar to all other structures mentioned above, the 
reproduction of demographic structures is again dialectically interwoven with agency, 
thus demographic structures both shape and are shaped by individual agency. Conse-
quently, my differentiation between the information I explicitly elicited on agency 
and the data I gathered on structure is somewhat artificial.  
Lastly, I carefully analyze ritual structures. Wedding practices have changed tre-
mendously in Fransfontein over the past 40 years.1 Until the late 1960s, wedding and 
engagement practices had a relatively simple and inexpensive structure. From the 
1970s onwards, these ritual structures have been successively appropriated by emerg-
ing elites and thoroughly transformed in the process. Today, engagements and wed-
dings have become the most important social sites to publicly demonstrate class dis-
tinction. Weddings are now indicators of social class and stratification.  
SOCIAL CLASS AND CLASS DISTINCTIONS 
Bourdieu (1984 [1979]) has thoroughly analyzed the mechanisms of distinction used 
to sustain the reproduction of ruling classes, especially in his “ethnography of 
France”, a book on “distinctions” based on expressions of “taste” in France. Bourdieu 
distinguishes social position based on both cultural and economic capital and ex-
pressed through different types of occupation from what he terms lifestyles. On a 
more abstract level, Bourdieu further differentiates three large social classes (encom-
passing social positions) which he dynamically constructs using a range of infor-
mation, especially occupation, but also other data such as place of residence: the rul-
ing or upper class, the middle class and the popular class. Social positions and 
lifestyles are densely intertwined but not equal, allowing for change and variations. 
The varying lifestyles are accumulations of different dimensions of tastes, such as 
tastes for music, sports or furniture. Through their tastes, social classes produce and 
                                                 
1 In popular discourse, people in Fransfontein often distinguished a wedding from a mar-
riage: while they used the word “wedding” to describe the ritual practices that publicly turn 
two individuals into a married couple, they used “marriage” to denote a state of being. In 
anthropological discourse, such a distinction is often not undertaken, demonstrated by the 
two influential anthropological encyclopedias by Seymour-Smith (1986) and Barnard and 
Spencer (1996): while both have entries for “marriage”, “marriage payments”, “marriage 
classes” and “marriage rules”, they have none for “wedding”. In this book I use both terms, 
with the term “wedding” used more specifically for the ritual practices of becoming mar-
ried and “marriage” more generally for both practices, processes and the state of being. 
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legitimize distinctions. Bourdieu’s (1984 [1979], 1990) concept of the habitus is cen-
tral for the understanding of these processes.  
The habitus of a person connects a person’s social position to the person’s life-
style. According to Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant (1992: 136), the habitus is the in-
ternalization of a specific type of economic and social condition. As such, the habitus 
is a socially constructed system of structured and structuring dispositions acquired 
through social practices. Based on his research in France, Bourdieu (1984 [1979]) 
states that all classes have a characteristic habitus. While the habitus of the ruling 
class is characterized by distinction and the construction of legitimate taste, the mid-
dle class hopes to strive ahead through education and appropriation of the ruling class’ 
tastes, while the popular class constructs a popular taste. Taste can thus be grouped into 
three categories, each linked to social position and class: legitimate taste, middle tastes 
and popular tastes. Importantly, legitimate taste legitimizes power, as Bourdieu (1984 
[1979]) is able to show with an impressive amount of statistical data. Thus the 
knowledge of a certain lifestyle (e.g. specific pieces of music, fashion or art) publicly 
legitimizes and reproduces social and economic inequalities. However, only if the 
different dimensions of legitimate taste remain exclusive do they serve as markers of 
distinction. As soon as cheap copies are available to the mass population, the marker 
of distinction looses its potential to create distinction. It changes from a sign of sophis-
ticated taste into a mass product. These processes of taste appropriation create a par-
adox situation for the upper class: on the one hand, their taste legitimizes their posi-
tion or power yet, on the other, their taste is under constant threat of appropriation by 
(mainly) the middle classes. Consequently, legitimate taste has to appear stable and 
justified while continuously creating new markers of distinction.  
Bourdieu’s (1977, 1990) treatment of French reproduction and legitimization of 
class distinctions has to be viewed and also criticised against the background of his 
wider theoretical approach (see Calhoun et al. 1993). Three concepts are especially 
important for Bourdieu’s general theorizing: the previously mentioned habitus, con-
ceptions of capital, and field (Calhoun 1993; Postone et al. 1993). All three are inter-
linked. Capital, thus different forms of accumulable social-symbolic resources, and 
habitus, namely embodied social structures, lead to positions within specific social 
fields: “The position of a particular agent is the result of an interplay between that 
person’s habitus and his or her place in a field of positions as defined by the distribu-
tion of the appropriate form of capital”. (Postone et al. 1993: 5) Fields are semi-au-
tonomous, with agents and their own accumulation of history, forms of capital and 
logic of actions. Their autonomy is restricted insofar as capital can be transferred 
between fields. Fields are hierarchically ordered on three levels (LiPuma 1993: 16). 
The first and most specific level comprises the distinctive fields. On a second level, 
these fields are located within a “field of power” defined by class dynamics. Finally, 
classes are located within these general fields of class relations. Edward LiPuma 
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(1993: 16) summarizes Bourdieu’s conceptualization in the following way: “This 
view of social structure tries to link class and status, relate both to action and practice 
through the habitus, and provide an account of the reproduction of hierarchy”.  
Bourdieu’s conception of habitus, field and class has been criticised, for example, 
by LiPuma (1993) and Michèle Lamont (1992). Lamont points out that Bourdieu’s 
theory of fields and classes assumes rather closed and homogeneous structures. How-
ever, as her research on French and US-American upper middle class men shows, the 
markers of distinction and the relative positions of her respondents are defined by 
open, changing, and interpenetrating semiotic and social fields and not by stable and 
closed ones (Lamont 1992: 183). Instead of presupposing fields and classes, Lamont 
calls for empirical research that analyzes how boundaries are established and vary 
across groups (not only classes), who is excluded by these boundaries and how they 
affect inequality. Lamont (1992: 188) further criticises Bourdieu’s habitus concept 
as focusing too exclusively on proximate structural conditions and not reflecting 
enough on the fact that “people do not always perceive the world only through their 
own experiences and that they often borrow cultural models that are decoupled from 
their own lives”. Thus, according to Lamont, processes of change and dynamic of the 
habitus remain unclear (see also Lash 1993). 
Like Lamont, LiPuma (1993) questions the pre-existence and the boundaries of 
Bourdieu’s fields and classes. He interrogates the existence of distinct classes as a 
necessity for Bourdieu’s thinking (since they are what is being reproduced and legit-
imized): instead of taking classes and fields for granted, one has to scrutinize the 
specific cultural formations that produce these categories in the first place. While for 
Bourdieu the cultural formations and categories of distinctions are in the end arbitrary 
– it is not the categories themselves that interest Bourdieu but their use as markers of 
distinction – LiPuma explicitly calls for a cultural analysis of these cateogries.2 Sim-
ilar to Lamont (1992: 180) and Sewell (1992), LiPuma stresses that resources and 
classes are only meaningful within their cultural context. Critique thus concentrates 
on Bourdieu’s too homogeneous, fixed and stable notion of class, the little attention 
he has paid to processes of change of habitus, and his lack of attention for the cultural 
formation of categories such as field and class. 
How then can Bourdieu’s theoretical insights and the critique of his thinking be 
fruitfully applied to the Namibian lifeworlds analyzed here? First of all, one might ar-
gue that Bourdieu’s theoretical approach in Distinctions (1984 [1979]) is not suited for 
this ethnographic context and that his reflection on precapitalist societies as outlined in 
his work on Algeria provides a more appropriate theoretical frame (Bourdieu 1977). 
Bourdieu theorizes that in precapitalist societies, elites directly and constantly re-create 
                                                 
2 If this is not done, then it would remain unclear “what sorts of categories should be taken 
as historically specific and which as trans-historical” (Calhoun 1993: 82). 
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relations of dominance while in capitalist societies (such as the French one) elites de-
pend on institutional orders to express and reproduce their interests. However, George 
Marcus (1983: 46) has observed that “most anthropological studies of elites […] are 
mixtures of both modes of domination discussed by Bourdieu”. Thus, just like most 
ethnographic cases discussed by Marcus (ibid: 47), in Fransfontein there are both “pow-
erful families and powerful institutions”. In many instances powerful families and pow-
erful institutions, such as the bureaucratic structures of apartheid’s homelands, are in-
deed interwined. This already indicates a high level of heterogeneity and fluidity 
regarding the production and reproduction of distinction and class in Fransfontein. 
I follow Bourdieu’s critics insofar as the concept of rather closed class boundaries 
and the notion of a stable and durable habitus are not well suited to the dynamics of 
Fransfontein’s class formation processes. Bourdieu analyzes a society, France, that is 
marked by very pronounced and long-term class differences.3 The Namibian postcolo-
nial situation is more fluid and heterogeneous, with classes and habitus in the making. 
Nevertheless, despite this justified critique of Bourdieu’s construction of groups and 
habitus, I want to show that Bourdieu’s dynamics of distinction – the continuous de-
mand for new markers of distinction elites produce in order to legitimize their positions 
– are at the heart of the class formation process in Fransfontein. Here I also take inspi-
ration from Abner Cohen’s (1981) seminal work on Creole public servants and profes-
sionals in Sierra Leone. Cohen unravels how through their cults, practices and symbols, 
including wedding rituals, Creole elites justify and legitimize their privileged class po-
sition. In Fransfontein, elites and their markers of distinction have recently emerged, 
albeit out of older cultural forms and practices that render a cultural analysis of these 
previous formations necessary. Wedding celebrations are one of the central arenas to 
express these distinctions and to introduce new markers of distinction. Following 
LiPuma and Lamont, I analyze the cultural production of marriage into a valuable re-
source and, following Bourdieu, how this culturally transformed resource is being used 
and reproduced to manifest class distinction. This does not imply that marriage has been 
of no value before the emergence of these elitist dynamics of distinctions. Bridewealth 
is a characteristic element of many “African” marriages. However, the scale of expendi-
ture and the forms of ritual expressions have thoroughly changed, mainly serving the 
desire for distinction of the new elites (Pauli/ van Dijk 2016).  
So far, I have used the concept of “elite” to describe the group of people in posi-
tions of power, wealth and influence. In some recent work, however, the concept 
“emerging African middle class” has partly replaced this older terminology. I exam-
ine this in the next section.  
                                                 
3 However, LiPuma (1993: 23) stresses that this homogeneity is probably a partial artifact. 
Internal divisions of social structure and class along racial and ethnic lines are not consid-
ered and Jews, Algerians and Moroccans do not appear in Distinctions. 
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From elites to emerging middle classes  
In her in-depth treatment of the use of the concepts of elite and (middle) class in 
Africa, Carola Lentz (2016: 25) observes: “Since the 2000s, interest in the middle 
classes, once heralded as the main forces behind industrialization, urbanization and 
bureaucratization but then somewhat neglected by social scientists (albeit not by his-
torians), has experienced a renaissance, this time on a global scale”. Up to then, Af-
rican elites and working classes had been at the center of research interests, to be 
interrupted by a period of little class analysis in the late 1980s and during the 1990s 
(Spronk 2014). Lentz (2016: 24) emphazises that a lot of the research now running 
under the lable “emerging middle classes” has strong thematic overlaps with older 
studies of African elites. Education, modernity and progressiveness are central to 
both terminological approaches. But unlike middle classes, elites have more often 
been seen in moralizing terms, condemning them as corrupt and exploitative (Behrends/ 
Pauli 2012). This might also help to explain why many recent studies prefer the seem-
ingly more “neutral” term “emerging middle classes”. Since the 2000s, several edited 
volumes and monographs have revived the study of class through the lens of the mid-
dle class, both on a global scale (Heiman et al. 2012a; López/Weinstein 2012) and in 
the African context (Kroeker et al. 2018; Melber 2016; Southall 2016). 
Not surprisingly, almost all of this research builds on Pierre Bourdieu’s (1984 
[1979]) analysis of distinction. Consumption and lifestyle are central practices 
through which the new or emerging African middle classes are being scrutinized. But 
unlike Cohen’s (1981) political analysis of an African elite through its conspicuous 
consumption (see also Veblen 1994 [1899]) and elitist celebrations, a thorough eth-
nographic analysis of the symbolism and practices of the nature of the African middle 
class is still outstanding.4 Here, I use consumption, habitus and lifestyle as central 
modes by which to understand class formation. I clearly share this approach with 
recent African middle class studies. But I will not use the term “middle class” to 
describe and analyze the group of people who came into office and power in Frans-
fontein since the 1970s and who have changed marriage practices so thoroughly. In-
stead, I classify them as “elite”. I have two reasons for this decision.  
My first reason concerns regional research traditions. In Namibia, recent ethno-
graphic and historic work on class formation uses the concept of elites (see Töte-
meyer 1978 for an older work that retains its importance). Gregor Dobler (2014) me-
ticulously describes elite traders in colonial Ovamboland. Mattia Fumanti (2016) 
analyzes different generations of elites in the northern Namibian town of Rundu. And 
                                                 
4 Rachel Spronk’s (2012) work on young professionals in urban Nairobi certainly goes in 
this direction. Yet her focus is not on the analysis of (middle) class but of gender and sex-
uality. 
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in neighboring Botswana, Richard Werbner (2004) has fruitfully used the concept of 
the elite to study the upper strata of Kalanga society.  
My second reason is more complex. Namibian class formation and the resulting 
social classes have to be historically situated. They have to be understood against the 
background of the country’s complex colonial and postcolonial history. During its 
liberation struggle against apartheid, the South West Africa People’s Organization 
(SWAPO) followed a socialist ideology. After Namibian independence in 1990, 
SWAPO’s ideology became increasingly neoliberal and market friendly (Melber 
2014). The extent of the subsequent spread of an emergent “black” Namibian middle 
class is contested. According to a recent study by the African Development Bank, 
which defines the middle class as those living on USD4-20 a day, only 9 per cent of 
the Namibian population falls into this category (The Namibian, May 11, 2015). 
Thus, some observers perceive SWAPO’s turn towards capitalism, neoliberal politics 
and nepotism through affirmative action programs as a central reason for the persis-
tence of dramatic economic inequalities (Dobler 2012; Melber 2011).  
During apartheid, the vast majority of the Namibian “black” population was ex-
cluded from any form of wealth accumulation. After Namibia’s full administrative 
“integration” into the Republic of South Africa in the late 1950s, the country was ad-
ministered as a de facto fifth province by South Africa, with apartheid structures 
(Wallace 2011: 261-271). A boundary was drawn between “whites” and “blacks”, 
with “blacks” excluded from almost all access to power and privilege. One of the a-
partheid “homelands” created in the wake of this move was “Damaraland”, which in-
cluded the Fransfontein region. The establishment of “ethnic” homelands also initiated 
processes of internal stratification. For a happy few, the establishment of infrastructure 
and bureaucracy within the homelands meant new and long-lasting possibilities of en-
hancing one’s living conditions (Rohde 1997; Tötemeyer 1978). A local, “modern” 
elite of “style-setters” (Plotnicov 1970: 293), such as administrators, businessmen, 
politicians and teachers, emerged in Damaraland and the other homelands (Dobler 
2014; Tötemeyer 1978). This was a small, regional elite, which enjoyed its status only 
within an artificial, local context; it was not a national middle class. During the apart-
heid period, national elite and middle class positions were occupied by the “white” 
minority.  
Following Chris Shore and Stephen Nugent (2002: 2), I define elite as a “privi-
leged minority” occupying the most influential positions and roles in the governing 
institutions of a community. Such a definition is always context dependent (Fumanti 
2004): the local elites of the apartheid era were clearly a privileged minority, and 
only existed “on top” of their respective local strata and the respective homelands. 
Recently, Carola Lentz (2016: 24, 40) has suggested a more restricted definition of 
elites as “persons or small groups with leadership roles”. To a large extent this defi-
nition also applies to the apartheid-period homeland elites. Many of them were indeed 
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in leadership positions within the homeland. With the end of apartheid in 1990, these 
local homeland elites became part of a newly emergent national, “black” urban mid-
dle class. Affirmative action programs aimed at promoting the previously disadvan-
taged “black” population fostered the growth of this class, as did new investments in 
the mining, fishing, construction and telecommunication industries.  
Much anthropological work on middle classes is reluctant to define the concept 
of the middle class (Brosius 2010; Heiman et al. 2012b; Scharrer et al. 2017). Nev-
ertheless, some conceptual overlaps between the various understandings can be de-
tected. Thus, people belonging to the middle classes have acquired a certain level of 
social and economic security, albeit one that is heavily context and culture/lifestyle 
dependent. Importantly, people who see themselves as belonging to the middle class 
perceive difference between themselves and those above and below them (Lentz 
2016: 41). These perceptions of boundaries and distinctions are both symbolic and 
social (Lamont and Molnár 2002).  
After apartheid and with independence, the political-economic landscape of Na-
mibia has become more diverse and fluid. An urban, “black” middle class has emerged 
in the national capital of Windhoek and in other urban areas (Melber 2014). This new 
middle class is still strongly linked to the rural areas. It largely consists of successful 
migrants from rural areas like Fransfontein “commuting” between urban middle class 
and local elite livelihoods (Pauli 2018). Although I will mention this group of mi-
grants, my focus here is not on them but on the local elites living in Fransfontein. By 
and large this group has continued to be “on top” of the local social strata, often but 
not always in leadership positions, since the apartheid period. Given this continuity, 
it thus seems to be appropriate to classify them as a local elite and not as an upper or 
an emerging middle class. 
This terminological decision should not, however, conceal that the Fransfontein 
elite is heterogeneous. The differences in wealth and lifestyle of the families of the 
wedding couple mentioned above show this. While Anna and Josef earn a stable in-
come and both of Anna’s parents are also permanently employed, Josef’s unmarried 
mother never had the luck of enjoying a secure income. Her dress was much humbler 
than the expensive garments worn by the wedding couple and their bridesmaids and 
groomsmen. Class distinctions thus divide families. But the wedding also shows that 
the Fransfontein local elite is still densely connected to the non-elite, especially through 
such kinship ties. Lentz has repeatedly emphazised this heterogeneity in processes of 
African class formation (Behrends/Lentz 2012; Lentz 1994: 45, 2016).  
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THEORIZING AFRICAN MARRIAGES 
The multiple entanglements of marriage with class formation processes make it an 
especially apt topic to study colonial and postcolonial lifeworlds. It is thus surprising 
that from the mid-1980s onwards hardly any research on marriage and weddings has 
been conducted in Southern Africa. This paucity stands in remarkable contrast to the 
centrality of the institution until the 1980s, documented in several influential volumes 
(Comaroff 1980b; Krige/Comaroff 1981; Kuper 1982; Mair 1969). Rijk van Dijk and 
I (Pauli/van Dijk 2016) have argued that the paucity of anthropological studies of 
marriage in the 1980s and 1990s is very likely an outcome of David Schneider’s 1984 
critique of structural-functionalist approaches to kinship and marriage. Since the late 
1990s, a revival under the lable “New Kinship Studies” has taken place (Carsten 
2004; Sahlins 2013). This has introduced novel concepts such as relatedness (Carsten 
2000) to emphazise the dynamic character of kin ties. Yet so far, marriage has hardly 
been studied within this new research agenda to kinship.  
In Southern Africa, marriage has recently re-emerged as a central topic in anthro-
pological research. Since the beginning of the new millennium, a number of studies 
have focused on marriage and kinship. Van Dijk (2010, 2012a, 2012b, 2017) has 
studied the institution in depth in Botswana, Danai Mupotsa (2014), Hylton White 
(2016) and Jaco Smit (2017) have analyzed marriage in South Africa, and I have 
examined marriage and weddings in Namibia (Pauli 2011, 2017a, 2018; Pauli/ Dawids 
2017). Some authors have discussed the meaning of marriage in situations where it 
is largely absent (Hunter 2010, 2016; James 2017; Schaumburg 2013). Aninka Claas-
sens and Dee Smythe (2013) edited a volume on the decline of marriage and land 
issues in South Africa, including work on bridewealth and marriage rates by Stepha-
nie Rudwick and Dorrit Posel (see also Posel/Rudwick 2014; Posel/Rudwick/Casale 
2011; Rudwick/Posel 2015) and on the problem of defining marriage by Victoria 
Hosegood (see also Hosegood/McGrath/Moultire 2009). Several of the authors of a 
special issue on marriage in Anthropology Southern Africa, which van Dijk and I 
edited (Pauli/van Dijk 2016), have done research on marriage and kinship for dec-
ades. This allowed the special issue to take a long-term perspective on the continuities 
and changes of the institution (Kuper 1982, 2016; Niehaus 1994, 2017; Solway 1990, 
2016).  
This book builds on this research and discusses the transformations in marriage 
through the lens of several broad anthropological perspectives that I label as “metanar-
ratives”.5 I use the term to stress the rather high degree of coherence within these 
                                                 
5 This brief overview of some of the main arguments of anthropological thinking about Af-
rican marriage in the 20th century is, of course, not at all comprehensive. The sketch aims 
to show how selected anthropologists have theorized African marriage, that is what models 
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interpretative frameworks. Similarly, James Ferguson (1999: 14-17) applies the con-
cept of a “metanarrative” to analyze the way anthropologists, among others, have 
perceived and constructed “modernity” and “urbanization” in the Zambian Copper-
belt. I start with British social anthropology and a metanarrative that centres on the 
leitmotif of the stable African marriage, examined in the next section.6 This metanar-
rative is only one among at least four metanarratives to describe change and continu-
ity in African marriages (Pauli 2016), the following three discussed in the subsequent 
sections. The second metanarrative is that of the destruction of “the” African mar-
riage and family system and the third (and most unspecific) one is that of change of 
African marriage and family systems.7 Finally, the fourth and most recent metanar-
rative used to interpret transformations in African marriages highlights fluidity and 
plurality of African marriages. I then discuss the possible emergence of a new, fifth 
metanarrative that aims at understanding the dramatic increase in wedding costs and 
the parallel decline in marriage rates, especially in Southern Africa.  
Stability of African marriages 
African marriage has played a pivotal role for the development of anthropological 
theory and thought. British social anthropology viewed African systems of kinship 
and marriage as the central ordering principles of pre-colonial society that lacked a 
centralized political power: it viewed the political, economic, religious, social and 
legal as being channeled and structured through kinship and marriage. Indeed, Alfred 
Radcliffe-Brown (1987 [1950]: 1) commenced his famous introduction to African 
systems of kinship and marriage by stressing how essential kinship and marriage are 
to all aspects of African life: “For the understanding of any aspect of the social life 
of an African people – economic, political, or religious – it is essential to have a 
                                                 
and narratives they have constructed to understand, interpret and explain the institution and 
its transformations. 
6 This does not mean that divorce is not mentioned in the contributions; quite the opposite 
(e.g. Fortes 1949: 84-87). However, the metanarrative of the stability of African marriage 
focuses on the societal level and does not necessarily mean durability of individual mar-
riages. 
7 My classification of the literature into these four “metanarratives” is only one possibility 
of ordering the thinking and findings on African marriage. One might also differentiate 
between studies following British descent theory and those based on French alliance theory 
(Parkin/Nyamwaya 1987a). However, for the development of my argument (understanding 
the decline in marriage rates), a closer look at alliance theory would not add any new 
thoughts beyond the British school as both alliance and descent theory treat marriage as a 
stable universal (Borneman 1996).  
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thorough knowledge of their system of kinship and marriage”. Thus at least in British 
social anthropology of the first half of the 20th century, studying kinship and marriage 
was the thing to do. Several now-classic studies of kinship and marriage stem from 
this period (for Africa, see especially Evans-Pritchard 1951; Fortes 1949).  
The 1950 collection entitled African Systems of Kinship and Marriage, edited by 
Radcliffe-Brown and Daryll Forde (1987 [1950]), presents a good overview of the 
general approach of British social anthropology to the study of kinship and marriage 
at that time. After Radcliffe-Brown’s introduction, in which he defines terms, classi-
fications and structures for a study of kinship and marriage, nine anthropologists pre-
sent their ethnographic findings. The contributions, as for example by Hilda Kuper 
on the Swazi of Southern Africa or Meyer Fortes on the West African Ashanti, are 
all written in present tense. Social features, to borrow Radcliffe-Brown’s term (1987 
[1950]: 3), like divorce or levirate, are discussed in relation to their function(s) within 
social systems. The central aim of the collection is thus to understand “a system as it 
exists at a certain time, abstracting as far as possible from any change that it may be 
undergoing” (ibid). Radcliffe-Brown and all other contributors to the volume of course 
clearly realized the dramatic influences and changes African systems of kinship and 
marriage were undergoing. Yet despite or perhaps even because of these changes, they 
perceived an urgent need to thoroughly describe the “pure” or “abstract” (i.e. pre-colo-
nial) kinship and marriage systems and their functioning before they would vanish: 
“To understand a process of change we must make a diachronic study. But to do this 
we must first learn all that we possibly can about how the system functioned before 
the changes that we are investigating occurred”. (ibid) 
For the British structural-functionalists, marriage was a stable, timeless and re-
cursive institution, as Borneman (1996: 220) has so convincingly shown. Although 
marriage does imply movement (mainly of women) and reification of social structure, 
from the level of abstraction “marriage itself remains bounded and stable as it func-
tions to reproduce timeless structures” (Borneman 1996: 220). How then is structure 
reproduced through African marriage? First, marriage is described as universal. Eve-
rybody will marry sooner or later in his or her life and thus be an integral part of the 
reproduction and rearrangement of social structure (Barnes 1952: vii; Fortes 1949: 
81; Radcliffe-Brown 1987 [1950]: 43). The universality of marriage is vividly de-
scribed by Fortes (1949) in his Web of Kinship among the Tallensi. To stay single is 
described as something that only the most deviant members of society would attempt:  
There is something wrong, by native standard, with men and women who never marry; and 
they are few. In the whole of Tongo I knew only knew five men who had never been married 
and who would, according to common belief, never marry. One was obviously mentally defec-
tive; another was an invert; two were said to be so ugly that no woman would accept them, but 
both were definitely unbalanced and eccentric; and the last was a gentle old man who, it was 
28 | The Decline of Marriage in Namibia 
 
said, had never had the enterprise to find a wife. I heard of no women who had never married. 
Deformities which do not wholly incapacitate a person or arouse repulsion are not a bar to 
marriage. The blind, the deaf, and the lame find spouses if they are otherwise able-bodied and 
presentable. (Fortes 1949: 81-82) 
Fortes’ ethnographic description leaves no doubt about the universal character of 
marriage.8 However, what counts as marriage is a rather large and flexible category 
for the Tallensi. Fortes shows that many first unions dissolve after some time. To 
capture the flexible character of these marriages, he classifies them as “experimental 
marriages” (Fortes 1949: 84). This leads to the second important feature of African 
marriage described by many British social anthropologists, namely the procedural 
character of marriage: “To understand African marriage we must think of it not as an 
event or a condition but as a developing process”. (Radcliffe-Brown 1987 [1950]: 
49) Marriage develops through different stages involving successive prestations (in 
general bridewealth in the form of cattle, payments, gifts, services) exchanged be-
tween the groom’s and the bride’s kin groups. Thus, marriage processes have a cer-
tain degree of flexibility and can even be reversed and dissolved. However, there is 
an endpoint to this process (in general after the negotiated bridewealth has been 
given) when a couple is considered as married. 
Finally, marriage is defined in mainly legal terms. African marriage “legitimizes” 
children and publicly manifests fatherhood (Fortes 1949: 82). Through marriage, the 
husband and his kin gain “certain rights in relation to his wife and the children she 
bears” (Radcliffe-Brown 1987 [1950]: 50). Summing up, Radcliffe-Brown (ibid: 51) 
stresses that African marriage always involves two “bodies of kin”, that is two kin 
groups that reproduce and rearrange social structure through marriage. The stability 
of marriage as an institution (being universal and sooner or later involving all seg-
ments of society through kin groups) thus is essential for the general reproduction of 
society. Given the dominance of social equilibrium and stability in the British 
school’s theorizing of African marriage, it is not surprising that the second prominent 
metanarrative of African marriage captures the opposite side of stability, namely de-
struction and decay, the focus of the next section.  
                                                 
8 Fortes’ generalization focuses on the Tallensi. However, the same argument is made by Rad-
cliffe-Brown (1987 [1950]: 43) for African marriage in general, Henri Junod (1962: 182) for 
the Tsonga of South Africa and John Barnes (1952: vii) for the Ngoni of Zambia (then North-
ern Rhodesia): “Adults are assumed to be married, and the assumption is justified. Marriage 
is seen by the Ngoni as part of the natural order. Unmarried adults cannot fill important roles 
and are regarded as overgrown children whose anomalous condition must be explained by 
reference to malady or a physical or moral defect”. Barnes (ibid) concludes that both “tradi-
tional” and “modern” marriage among the Ngoni is of “universal and permanent character”. 
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Destruction of African marriages 
Following Radcliffe-Brown’s and Forde’s central aim to describe African systems of 
kinship and marriage as they exist at a certain time and “abstracting as far as possible 
from any change” (Radcliffe-Brown 1987 [1950]: 3), Radcliffe-Brown limits his re-
flections on change to a few lines in his introduction to the volume:  
African societies are undergoing revolutionary changes, as the result of European administra-
tions, missions, and economic factors. In the past the stability of social order in African socie-
ties has depended much more on the kinship system than on anything else. In the new condi-
tions kinship systems cannot remain unaffected. The first changes are inevitably destructive of 
the existing system of obligations. (ibid: 84-85) 
Because kinship and marriage are so central for the organization of African society, 
any change in kinship and marriage is perceived to be more or less “destructive” for 
the whole society. Mark Hunter (2007: 654) has termed these constructions of change 
“teleological narratives of ‘family breakdown’ in Africa”. He stresses that, albeit their 
ethnographic richness, a number of South African ethnographic studies since the 
1930s (e.g. Krige 1936; Longmore 1959) have fueled the perception that “African 
families were in slow but steady decline” (Hunter 2005: 396; see also 2007: 694).  
Harriet Ngubane’s (1987) research on Zulu and Swazi marriage and kinship is an 
example of both the ethnographic richness attributed by Hunter to these South Afri-
can ethnographic studies and the construction of a metanarrative of destruction of the 
African family. Many researchers have analyzed the centrality of bridewealth and 
cattle for Southern African marriage and kinship systems (for excellent discussions, 
see Comaroff 1980a; Kuper 1982). Marriage payments among the Nguni (to which 
both Zulu and Swazi belong) are expressed by the term lobolo (Ngubane 1987: 173). 
Ngubane shows in great detail how a complex web of economic and social rights and 
duties is built and maintained through the exchange of cattle between the bride’s and 
groom’s kin groups. She argues that this form of social organization is of special 
importance to women because it reduces their social and economic vulnerabilities. 
However, on a more general level, and very much in line with Radcliffe-Brown’s and 
the British school’s perception of the centrality of kinship for societal organization, 
Ngubane stresses the fundamental importance of kinship for the general social, eco-
nomic and political organization (ibid: 177). Consequently, if kinship and marriage 
are so central for the general societal organization, any change to it has to be per-
ceived as catastrophic. Ngubane puts forward the position that marriage as an insti-
tution was substantially weakened by the monetization of lobolo, that is the substitu-
tion of cattle for cash in bridewealth prestations. This, she noted, had severe effects 
for both the kinship structure and society in general: “To undermine the structure of 
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a kinship-based society, which by definition is one in which rights and obligations 
derive primarily from bonds of agnation and consanguinity, as in the institution of 
lobolo, is to undermine the whole social fabric”. (ibid: 180) Her language very tell-
ingly expresses the metanarrative of destruction: she writes of “social disorganiza-
tion”; that the consequences of change are “devastating”; and that women are “vic-
tims” and families “suffer” (ibid: 180-181). Main triggers behind these changes are 
processes associated with “cultural contact” (Hunter 2007: 694) and colonization, 
thus processes of monetization and commercialization, urbanization, Christianiza-
tion, apartheid, migration and industrialization. However, Hunter (2004, 2005, 2007, 
2009a) and other researchers (see, for example, Moore and Vaughan 1994) have 
questioned the myth of the destruction of African families and marriage as misleading 
and insufficient to appropriately understand the complex social dynamics observable 
in kin, family and marriage transformations. The next section focuses on the third 
metanarrative, that of change, which to some extent responds to Hunter’s and Moore 
and Vaughan’s concerns.  
Change of African marriages 
The metanarrative of change is much more difficult to summarize than the two other 
metanarratives. Nevertheless, a closer look at anthropological work focusing on 
change in African marriage reveals that the conception of change is but a variation of 
the destruction metanarrative. Similar to the latter, research on change sets up how 
things were before the change, in general labeled as “traditional”, such as traditional 
marriage, traditional society or traditional social organization, and contrasts these 
with the changed phenomena, often labeled as “modern”, such as modern marriage 
or modern families. There are numerous examples for this kind of conceptualization 
of the dynamics of African marriage (Barnes 1952; Bledsoe 1980; some articles in 
Krige/Comaroff 1981; and also some articles in Parkin/Nyamwaya 1987b; Pauw 
1963; Schapera 1939). Some topics are especially prominent in this literature, namely 
the decline of polygyny and the rise of monogamy; the monetization of bridewealth 
and the commercialization of gender relations; an increase in the number of children 
born out-of-wedlock; and an expansion (or loss) of female autonomy and changes in 
household structures, especially an increase in female-headed households. 
What distinguishes the change metanarrative from the preceding two, however, 
is a lesser degree of generalization and a higher degree of internal variation. While 
the metanarratives of stability and destruction picture large social entities as rather 
homogeneous, the change perspective allows for variation and internal differentia-
tion. But often these variations are only seen to apply as a consequence of change, 
while the period before the change is assumed to be relatively homogeneous. Isaac 
Schapera’s (1939) work in Married Life in an African Tribe on Kgatla families in the 
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former Bechuanaland Protectorate (today Botswana) provides an example. He sum-
marizes the dynamics of change in marriage and family life as follows:  
It will have been gathered already that there has been no uniformity of change, and that the 
family is today not nearly as homogeneous as before. Some of its traditional features have 
disappeared completely, or else have become much common. Others persist strongly, or per-
haps have been modified only slightly. (ibid: 333) 
The tendency to imagine a past, that is to project contemporary ideas on past situations, 
has been thoroughly analyzed by historically-oriented research, most prominent in the 
work on the “invention of tradition” (Hobsbawm and Ranger 2003 [1983]). Equally, 
Jane Guyer (1994) has cautioned researchers of African marriage and family against 
the perception that present configurations always represent sharp transformations of the 
past. Much more, they may be seen as “continuities with shifting emphasis” (ibid: 249).  
Nevertheless, despite these sometimes problematic constructions of past marriage, 
family and kin constellations that can be found in some of the works cited above, the 
attempt to understand internal variations clearly extends the limited perspectives of the 
stability and destruction metanarratives. Caroline Bledsoe’s (1980) research on marriage 
in Kpelle society, Liberia, is a good example for this opening up of perspectives and 
complexity. Bledsoe compares the options available to and strategies applied by Kpelle 
women (and to a lesser degree Kpelle men) within what she classifies as “more tradi-
tional” and “more modern” arenas. Underlying her analysis is the “wealth-in-people” 
system which binds people to superiors in ties of marriage, clientship and filial obliga-
tion. She argues that the “wealth-in-people” system continues to be of central importance 
for the understanding of Kpelle marriage and other social relations (ibid: Ch 3). How-
ever, because of political economic transformations, especially the emergence of a cash 
economy and the creation of new income opportunities through wage labor, marketing 
and cash cropping, the “wealth-in-people” model is being transformed – but not de-
stroyed. Bledsoe’s approach thus clearly fulfils Jane Guyer’s call to study “continuities 
with shifting emphasis”. Further, Bledsoe’s detailed analysis of the varying effects that 
structural (especially economic) transformations have on the agency of different actors 
and groups of actors is also visionary for her time. Without using any of the terminology 
of practice theory,9 her combination of structural analysis with the actions and percep-
tions of individual actors and groups of actors is an early example of this theoretical and 
methodological perspective. Bledsoe shows the ambiguous consequences of the mone-
tization process: while new opportunities may open for some women (based on combi-
nations of generation, location and class), as for example the choice to stay single, other 
                                                 
9 Major works of practice theory, such as Bourdieu’s Outline of a Theory of Practice (1977), 
were being published around the same time as Bledsoe’s book. 
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women’s agency is further constrained. This complex perspective stands in sharp con-
trast to Ngubane’s (1987) approach, discussed above. Ngubane’s account does not dis-
tinguish between different groups of women but lumps all into one category of “victims” 
(for comparable insights about the problematic construction of the categories “women” 
and “gender”, see Cornwall [2005]). Bledsoe’s approach goes beyond the narratives of 
destruction, victimization and simple conceptions of change. It also expands the narrow 
normative and categorical perspective of marriage, thus one expressed in descriptions of 
Kpelle society as “patrilineal with brideservice and bridewealth”, through an analysis of 
“how people’s acts create and change institutions such as marriage” (Bledsoe 1980: 47). 
Agency, social practice and the dialectic of agency and structure, while not named ex-
plicitly, are nevertheless very present in her work. Hence in several respects, Bledsoe’s 
ethnography, although still using the metanarrative of change and concepts like “tradi-
tional” and “modern” arenas, anticipates contemporary approaches highlighting negoti-
ation, contestation and ambiguity of marriage. 
Around the same time as Bledsoe’s ethnography, a number of other researchers 
began to theorize African marriage in more ambiguous and complex ways. For exam-
ple, in Southern Africa, the effects of labor migration on marriage were studied in 
comparably innovative ways as Bledsoe approached her research (Gulbrandsen 1986; 
Murray 1981a, 1981b; Sansom 1981; Spiegel 1975). The theoretical movement from 
models of African marriage that focused mainly on structure to more dynamic models 
that included actors’ agency and the interplay between agency and structure can also 
be traced in the publication of three influential volumes on African marriage during 
the 1980s (Comaroff 1980b; Krige/Comaroff 1981; Parkin/Nyamwaya 1987b). In the 
early 1980s, John L. Comaroff edited two volumes on marriage, one on the meaning 
of marriage payments (comparing cases from Asia, Africa and Europe) and the other, 
together with Eileen Jensen Krige, on marriage in Southern Africa (Comaroff 1980b; 
Krige/Comaroff 1981). In the introductory remarks to both volumes, Comaroff (1981: 
xii) underlines that “the main thrust of research has been directed at the jural and struc-
tural aspects” of marriage and marriage payments. At length, Comaroff shows the def-
icits of the three variants of “structure-focused” (in a broader sense) explanations – 
structural-functionalist, Marxist and structuralist – to understand marriage payments. 
The contributions to both volumes all try to go beyond these limits, as do the contri-
butions to the volume edited by David Parkin and David Nyamwaya (1987b). Tell-
ingly, Parkin and Nyamwaya subtitled their introduction “change and choice”, thus 
stressing both structural dynamics and agency (1987a). Acting as discussant at a sym-
posium on demographic and anthropological perspectives on African marriage a few 
years later, Parkin again stressed that anthropological research on African marriage 
has moved away from normative approaches and towards “interactional” approaches 
that emphasize process, strategy and negotiation of conjugality (Bledsoe/Pison 1994: 
9).  
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The three metanarratives of African marriage, however, cannot be placed in a 
chronological order. There is no evolution from stability over destruction to change 
and complexity. Although stability conceptions following the British tradition have 
become rare, they are nevertheless still present, as a recent publication on African 
families shows: “Because African women and men are expected to marry and have 
children, it has been suggested that marriage is nearly universal” (Oheneba-Sakyi/ 
Takyi 2006: 9). The metanarratives of destruction and of change equally continue to 
be influential. With the emergence and dramatic spread of the AIDS pandemic, the 
theme of the “destruction of African families” has certainly gained a new momentum 
(e.g. Gronemeyer 2002). Yet, while clearly acknowledging the tragic effects AIDS 
has on social relations, one must also consider the resilience of kin and family ties in 
the midst of such a crisis.10 Again, crisis and change do not have one linear effect, 
such as the destruction of family and kin ties, but trigger various and complex reac-
tions by individuals and groups of individuals. To understand African marriage and 
other types of conjugal and kin relations as dynamic social fields of negotiation, am-
biguity and hybridity is probably the dominant contemporary metanarrative, the fo-
cus of the next section.  
Plurality of African marriages 
The plurality and dynamic of marriage forms are central topics of recent research on 
African marriages (for instance Cole 2004; Cornwall 2002; Helle-Valle 1999; John-
son-Hanks 2006, 2007b; Lewinson 2006; Masquelier 2005). These issues are not en-
tirely new, though. Throughout the 20th century, attempts have been made to define 
and classify dynamic African marriages. However, more recent approaches – like 
Johnson-Hanks’ (2007b) research on marriage, love and the Internet in southern 
Cameroon, or Jennifer Cole’s (2004) work on sexuality, marriage and consumerism 
among Malagasy youth – have shifted the emphasis away from issues of classifica-
tion and towards questions on the intermingling of love/sex/marriage and money/con-
sumerism.11  
The two related questions “What is a marriage?” and “When is a union a mar-
riage?” are recurrent themes in most research on African marriage up to the present. 
                                                 
10 Gulbrandsen (1986: 25) suggested a similar reasoning two decades earlier when he reacted 
to Schapera’s argument for the destructive character that labor migration has had on 
Tswana family life: “Although abandonment of polygyny and circular labor migration in 
combination have fundamentally transformed the systems of marriage and family relations, 
it can be argued that a pattern has evolved which ensures links of mutuality and support 
between productive and dependent family members”.  
11 Remarkably early, Schapera (1939: 15-17) also commented on these issues. 
34 | The Decline of Marriage in Namibia 
 
They are already mentioned by Fortes (1949: 84) in his reflections of what he classifies 
as “experimental marriages”. Some decades later, Philip Burnham (1987: 50) suggests 
considering marriage not as a stable category but as a “bundle of interactional possi-
bilities”. He places marriage as just one among several types of conjugal unions (in-
formal cohabitation, or church, registry or customary marriage) open to men and 
women, and their respective kin, for interaction. In their introduction to the volume in 
which Burnham’s essay appeared, Parkin and Nyamwaya (1987a: 4) underline Burn-
ham’s approach and state: “This idea of all types of ‘marriage’ as representing a range 
of interactional possibilities for individuals and their groups complements that which 
sees marriage as the product of strategies: the logical possibilities are there, and people 
can strategize within them”. All three authors stretch their use of the term “marriage” 
very far, virtually to the point of including most conjugal unions. 
The difficulties in defining certain types of unions as marriage (and others per-
haps as not) are closely connected to two central characteristics of African marriage: 
polygyny and its transformations, on the one hand, and the procedural character of 
marriage, already mentioned by Radcliffe-Brown (1987 [1950]) and often repeated 
in subsequent research on African marriage (e.g. Bledsoe 1980; Bledsoe/Pison 1994; 
Comaroff 1980b; Helle-Valle 1999; Lewinson 2006; Murray 1976; Solway 1990), 
on the other. I first discuss the dynamics of polygyny.  
Although polygyny has declined in many parts of Africa and some African 
countries have even prohibited it, the practice and its transformations nevertheless 
continue to exist, as many studies indicate (Anderson 2000; Antoine 2006; Blanc/ 
Gage 2000; Bledsoe/Pison 1994; Comaroff/Roberts 1977; Spiegel 1991; Timaeus/ 
Reynar 1998; van der Vliet 1991). As early as 1977, Comaroff and Roberts already 
argued that the changes in polygyny did not mark a decline in the practice but rather 
its transformation. Restudying Schapera’s 1933 descriptions of Kgatla premarital 
sexuality, Comaroff and Roberts (1977: 121) found that “the practice of polygyny 
has been replaced by an emergent social form with an essentially similar cultural 
logic”. The emergent social form they identified is the practice of serial monogamy: 
thus, men continue to have multiple partners, yet the timing differs (for a related ar-
gument about women and their practice of “polyandrous motherhood”, see Guyer 
[1994]).  
Another variation of polygyny is described by Kristin Mann (1985) in her histor-
ical study of elite settlers in 19th and early 20th century colonial Lagos. She recorded 
how “outside marriages”, that is long-term unions contracted outside church or stat-
utory codes, caused much conflict among elite men and women. While these unions 
gave non-elite women access to resources and probably upward mobility, they threat-
ened the position of “inside wives” and their children. Similar conflicts about “out-
side marriages” are portrayed by Barbara Harrell-Bond (1975) for conjugal unions in 
Sierra Leone and by Wambui Wa Karanja (1987, 1994) for the contemporary upper 
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classes of Lagos and Ibadan. Other polygynous variations are the so-called “little 
houses” in Tanzania (Lewinson 2006), the bobolete in a rural community in Bot-
swana (Helle-Valle 1999) and the tavern women of Gauteng province, South Africa 
(Wojcicki 2002). Thus, Bledsoe and Pison (1994: 7) conclude their review of multi-
ple partner unions with the following words: “Many of the new marriage forms that 
outwardly resemble monogamy actually follow patterns of de facto polygyny”. Con-
sequently, a range of conjugal relationships exists, dynamically combining custom-
ary practices, residence arrangements, state and religious laws, and sexual and other 
types of exchanges. Depending on one’s definition, some of these relations will be 
classified as marriages, others not. Definitions focusing on shared residence might 
include “outside marriages” while definitions based on church or statutory codes will 
exclude these unions. 
The continuity of polygyny is also connected to the procedural character of mar-
riage, the second characteristic of African marriages that renders a definition of the 
institution difficult (some argue maybe even impossible, e.g. Ekong 1989: 40]). Mar-
riage in many parts of Africa is a long, ambiguous process rather than a discrete single 
event established by a legal, ritual or economic transaction (e.g. Bledsoe 1980; Bled-
soe/Pison 1994; Comaroff/Roberts 1977; Guyer 1994, 2000; Murray 1981b). Mar-
riage payments, commonly in the form of bridewealth, are seldom transferred at once 
but through a process of events, with negotiations of bridewealth having implications 
for notions of legitimacy and personhood (Comaroff 1980b: 30). Bledsoe and Pison 
(1994: 4) describe the sequences of events that may finally lead to marriage: “The 
process transpires through a sequence of events that might include the exchange of 
symbolic tokens, making instalments on bridewealth payments, establishing a joint 
residence, or even the birth of a child. This process may extend over a period of 
months or even years”. Further, the marriage process is often not a linear process but 
more closely resembles a continuous mix of movements in which relationships can 
be maintained, but also dissolved and renegotiated. Thus, it can be very difficult to 
define at what point in time someone is married and when a union begins. Bledsoe 
(1980: 7) has also noted in her ethnography of Kpelle marriage in Liberia that marital 
status is neither visibly nor audibly expressed. There are no special clothes for mar-
ried folks and the words for woman or man are the same words as for wife and hus-
band. The same applies to the situation in Fransfontein: taras refers to woman, wife 
and female conjugal partner, while aob refers to man, husband and male conjugal 
partner. This fluid construction of marriage has caused some headaches for social 
scientists, especially demographers who want to compare, for instance, the average 
age at first marriage or the percentage of a population that is married (Antoine 2006; 
Bledsoe/Pison 1994; van de Walle 2006a). 
What then are the effects of these flexible structures for individual actors? Re-
search written from a gendered perspective clearly stresses the enhanced agency 
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some women may gain through the fluidity of the situation (Cole 2004; Cornwall 
2002; Helle-Valle 1999; Johnson-Hanks 2007b; Lewinson 2006; van der Vliet 
1984). As some rather fluid and flexible relations do eventually end in marriage, this 
may justify that women also behave rather flexibly. Further, because the exchange 
of gifts, money and consumer goods is also an important aspect of betrothal and 
marital relations, the mixing of money, sex and love described in much recent eth-
nography (e.g. Cole 2004; Cornwall 2002; Helle-Valle 1999; Lewinson 2006; Thomas/ 
Cole 2009) is not necessarily something that is condemned on the ground. This sit-
uation has also resulted in some puzzlement by and confusion among Western ob-
servers such as missionaries, early ethnographers and colonial administrators who 
were concerned that this intermingling was a form of prostitution (Gordon 2002; 
Hunter 2002).12 
However, Cole (2004: 580-581) has stressed that while some women may profit 
from flexible conjugal notions, other women, especially those who have lost their 
“reputation” and may even be perceived locally as “prostitutes”, experience severe 
downward mobility. Reputation and its ambiguities are tightly intertwined with eco-
nomic issues and the flexible character of conjugal relations. As Cole notes for her 
Malagasy informants: “All girls who engage in the game of sex for money are con-
stantly involved in a politics of reputation”. (ibid: 581) She demonstrates that the 
reputation of economically unsuccessful women is especially threatened (ibid: 580). 
In other settings, the reputation of economically successful and independent women 
is questioned as well. In her research on gender relations in Ado-Odo, a small Yoruba 
town in southwestern Nigeria, Andrea Cornwall (2002) shows that economically in-
dependent women are classified as wayward and troublesome. Similarly, Virginia 
van der Vliet (1991: 237) observes a high degree of moral resentment against eco-
nomically independent women in a 1970s Grahamstown town in South Africa: “Men 
seemed aware that these independent women were a nail in the coffin of patriarchy. 
They often reserved a special scorn for them and their offspring”.  
To access the reputation and character of conjugal and sexual partners, men and 
women engage in varying practices of “testing” a partner (Bledsoe/Pison 1994: 5; 
Dilger 2003; Gulbrandsen 1986: 13; Johnson-Hanks 2007b; Lewinson 2006; Pauli/ 
Schnegg 2007; Smith 2003). These may include evaluations of a person’s public rep-
utation or tests on how a partner behaves in certain crucial situations (e.g. providing 
money in times of need, cohabitation, and the birth and support of children). In times 
of AIDS, other dimensions of “testing” have been added, such as the “examination” 
of the partner’s physical body for “suspicious” marks that could point to the disease. 
Love is often constructed as the result of successful testing (Johnson-Hanks 2007b; 
                                                 
12 Helle-Valle (1999) has discussed the difficulties (and perhaps even impossibilities) of 
transferring the Western concept of “prostitution” to African contexts. 
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Lewinson 2006; Pauli/Schnegg 2007), that is love is perceived as the central expres-
sion of a partner’s involvement in, caring for and investment in a relationship that 
becomes visible through “testing”. As Bledsoe and Pison remark (1994: 5), the some-
times year-long liminal phase of “testing” a partner is a central aspect of the proce-
dural character of marriage. Consequently, it is important to stress that the flexibility 
of conjugal relations (as noted above) is tightly embedded in a not-so-flexible moral 
and economic structure.  
Yet there are limits to the metanarrative of flexible and dynamic conjugal and mar-
ital structures. I want to conclude this section with a reflection on these limits.  
I argue that there are at least three central problems associated with the notion of flex-
ible, plural African marriages. First, to classify most conjugal relations as “marriages” 
results in an inflationary use of the term and a significant loss of differentiation and 
meaning. Second, this inflationary use of the term “marriage” discloses emerging 
mechanisms of marginalisation and new forms of exclusion. And, third, a focus only 
on the flexibility of conjugal relations ignores that the construction of marriage as a 
process ideally has an endpoint when a couple is finally considered married. I examine 
each of these three in turn.  
My first argument has been inspired by a recent, undoubtedly controversial article 
by Warren Shapiro (2008) on the new kinship studies. Although I do not follow Sha-
piro’s fierce critique of feminist and constructivist theory, I nevertheless think that 
his objection that not all types of relatedness can be taken as equivalent to kinship 
ties is justified. There are indeed limits to the construction of kin relations. Based on 
results from cognitive science, Shapiro highlights the distinction between focal no-
tions of kin concepts, such as prototypes, from variations of these notions. Thus, alt-
hough concepts like “father” are transferable, as in the conceptualization of God as 
father, this does not mean that all relations subsumed under the concept have the same 
quality. These thoughts may also be fruitfully applied to the study of African mar-
riages. While there is no doubt a great amount of flexibility, plurality and dynamic in 
the construction of African marriages, this does not justify the conclusion that there 
might not be something like an emically defined “prototypical marriage” or that all 
conjugal relations are de facto marriages. What exactly constitutes a “prototypical 
marriage” will certainly vary from context to context.  
In Fransfontein, people do, indeed, have an idea of a contemporary marriage pro-
totype. This does not mean that the current prototype is fixed and has clear boundaries 
– quite the opposite: the edges are fuzzy and new elements are continuously added. 
But the marriage prototype acts as a baseline against which other types of relations 
are evaluated. An example may illuminate the argument. While people in Fransfon-
tein acknowledge that cohabitation might be a step on the way to marriage, cohabi-
tating unions are nevertheless negatively described as #nu gomans omi, literally a 
black cow house, and the physical structure the couple inhabits might be called  
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!hai-omi, a bad house. Locally, #nu gomans omi are not perceived as marriages but 
as variations of marriages. Thus, a couple living in a #nu gomans omi will not receive 
the same respect as a married couple. Additionally, children born to mothers living 
in #nu gomans omi will not have the same rights to their father’s inheritance and 
property as children born to married mothers.  
This leads to the second problem associated with the flexible and plural notion of 
African marriages. A strong focus on flexible constructions of marriage ties might 
potentially ignore mechanisms of exclusion underlying seemingly fluid structures 
(see also Bourdieu 2008). This point was made at a conference on anthropological 
and demographic approaches to African marriages:  
Claude Meillassoux, a discussant at the seminar, drew forceful attention to these sweeping 
changes in nuptiality and to their economic underpinnings. He stressed that these criteria be-
come encoded into the marriage system, making conjugal hierarchies more entrenched: élite 
women are more likely to become “legitimate” or “insider” wives, while the status of other 
women deteriorates. (Bledsoe/Pison 1994: 19)  
I argue that a central force behind the status deterioration of the majority of Frans-
fontein women is the tremendous decline in marriage rates, a decline crucially linked 
to class formation processes. While a small elite has appropriated the privilege of the 
“prototypical marriage”, the overwhelming majority lives in relationships, like the 
#nu gomans omi, that are not granted respect and prestige and, importantly, lack ac-
cess to central resources connected with marriage.  
This leads to my third critique of the notion of flexible, plural African marriages. 
To focus only on the procedural character ignores that there is an ideal endpoint to 
the negotiations and flexibilities and that this endpoint – formally and publicly being 
considered as married – is not being reached by an ever-increasing number of people, 
in Fransfontein and beyond. The current strong focus on flexibility and plurality of 
African marriage may also explain why the de facto decline of marriage rates (which 
is only possible if there is an endpoint to the marriage process) in many regions of 
Africa has only recently been recognized by anthropologists (Pauli/van Dijk 2016). 
After having discussed the four metanarratives that have been central so far, I now 
turn to a fifth, emerging metanarrative. 
THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 
Before analyzing changes in marriage rates, it is necessary to discuss how universal 
marriage has really been. Analysing genealogies, Rada Dyson-Hudson and Dom-
inique Meekers (1996) have been able to show that the notion of nearly universal 
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marriage, so prominent in the stability metanarrative, is an overgeneralization for 
sub-Saharan Africa. They argue that this image has, in fact, been caused by measure-
ment problems and reporting biases:  
In many studies, the universality of marriage is an artefact of the methods of data collection, since 
both census and survey data exclude emigrants and people who have died. The idea of universality 
of marriage also is based on emic statements of what people aspire to, but may not actually achieve 
until late in life, and sometimes not at all. (Dyson-Hudson and Meekers 1996: 318) 
These findings caution against too general statements regarding both the universality of 
marriage and the decline of marriage rates.13 For a number of years, however, both 
demographers and anthropologists have noted significant changes in marriage rates and 
family relations (Claassens/Smythe 2013; Hunter 2007; Pauli 2010a, 2011; Posel/Rud-
wick/Casale 2011). Discussing the effects of labour migration on Southern African sys-
tems of family and marital relations, several anthropologists became increasingly aware 
from the 1930s onwards of rising rates of children born premaritally. An early example 
is Schapera’s (1933) work on premarital pregnancies among Tswana communities 
heavily involved in male labour migration. Based on urban research in the 1950s and 
the 1960s, a number of anthropologists reported similar rising numbers of children born 
out-of-wedlock and an increase in unmarried female-headed households for several 
South African townships (Mayer 1961; Preston-Whyte 1978). However, these devel-
opments were largely attributed to the effects urban life and migration were having on 
family compositions in towns. Despite Schapera’s earlier work, rural areas continued 
to be seen as virtually untouched by these changes (Preston-Whyte 1978: 82). This 
changed when, based on rural research from the 1970s and 1980s, both Adam Kuper 
(1987) and Ørnulf Gulbrandsen (1986) began to describe tremendous changes in mari-
tal and family relations for rural Southern African communities. Kuper, whose ethno-
graphic comparison of four Southern African marriage systems titled Wives for Cattle 
(1982) had described the universal marriage as part of the political and economic sys-
tem, observed in 1987 “dramatic changes in the incidences of marriage and in the inci-
dence of illegitimacy” (Kuper 1987: 141). In a 1978 restudy of the Botswana village 
where Isaac Schapera had conducted his researched in the 1930s, Marja Molenaar, one 
of Kuper’s graduate students, found a “substantial increase in the number of unmarried 
women and in the number of children born out of wedlock. The decline in polygyny 
only partially accounts for these changes”. (ibid: 141). As recent anthropological and 
demographic work on Botswana shows, these trends of declining marriage rates, an 
increase in children born out-of-wedlock and couples cohabitating without being mar-
ried continue until today (Mokomane 2005, 2006; Setume 2017).  
                                                 
13 Catherine Allerton (2007) comes to a comparable conclusion for South and Southeast Asia. 
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For South Africa, similar macro and micro level trends are described (Hosegood/ 
McGrath/Moultire 2009; Mhongo/Budlender 2013; Posel/Rudwick 2013). Based on 
long-term ethnographic fieldwork in South Africa’s Kwazulu-Natal province, Hunter 
(2007: 692) shows that “throughout the 20th century a growing number of women gave 
birth out of wedlock”. To further extend his ethnographic findings, he incorporates 
macro level national census data into his analysis. Despite a number of data problems, 
Hunter is able to present chronological data on marriage status for the South African 
population classified as “African”. He shows that, from 1936 to the 1980s, between 
50 to 60 per cent of the “African” population 15 years and older has been married (in-
cluding both civil and customary marriages). Then the number of people classified as 
married declines to 42 per cent in 1980, 38 per cent in 1991 and 30 per cent in 2001. 
Hunter concludes: “Census data support the claim that there has been a quite dramatic 
decline over the last four decades”. (ibid: 695) While he stresses that the factors behind 
the decline are complex, he explicitly mentions women’s increased economic inde-
pendence and, with rising unemployment rates since the 1970s, men’s inability to se-
cure bridewealth (ilobolo) and to act as provider (Hunter 2009b, 2010). He concludes 
that, in South Africa, “marriage today is, in many respects, a middle-class institution”. 
(Hunter 2007: 695) 
As in Botswana and South Africa, marriage rates are also declining in Namibia. 
According to the 1992 Namibia Demographic and Health Survey (MOHSS 1992), 
Namibia has very high proportions of unmarried women at the end of their childbear-
ing years compared with most other countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Bongaarts 2007; 
Raitis 1994: 112). Furthermore, the total fertility rate of unmarried women is only one 
child lower than that of all women, and many women give birth before marriage (Raitis 
1994: 116). In a similar vein and using the same data set, Gage (1998: 25) reports that 
37 per cent of all births in the five years preceding the survey were premarital births. 
Demographers have highlighted a rise in the mean age at marriage as a central expla-
nation for the transformations in marriage and fertility systems (Bongaarts 2007; 
Garenne/Zwang 2005). Some anthropologists have also noted declining marriage 
rates in different parts of Namibia (Fuller 1993; Gordon 1972; Iken 1999; Tersbøl 
2002). 
Demographers Michel Garenne and Julien Zwang (2005: 166) raise the important 
question of the extent to which these trends might be especially characteristic for 
Southern Africa: “High levels [of premarital fertility] such as those noted in Namibia, 
Botswana and South Africa, as well as late average age at marriage and premarital 
fertility at older ages, seem to be a feature of modern South Africa, and especially in 
the former apartheid areas”. Similarly, in a recent publication on changes in median 
age at marriage and HIV/AIDS prevalence rates of 33 sub-Saharan countries, John 
Bongaarts (2007: 75) finds that “countries with late marriage and high HIV preva-
lence are concentrated in southern Africa”. Therborn (2006: 38) has equally stressed 
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the uniqueness of Southern Africa’s marriage transformations: “On the whole, Africa 
has belonged to the vast world regions of virtually universal marriage […] However, 
in recent times Africa also includes some deviants, above all in Southern Africa”. 
Recent demographic and ethnographic research in Southern Africa thus clearly indi-
cates that marriage rates have substantially declined, age at marriage has markedly 
increased and premarital fertility rates have increased. 
Although these developments are especially pronounced in Southern Africa, some 
of the trends can also be observed in other African regions. Uche Isiugo-Abanihe 
(1994), for example, has shown that, among highly educated Igbo-speakers in Nige-
ria, marriage is being delayed, age at first marriage is increasing and the proportion 
of never-married individuals is rising. He concludes that marriage is not early and 
universal anymore. As main reason for these changes, he cites exploding bridewealth 
costs, far beyond reach for the majority of men. He even speaks of an “inflation of 
bridewealth”.  
Adeline Masquelier (2005: 59) notes very similar developments in Dogondoutchi, 
a Hausaphone and predominantly Muslim town in rural Niger, where a common per-
ception pertains that today’s youths are facing a crisis of unprecedented proportions: 
“The ‘crisis’ centres on their inability to marry and to achieve full social seniority”. 
Marriage in Mawri society is central for social maturity and without marriage the 
young do not become adults. Bridewealth and wedding costs have increased tremen-
dously and “young men without the means to marry find themselves condemned to a 
kind of limbo life” (ibid: 60). Alcinda Honwana (2012) has aptly coined the term 
“waithood” to describe this state in limbo. These observations resonate with my de-
scription of the envy and jealousy that the bride Anna experienced when she got mar-
ried. Masquelier provides further explanations why bridewealth and wedding costs 
have exploded so much. According to her, there is “a widespread sense in Niger that 
a growing thirst for the prestige earned through the staging of extravagant wedding 
celebrations has contributed to the spiralling bridewealth inflation and, by implica-
tion, the postponement of marriage for many” (Masquelier 2005: 62-63). To celebrate 
(class) distinction and modernity through weddings and marriages is not only an Af-
rican, but a global trend (Argyrou 1996; Bristol-Rhys 2007; Kaplan 2013; Kendall 
1996; Lankauskas 2015; Reed-Danahay 1996). 
Another West African example is the decreasing probability of age-specific mar-
riage in southern Cameroon (Johnson-Hanks 2007b). As Isiugo-Abanihe and Mas-
quelier, Johnson-Hanks (2007b: 652) emphasizes how marriage rates are entangled 
with economic dynamics: “Of course, there are many reasons for this decline; how-
ever, the disjuncture between aspirations for marriage and real-life opportunities 
plays a central role”. Importantly, she stresses that a decline in marriage rates does 
not necessarily mean a decline in the meaning and relevance of marriage. Indeed, it 
may mean just the opposite:  
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That is, marriage rates are not declining because marriage is becoming irrelevant or because it 
is less systematically valued than in the past. Rather, marriage is becoming more rare precisely 
because it is so terribly important to women’s status that it be done well. (Johnson-Hanks 
2007b: 652).  
For Fransfontein, I would add that marriage has become “so terribly important” not 
only for the status of women but for the status of a local elite. Marriage has become 
rare for an increasingly large group of Fransfontein people. Men and women who, 
because of their meagre economic and “real-life opportunities”, are unable to marry 
have been degraded to being the audience at elite weddings. The celebration of dis-
tinction through conspicuous weddings has become the elite’s central arena for a 
demonstration of class and the legitimization of privilege.  
Following Ferguson (1999), I have used the term “metanarratives” to label the 
various interpretations of the transformation of African marriage. The first four, sta-
bility, destruction, change and plurality, have been central lenses through which Af-
rican marriage has been interpreted. The currently dominant metanarrative, plurality 
or fluidity, emphasizes the great flexibility and adaptability of marriage (and also kin-
ship) in both past and present times. Yet this metanarrative also has significant limits, 
especially that it does not consider a strong increase in wedding costs and the parallel 
decline in marriage rates, developments that have been observed in several parts of 
Southern Africa. In general, these dynamics have to be linked to class formation pro-
cesses and a substantial increase in economic and social stratification. A new, fifth 
metanarrative is thus emerging, one that is characterized by low occurrence and high 
value of marriage. I suggest that this emerging metanarrative could be labelled the 
“exclusivity of marriage”: it draws out how in many parts of Southern Africa mar-
riage rates are at an unparalleled low while marriage as an institution is extremely 
valued. 
AIMS, LIMITS AND STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK 
The overall aim of this book is to understand how marriage in Fransfontein has turned 
from an almost universal institution into a celebration of class distinction. To pay 
close attention to the complex entanglements of marriage with political economic 
processes, especially class formation processes, but also gender dynamics and repro-
ductive changes, a methodologically and theoretically plural approach is needed. 
Theoretical approaches roughly summarized as “practice theory” are key for my un-
derstanding of these developments. This has both methodological and theoretical im-
plications. To grasp the interplay between structure and agency as carefully as possi-
ble, I draw on various methods and data. These include archival data, like church 
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registers, systematic participant observation of engagements and weddings, life nar-
ratives, general participant observation, economic and demographic surveys, census 
data and group discussions. In terms of theory, I combine macro level explanations 
proposed by demographers, approaches popular in anthropology at the intermediate 
level of the household, and micro level examinations that focus on individual actors 
and their agency, common in anthropology, sociology and history. 
Western anthropology has a long tradition of research in marriage, gender and 
reproduction in Africa. This history of involvement has, however, also caused irrita-
tion and rejection. In feminist anthropology, the question of the extent to which West-
ern researchers could study African gender, marriage and sexuality has been dis-
cussed virulently (Arnfred 2004; Cornwall 2005; Kolawole 2004). A recent book by 
Francis Nyamnjoh (2008) further challenges any “Western” attempts to understand 
African social dynamics through social science research methods. With these caveats 
in mind, I nevertheless hope that my findings contribute to the overall understanding 
of past and current dynamics of marriage and class formation processes in Namibia 
and Southern Africa. I follow Bruce Knauft’s assertion that “approximation” and 
“pragmatic possibilities of comprehension” are intersubjectivley possible:  
While ultimate knowledge of others’ experiences or actions (or even their existence) is impos-
sible, greater or lesser approximations of this otherness are possible; indeed, they provide the 
basis of all social living. Absolute impossibilities should not blind us to pragmatic possibilities 
for comprehension, translation, and representation across the intersubjective divide. (Knauft 
1996: 46-47) 
Doing research in postcolonial Namibia is permeated by power differences and ine-
qualities. My attempts to reciprocate and to reflect these differences and injustices in 
my writings are approximations but not solutions. Despite these complex circum-
stances, Fransfonteiners showed great willingness, and often also joy, in talking with 
me about marriage celebrations and wedding dreams. People proudly introduced me 
to the ways in which marriages are currently celebrated in Fransfontein. Marriage 
continues to be one of the most central aspects of Fransfontein life. For everybody 
involved in our research, there was never any doubt that marriage was a well-chosen 
topic. This resonates with Adam Kuper’s (2008: 733) reminder not to abolish the 
study of marriage and kinship from anthropology:  
Marriage choices are regarded in very many societies as the most important decisions in life, 
almost certainly too important to be left to any individuals to make for themselves. It would be 
a disaster if anthropologists found that they had nothing to say about matters that are so essential 
to most of the people we live among, to say nothing about our recent ancestors, and, perhaps, 
even ourselves.  
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The book is divided into three parts, following the dramaturgy of background, main 
act and consequences. In the three chapters of Part I, I present the methodological, 
conceptual and ethnographic background to the study. In the first, entitled “Fransfon-
tein Fieldwork”, I reflect on my fieldwork situation in the Fransfontein region and 
present the different kinds of data gathered. The chapter also discusses a number of 
theoretical concepts that have been suggested to analyze change over time. Out of 
these concepts, I develop an approach that combines biographic, cohort and genera-
tional perspectives. “History through Biography” gives detailed information on the 
political economic developments of Fransfontein with a detailed description of the 
emergence of indigenous, local elites since approximately the 1970s. The third chap-
ter of Part I, “Postapartheid Livelihoods”, presents ethnographic portraits of contem-
porary, postcolonial lifeworlds in Fransfontein.  
In the two chapters of Part II, I tackle different aspects of the transition from 
common to elite marriage. “Contemporary Fransfontein Marriages” presents a de-
tailed outline of how weddings are being practiced in Fransfontein today. The find-
ings are discussed in light of other historic and regional studies. “From Decline to 
Distinction” extends these findings and describes how and since when marriage rates 
have declined in Fransfontein. The chapter unravels the ways in which marriage has 
turned into the central arena for class distinction by local elites. Special attention is 
paid to how new forms of consumption have been integrated into wedding rituals, 
making weddings increasingly more conspicuous and costly. 
Part III discusses some of the main consequences of the decline of marriage in 
two chapters. “Forming Families” links the transformations in marriage to the for-
mation of families and reproduction. Detailed life stories, mainly of women, help to 
explain how marriage, sexuality and reproduction have been entangled and disentan-
gled during different periods of time and for various generations. “Intimacy outside 
Marriage” discusses how intimate relations are formed, maintained and resolved out-
side and beyond marriage. The chapter also scrutinizes the increasing stigmatization 
of children born out-of-wedlock and transformations in inheritance practices relating 
to marital status.  
The conclusion discusses my main findings in global comparison, investigating 
the specificities of the Namibian situation. It ends with a reflection of the possible 

















The white men named places after themselves, and 
after the women they were with or the women whom 
they had left behind, after the men they wanted to 
placate or impress: Salisbury, Muriel, Beatrice, Alice 
Mine, Juliasdale, West Nicholson. 
And they gave some places hopeful names: Copper 
Queen, Eldorado, Golden Valley. And obvious names: 
Figtree, Guinea Fowl, Lion’s Den, Redcliff, Hippo 
Valley. And unlikely, stolen names: Alaska, Venice, 
Bannockburn, Turk Mine.  
In 1896 the Ndebele people had rebelled against this 
Europeanness. 
Fuller/Don’t Let’s Go to the Dogs Tonight  
 
Right from the start of our fieldwork we realized that claiming property through nam-
ing is a very common practice in Namibia. It was mid-May 2003, and my colleague 
and husband, Michael Schnegg, and I had just arrived at Windhoek airport for the 
very first time, together with our one-year-old daughter, Liliana. Already the half-
hour drive from the airport to the city filled us with amazement. We were struck by 
the vastness of the countryside and the incredible varieties of shades, colors and 
forms. But our positive impressions were disturbed, at least in our perception. Along 
the road we were travelling on, tall fences framed our view on either side. Later we 
learned that most of these fences had been built during apartheid, when labor was 
still cheap and easily available for ‘white’ commercial farmers. From time to time we 
saw large signs announcing the names of the farms we passed. As Alexandra Fuller’s 
(2003) description above of how Europeans appropriated the Zimbabwean landscape 
by naming, Namibian farm names contained a strange mix of African names, female 
European names, English animal names, and borrowed names of Western regions, 
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countries or cities. Later, and with some irritation, I even encountered a farm called 
Paderborn, the name of the provincial German town where I grew up.  
This European appropriation of land does not cover all of Namibia. It is not applied 
in those areas that the Germans first called “reserves” and the South Africans later 
remodeled into “homelands”. Today, these areas are referred to as “communal areas”, 
distinguishing them from the so-called “commercial farming areas”. Unlike in the 
commercial areas, where farm names mark the division of the land into privately 
owned plots, in the communal areas only settlements have names, but not the land 
itself. Fencing is almost nonexistent in the communal areas. Thus, these varying prac-
tices of naming the landscape are also expressions of borders dividing the country and 
its different inhabitants. Very early on it became apparent to us that if we wanted to 
do field research in a “communal area”, we would have to cross the border between 
what was considered “white” areas (i.e. most commercial farms and those parts of 
towns and cities mainly inhabited by people of European descent) and what was per-
ceived as “black” territory (i.e. the communal areas and “townships”). Our landlady 
in Windhoek told us that for her such a crossing-over would be unimaginable. Living 
in the country as a Namibian of German descent in the third generation, she perceived 
the divide between herself and her “black” workers as insuperable. However, she as-
sured us that, as foreigners, the passage across might well be possible for us.  
We had not identified a specific research site before arriving in Namibia. In 2002, 
the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, Germany’s national research founda-
tion) accepted my research proposal for a project on demographic, economic and so-
cial transformations in a multiethnic community in the former Namibian Damaraland, 
from a historic and ethnographic perspective, as subproject C10 of the interdiscipli-
nary special research project Arid Climate, Adaptation and Cultural Innovation in 
Africa (ACACIA) based at the German universities of Cologne and Bonn.1 In 2003, 
and after a few days in Windhoek, we thus started a two week tour through the former 
Damaraland, today part of the Kunene and Erongo regions, in search for a suitable 
community. 
We had defined the criteria for such a community rather loosely. Given the scar-
city of research on Damara culture (Barnard 1992: 199), we had decided to focus on 
the former Damaraland and to work with people that perceived themselves to be Da-
mara. Within the ACACIA project itself, the lives of Damara people had until then 
only been investigated from a historic but not from an ethnographic perspective 
(Gockel-Frank 1998). The few sources on Damara culture and livelihood available 
to us at the time clearly indicated that despite apartheid’s attempt to territorially di-
vide Namibians by ethnic categories within so-called homelands, the lived reality in 
                                                 
1 For an overview of the research program, see ACACIA (2011).  
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most communities in the former Damaraland was multiethnic and multilingual (Fuller 
1993; Gordon 1972; Kuper 1995; Rohde 1994, 1997; Sullivan 2000, 2003).  
Another criterion was the presence of a certain historic depth, especially in terms 
of the availability of church registers. In a previous research project on ritual change 
in Tlaxcala, Mexico, Michael Schnegg (2005, 2007b) had successfully analyzed 
church registers to understand historic-demographic processes. Similarly, a group of 
Finnish researchers working in the former Namibian Ovamboland had used church 
registers to analyze population dynamics that would otherwise have been impossible 
to reconstruct (Notkola/Siiskonen 2000; Shemeikka/Notkola/Siiskonen 2005; Siis-
konen/Taskinen/Notkola 2005). We were thus looking for a community for which 
there were church records and that had a long history, possibly back to the German 
colonial period or even earlier. Because of previous visits to the archives of the Rhen-
ish missionary society in Wuppertal, Germany, we knew that several communities in 
the former Damaraland provided such a long-term perspective. 
Finally, after visiting Omaruru, Karibib and Usakos in central Namibia, we added 
another criterion. Several Namibian towns, such as the three we had been to, are still 
largely divided into “white”, “colored” and “black” areas.2 In the town of Omaruru, 
we stayed in a guesthouse run by German pensioners. The couple had moved to Na-
mibia roughly ten years earlier. In Germany, the wife had worked as a clerk and the 
husband had been unemployed. In Namibia, the wife’s German pension money plus 
the extra income generated by the guesthouse allowed them a relatively affluent life-
style. They employed two men from the Omusati region, northern Namibia, and 
treated them in an almost preposterous imitation of an imagined colonial lifestyle. 
One of the two middle aged, married men was called the “garden boy”, the other one 
the “house boy”. Here too, naming was used as an expression of appropriation and 
power. The landlady called the man helping with the domestic work “Serane”, even 
though he had told her over and over again that his name was “Matthias”. Yet the 
landlady thought it ridiculous of him to expect her to start using a different name than 
the one she had memorized. The behavior of these Omaruru retirement migrants 
might be extreme (but also see Widlok 1999: 193-194),3 yet the vignette points to the 
racism that continues to be widespread in postcolonial Namibia. 
                                                 
2 The terms “white”, “black” and “Colored” to differentiate between groups of people on a 
racial basis are very problematic. However, the classification into, for example, “white” 
commercial farms and “black” communal farmland, which stems from colonial times, is still 
being used today. I use the terms because of their continuing applicability in present-day 
Namibia, though realizing their political context and racist origins (see Kössler 2005: xiv). 
3 There is a significant community of German retirement migrants in Omaruru. They can be 
rather challenging to approach for research purposes. Ulrike Winkelman, a journalist friend 
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    Figure 1: Map of Namibia with Fransfontein 
     Source: Figure reproduced with permission by Michael Schnegg. 
In this situation, the boundaries separating the different Namibian groups did not ap-
pear very permeable to us. We could not imagine staying in the white part of town 
and commuting daily to work in the township, locally often called the location. We 
explored living in the location itself, but warnings from all sides that this might be 
too risky with a small child dissuaded us from pursuing this further. Thus, a rural 
community in the communal area that was not marked by these stark ethnic (and also 
economic) forms of segregation, seemed most suitable for us. All of this we encoun-
tered in Fransfontein, our last destination on our exploratory tour (see Figure 1). 
Fransfontein is located on gravel road C35, one of several routes from Hentiesbaai 
on the coast up to Ruacana on the border to Angola. It is a quiet road; mosttraffic to 
the north of the country uses the tarred B1, which runs further to the east of Fransfon-
tein. Because of the way unpaved roads are constructed in Namibia, the road is ele-
vated above the level of the village. A driver passing by only sees a few mud huts with 
who visited Namibia in 2004, was unable to conduct interviews with them because they 
were afraid of being classified as “racist”.  
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Figure 2: Fransfontein, southern Kunene region  
Source: Photo reproduced with permission by Tara DiTommaso. 
corrugated iron roofs, a newly built and brightly painted government building, an 
old, decaying government building and a bewildering wooden cabin surrounded by 
barbed wire. The latter are the remains of a Norwegian development project that tried 
to enhance the livelihoods of Fransfontein’s women. The project ceased to exist years 
ago, and all attempts at reviving it ended in internal conflict. During our research, the 
building was sometimes used for official celebrations, like on Independence Day. 
The center of the village itself is, however, not visible from the C35; one has to leave 
the road and drive into the village. The Fransfontein community is located at the foot 
of the Fransfontein Mountains, a chain running in east-west direction. Most buildings 
are made out of local materials, such as cow dung and mopani poles (a locally culti-
vated timber). Unlike cement buildings, these houses are hardly visible on bird’s-eye 
photographs. The one shown here (see Figure 2) is taken from the Fransfontein 
Mountains and captures the vastness of the landscape and the isolation of the com-
munity.  
The Fransfontein community is surrounded by 25 settlements, where most of the 
inhabitants’ livestock are kept. These settlements can range quite widely in size: some 
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are rather small, with only a handful of households, while others are large with sev-
eral dozens. All of these communal settlements are permanently inhabited, often with 
larger numbers of older and retired people residing there. The research on which this 
book is based concentrated in particular on Fransfontein village, and less on these 
surrounding settlements. Michael’s research on water management, institutions and 
nature conversation, in turn, focused primarily on the settlements in the communal 
area (Schnegg 2016b; Schnegg/Bollig/Linke 2016; Schnegg/Linke 2016). Our re-
search collaborators Clemens Greiner and Theresa Linke conducted ethnographic re-
search in different settlements in the communal Fransfontein area (Greiner 2008; 
Linke 2017).  
Most of the settlements to the north of the Fransfontein Mountains are inhabited 
by people who classify themselves as Damara, while the settlements to the south of 
Fransfontein are more multiethnic, including people who identify themselves as 
Ovambo, Herero, Nama and Damara. About 30 kilometers to the northeast, the 
Fransfontein communal area borders commercial farmlands, still mainly owned by 
white Namibians. Approximately 20 kilometers to the south lies Khorixas, the re-
gional capital with a hospital, several stores, schools and a petrol station. Here Mar-
tina Gockel-Frank, another research collaborator, conducted her field research on 
HIV/AIDS and reproductive decision making in 2005 and 2006 (Gockel-Frank 
2007, 2009). 
It was early June 2003 when we were driving north on the C35. At Fransfontein 
we turned off the road and entered the village for the very first time. We had had to 
rule out all of our other possible research sites and were quite nervous, uncertain 
whether this one would work out. We did not know anybody in Fransfontein. So, 
after driving through the village and seeing all its buildings, we decided that the local 
church might be a good place to start. The Protestant church had recently been reno-
vated and was easy to spot. The resident priest turned out to be very friendly: he 
directed us to one of the church elders, Sara Jod. She and her grandson Hasafa were 
also extremely helpful – not just at the outset, but throughout the fieldwork. Sara 
accompanied us to the local school and arranged for us to rent one of the empty wings 
of the hostel as accommodation (after Namibia achieved its independence in 1990, 
the number of pupils in Fransfontein steadily decreased and two of the four wings in 
the hostel were no longer in use). The school principal, Mrs. Hanabes, helped us out 
with beds, a table, several chairs and other furniture. This accommodation offered us 
a good position from which to start our fieldwork and we stayed there for two months. 
Yet living there also showed us that the location and circumstances of the hostel 
meant that we were too detached from the community. Although primary school and 
the hostel were situated in the middle of the village, they were fenced in by barbed 
wire, creating an undesired border. When the local nurse offered us an alternative, 
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a house with electricity and running water that was intended for the resident nurse 
but that she did not wish to use as she felt it was too run down, we took the oppor-
tunity to move. Agreeing to paint the inside walls, hang up curtains and install a toilet 
and a shower, we were able to rent the house, living there from mid-2003 until Octo-
ber 2004. During shorter periods of follow-up research in 2005 and 2006, in turn, we 
stayed in the house of Bisey /Uirab and his family who were living in Windhoek but 
retained a second home in Fransfontein. Because this house was located in the north 
of the village, whereas the nurse’s house was in the south, the combination provided 
us with a good insight into the various living arrangements of different parts of the 
community.4  
During our first days in Fransfontein in 2003, Sara Jod also introduced us to the 
local governor, who is in charge of the water and electricity services and some of the 
traditional authorities. The political situation in Fransfontein is complicated, filled 
with tensions and strongly shaped by colonial and postcolonial history (see the next 
chapter). Sara accompanied us to meet Festus Aseb, the Damara dana khoeb (head-
man), a friendly and astute elderly man. Headman Aseb greeted us, then smiled and 
said that he would now give our daughter a name. Liliana should be called oa !naas 
(investigation) because her parents had come to live in Fransfontein to do an investi-
gation of the local culture. This was our third encounter with the practice of naming 
in Namibia. This time the connotations of the name given were rather positive: by 
calling Liliana oa !naas, he provided us with a role and a position in the community. 
Later we learned that naming – each other or oneself – is a widespread practice in 
Fransfontein. Unlike the arrogant and racist naming by the German migrant couple 
in Omaruru or the appropriation of land by white settlers by applying names, both 
ways of excluding or controlling others, naming in Fransfontein is a way to start, 
value and sustain relationships. Fransfontein naming does not create borders but 
overcomes them, as we learned that day.  
After a brief return to Windhoek, we began living in Fransfontein permanently 
from mid-June 2003 onwards. Our first days were dedicated to cleaning and home 
                                                 
4  In 2010, Michael received funding from the DFG for a long-term research project on local 
institutions and water management. (cf. LINGS n.d.) In the course of establishing this pro-
ject, Michael renovated a local house in one of the settlements, returning to the communal 
area at least twice a year. I only returned to Fransfontein again in 2015. Having received a 
DFG grant to conduct research on love, marriage and intimacy in urban Namibia, I fol-
lowed up on the life stories in Fransfontein from my previous research. I spent most of my 
time in Windhoek (August 2015 until January 2016), with only brief visits to Fransfontein. 
Data from this new research project will not be included here. The ethnographic present of 
this book are the years 2003 to 2006. 
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making. The hostel wing had not been used in years and the conditions were accord-
ingly. The next step was to search for field assistants and for a teacher in Khoekhoe-
gowab.5 Again, we were very lucky. We found Jorries Seibeb, a pastoralist who had 
worked as teacher in adult education. He became our language teacher and field as-
sistant and, soon, also our friend. Eventually, our Fransfontein fieldwork was con-
ducted in four languages: Afrikaans (which we had begun learning in Germany be-
fore moving to Namibia), English, German and Khoekhoe. Of course, our fluency in 
the four languages varied considerably. Most young people spoke English with us, 
several of the elder people spoke German, and some Fransfonteiners spoke Afrikaans. 
Khoekhoe is the language most frequently used in everyday conversation. For most 
interactions in this language we needed the assistance of Jorries and, later, of Valery 
Meyer, who became my field assistant. When Valery joined me in 2003, she was in her 
mid-twenties and mother of a small son in my daughter’s age. In 2004, Valery moved 
away, so when I returned to Fransfontein in the summer of 2005, I employed Emma 
/Uiras. In 2006, in turn, Emma had moved away and her sister Lydia /Uiras stepped in 
as research assistant. 
The importance of reciprocity for successful ethnographic field research is ac-
knowledged by many anthropologists (Pauli 2006). Edward Evans-Pritchard (1940: 
13) informed his readers that the Nuer demanded tobacco in exchange for all his 
questioning. During his fieldwork in a school in the United States of American 
(USA), Robert Everhart (2001 [1997]: 180) observed: “My steady integration into 
their world revealed the importance of giving as well as taking in long term fieldwork 
[…] I had, at last, recognized the place of reciprocity in productive fieldwork”. What 
exactly will be exchanged varies, depending on context and persons involved (Pauli 
2006). Reciprocity was an everyday topic during our fieldwork as sharing (augu) is 
a central social institution in Fransfontein (Schnegg 2006b, 2015, 2016a). We partic-
ipated in several augu networks, giving small amounts of sugar, tea, meat, bread or 
matches and receiving, in a long-term perspective, the trust and ideas of our neigh-
bours. All people who worked for the research project on a more regular basis re-
ceived a financial compensation. Besides the four field assistants mentioned above, 
                                                 
5 Gowab means language, khoe human being. Often, Khoekhoegowab is referred to in an 
abbreviated form as Khoekhoe. I also use the two terms interchangeably. Both Damara and 
Nama (and also Hai//om) share Koekhoegowab, a Khoisan language and the main language 
spoken in the Kunene region where our research area was located. Khoekhoegowab is a 
so-called click language. Four primary clicks are differentiated: / (affricated) dental click; 
! (implosive) alveolar click; ‡ (implosive) palatal click; and // (affricated) lateral click (for 
more details, see Haacke/Eiseb 2002). 
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13 other Fransfonteiners helped us in this way.6 Most of them supported us with the 
ethnographic census and survey, both discussed in more detail below. It was posi-
tively viewed by the local population that we employed people from the Fransfontein 
area. Finally, all of the 750 persons who participated in the ethnographic census and 
survey received a mug filled with some sweets as a token of thanks. All qualitative 
interviews, though, such as life stories and expert interviews, were not directly recip-
rocated.  
Another form of reciprocation was our involvement in a publication project 
with our local friends. By October 2004, at the end of our first long-term stay of 
one and a half years, we had learnt quite a bit about tensions and conflicts within 
the community. Although most people had stressed over and over again that the 
differences between ethnic groups were small to nonexistent in daily interactions, 
local political groups often used ethnic discourse to create and emphazise differ-
ence and achieve certain political goals. Together with local friends, especially 
with Otto /Uirab’s input, we began to develop the idea of writing a book, but rather 
than focusing on the differences between people and living apart, we decided to 
focus on similarities and on living together. This led to Living Together. Culture 
and Shared Traditions in Fransfontein, Namibia (Dawids et al. 2007), a co-au-
thored publication between five Fransfontein locals – Francois Dawids, Fiona 
Ilonga, Titus Kaumunika, Jorries Seibeb and Otto /Uirab – and Michael and myself, 
financially supported by the German Jutta Vogel Foundation. In addition to making 
the book openly available on the web (Living Together 2007), we provided printed 
copies to local schools, traditional authorities, churches and the local government 
office. 
REFLECTIONS ON FIELDWORK WITH A FAMILY 
Khoekhoegowab became our daughter’s first language. Metaphorically speaking, this 
opened many doors for us. People were amazed how well this little blond girl pro-
nounced the clicks. It was never a problem to start conversations. Most ethnographies 
today include a section with reflections of the field situation, including children 
and/or partners (van Maanen 2011: 77), and fieldwork as a family or a couple is in-
creasingly being discussed in anthropology (e.g. Cassell 1987; Flinn/Marshall/Arm-
strong 1998; Gottlieb/Graham/Gottlieb-Graham 1998). Similar to the experiences of 
                                                 
6 Goldine !Ases, Alexia Gertze, Elly Gertze, Gideon /Goagoseb, Dina /Goagoses, Ivonne / 
Goagoses, FriederiTereska Kana //Gowases, Rheinhardt Haraeb, Perpetina Jod, Hubert Ka-
hono, Ferdinand /Nanubeb, Brigitha Pietersen and Maria Philips. 
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many of these authors, I view the presence of a child with ambivalence. To explain 
this, I need to look at the fieldwork in its context.  
Compared to my Mexican field research (Pauli 2000, 2008b, 2013), which I did 
mostly alone and with only a few visits by Michael, I felt emotionally much more at 
ease in Namibia. Loneliness and sickness were much less a problem for me in Frans-
fontein. This emotional stability was the result of my family being present during the 
fieldwork. Another critical difference between the two experiences was that I had run 
my PhD research in Mexico on a very meager budget, without transport or any other 
amenities, whereas we had sufficient funds to buy a reliable four-wheel car for the 
project in Namibia. Because both Michael and I had achieved our doctoral degrees, 
we were treated with respect in the field. This was very different from my research 
in Mexico, where I was treated as young and naive female student – which of course 
I was at the time. 
The presence of our daughter Liliana underscored our adult status in Namibia. 
We were very lucky that in terms of health, everything went well during the research: 
there were no severe illnesses, and the snakes and scorpions left us untouched. Yet, 
especially at the outset of the research, I felt anxious and concerned about being in 
the field with my family. The following small episode gives an impression of my 
worries. Several weeks after moving to Fransfontein, we were visiting a family, sit-
ting outside, chatting and enjoying refreshments. Liliana was playing in the sand with 
the other children. A man next to me coughed insistently, looking thin and quite sick. 
When we walked back to the hostel wing, we discussed what might be wrong with 
him and Michael suspected that the man might have TB. The next day Michael re-
turned to the house and our host confirmed the suspicion: it was open TB, a highly 
contagious illness. Was Liliana in danger? We called different medical doctors and 
pediatricians who eventually calmed us down. 
Although Liliana clearly felt very happy in Fransfontein, there were moments 
when I felt more uncertain. The very common practice of severe corporal punishment 
of children in all sorts of contexts (at school, at home, among peers) caused me great 
concern. I realized that my role as mother and that as researcher were coming into 
conflict with each other. Other anthropologists have reported comparable dilemmas 
(Flinn/Marshall/Armstrong 1998). Joan Cassell makes an observation that I share: 
having one’s own children in the field makes it more difficult for the researcher to 
hold back personal information (1987: 258). This has positive but also negative cor-
ollaries. A “socially embedded” researcher is more likely to being perceived as a 
“normal” human being by the community he or she studies (Flinn/Marshall/Arm-
strong 1998: 9), a status the “lone researcher” might have difficulties obtaining. Yet 
the worries that the researcher will experience in relation to the health and security 
of especially small children lead to additional stress and tension. 
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It is difficult to say in what ways the presence of our daughter directly influenced 
the research process. Michael, however, strongly inspired and influenced my research 
in very positive ways. In her classic volume on women in the field, Peggy Golde 
(1986: 78) describes an ideal field situation: “If the goal of research is unbiased un-
derstanding, two people working together, preferable one of each sex, would provide 
the balance, the necessary check of objectivity, and the control of sex-determined or 
personality factors that one person, however artful, cannot accomplish alone”. Our 
constant exchange of thoughts, observations and ideas has been the most important 
input throughout my research. I believe that the balance Golde mentions worked es-
pecially well during our Namibian research because we were in comparable social, 
academic and economic positions. During our Mexican research projects this had 
been different. When I did my PhD research in Mexico in 1996-1997, Michael estab-
lished some close relationships with several men of my research community. How-
ever, it was always evident for everybody that I was doing the research and that Mi-
chael was just visiting me. Similarly, when Michael did his PhD research in Tlaxcala, 
Mexico in 2000-2001 (several hours away from the community where I had done 
fieldwork), it was very difficult for me to accept that the community did not perceive 
me as a researcher but mainly as the wife. In Namibia, it was clear from the beginning 
that we were both researchers and that we were jointly engaged in the research.  
Reflecting on the research process, it is almost impossible to say who first had 
which idea and when. This intellectual density and fuzziness shows the advantages 
of joint field research. But conflicts may also appear if intellectual property becomes 
a contested terrain. Because of our previous Mexican research experiences, Michael 
and I knew that collaboration can also mean competition and even conflict. We 
agreed early on that only a constant attempt to discuss issues, including our own vul-
nerabilities, would lead to satisfying research for both of us. This does not mean that 
everything always went smoothly. Hurt feelings because the other had rejected an 
idea and discarded a research suggestion were as much part of the research process 
as ongoing discussions on the best methodological approach. But difficult debates 
also resulted in many positive tradeoffs: the high level of reflexivity produced an 
ethnographically sounder research approach, including the posing of questions and 
making of observations that one person alone would have missed.  
For both Michael and me, the final topics of each of our research projects were 
not set when we started the fieldwork. I knew that I wanted to focus on cultural em-
beddedness of demographic processes, due to my previous research interests and the 
project (subproject C10) I was then heading within the ACACIA research group. Mi-
chael, in turn, aimed to focus on issues of social and economic security. We contin-
uously helped each other with data collection and shared data. It took weeks in the 
field for me to realize how substantially marriage and non-marriage were shaping the 
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lives of people in Fransfontein. The idea to run a marriage questionnaire, which be-
came essential to demonstrate the decline of marriage and the transformation of mar-
riage rituals, was motivated by Michael’s previous research on community celebra-
tions in Mexico (Schnegg 2005, 2007b). Michael also inspired me to think more 
deeply about the entanglements involved in the decline of marriage and how it af-
fected generations differently. This was triggered in particular by a small event in 
early 2004 when Michael and Jorries were conducting interviews with older married 
couples on marriage. On their way to one of the communal farms in the outskirts of 
Fransfontein, they met one of Jorries’s relatives. The old lady stopped her donkey 
cart. She had heard of the interviews from other relatives. With a bitter undertone she 
said that one should better ask the young people what had happened to marriage: 
“They have ruined the whole thing”. Our later reflections of the episode centred on 
the question of whom this old lady in her seventies meant when she spoke of “young 
people”: was she referring to the generation of her children, born in the middle of the 
20th century, or that of her grandchildren, born after the 1970s? Or was there even 
another group that she perceived of as “young”? And when exactly did this group of 
“young people” ruin marriage? In our discussions I recognized that in order to fully 
comprehend the changes that had happened in terms of marriage, I had to set the lived 
experiences of individuals within a larger historical timeframe.  
STUDYING MARRIAGE OVER TIME:  
CONCEPTS, METHODS, DATA 
Participant observation at weddings provided essential insights into the complex 
practices of class distinction and struggle. Michael and I systematically observed the 
ritual process in a dozen engagements and marriages. Two of our field assistants, 
Francois and Jorries respectively, got married during our fieldwork. Both Francois 
and Jorries were very close to us and integrated us into their marriage processes, as 
they did their relatives. This meant financial but also social and emotional obligations 
for Michael and me. And when conflicts emerged, we were directly drawn on to solve 
them. Yet not only the collection of ethnographic data, but also the analysis of mar-
riage was a collaborative effort with our local assistants: in Living Together, Francois 
wrote a chapter in which he analyzed weddings and marriages in Fransfontein 
(Dawids 2007). In a joint article, he and I took his marriage as starting point for an 
examination of what we classified as “struggle marriages” (Pauli/Dawids 2017). In 
addition to the data elicited through participant observation, Michael and I collected 
information through an ethnographic census, a questionnaire on marriages, the ex-
amination of church registers, and the collection of life stories.  
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From March to July 2004, Michael and I conducted an ethnographic census (Pauli 
2008a) in the wider Fransfontein region. Francois and Jorries assisted with translating 
the English census questions into Khoekhoegowab and Afrikaans. To ascertain the 
quality of the translation, two different translators retranslated the Khoekhoegowab 
and Afrikaans questions back into English. Michael and I have both used this census 
data for our respective projects and publications. The census questionnaire was split 
into two parts: a household questionnaire that dealt with the whole household and an 
individual questionnaire that addressed individuals. One central challenge in con-
structing a household questionnaire is the definition of a household (Hammel/Laslett 
1974; Lang/Pauli 2002; Pauli 2008a; Rössler 2005: 174-176). Different criteria might 
be used to distinguish one household from another: co-residence, specific functions 
of the household or certain kinship ties that connect household members. These cri-
teria can but do not necessarily need to overlap. The applicability of the concept of 
the household has been repeatedly questioned for African societies. While econo-
mists (and also demographers) prefer the household as a central social and economic 
unit, also in the African context, some anthropologists have insisted that lineages are 
the more centrally meaningful social unit (van de Walle 2006b: xxi). In the Fransfon-
tein area, however, the lineage is not an applicable concept: rather, it is the household 
that is perceived locally as the central social unit, regardless of the fact that even here 
it is difficult to establish a uniform definition of what a household is.  
To construct a culturally sound definition of the household, we discussed our 
ideas with different assistants and locals. There are several components to this defi-
nition. First of all a household is seen to be a residential unit. Despite the existence 
of dense exchange networks between geographically distant households, these units 
are not perceived as one “multilocal” household but as two separate, albeit closely 
related households. If in doubt about whether a person belonged to a certain house-
hold, we were told to probe where the bulk of a person’s possessions were located. 
Further, Fransfontein households are consumptive and in almost all cases also pro-
ductive units. Those who eat at the same fireplace on a regular basis are part of one 
household. In general, these people also share their incomes. Finally, most of a house-
hold’s members will be linked through kinship ties. In this, the head of the household 
and how this figure is defined is critical for how to understand the relationships be-
tween household members, an issue that has also been thoroughly discussed (Pauli 
2008a; van de Walle 2006b: xxxiii). In most cases, it was not difficult for our Frans-
fontein informants to name a household head: mostly they either named the eldest 
productive male person or, if there was none, the eldest productive female person.  
The household questionnaire included questions on household composition, the 
standard of living (e.g. sanitation, type of dwelling), and economic strategies, includ-
ing questions on social embeddedness and networks of household members. It elicited 
60 | The Decline of Marriage in Namibia 
 
basic demographic information (relation to household head, marital status, age, reli-
gion, education, occupation) for each member of the household, including of all chil-
dren. In general, a household questionnaire would be answered collectively by several 
household members.  
There were two versions of the individual questionnaire: a female and a male 
version. Most of the questions were the same for both, such as questions on migra-
tion, education and occupation, gender, sexuality and HIV/AIDS. Both male and 
female marital, conjugal, reproductive and birth histories and the use of contracep-
tives were elicited. The female questionnaire included an additional section on 
pregnancy, lactation, sterilization and abortion. The individual questionnaire al-
ways followed the household questionnaire and all household members of 15 years 
and older were asked to participate. The reason for this age mark was demographic: 
we did not expect and also did not encounter any women having a child before the 
age of 15. In all individual interviews, only the interviewed person and the inter-
viewee were present.  
Almost all households in the area agreed to participate. In total, we visited 329 
households. For two households, the basic information remained incomplete. Thus, 
for some issues only 327 households can be analyzed. 750 individuals participated in 
the individual questionnaire (see Table 1). We visited all households of the Fransfon-
tein community plus all households in the 25 settlements in the communal grazing 
area surrounding Fransfontein. We also visited four commercial farms bordering the 
Fransfontein area and owned by white Namibians, where we interviewed the workers 
and their families living in the worker locations on these farms. Contrary to Frans-
fontein and the communal area, both clear geographic units, the commercial farm 
sample is arbitrary and many more locations could have been included. The four 
commercial farms we visited were chosen because of the many links that their work-
ers maintained with households in Fransfontein and its communal area. 
Of the 844 possible individual interviews, 89 per cent (i.e. 750 interviews) were 
completed (see Table 1). Only roughly 1 per cent (7 interviews) of all possible inter-
views was refused. All people who refused to be interviewed were living in Frans-
fontein. Most of them were men who did not want to talk about the children they had 
fathered. Ten per cent (i.e. 88 interviews) of all possible interviews were incomplete 
for a variety of reasons: most often, and despite repeated visits, we were unable to 
find a specific person so that these interviews were in fact never begun. In other cases, 
interviews were incomplete when the interviewee had to leave and we were unsuc-
cessful at rescheduling a follow-up meeting. 
Before we started with the interviews we trained 13 local interviewers, all living 
in Fransfontein or the communal area and all well known to us. All spoke fluent 
Khoekhoegowab and English; some were also fluent in Otjiherero and Afrikaans. In 
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Table 1: Response rates in households and individual questionnaires  
*HH households; Ind individuals.  
 
Source: Ethnographic census, July 2004.  
April 2004, the local primary school allowed us to use some of their rooms for the 
course of interviewer training. At the end, we conducted a one day trial run in the 
nearby town Khorixas. This helped to further check the quality of the interviewers 
and the validity of the questionnaire. All of the interviewers received two T-shirts 
with the ACACIA logo to identify them (and to initiate interest in them and the eth-
nographic census), a financial compensation and a daily food allowance for the du-
ration of the training and the interviewing process.7  
We began conducting interviews in Fransfontein and then gradually expanded 
our interview radius. Some of the communal settlements were very remote and it took 
more than an hour to reach them. During the evenings we checked all interviews and, 
where unclarities arose, revisited households and individuals. Many people appreci-
ated that we only worked with local assistants and some even gave this as the reason 
why they decided to participate. In total, the ethnographic census generated infor-
mation on 3738 persons, though many of these were dead or absent.  
In 2004, Michael and I also administered a questionnaire on marriage to elicite 
information on wedding practices and marriage support networks. From January 2004 
                                                 
7 The interviewers were Goldine !Ases, Francois Dawids, Alexia Gertze, Elly Gertze, Gid-
eon /Goagoseb, Ivonne /Goagoses, Rheinhardt Haraeb, Perpetina Jod, Hubert Kahono, Val-
ery Meyer, Ferdinand /Nanubeb, Maria Philips, Jorries Seibeb and Emma /Uiras. 
 




HH* Ind* HH Ind HH Ind HH Ind 
Fransfontein 137 353 0 27 0 7 137 387 
Communal 
farms 




  29   59 0   0 0 0   29   59 
Total 327 750 2 87 0 7 329 844 
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until September 2004 we were able to collect information on 132 marriage celebra-
tions. We either interviewed the couple or one of the spouses. Often, children of the 
couple were also present. In general, people were very open to discuss their marriage 
celebrations with us. Expensive and elaborated marriages were presented with great 
pride. More simple marriages were discussed against the background of the decline of 
marriage. As the elderly lady mentioned above driving a donkey cart, older women 
lamented this development in particular, stressing that it used to be so much easier to 
tie the knot: all one needed was a ring, a goat and some singing in front of ones’ house.  
Several marriages are excluded from the sample due to incomplete information. 
For the earliest marriage celebration that we were able to record, celebrated in 1938 
in Outjo – a town approximately 150 kilometers east of Fransfontein (see Figure 1) 
–the date and place are missing. For eight other marriages, the interviewed couples 
could not remember their marriage dates and other basic information. Almost all of 
these couples were born in the 1920s and 1930s. These marriages are also excluded. 
This reduces the sample to 123 marriages.  
Another way to reach historical depth was through an analysis of church registers 
from the three parishes of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of the Republic of Na-
mibia (ELCRN) in the region: Fransfontein, Khorixas and Outjo. The ELCRN grew 
out of the work of the Rhenish mission, one of the most influential missionary organ-
isations in Namibia in the 20th century. During this period the parish responsible for 
the people of Fransfontein changed several times. From 1892 until 1907 church reg-
isters were kept in the Fransfontein church. These documents are nowkept at the 
ELCRN’s archives in Windhoek where they can be consulted. Between 1908 and 
1967, all records were kept in Outjo but the registers from 1960 to 1967 are missing. 
One complication with these Outjo materials is that they do not list the Fransfontein 
congregation separately from the other congregations in the parish. From 1968 to 
1972, the Fransfontein church registers were archived in Khorixas, due to South Af-
rica’s implementation of the homeland system and the town’s growth as regional 
center. From 1973 to 1983, Fransfontein had its own pastor stationed in the village, 
Pastor Hendrik Jod, who kept the church registers in the community. The registers 
for Fransfontein for the years 1984 to 1993 have proven untraceable, creating a sec-
ond gap in the data. Since 1994, the church registers have been kept at the Fransfon-
tein church and the current pastor and elders kindly allowed us to consult all records 
up to 2002. In total, the available church registers provide information on 1461 mar-
riages for the period 1892 to 2002. As I discuss in more detail in the following chap-
ter, the majority of the Fransfontein population consider their religious affiliation to 
be Lutheran. However, there are also a number of other churches present, especially 
the Roman Catholic Church. This means that the ELCRN church registers do not 
cover the entire population. 
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Both Gerd Spittler (1980) and Trutz von Trotha (1994) have stressed the prob-
lematic quality of church registers or state administered census data for varying po-
litical contexts (see also Kertzer/Arel 2002). Although their critique of the validity of 
this kind of abstract “power knowledge” (Herrschaftswissen) is more than justified, 
church registers as well as national census data nevertheless provide an important 
access to past demographic processes in Africa. Both African census data and church 
registers are understudied and more insight could certainly be gained from them 
(Notkola/Siiskonen 2000; Siiskonen/Taskinen/Notkola 2005; van de Walle 2006a).  
My final approach to the study of marriage over time was through the collection of 
life stories. Because I wanted to compare the construction, perception and interpretation 
of specific essential events and rites of passage, for instance how women experienced 
their first love, their first sex, their marriage or their first birth, I collected the life stories 
of 20 Fransfontein women. My focus on women’s lives has been a conscious choice. I 
believe that due to my focus on women and their narratives, women trusted me and 
were more willing to narrate from their own experiences. An equally in-depth treatment 
of men’s lives would have been desirable. In parts, Michael has provided such insights. 
However, the focus of his research was different from my research questions. I have 
elicited several life stories from men well-known to us. Yet these insights are more 
limited when compared to the information I collected on women’s lives. 
The life stories provide information on how the women constructed and perceived 
crucial moments of their lives in hindsight, in comparison to the experiences of their 
agemates but also their grandmothers, mothers or daughters. I agree with Faye Gins-
burg (1987: 626) who has stressed that “life stories can be seen as the effort of indi-
viduals to create continuity between subjective and social experience, the past and 
current action and belief”. Life stories create personal continuity despite wider social 
change and even turmoil. In her work on discourses and activism for and against 
abortion in a US town, Ginsburg uses the life stories of pro-choice and pro-life wom-
en to understand their political positioning. At the beginning of her analysis, Gins-
burg is puzzled why she is unable to interpret the women’s positioning by “classic” 
social categories like religion or education. Only when she takes time into account 
an interpretation emerges. Ginsburg combines the way the women reflect the devel-
opment of their own life courses, especially crucial events like giving birth, with her 
own classification of women by different birth cohorts and generations: “In the ne-
gotiation of critical moments in the female life course with an ever-shifting social 
environment, the contours of their own biographies and the larger cultural and his-
torical landscape are measured, reformulated, and given new meaning”. (ibid: 625) 
Ginsburg’s approach is inspired by Karl Mannheim’s (1952) classic essay on “The 
Problem of Generation” and his idea of “fresh contact” in the formation of generations 
(Alber/van der Geest/Reynolds Whyte 2008; Cole 2004; Fumanti 2016: 79, 238). Like 
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Mannheim, Ginsburg wants to understand the nexus between individual life cycles 
and larger historical forces. She distinguishes between the women’s interpretations 
of transitional events in their life courses (like giving birth) and what she calls “the 
historical moment shaping the culture when these key transitional points occur” 
(Ginsburg 1987: 626). Ginsburg’s approach will help me to interpret why the elderly 
woman with the donkey cart was so angry with the “young people” who have ruined 
marriage. Ginsburg’s and Mannheim’s uses of the concept of generation offer a fruit-
ful approach to analyze change in marriage over time. 
LIVED EXPERIENCES AND HISTORICAL EVENTS 
Our concern is not whether to study change in society 
but how to study it.  
Wilson/For Men and Elders  
After a static – timeless – view of culture was thoroughly discarded, several anthro-
pologists, like Monica Wilson, asked how to study “the intersection of personal his-
tory, general history, and the changing structures of developmental processes” 
(Rosaldo 1980: 110).8 Although functionalists and structural functionalists like 
Bronislaw Malinowski (1929) and Meyer Fortes (1971 [1958]) introduced a perspec-
tive of time into their anthropological thinking, in the end their conceptualization 
remained quite static. While Malinowski’s so-called biographical approach appeared 
to overcome the short time span of fieldwork, his construction of a “typical life” nev-
ertheless created “the illusion of a static and homogeneous primitive society” 
(Rosaldo 1980: 109). Similarly, Meyer Fortes’s concept of the development cycle of 
the domestic group was not historically embedded.  
Renato Rosaldo (1980) was one of the first anthropologists who tried to overcome 
these theoretical and methodological shortcomings when he incorporated the demo-
graphic concept of cohort analysis as a master concept into his ethnographic approach.9 
                                                 
8 Elizabeth Colson (1983: 1) has discussed how “the thrust of time” has entered anthropo-
logical thoughts and methodologies. She argues that one important impetus has been given 
by repeated returns to the same research site over time, as she had been doing since the 
1940s. By the second half of the 20th century, this approach had become quite widespread 
because of easier and cheaper travel opportunities. 
9 Rosaldo (1980: 110) commented on anthropology’s general disinterest (and other disci-
plines’ interest) in the cohort concept as follows: “Although the concept of cohort analysis 
has hardly entered anthropological discourse, apposite though it may be, it has been widely 
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Through the notion of a cohort, Rosaldo (1980: 110) tried to understand “individual 
biographies in their historical, cultural, and social structural context”. He thus broad-
ened the anthropological perspective of time, similar also to Johannes Fabian’s consid-
erations: “As soon as culture is no longer primarily conceived as a set of rules to be 
enacted by individual members of distinct groups, but as a specific way in which actors 
create and produce beliefs, values, and other means of social life, it has to be recognized 
that Time is a constitutive dimension of social reality”. (Fabian 1983: 24) Rosaldo’s 
use of the concept of the cohort was inspired by Norman Ryder’s (1965: 859) seminal 
article that proposed the cohort as a “macro-biography”, thus “the aggregate analogue 
of the individual life story”. For both Rosaldo and Ryder the cohort offered the possi-
bility to go beyond a collection of autonomous life stories and a limited understanding 
of history based only on periodic events. In this, they were both influenced by Mann-
heim’s (1952) and José Ortega y Gasset’s (1933) thoughts on generations. Ortega y 
Gasset (1933: 859) viewed the cohort as the most important concept in history because 
of its “dynamic compromise between mass and individual”.  
Ryder provided the following demographic definition of the cohort: “A cohort 
may be defined as the aggregate of individuals (within some population definition) 
who experienced the same event within the same time interval”. (Ryder 1965: 845) 
In demography, the event that is often taken to form a cohort is birth (Glenn 1977: 8; 
Ryder 1965: 845). However, the approach can be applied to cohorts identified by any 
significant and enduring event in the life course (Ryder 1965: 847). Other examples 
of events that form cohorts are marriage cohorts (people marrying in a similar time 
period), or school cohorts (people starting or finishing school at the same time). Co-
horts are not only summaries of individual lives but have distinct characteristics and 
compositions, such as varying sizes (like the baby-boomers). Because of this historic 
situatedness, each cohort experiences the world differently from its predecessors 
(Ginsburg 1987; Rosaldo 1980: 112).  
Cohorts can be used to analyze two types of dynamics: intercohort variations 
(comparisons between cohorts) and intracohort variations (comparisons between 
members of one cohort). Intercohort analysis tries to understand in how far subse-
quent cohorts differ, on the basis of the understanding offered by Elizabeth Colson 
(1983: 4): “To be young is to be young at a particular time and place; each age-cohort 
is unique”. One might, for example, ask in how far the divorce rate was lower for 
women born in the 1950s, because of a more conservative socialization, than for those 
born in the 1960s, brought up under more liberal circumstances. Unlike a periodic 
analysis that focuses on the distribution of specific events during specific times 
                                                 
discussed in other disciplines”. Exceptions to Rosaldo’s general remarks were anthropolo-
gists working on demographic issues, like Elizabeth Colson (1983).  
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(e.g. the number of divorced women in 1980 compared to 1990), cohort analysis tries 
to understand social change (e.g. an increased practice and acceptance of divorce) 
embedded in the lived experiences and historically singular circumstances of a spe-
cific group of people defined by their birth dates (see also Ginsburg 1987).  
Ryder and Rosaldo differed in their understanding of the cohort, not in how they 
applied the intercohort analysis but in how they treated intracohort variation. This 
disparity stemmed from the fact that they defined and used the concept of the cohort 
differently. For Ryder (1965: 847), cohorts were structural categories with compara-
ble analytic power as other central social categories, such as class, ethnicity or gen-
der. That a cohort exhibits some kind of collective identity is possible but not neces-
sary. Thus, Ryder’s cohort is an analytic category: “Commonality is likely but not 
community”. (ibid: 855) He discussed the peer group as a subset of the cohort, de-
fined as a group of people of the same age with attitude-forming relationships among 
each other. This definition had similarities to Mannheim’s (1952: 304) concept of the 
“generational unit”, which he understood as subgroups within a generation that are 
often in conflict with each other. Thus, as Mannheim’s generational unit, Ryder’s 
peer group is only a small fraction of the total cohort. In this situation, intracohort 
variations might show that a peer group significantly varies from other cohort con-
temporaries. Consequently, Ryder (1965: 847) stressed that the comparison between 
cohorts always had to be supplemented by an analysis of the variations within co-
horts: “Different subsets of the cohort have different time patterns of development. 
Youth of manual and nonmanual origins differ in length of educational preparation 
and age at marriage”. As examples of intracohort differentiation, Ryder listed educa-
tion, occupation, marital status and parity status. 
Rosaldo approached the cohort very differently. He stated: “The point of entry in 
cohort analysis is an inquiry into the extent to which a number of individuals have be-
come self-conscious about their identity as a group in the face of life chances terribly 
different in appearance from those of their elders and their juniors”. (Rosaldo 1980: 
111) Thus, to apply the cohort concept, the ethnographer has to search for those politi-
cal, economic and social events that cause “life chances to terribly” differ so that indi-
viduals become self-conscious about them. In the case of the Ilongot, amongst whom 
Rosaldo did his research, a number of historical events had these effects on a marriage 
cohort of 20 men who were loosely related through inter-marriages that took place in 
the period from 1955 to 1958. Katherine Newman (1986) suggested a very similar kind 
of application in her comparison of US “women of the depression” and “women of the 
Sixties” and their experience of postdivorce downward mobility. Newman preferred to 
use the term “generation” to highlight the shared consciousness: “A generation is a spe-
cial kind of birth cohort: a group of similarly aged people who share some important 
formative experience. The focus of the term ‘generation’ is on the shared experiences,  
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Table 2: Overview of time-structuring concepts  
 
not on age”. (ibid: 232)10 For both Rosaldo and Newman the focus was thus not on 
intracohort variation but on intracohort homogeneity – the groups they studied were 
purposefully formed by two events: age (birth) and historic event(s). In constrast, for 
Ryder a cohort was defined by just one event – often birth.  
Nevertheless, the differences between the varying conceptualisations of the co-
hort are not that large. What Newman termed “generation”, Rosaldo “cohort” and 
Ryder “peer group” were all just variations and extensions of the basic concept of the 
cohort: a cohort is an aggregate of individuals who experienced the same event within 
the same time interval (see Table 2). The three authors simply varied in the level of 
group consciousness, namely the level (and necessity) of awareness as to how far a 
similar lived experience leads to group cohesion. For my own application of the co-
hort and the generation concept, I combine these approaches. 
                                                 
10 One problem with Newman’s definition is that the span of a generation is fuzzy. Kertzer 
(1983) discussed in detail the many problems associated with the imprecise and polysemic 
use of generation in the social sciences. Because of these difficulties he suggested not to 
use the concept but instead to analyze age, cohort and periodic effects (ibid: 130-131). 
Macrobiography Cultural Patterns History 
Cohort  
as an aggregate of individuals 
experiencing the same event  
within the same time interval  
[general definition] 
Age group  
as a temporal, culturally  
defined stage in life 
(e.g. based on norms and 
values) [general definition] 
Time periods 
structured by  
(significant) 
events 
This includes This includes 
Generation as a group of people 
sharing a formative event (Newman) 
The concept 
of the life cycle 
Peer groups as a group of similarly 
aged people with attitude-forming 
relations (Ryder) 
The genealogical concept 
of generations 
Cohort as a self-conscious group 
experiencing very different life 
chances from other groups 
(Rosaldo) 
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Cohort analysis thus offers a strong and flexible tool to understand and analyze 
change both between and within specific groups formed through specific, time-
bound events. Yet not everything changes. To analyze what might remain similar 
despite varying cohort experiences, the concept of age groups and the life cycle is 
helpful. In her research on abortion, Ginsburg (1986: 625) observed: “In the narra-
tives, all the women are struggling to come to terms with problematic life-cycle 
transitions, but in each group, the way they experience those as problematic is asso-
ciated with very particular historical situations”. Specific norms and values are 
closely linked to the life cycle: “Age ascription is the cross-sectional counterpart of 
cohort differentiation. Similarities of experiences within and differentiation of expe-
rience between age groups are observable in every culture”. (Ryder 1965: 846) Of 
course, age specific norms are also dynamic. However, the coherence of the life 
cycle and the norms and values ascribed to certain life stages can counter the poten-
tial for change. In my research on reproductive changes in rural Mexico, I described 
that the number of women taking modern contraceptives strongly increased for cer-
tain birth cohorts (Pauli 2000). However, before the birth of a child, not a single 
woman – independent of her birth cohort – took contraceptives. Regardless of wheth-
er a woman was born in 1950, 1960 or 1970, she did not use contraceptives before 
the age of twenty-two. Yet, women born from 1970 onwards took more and more 
diverse contraceptives than women born before the 1970s. A combination of cohort 
and life cycle/age group analysis makes it possible to analyze these changes and con-
tinuities together.  
The concept “generation” can also be defined in a way that resembles more close-
ly the mechanisms through which age groups and the position in the life cycle struc-
ture time. Parallel to Newman’s definition of generation as a group of people sharing 
a formative event, another common use of the concept in anthropology is genealogi-
cal in nature (for an overview, see Whyte/Alber/van der Geest 2008). Generations in 
this respect are temporal units of kinship structure. Like age groups and the life cycle, 
this definition of “generation” highlights cultural patterns rather than temporal vari-
ations. Table 2 summarizes this discussion of the different concepts. 
So far I have discussed what Ryder (1965: 859) summarized as macrobiographies 
and cultural patterns and only briefly mentioned the periodic concept (the third col-
umn in Table 2). Before Ryder’s path-breaking work, the periodic perspective with 
its focus on points in time (e.g. comparing the number of marriages in 1950, 1960 
and 1970 in a population) was the most dominant one in demography. Today, cohort 
(or macrobiographic) and periodic approaches are common in demography. In an-
thropology, ethnographic studies conducted over a period of time have fruitfully ap-
plied the periodic approach for comparisons. A good example is Jane F. Collier’s 
(1997) study over time of a Spanish village. She compares village life in the 1960s 
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and the 1980s and discusses in how far her findings extend or even contradict popular 
“modernization” discourses. There are thus different ways of thinking about and con-
ducting research into the intersections of lived experience and historical event. For 
my analysis of the decline of marriage, I take generations and cohorts as my starting 
point. To this I later add reflections on how generations and cohorts are entangled 
with formative historic events and the life cycle. 
GENERATIONS AND COHORTS  
OF FRANSFONTEIN WOMEN 
I distinguish three generations of women.11 The lived experiences of the women are 
tightly connected to the colonial and postcolonial situation in Namibia. Until the mid-
20th century, Fransfontein women’s lives were framed by the exploitation they expe-
rienced by white settlers. Many of the elder women worked on commercial “white” 
farms, underpaid and on very insecure terms, for substantial periods of their lives. 
The overwhelming majority of these women later established themselves as commu-
nal farmers. I classify this group of women the “older generation” (born between 
1915 and 1944). With the establishment of apartheid and the Damaraland homeland 
in the 1970s, the lives of the next generation of women (born between 1945 and 1964) 
differed substantially from the lives of their mothers. I label this the “middle genera-
tion”. During apartheid, economic stratification gained momentum. A small group of 
newly elite women profited from these developments. But the vast majority of 
women (and men) continued to live lives in economic and political limbo. Finally, in 
the 1980s and accelerated further with independence in the 1990s, the political and 
economic context changed again. The new-won freedom brought new opportunities 
for women, especially for women of the “younger generation” (born between 1965 
and 1994). However, new threats and insecurities also emerged, the most tragic one 
being HIV/AIDS. 
The way I construct the three generations thus resembles Newman’s (1986) ap-
proach to the concept of generation. I classify Fransfontein women into three genera-
tions based on the observation that they form groups “of similarly aged people who 
share some important formative experiences” (Newman 1986: 232). In how far these 
three generations of women “have become self-conscious about their identity as a group  
                                                 
11 Detailed information on the political and economic history of the region follows in the next 
chapter. Here, I only give some basic information on the livelihoods of the women in order 
to construct the different generations and cohorts that this study focuses on. 
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Number of  
life stories 
All Married All Married All Married 
Older  
generation  
  78  59 
1915-1924  11  10 
 4 3 1925-1934  26  25 
1935-1944  41   24 
Middle 
generation 106  36 
1945-1954  47 14 
 6 2 
1955-1964  59 22 
Younger 
generation 
180  20 
1965-1974  65 15 
10 1 1975-1984  89 5 
1985-1994  26 0 
Total 364 115  364 115 20 6 
 
in the face of life chances terribly different in appearance from those of their elders 
and their juniors” (Rosaldo 1980: 111) is debatable. Above, I cited the lady in her 
seventies who commented on “young” people ruining marriage. In their life stories, 
women of one generation had markedly different experiences from those of other 
generations. Yet, the generations did not really perceive themselves as self-conscious 
groups. My classification is, thus, also influenced by Ryder’s (1965) more analytic 
approach. Further, I also consider Ryder’s call to analyze both inter- and intracohort 
variations. As Table 3 shows, marital status strongly varies not only between gener-
ations and cohorts but also within them.12 
Whereas 76 per cent (59 out of 78 women) of the women of the older generation 
are or have been married (and are now widowed), only 34 per cent (36 out of 106 
women) of the middle generation are married (Table 3, columns two and three). For 
the younger generation, women born after the mid-1960s, only 11 per cent (20 out of 
180 women) are married. A late age at marriage leads to high numbers of unmarried 
                                                 
12 The data discussed here were collected with the help of the ethnographic census and the 
life history interviews. 
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women in the youngest cohorts. After classifying the women in Fransfontein into 
three generations, I then apply a finer classification to divide the three generations in 
10-year birth cohorts (Table 3, columns four to six). These birth cohorts correspond 
to Ryder’s definition of a cohort. The classification is not based on any formative 
event or self-conscious group; it is simply a grouping of the three generations in terms 
of time periods as method to grasp more subtle changes within one generation. The 
oldest woman in the whole population of 364 women was born in 1916, the youngest 
in 1990. After an analysis of the distribution of all 364 women by age, a division into 
eight 10-year birth cohorts, starting with the 1915-1924 cohort and ending with the 
1985-1994 one,13 seemed most appropriate. Demographers analyzing large datasets 
often use one-year birth cohorts, yet the present study did not offer enough cases to 
group women into such narrow categories. Ten-year birth cohorts are more appropri-
ate for our data. For each of the eight birth cohorts, I conducted at least one and often 
several life story interviews. Half of all “life story” women belong to the youngest 
generation.  
The classification into generations can be fuzzy at the edges. This becomes evi-
dent when one takes a closer look at Olga, born in 1942. By age, she should be as-
signed to the older generation. Yet, because she was one of the very first women to 
work as a domestic worker for the state, her economic (and also reproductive) auton-
omy was very different from the lives of the women in the older generation and I 
decided to assign her to the middle generation.  
In the following chapters, a combination of cohort (plus generational) and age 
grade (plus life cycle) analysis is used to understand the conjugal and reproductive 
dynamics in Fransfontein throughout the 20th century. In addition, periodic analysis 
is applied, especially in the chapter on the decline of marriage in Part 2. I analyze 
changes in the performance, economic implications and meanings of marriage over 
different time periods (e.g. marriage in the 1960s, in the 1970s and in the 1980s).  
I also examine closely the practices of weddings, focusing on the lived experiences 
of different generations and cohorts of women and men. The different approaches on 
the intersection of lived experience and historical events discussed so far thus help 
us understand continuities and changes in marriage and reproduction from an indi-
vidual, a macrobiographic and a historical perspective. 
                                                 
13 Only women who were 15 years and older in 2004 were interviewed. This means that the 
youngest women interviewed were those born in 1990, and that the last birth cohort (1985-
1994) does not include any women born between 1991 and 1994.  

 




The turmoils of the late 19th and the 20th centuries touched the lives of Fransfontein 
men, women and children in many and at times inconceivable ways. The Berlin con-
ference of 1884/1885, the two world wars and the end of the Cold War all affected 
the fates and life chances of the inhabitants of Fransfontein, regardless of the town’s 
geographic remoteness. As early as 1844, the Rhenish Mission Society commenced 
its work in Namibia, first in the southern parts of the country and then expanding to 
the central region. With the Berlin Conference, the formal colonization of Namibia 
began.1  
Very quickly thereafter, indigenous Namibians of southern and central Namibia 
lost the basis of their livelihoods: their land. Both the needs of the white settler com-
munity with its demand for land and labor and the strategies and aims of the Rhenish 
Mission Society shaped and reshaped Fransfontein’s geographic appearance. In 
1905, Fransfontein became one of the first reserves of Germany’s colony of “South-
west Africa”. In 1915, in the midst of the First World War, Germany succumbed to 
South Africa’s expeditionary forces. After a brief intermittent period (1915-1920), 
the League of Nations granted South Africa mandatory power over Namibia in 1920. 
The consolidation of South Africa’s colonial power implied further cuts to the free-
doms of indigenous Namibians. After the Second World War, South Africa submitted 
a petition to the newly formed United Nations (UN) for permission to integrate Na-
mibia into South Africa. This petition was rejected. However, with the victory of the 
National Party in South Africa in 1948, the country illegally annexed Namibia, ruling 
it as its “fifth province”. In this manner, Namibia was included in the National Party’s 
racist apartheid policy. In 1966, this step led the UN to revoke South Africa’s League 
of Nation mandate to rule Namibia. The International Court of Justice confirmed in 
1971 that South Africa’s continued occupation of Namibia was illegal. Despite this, 
                                                 
1 For further information on the history of Namibia, see Wallace (2011), Lau (1986), Hayes 
et al. (1998).  
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South Africa went ahead to establish almost a dozen “homelands” on Namibian ter-
ritory. “Damaraland” was created, which enclosed the Fransfontein reserve, one 
among several remote reserves. Two decades later, it was the gradual decline of the 
Cold War era that had a significant impact on the lives of Fransfontein people. Cuba’s 
withdrawal of its forces from Angola in 1988 led South Africa to accept UN Resolu-
tion 435 from 1978, which led to Namibia’s independence in 1990.  
Of course, the fact that Fransfontein’s fate was locked into national and global 
events was comparable to the situation of other regions in Namibia. Yet each com-
munity and each region experienced, suffered through and resisted these changes in 
their own unique ways. Although much historical work remains to be done, several 
excellent political-economic histories of communities neighboring Fransfontein have 
been published.2 Bennet Fuller (1993, 1998) has written an ethnography on the de-
velopment of Otjimbingwe and Sesfontein. Much of the following has profited from 
his insights. Equally, Richard Rohde’s (1994, 1997) historically grounded ethnogra-
phy of Okombahe has been central for my understanding of the local reactions to the 
Odendaal plan, which led to the implementation of homelands, and the introduction 
of apartheid in Namibia (see also Rohde/Hoffman/Cousins 2000). These two publica-
tions are, to my knowledge, the most in-depth treatments of communities of the for-
mer Damaraland. Other historic and ethnographic work on communities within for-
mer Damaraland does not explicitly focus on the social and political history of the 
region but remains valuable for insight into specific aspects, such as its environmental 
history and its forms of natural resource management (Botha n.d.; Linke 2017; 
Schnegg 2016b, 2018; Sullivan 1996, 2000, 2003), its mining towns (Kuper 1995), 
its migration history (Greiner 2008, 2011), its pre-contact and early colonial history 
(Gockel-Frank 1998; Lau 1986, 1987) and everyday life under apartheid (Gordon 
1971, 1972).  
Fransfontein is and has always been multiethnic. Since the community’s estab-
lishment in the 1890s, both Damara and Nama people have lived together in the re-
gion. Most everyday practices transcended ethnic boundaries (Dawids et al. 2007), 
though a sense of ethnic belonging continues to exist. Thus, work on Nama history 
has also provided insights, even though it focuses on southern Namibia, especially 
Reinhart Kössler’s (2005) detailed history of two southern Namibian Nama commu-
nities, Adelheid Iken’s (1999) ethnography on Nama female-headed households and 
Sabine Klocke-Daffa’s (2001) ethnographic work on reciprocity and sharing in the 
                                                 
2 Because of Namibia’s large geographical range, “neighboring” communities can be re-
moved from each other by tens to hundreds of kilometers. Fransfontein’s closest neighbors 
are the communities of Okombahe (approximately 2 hours by car), Sesfontein (2 ½ hours) 
and Otjimbingwe (3 ½ hours). 
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southern Namibian community of Berseba. The third largest ethnic group that has 
lived in the Fransfontein area for several decades is made up of speakers of Bantu 
languages, who migrated into this area in the 1930s. Giorgio Miescher (2006) pro-
vides a historic account of their life prior to their move to Fransfontein and their 
migration, with further information provided by Michael Schnegg (2007a) and Clem-
ens Greiner (2008). Schnegg’s (2007a) analysis of the antecedents and consequences 
of an early colonial war in the Fransfontein area explicitly focuses on the multiethnic 
history of Fransfontein and is thus another central source for my discussion. 
My objective is not to write a history of the social, political and economic devel-
opments of Fransfontein in the late 19th and the 20th centuries. To achieve my general 
aim, an understanding of the transformations of marriage, reproduction and class, I 
rather discuss historic processes as that which frames individual lives and sets the 
limits and opportunities for individual actors. Of course, structure is not possible with-
out agency and vice versa (Bourdieu 1977; Giddens 1984; Schnegg/Pauli 2010; Sew-
ell 1992, 2005). The life stories I gathered show the interdependency of structure and 
agency, making visible the “complex nexus of individual responses to the political, 
environmental and economic circumstances” (Rohde 1997: 273). I use the concepts 
of generation and cohort, introduced in the previous chapter, as analytic devices. Co-
hort and generational analyses, thus what Ryder (1965: 859) has called “macro-biog-
raphies”, connect individual life experiences with larger historical forces. My con-
cern here is thus neither with a general historic description of the community nor with 
an exclusive focus on individual lives. I am rather concerned to understand history 
through biography, by integrating an analysis of periodic events with that of genera-
tions and cohorts. 
The previous chapter, “Fransfontein Fieldwork”, introduced three generations of 
women. Other classifications might also be possible. Chris Tapscott (1995: 154), for 
example, has suggested a division into a formative period up to 1974, the intensive 
years of war from 1974 until the onset of independence in 1989, and the postinde-
pendence era. His classification, however, is based on historical developments in the 
northern parts of the country, which differ quite substantially from those in central 
and southern Namibia (Pankhurst 1996; Silvester/Wallace/Hayes 1998). Unlike Na-
mibians in the north, only few people in Fransfontein had direct contact with the 
warfare of the 1970s and 1980s. Inversely, the northern territories did not experience 
the trauma of massive land dispossession that all southern and central Namibian com-
munities (including Fransfontein) experienced. Similarly, where only few women in 
the north worked on white settler farms, numerous women and couples from central 
and southern Namibian communities like Fransfontein made this experience.  
For many Fransfontein women that I classified as belonging to the older genera-
tion (born between 1915 and 1944), working and living on white commercial farms 
76 | The Decline of Marriage in Namibia 
 
was the central experience during most of their productive and reproductive lives. I 
begin my diachronic analysis with their lives. Previous events and circumstances, 
like the colonial formation of the “Damara” ethnic group or pastoralist pre-colonial 
livelihoods of inhabitants of the area, will not be discussed (Fuller 1993; Gockel-
Frank 1998; Riechmann 1899; Rohde 1997; Schnegg 2007a). The establishment of 
homelands in the 1960s and 1970s greatly changed the livelihoods of the Fransfontein 
people and ushered in the next generation that I look at. In this period, the living 
conditions of many deteriorated even further while for a small emerging elite new 
opportunities arose. The women who reached their productive and reproductive 
prime during this period I have labeled as “middle generation” (born between 1945 
and 1964). Following Rosaldo’s (1980: 111) approach to distinguish generations, the 
life chances of these women were “terribly different in appearance from those of their 
elders and their juniors”. The youngest generation of women, born between 1965 and 
1994, came of age after Namibia gained independence. Although class formation in 
Namibia has strong antecedents in the pre-independence era (Abrahams 1982; Jauch 
1998; Tapscott 1993, 1995), for the majority of the population independence has 
meant a significant change in their lives. This is clearly expressed in the life stories 
of the younger women who described increasing individual liberties and less racist 
discrimination. But they also mentioned new threats, especially the fear of an HIV 
infection. The discussion below, of history through biography, is structured by the 
central experience of each of the three generations of Fransfontein women: life on 
white commercial farms, apartheid, and independence, respectively.  
THE OLDER GENERATION:  
A LIFE ON COMMERCIAL FARMS AND RESERVES 
When I meet Rose for the very first time in 2004, she is sitting in front of her house, 
cooking on an open fire. At that time she is 78 years old. All her life she has been 
working hard, as a worker on commercial farms of white farmers and as a farmer 
herself in the communal area. Both her hands and her face express years of struggle 
and pain; they are very dry, with many wrinkles.  
Rose was born in the 1920s, in one of the settlements surrounding the Fransfon-
tein community. When she was a young child, her parents started working on the 
German farm “Ritterstall” (stable of the knights). For most of the time, Rose re-
mained in the Fransfontein reserve, separated from her parents. In her teens she also 
started working at “Ritterstall”. There she met her future husband, Jacob. Jacob was 
born in 1919 and grew up in the Okombahe reserve which the Germans had estab-
lished in 1905. Neither Rose nor Jacob received any formal education. For a while, 
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Rose, Jacob and Rose’s parents all worked at “Ritterstall”. But when a conflict arose 
between Rose’s parents and the farmer, all four of them left the farm. The following 
years were very challenging for Rose. Jacob and Rose worked on different farms, but 
everywhere the conditions were bad. Workers were treated in humiliating ways, 
physically abused and undernourished. During this period Rose and Jacob lost the 
first two of their children shortly after birth. Through Jacob’s parents, who had found 
work with an Afrikaner farmer by the name of van Zyl on the farm “Twyfel”, Jacob 
and Rose also found employment. In 1942, while working for van Zyl, Rose gave 
birth to Olga. Olga survived early childhood and grew up in the Fransfontein reserve. 
Here, the elderly members of the family were taking care of the family’s livestock 
and the children, while the productive family members worked on white commercial 
farms.  
Several more children were born to Rose and Jacob. In this situation, the couple 
decided that they wanted to get married. Van Zyl agreed to support them with some 
clothes. He preferred married couples as workers and paid them better. Rose says that 
it was much easier for a worker to become a foreman on the farm when he was mar-
ried. During the week of their wedding, Jacob received a note from his relatives in 
the reserve asking him to come as several of Jacob and Rose’s livestock had disap-
peared. For several days Jacob searched the reserve for the animals. Rose was unable 
to accompany him because she was very advanced in pregnancy. Upon Jacob’s return 
the farmer was angry at his protracted absence and the wedding was cancelled. De-
spite many conflicts with van Zyl, Rose and Jacob continued working for him. 
For several decades, Rose and Jacob had to work on white commercial farms. 
They were forced into this because there was never enough food and not sufficient 
grazing for their livestock in the Fransfontein reserve. Labor migration on white com-
mercial farms has thus been a very common experience in the family. All of Rose 
and Jacob’s 12 children were born on white farms. In the mid-1980s, Jacob and Rose 
retired and started living permanently at one of the settlements in the Fransfontein 
area. Their house in the settlement has four multipurpose rooms all made out of local 
materials. There is no electricity and the water is retrieved from a borehole. The 
household’s main source of income is the pension money that Rose and Jacob re-
ceive. In 1988, and several decades after their first attempt, Rose and Jacob finally 
got married. They were among the elderly and long-term couples whom the local 
pastor visited on their farms and married in a very inexpensive and brief ceremony. 
The lived experiences of Rose and Jacob are exemplary for the older generation, as 
Figure 3 demonstrates. 
Forty-four per cent (172 of 387) of all women and 49 per cent (178 of 362) of all 
men of 15 years and older have worked on white commercial farms. Thus, almost 
half of the population has been drawn directly into the white settler economy. Yet,  
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working experiences on commercial farms vary strongly between the cohorts, as Fig-
ure 3 demonstrates. In the cohort of men born between 1925 and 1934, almost eight 
out of ten men worked for white farmers. In the following cohort, seven out of ten 
men had to make the experience. Then, the percentages gradually decline, indicating 
the rise of other income opportunities besides communal farming and working on 
commercial farms. This process starts with the birth cohorts I have classified as the 
middle generation, thus the cohorts born between 1945 and 1964. The only exception 
to this process is the female birth cohort of 1945-1954 with remarkable low percent-
ages. Below I will explain this deviation. The low percentage for the first cohort of 
men born between 1915 and 1924 can be explained with the then still existing option 
of independent communal farming; many of these older men were still able to survive 
as communal farmers. This independence vanished for the following cohorts. Other 
employment options besides communal farming (which became increasingly unten-
able as a mode of survival because of continuous land dispossession) and labor mi-
gration on commercial farms were virtually non-existent, including mining, an option 
that only arose later.3 
                                                 
3 Pastor Eliphas Eiseb is an exception to this rule. He was born in 1918 and became an 
ELCRN pastor. In the 1980s he served as acting king for the Damara Council. He lived in 
Fransfontein from the late 1980s onwards, and passed away in 2007.Together with Profes-
sor Haacke from the African languages department at the University of Namibia, Pastor 
Figure 3: Working experiences on commercial farms 
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As Figure 3 shows, the percentages for women with working experiences on white 
commercial farms are in general lower than those for men. This can be explained by 
the fact that several couples did not stay and work together on commercial farms. In 
these cases, the men were engaged in labor migration while the women stayed in the 
reserve and kept the farm household running. Still, significant numbers of women left 
the reserve and worked for white commercial farmers.4 The percentages are highest 
for the first three cohorts, those cohorts I have classified as being part of the older 
generation. More than half to two thirds of these women have lived and worked on 
white commercial farms. The first cohort of the middle generation, women born be-
tween 1945 and 1964, clearly differs from this pattern. Where the preceding cohort 
(1935-1944) had more than 60 per cent of women with experiences of working on 
commercial farms, only 40 per cent of the women born between 1945 and 1954 made 
these experiences. The reason for this decline is a new income alternative besides com-
mercial farm work that arose at this time: twenty-five per cent of the women of this 
cohort found employment as domestic workers. In 1964, the Frans Frederik Primary 
School and its hostel were inaugurated in Fransfontein. In the following years, several 
women in their twenties found employment as domestic cleaners at the school and 
hostel. For women and men of the youngest generation, born between 1965 and 1994, 
work on commercial farms has become only one option among others. Especially 
young men have been able to find temporary employment on one of the surrounding 
commercial and today also safari farms, for example as guides for hunting expeditions.  
Not only do the percentages of women and men with working experiences on 
white commercial farms vary between cohorts. The length of time spent on commer-
cial farms also varies between cohorts. While men and women of the eldest genera-
tion have, on average, spent more than a decade of their lives as workers on white 
commercial farms, the number of years spent on commercial farms declines for the 
middle generation (1945-1964). Fransfontein women and men of all generations have 
tried to reduce their time on white commercial farms. Relations between white set-
tlers and indigenous Namibians were often problematic and tense.  
From the time of the German colonization of then South West Africa, the econ-
omy was geared primarily to the demands of two groups: foreign capital controlling 
                                                 
Eiseb wrote the first (and only) comprehensive dictionary of Khoekhoegowab (Haacke 
2007; Haacke/Eiseb 2002).  
4 In this respect, southern and central Namibia clearly differ from northern Namibia. The 
contract labor system in north Namibia forced only men into waged employment, not 
women. Men in southern and central Namibia were also forced into waged labor, but they 
were allowed, and sometimes even encouraged, to bring their families with them (Iken 
1999: 4). 
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the lucrative mining industry, and the white settler community (Simon/Moorsom 
1987; Tapscott 1995: 154). Both sectors demanded cheap labor and were interested 
in the indigenous population only as unskilled workers and not as consumers (Tap-
scott 1995: 154). Local production was virtually absent and the import of consumer 
goods was oriented towards the needs of the colonial elite. The white settler demand 
for land meant a massive dispossession of land for the indigenous population of 
southern and central Namibia. From the beginning of land appropriation in 1883 by 
the German trader Franz Adolf Eduard Lüderitz, who bought large areas of land in 
southern Namibia from the local Nama chief Joseph Fredericks, there were different 
types of appropriation by white settlers, traders and officials, ranging from illegal 
appropriation to “deals” with local leaders (Schnegg 2007a; Werner 2004: 293). With 
the end of German colonialism in 1915, indigenous Namibians in the central and 
southern parts of Namibia, the so-called police zone, had lost much of their land and 
livestock (Jauch 1998: 27).5  
The arrival of white settlers also meant a gradual end of the transhumance system 
with its high level of adaptation to ecologic variations (Botha n.d.; Rohde 1997; 
Rohde/Hoffman/Cousins 2000; Fuller 1998: 194). White farm owners started draw-
ing boundaries around parcels of land, marking them with fences. Thus, privately-
owned land (and the expression of such in the fixation of borders through fences) 
stood in contrast to how Damara, Nama, Herero and Baster communites of southern 
and central Namibia, divided into small mobile groups with low levels of political 
centralization, used land and water communally in the pre-colonial period (Rohde 
1997; Werner 2004). 
The history of land dispossession in Fransfontein corresponds closely to the above 
description. According to oral traditions of the Swartbooi Nama (//Khau-/goan), they 
were herders from south and central Namibia who arrived in the area around Frans-
fontein in the 1890s.6 Searching for water, the Swartbooi encountered the Fransfon-
tein fountain and named the place after one of them, Frans Swartbooi. However, as 
Damara oral histories narrate, they were already settled in the area around the foun-
tain, a place they had named Anipira a he (the place where the birds drink). This is 
confirmed in the writings by missionary Heinrich Riechmann of the Rhenish Mission 
                                                 
5 The “police zone” was created under German colonial rule in 1906 when the north of the 
country was formally separated from the central and southern parts. Within this central and 
southern “police zone”, whites were permitted to settle (theoretically under police protec-
tion). Under South African martial law (Proclamation 15 of 1919), no person could cross 
the border of the “police zone” without permission. The line also became known as the 
“red line” (see Silvester/Wallace/Hayes 1998: 3). 
6 For more details, see Schnegg (2007a) and Riechmann (1899). 
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Society of Wuppertal, Germany, who settled in Fransfontein in 1891. With the estab-
lishment of Fransfontein by Riechmann and the Swartbooi, the Damara were moved 
to Tsumamas, a spring about 25 kilometers east of Fransfontein (Riechmann 1899; 
Schnegg 2007a). In 1905, the Germans turned Fransfontein into a reserve (RSA 1964; 
Werner 2004: 295) while Tsumamas was declared white commercial farm land. 
Some of the Damara families continued to stay on the newly established white farms 
as workers, building fences, dams and roads; others migrated to the reserve area. Yet 
these events of 1905 were not the first Fransfontein experiences of land dispossession 
through white colonizers. A war in 1897/1898 between the Swartbooi and their He-
rero-speaking allies and the German Schutztruppe at Grootberg, close to Fransfon-
tein, is an example of the conflicts that grew out of land “deals” between local leaders 
and German officials. At the time, the Swartbooi not only lost a significant amount 
of land but had to surrender to the German Schutztruppe with half of the population 
of Fransfontein being imprisoned in Windhoek (Riechmann 1899; Schnegg 2007a). 
The manner in which the Swartbooi fought against the Germans is only one example 
of resistance against land dispossession and German colonialism of this period.7 
During the South African occupation from 1915 onwards, land dispossession con-
tinued. From the 1930s to the 1950s, an especially generous Land Settlement Pro-
gram – described as one of the most generous settlement schemes on the planet (Ful-
ler 1993: 50) – tried to attract white farmers, mainly from South Africa, to Namibia 
(Fuller 1993; Kambatuku 1996; Moorsom 1982: 32; Rohde 1997: 252-253; Sullivan 
1996). One consequence of this in-migration was the creation of “large blocks of 
economically disadvantaged voters able to extract concessions from the government” 
(Fuller 1993: 48), concessions that generally went to the cost of the indigenous pop-
ulation. However, partly because of its peripheral location and partly because of its 
vulnerability to drought, the area that later became classified as “Damaraland” was 
one of the last areas to be settled by white farmers (Rohde 1997: 253).8 The majority 
of surveyed farms in the north-west Damaraland were not settled until 1954 (Kam-
batuku 1996). At that time land speculation by white settlers was booming and the 
value of the surveyed farmland was at its height (Fuller 1993: 52-56; Sullivan 1996: 
15, 17). 
                                                 
7 Another example is the uprising of Hendrik Witbooi at Hornkrantz in 1894. Of course, the 
war of 1904-1907 and the subsequent genocide of the Herero (with an estimated 75 to 80 
per cent of the population killed), including tremendous losses for Nama (with an estimated 
50 per cent of the population killed) and Damara people (Fuller 1993: 27), is the most well-
known instance of resistance against German colonialism in Namibia.  
8 This excluded the not-inhabited coastal strip. 
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From the perspective of the Fransfontein population, the robbery of their land 
was thus a gradual process, a “creeping occupation” (Schnegg 2007a: Figure 2). 
By the end of the process in the 1950s, the Fransfontein reserve was a small island 
in a sea of white commercial farms (see maps in Schnegg 2007a). White settler 
demand for land led to a strong need for cheap labor. In the 1920s, over 60 per cent 
of the non-white population within the so-called police zone worked on white farms 
in rural areas (Botha n.d.; Rohde 1997: 247). During that and the following dec-
ades, the western Namibian reserves of Okombahe, Fransfontein and Otjohorongo 
functioned as labor reserves for the surrounding settler farms (Rohde 1997: 261). 
This is also clearly expressed in the high percentages of Fransfonteiners from the 
oldest generation who worked on white commercial farms (see Figure 3).9 For the 
eldest generation of Fransfonteiners, occupational opportunities other than labor 
migration or communal farming were virtually non-existent. Similarly, educational 
possibilities were very limited for indigenous Namibians and, just as in South Af-
rica, upward mobility was strongly constrained by a job color bar (Tapscott 1995: 
154). 
There was a strong connection between the massive land dispossession of indig-
enous Namibians, the white economy’s labor needs and the establishment of “native” 
reserves (Werner 2004). Reserves were first established by the German colonial ad-
ministration: after the 1904-1907 war, it set up six small reserves, including the Frans-
fontein reserve with an area of 36.188 hectares (Werner 2004: 295). After Germany 
surrendered to the Union of South Africa in 1915, South Africa adopted this policy. 
Its Native Land Act of 1913 served as a “prototype” for “separate development” 
within Namibia in the first years of its colonial rule (Fuller 1993: 25; Werner 2004: 
296). In the 1920s, there were three reserves inhabited primarily by Damara/ Nama 
speakers in western Namibia: Fransfontein, Okombahe and Sesfontein. The “Herero” 
reserve of Otjohorongo, which was later incorporated into “Damaraland”, was cre-
ated in 1925 (Sullivan 1996). The establishment of the reserves alongside the grow-
ing of “white” commercial farms heralded the beginning of the dichotomy between 
“communal” and “commercial” land, one that still applies today. A restricted access to 
land by the indigenous population thus also determined their high availability and 
low cost to the colonial economy (Werner 2004: 292): the reserves allowed white 
farmers and the government to shift responsibility of all social costs (such as old age 
pensions or health care) to the communities on the reserves and thus to the workers 
                                                 
9 Until the uprising of 1904-1907, it was mainly indigenous Namibians from southern and 
central Namibia who were exploited as cheap sources of labor (Tapscott 1995; Jauch 1998). 
After the genocide, a system of recruiting migrant contract labor from northern Namibia 
was established (Tapscott 1995). 
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themselves (see Fuller 1993: 55). But because of the limited value of the land given 
to the indigenous population, the people were not able to accumulate enough assets 
to survive independently of the “white economy” and were forced to work for the 
settlers and to tolerate dismal working conditions (Werner 2004: 292). Additionally, 
heavy taxes on grazing were imposed to extract indigenous labor from the reserves 
(Fuller 1993: 55).  
Because of the difficult working conditions on commercial farms, many Frans-
fonteiners tried to work as rarely as possible for white commercial farmers. Many 
other indigenous Namibians tried avoiding the farming sector altogether and preferred 
working on the mines. However, no one of the eldest generation of Fransfonteiners 
worked for the mines – most likely because there were no active networks linking 
them up with the mining areas. Working conditions on white commercial farms were 
bad and cruel mistreatment was common (Fuller 1993: 57), including both physical 
mistreatment and starvation: “Physical abuse was a possibility and hunger a cer-
tainty”. (ibid: 58) The diet consisted of a ration of white corn meal and sugar, which 
by itself is not a nutritious diet (ibid). However, workers were earning too little to 
supplement this meager diet and many suffered from malnutrition and diseases asso-
ciated with a weakened condition. In these situations, many women of the eldest gen-
eration endured miscarriages and the loss of one or several children while working 
on commercial farms, as Rosalie’s story above illustrates. 
Given the racist conditions under which the reserves were created, life in the “na-
tive” reserves was often not much better. They were administered by so-called Re-
serve Boards, responsible for managing the Reserve Administration Trust Funds in 
which a reserve’s revenues, mainly from taxes, were deposited (Sullivan 1996: 21). 
Although these boards were set up to administer the internal affairs of the reserves, 
they “were in effect institutions designed to ensure that the economic development 
of these areas was in line with the interests of White farmers” (Rohde/Hoffman/Cous-
ins 2000: 327). Thus, these “native reserves” established by the South Africans from 
1915 onwards were not created to foster a sustainable livelihood for indigenous Na-
mibians but to fulfill white settlers’ need for cheap labor (Werner 2004: 292).  
After the German colonial government established Fransfontein as a reserve in 
1905, it expanded in size in the 1930s, again in accordance with the needs of the 
white farmers in the region rather than for the good of its inhabitants. The expansion 
came about when expanding land occupation by white settlers in 1938 forced a group 
described as “Ovambo” (composed of Ovambo- and Herero-speakers) was forced to 
leave Otjeru, a settlement located between Outjo and Omaruru that had been granted 
to them by the German administration (Miescher 2006). The leader of the group, 
Lazarus Amporo, asked Petrus Swartbooi, then head of the Fransfontein Reserve Board 
and leader of the Swartbooi, for support and for permission to settle in the Fransfontein 
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area. Petrus Swartbooi was in favor of the idea and, given the limited size of the 
Fransfontein reserve, submitted a petition to the colonial administration for an exten-
sion to the reserve, a request which was granted.10 This migration was probably the 
largest migration into the Fransfontein reserve; yet it was followed by a number of 
smaller, additional ones, as for example the “!Ganeb migration” of the !Ganeb family 
in the 1940s (Schnegg 2007a). Yet the extension of the reserve did not occur in pro-
portion with the growing population: while becoming more multiethnic, it also be-
came more crowded. At this point it had a police station with a police commander 
who submitted a monthly report to his supervisors in Outjo, updating them on live-
stock and grazing, the number of visas issued, the crimes committed and a classifica-
tion of the population by ethnicity.11 
The lives of the older generation in Fransfontein were thus characterized by ex-
periences of extreme loss in both movement and property. This generation had to 
endure the consolidation of the reserve, the continuous deprivation of land and au-
tonomy, and the forced need to work for white farmers. Until the 1960s, “blacks in 
Namibia were totally excluded from all positions of influence or authority within the 
Namibian polity” (Abrahams 1982: 21). People were forced to work at the lowest 
level of unskilled labor, in the case of Fransfontein’s older generation as workers on 
white commercial farms. 
For the oldest generation of the residents of Fransfontein, the lines of confronta-
tion ran between what was perceived as the “natives” and the “white settlers”, and 
not (yet) along ethnic lines (Lau/Reiner 1993: 11). Indeed, “apart from a few piece-
meal exceptions, rural reserves were not intended to be confined to particular ethnic 
groups until the Odendaal Plan was tabled in the early 1960s” (Silvester/Wallace/ 
Hayes 1998: 46). At this point, a policy of “politicised ethnicity” thoroughly changed 
the structure of indigenous Namibian communities (Kössler 2005: 8; Maré 1993), a 
development we see shaping the middle generation.  
                                                 
10 Schnegg (2007a) mentions that the South African administration might have agreed to the 
extension in order to accommodate Nama from Grootfontein and Walvis Bay rather than 
the “Ovambo” group from Otjeru. 
11 Ethnicity captured in this way is very problematic and biased. However, as Schnegg 
(2007a) shows, ethnic heterogeneity clearly increased in the Fransfontein reserve from the 
1930s to the 1950s as a result of this in-migration. 
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THE MIDDLE GENERATION: SEPARATED BY APARTHEID  
The division into ethnic groups, so central to the construction of apartheid, not only 
resulted in the creation of “politicised ethnicity” (Kössler 2005: 8) between ethnic 
groups but also initiated processes of stratification within ethnic groups. To under-
stand how these class formation processes during apartheid shaped the Fransfontein 
middle generation, it is necessary to first outline the new homeland structures.  
After Namibia’s full administrative “integration” into the Republic of South Africa 
in the late 1950s and 1960s, Namibia was administered as South Africa’s fifth prov-
ince. This annexation also implied the establishment of apartheid and the creation of 
“homelands” based on ethnic criteria in Namibia (Rohde 1997: 258). To achieve this, 
the South African government appointed the so-called “Odendaal commission” in 
1962. Because of international critique, the implementation of the commission’s sug-
gestions, summarized in the “Odendaal plan” (RSA 1964), commenced only in the 
late 1960s (Vesper 1983: 107). One of its main recommendations was the creation of 
ten ethnically homogeneous and self-administered “homelands” (Vesper 1983: 113; 
Wallace 2011: 261-271), among these “Damaraland” that would include the Fransfon-
tein reserve. 
Because of the poor quality of the land that was allocated to Damaraland, already 
the Odendaal plan stated that the majority of the population would be unable to sur-
vive solely from the resources available in the homeland (RSA 1964: 93). Forty per 
cent of the newly created Damaraland was made up of desert (Wallace 2011: 263). 
For the creation of what came to be known as Damaraland, 223 farms were bought 
from their white owners, most of them only surveyed and settled since the 1930s and 
holding extensive cattle and small-stock enterprises (Rohde 1997: 258; see also Rohde 
1994). In addition, some state land and the three existing reserves of Okombahe, 
Fransfontein and Sesfontein were allocated to the new homeland (Rohde 1997: 259). 
Unlike the 8500 hectares that were considered the minimum size of land a white 
farmer needed for farming, residents in the newly created Damaraland had to survive 
on a meager 250 hectares per family. Consequently, many Damara-speakers had to 
live on white commercial farms or in the Windhoek township Katutura in order to 
access employment (Barnard 1992: 213; Rohde 1997: 259). This situation was com-
parable to the situation in other homelands: “As none of these artificially created 
homelands was economically viable in terms of subsistence agriculture, the inhabit-
ants were forced to look for wage employment in order to provide for their families” 
(Jauch 1998: 28).  
As envisaged by the Odendaal plan, the structure of Damaraland’s administration 
was grounded in notions of traditional leadership (RSA 1964: 93). A so-called Damara 
Council was established that took over the functions previously carried by the South 
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African Department of Bantu Affairs, except for issues of defense, security, foreign 
affairs and utilities which remained in the hands of the South African government. The 
council consisted of an appointed chief, his deputy, and the headmen and councilors 
for Okombahe, Fransfontein and Sesfontein. Head or chief of the Damara Council was 
“Damara King” Justus //Garoeb. The town of Welwitschia (later renamed Khorixas) 
became the administrative seat of this Damara regional government. The administra-
tion of Damaraland was subdivided into 12 wyke (wards). Fransfontein was ward nine, 
headed by hoofman (headman) Johannes Isaak Hendriks. Festus !Aseb, Petrus !Gaora-
seb and Rudolf !Nawaseb represented ward nine as councillors.  
With the intention to legitimize the new homeland structure, the first so-called 
“Bantustan-elections” were held in 1978 in Damaraland. However, these elections 
were boycotted by all political groups except for the Damara United Front which was 
linked to the South-African backed Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) (Sullivan 
1996: 22). Then, in 1980, the Damara Council under Justus //Garoeb received a mas-
sive majority. This victory marked the rise of a strong regional power, based on a 
rather static “tribal” identity (ibid). It also marks the emergence of new patronage 
structures in Damaraland. The headmen and councilors of the newly created wards 
started to receive government payments for their administrative services. Further, 
they were now in charge of the distribution of pensions and wages (ibid: 23). Thus, 
the bureaucratization of the Damara homeland created a new elite of politicians and 
administrators, strongly intertwined with the Damara Council. Similar process also 
occurred in other homelands.  
In Ovamboland, the new homeland structures created a “modernizing” elite, qual-
ified through (Western types of) education and consisting of teachers, religious lead-
ers, official/clerks and nurses; this new elite complemented the “traditional” elite of 
pre-apartheid times, consisting of traditional leaders and traders, often lacking any 
Western type of education (Tötemeyer 1978). This latter interconnection may even 
have had historic roots, as Gregor Dobler (2014) traces these types of links back in 
time into colonial Ovamboland. Writing about elite formations in the Kavango during 
the homeland period, Mattia Fumanti (2016) suggests that the disparities between 
“traditional” and “modern” types of elites might be a question of generations.  
Who then formed the new homeland elites? A closer look at the institutional 
make-up of the homelands reveals at least three groups: politicians, civil servants, 
and professionals, such as teachers and nurses (Jauch 1998: 41; Tapscott 1995: 157; 
Werner 1987: 76). However, there was a certain occupational fluidity supposedly 
characteristic also for other African elite formation processes (Daloz 2003; Fumanti 
2016): many politicians, for example, started out as teachers. The salaries this new 
elite earned was on par with salaries earned by white counterparts and were signifi-
cantly higher than those of the average black worker (Jauch 1998: 41). During the 
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1970s and 1980s, most indigenous households continued to live in poverty and in 
some regions the situation even worsened (see Fuller 1993 for Otjimbingwe). For the 
professional, political and administrative elite, though, the economic situation signif-
icantly improved. The differences in wages in the later 1970s were marked: where 
black ordinary wage-earners earned R230 annually (even less in rural areas), the 
chairmen of the homeland executive committees had an annual salary of between 
R22.000 and R28.000, ordinary members of the (ethnic legislative assemblies be-
tween R3000 and R5000, and high school teachers R12.000 to R18.000 (Abrahams 
1982). And in addition to their salaries, elite earners received access to housing, med-
ical aid and pension schemes. In 1984, this class comprised approximately 15-20 per 
cent of all indigenous households (Jauch 1998: 41).  
The emergence of the “new indigenous elite” was recorded by political activist, 
co-founder of the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) and medical 
doctor Kenneth Abrahams (Abrahams 1982: 21). In his work, he defines the elite as 
a group of people occupying positions of superiority by virtue of certain qualities 
(actual, claimed or presumed) of excellence or distinctions (ibid: 21). Introducing the 
elite with Janis Joplin’s famous song line “Lord, won’t you buy me a Mercedes 
Benz”, he demonstrates how the impoverished workers of Katutura called the elite 
the waserauta, those who had “‘sold out’ – to South Africa or to the governing author-
ities or for financial gain. They are considered to have betrayed their people”. (ibid; 
cf. Tapscott 1995: 157). Abrahams (1982: 22) shows how the percentage of indige-
nous Namibians employed in better paying jobs such as management positions or 
occupations in the health sector strongly increased in the 1970s, thus corresponding 
in time with the institutionalization of the homelands. He concludes:  
In short, due to a combination of factors, including the new political dispensation, the estab-
lishment of a National Assembly and Ministers Council, Namibianisation of the civil service, 
the creation of eleven ethnic administrations, the massive departure of skilled White workers, 
and the legal abolition of the Colour Bar in the private sector (commerce, industry, trade, agri-
culture, etc.), skilled and qualified Blacks are, for the first time in our history, able to become 
mobile in upward direction. (ibid: 23) 
Abrahams (1982) compares the Namibian indigenous elites with postcolonial elites 
of other African countries and discovers both similarities and differences. In terms of 
lifestyle, consumerism and influence of “Western” products, practices and values, 
Abrahams sees the emerging Namibian indigenous elite as rather similar to other Af-
rican elites. Huge amounts of public funds were invested into luxurious housing and 
vehicles (ibid: 30). Yet, unlike in other African countries, the indigenous elites in 
Namibia were a “pre-independence phenomenon” that developed long before the 
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country’s independence. Despite their elite status, members of the new Namibian 
elites were confronted with the everyday racism inherent in the apartheid system. 
Apartheid then both enabled the emergence of new indigenous elites and at the same 
time constrained the lives of the new Namibian elites (ibid).  
A moral evaluation of Namibian indigenous elite formation has thus to proceed 
very cautiously (Behrends/Pauli 2012). As Carola Lentz (1994: 151) warned in rela-
tion to Ghanaian elites, one should neither hold “partisan perspectives that idealise 
them as upholders of ‘civil society’ [n]or condemn them as exploitative patron-bu-
reaucrats”. While Tapscott (1993, 1995), Herbert Jauch (1998), Abrahams (1982) and 
Henning Melber (2007, 2011, 2014) critically assess the (mis)behaviour of many in-
digenous Namibian elites since the 1970s, Gerhard Tötemeyer (1978), David Simon 
and Richard Moorsom (1987), Dobler (2014) and Fumanti (2007, 2016) are much 
more cautious.12 Fumanti (2007) stresses that there are significant differences between 
various Namibian regions regarding collaboration, cooperation and the political ac-
tivism of regional elites that need to be considered when evaluating the elites in the 
decades before independence. In Damaraland, the new elite was not perceived as cor-
rupt or exploitive. Rather, the Damara Council was viewed as successful by the local 
population: first, it seemed successful at redistributing wealth to the wards and, sec-
ond, it fought to overcome historically ingrained negative stereotypes of the Damara 
people without compromising its support for SWAPO’s nationalistic ideology (Sul-
livan 1996: 23).  
The classification into modernizing and traditional elites is also helpful to under-
stand the dynamics of elite formation in Fransfontein. Although a modernizing elite 
existed before the establishment of the homeland in the 1970s and 1980s, it was very 
small and mainly linked to the Protestant church that had been established in Frans-
fontein in 1891. By the time apartheid was introduced in Namibia, the Fransfontein 
church hosted a small school, hostel and a health station with one nurse and one pas-
tor. The establishment of bureaucratic structures with the homeland notably increased 
this modernizing elite. Now, jobs as administrator or politician became available. 
                                                 
12 The involvement of the South African state in Namibian class formation processes is an-
other field of inquiry on which the above mentioned authors differ. Jauch (1998), Abra-
hams (1982) and especially Tapscott hold the view that, with the implementation of self-
governance through “homeland authorities”, South Africa fostered the rise of a loyal and 
stabilizing class within the homelands: “As in South Africa at the time, the creation of a 
black middle class was intended to act as a hedge against the growing militancy of the 
masses and to counter their growing antipathy towards capitalism”. (Tapscott 1993: 30, 
1995: 156) In contrast, Fumanti (2007) underscores the agency and resistance of an indig-
enous elites in Rundu. 
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Additionally, a new school and a new health station were opened in Fransfontein, 
offering employment for teachers, nurses and domestic workers. This sudden availa-
bility of new employment opportunities changed the economic structure of Fransfon-
tein. Almost all new occupations of influence, power and prestige were filled by men. 
Women were very differently integrated into the novel economic structures. They 
were placed at the receiving end, being offered low-paying occupations as domestic 
workers by the new male elite. This development was an important element in the 
establishment of a homeland patronage system.  
Big men at work: Homeland patronage systems 
The development of a “homeland” bureaucratic in-
frastructure led to new economic dynamism based on 
state and leadership patronage.  
Richard Rohde/Nature, Cattle Thieves and Various 
Other Midnight Robbers  
The colonial South African state was interested in the development of loyal indige-
nous elites. With the implementation of the homeland administrations from the 1960s 
onwards, emerging local elites had remarkable autonomy to administer public funds. 
A general lack of accountability presented opportunities for politicians, administra-
tors and professionals to enrich themselves through corruption (Tapscott 1995: 157).13 
Although a commission of enquiry into corruption was established (see Rohde 1997; 
Werner 1987), the misappropriation of funds was not really sanctioned. Quite the 
opposite, as Tapscott (1995: 157) states; the behavior of the new “ethnic” elite was in a 
way welcomed by the colonial state: “It is evident that corruption and inefficiency, 
while not endorsed, were nevertheless tolerated as necessary for retaining the support 
of the leadership of the second-tier authorities”. 
A closer look at the dynamics within Damaraland reveals a rather complex pic-
ture. On the one hand, and similar to other homelands, there are multiple accusations 
of corruption, as for example the buying of cars without interest charges, or the allo-
cation of “inconvenience allowances” and “private construction projects” (Botha 
n.d.). The Damara Council was described as “a money picnic”, an observation based, 
                                                 
13 Not all researchers assess the extent of corruption within the homelands in equal measure. 
Tapscott (1993, 1995), Christo Botha (n.d.) and Abrahams (1982) see a strong presence of 
corruption. Simon and Moorsom, in contrast, consider it a much smaller phenomenon, stat-
ing that only “a handful” of politicians engaged in these practices (1987: 85-86). It is likely 
that corruption varied in the different homelands.  
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for example, on the fact that the Council overspent its allocated budget of R20 million 
in 1982–1983 by R9 million (Rohde 1997: 296).14 On the other hand, there was also 
an awareness of significant administrative problems within the Damara Council. In 
the 1980s, the chairman of the Damara Executive Committee, King Justus //Garoeb, 
admitted that his administration lacked good administrators and was not able to deal 
with the influx of 28.000 people into Damaraland (Botha n.d.). //Garoeb also pointed 
out the difficulties in the interaction with white officials. In several instances, for 
example regarding the resettlement of Riemvasmaker people into Damaraland, South 
Africa had failed to consult with the Damara Council (Botha n.d.: 9).  
It is remarkable that, despite a strong increase in internal stratification and multi-
ple accusations of corruption, the Damara council was nevertheless supported by 
most of the Damara-speaking population of the region (Botha n.d.; Rohde 1997; Sul-
livan 1996). Above I already mentioned two possible explanations: the Council’s 
success in remodeling the negative stereotypes of Damara people into a positive and 
self-conscious ethnic identity (Sullivan 1996: 23); and the perception that the Council 
did redistribute wealth to the local level. This redistribution was mainly channeled 
through patronage networks, as I describe below. Yet there is a third reason to explain 
the Damara Council’s credibility among the local population: namely that the over-
spending of funds provided by the colonial South African government was perceived 
as a kind of resistance and revenge against the colonial power. Botha records it in the 
following manner:  
A telling comment on the differing perceptions concerning misappropriation of government 
funds was provided by Emil Appolus, former SWAPO member and “interim government” mem-
ber. Accusations against the Damara Council-controlled government of having misappropri-
ated funds, he stated, invited a reaction from among ordinary Damaras “… that they should 
have stolen more from the Boers”. (Botha n.d.: 9) 
Another example for a Damaraland kai aob (big man) (Rohde 1997: 294) was coun-
cilor Simon G. (Rohde 1997: 295).15 G. was a very successful business man and one 
of the wealthiest men in the region. He died in 1985 in a car accident. He has vari-
ously been described as either a Damara Robin Hood or as a corrupt politician and 
petty criminal (Rohde 1997: 294). He drove a big Mercedes Benz and newspapers of 
                                                 
14 During the same time, the Council’s contribution to the “homeland” budget was R640.000 
(Rhode 1997: 296). This money was mainly gathered through the regional authorities’ re-
sponsibility of collecting a monthly grazing fee of 5c per small stock and 60c per head of 
cattle to supplement their budget (Sullivan 1996: 23). 
15 Singular kai aob, plural (two) kai aora, plural (more than two) kai aogu. 
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the 1980s described him as the best dressed man in Damaraland (Rohde 1997: 295). 
Remarkably, Damara residents did not view his grandeur as elitist snobbism but, 
quite the contrary, widely admired it as an expression of his ability to take advantage 
of the white apartheid regime (Rohde 1997: 296). Their positive evaluation of the 
local “big men” is confirmed in the political continuity of most of these actors in the 
postindependence period. Indeed, several of Simon G.’s “more discreet political as-
sociates, less flamboyant kai aob including King Justus //Garoeb and the present re-
gional councillor for Khorixas district Simson Tjongerero, have remained in political 
office since that time” (Rohde 1997: 296). 
The revenge and resistance discourse was backed up by a complex patronage sys-
tem. Because of their positions, ward leaders, councillors and other administrators 
had access to important resources like drought relief and many other rights and priv-
ileges. Ward leaders and councillors were, for example, consulted on questions of 
residence and disputes over access to land, the latter being rarely taken higher than 
the ward level. The ward’s authority also served symbolic and organizational func-
tions: “Within the impoverished economy of Damaraland, networks of patronage as-
sociated with administratively legitimized leaders and their mediation in issues of 
access to the few resources available was highly significant within the homeland sys-
tem”. (Rohde 1997: 262) 
Jobs were probably the most important asset that the new patrons distributed. With 
the establishment of Damaraland, new buildings, like health stations and schools, were 
built in the administrative capital Khorixas and – though to a lesser extent – also in 
smaller communities. In Fransfontein, the Frans Frederik Primary School was inaugu-
rated in 1964. In 1980, its old, rather small hostel was replaced by a new state-financed 
hostel that offered job opportunities for women as domestic workers. A large commu-
nity hall was built in 1978, today used in particular for weddings. In 2000, a small post 
office moved into one part of the hall. And in 1981, a health station was built in Frans-
fontein. In Khorixas, four primary schools and two secondary schools, all with adja-
cent hostels, and a hospital all opened between 1968 and 1982. Thus, both in Frans-
fontein and Khorixas job opportunities significantly increased and became a central 
element in the emerging patronage systems as employment came to be distributed 
through the local power structures (Sullivan 1996). This also legitimized the positions 
of the tribal authority (Rohde 1997: 262). Equally, “tribal leaders utilised their access 
to state authority and funds to expand their support” (Werner 1987: 76). Yet the kai 
aogu received more than political support and loyalty in exchange for their patronage. 
Often, they also received love and children. This gender dimension of their patronage 
behavior has rarely been explored (Pauli 2010b). In all of the newly built institutions, 
the hostels, schools and health stations, young, unskilled women were employed as 
cleaners, cooks or hostel matrons; many of them were lovers of kai aogu. 
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Hertha’s story of how she received a lifelong occupation as one of the domestic 
workers in the Fransfontein school hostel highlights this central feature of the eco-
nomic and social dynamics of patronage networks. Hertha was born in the mid-1950s 
and came to Fransfontein as a teenager. She continued her school career but dropped 
out at the age of 17 when attending grade 7 because she was pregnant with her daugh-
ter. The baby girl was taken away from her by her family and grew up with the fa-
ther’s family. In 1974, Hertha became pregnant again but lost the baby. Around that 
time she started dating one of the local big men; she was in her mid-twenties and full 
of admiration for the older, married man. He treasured her beauty and her youth. In 
1978, she fell pregnant with his child. At the same time, he assisted her with gaining 
employment at the hostel – first temporarily to replace a worker on maternity leave 
(even though pregnant herself) and then, after the birth of her child, as a permanently 
employed domestic worker. The relationship with the kai aob did not last much 
longer than the birth of the child. However, this child was the only one of her children 
that ever received maintenance by the father. The fathers of her other four children 
never paid any maintenance; Hertha, however, did not sue them. Today, Hertha en-
joys being economically independent. Although she does not earn a lot, she is happy 
to have a permanent income as a hostel worker. She has a small but well-kept house. 
She says that she never wanted to marry any of the fathers of her other children: that 
would have only meant an extra mouth to feed and the loss of her economic inde-
pendence (Pauli 2007a, 2007b). When I asked whether she would have married the 
kai aob, she indicated reluctantly that she probably would have, but that he was al-
ready married when she met him. 
Like Hertha, many young women in the 1970s and 1980s were lovers of influen-
tial men of the homeland’s administration.16 One of the ward’s council members, now 
in his late fifties, provided us with information about all the children he knows he 
fathered: in total, he knows of 20 children he had with 11 women, one of them his 
wife (with her he has five children). Most of his children were born during the 1970s 
and 1980s. However, not all women who gave birth to children of kai aogu received 
support similar to what Hertha experienced. Some received smaller favors and others 
hardly anything at all. Conversely, not all women who were lucky enough to find 
domestic employment in the 1970s and 1980s were lovers of influential big men. 
Jana, born in the mid-1950s, started working as a hostel cleaner in the 1980s. She had  
                                                 
16 These gender relations did not necessarily cease after independence. Furthermore, not only 
the kai aogu of the new administrative structures had lovers and out-of-wedlock children 
in the 1980s; men of the “modernizing elites”, especially teachers, acted in a very similar 
manner to the political kai aogu. 
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Table 4: Occupation of 381 women by birth cohorts 
Birth  












1915-1924 11     11 
1925-1934 28     28 
1935-1944 45  1  1   43 
1945-1954 48 12  2  3 27  4 
1955-1964 58 10  6  5 37  
1965-1974 68  2  2 10 54  
1975-1984 91   1  3 87  
1985-1994 32    32  
Total  381 25 12 21 237 86 
 
been a member of the United Democratic Front (UDF), the party lead by Damara 
Council’s head Justus //Garoeb, for some time. Every time she met //Garoeb at a 
meeting, she begged him for work and stressed that she had always been loyal to him 
and the party. Eventually, Jana says, he pitied her so much that he gave her the work. 
Not only women but also a few men received job favors from the kai aogu, as for 
example toilet cleaners or janitors; yet, most of the permanent, albeit low-paying jobs 
that the patrons gave away were given to young women who were often their lovers. 
Table 4 indicates how closely employment as a hostel and school cleaner is linked to 
two specific birth cohorts, namely women born between 1945 and 1954 and between 
1955 and 1964.  
Of the 25 women who found employment at the Frans Frederik hostel and school,  
22 were born between 1945 and 1964. Furthermore, a quarter of the women born 
between 1945 and 1954 and a fifth of the women born between 1955-1964 have 
worked or are working for the hostel or school, compared to only one woman from 
the earlier cohorts and none in the later ones. All of the women were hired in the 
1970s and 1980s when they were in their twenties and thirties. Most of them had 
children by men from the homeland administration who were influential at that time. 
Women in the “pensioner” category have never been employed as hostel workers or 
94 | The Decline of Marriage in Namibia 
 
at any other government institution such as the health station or the school.17 I sum-
marize state-financed occupations such as teaching and nursing in the column “other 
government employees”. As with the emergence of hostel workers, better paid posi-
tions requiring higher qualifications (as in education, health care or the local admin-
istration) became more common in the 1970s and 1980s. The largest category of 
women, however, finds itself in the “penny economy” category. This is a broad cat-
egory, including occupations such as taking in clothes for washing, collecting fire 
wood, working temporarily for commercial farmers, working as a pastoralist or help-
ing in the mother’s household.  
Only two women born after 1964 were ever hired as hostel workers. Almost all 
younger women never had a chance to work in this sector – all positions were occu-
pied before they came of age. Today, the rather inflated Fransfontein hostel and school 
sector is no longer expanding but rather being cut back. As Hertha’s account of love 
and work has already indicated, the cohort employment pattern that becomes visible 
in Table 4 underlines that hostel work was one of the central modes of exchange 
between the kai aogu and a particular section of the local female population. Through 
hostel work the women received a certain degree of economic security and autonomy, 
most often in exchange for love and children. 
Table 4 also shows the rise of “housewives”. The discourse surrounding these 
married women is that they do not have to work because their influential and rela-
tively wealthy husbands provide for them. In Part II, I analyze these types of marriage 
transformations in detail. Here, I only want to comment briefly on the entanglements 
between male patrons, their wives and their lovers (who sometimes became hostel 
workers). Splendid and expensive weddings were first celebrated in the 1970s. In 
fact, the above-mentioned member of the ward council who fathered 20 children with 
11 women was one of the first people in the area to celebrate a large, sumptuous 
wedding in the mid-1970s. He married a former hostel worker who, after the mar-
riage, stopped working and became a “housewife”. One might argue that the male 
patrons of that time were very privileged – in opulent weddings they married their 
wives and at the same time continued relationships with other women with whom 
they also had children.  
While the local big men thrived, the “small men”, thus men without permanent 
and secure employment, lost out significantly (Rohde 1997: 296). Their chances of 
ever financing one of the increasingly more expensive weddings fell dramatically. 
                                                 
17 Every Namibian who reaches the age of 60 is entitled to receive a monthly pension. During 
our main fieldwork time in 2003 and 2004 the amount was NAD250 per month. The ex-
change rate between Euro and Namibian Dollar (NAD) was about 1:8 at the time of data 
collection. 
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During the last two decades, the postcolonial disempowerment of large portions of 
men has become a topic in African gender studies (Honwana 2012; Silberschmidt 
2001). In Damaraland, “unemployed young men are unable to gather the necessary 
wealth – animals for slaughter, traditional beer and store bought liquor, a dress for 
the bride, and food for the reception – that a marriage requires. As a result, sexual 
unions remain informal, lacking the consent of the community” (Fuller 1993: 297). 
This situation creates underlying tensions that can turn violent (Rohde 1997: 297), 
lead to excessive drinking and erupt into domestic fights. Who then are the big, 
who the small men? Again, the middle generation has profited the most from the 
jobs created with the homelands. More than men from any other cohort, those born 
in the 1945-1954 and 1955-1964 cohorts managed to work as traditional authorities 
or for the local government within the homeland administration.18 Yet they form a 
very small elite compared to the large group of men with insecure or no employ-
ment. 
The patronage system that emerged with the homelands was thus dominated by a 
few powerful kai aogu. These men thoroughly changed marriage by increasingly cel-
ebrating their distinctiveness on an ever larger scale (see Part II). By giving occupa-
tional favors to some of their lovers, the big men (probably unintentionally) also cre-
ated a space for female autonomy. In contrast to the older generation of women whose 
lives were framed by the white settler community, the life chances of the women of 
the middle generation were thus “terribly different in appearance” (Rosaldo 1980: 
111). Next I discuss both the changes and the continuities in the life chances of the 
youngest generation of women. 
THE YOUNGER GENERATION:  
“NOW EVERYBODY CAN HAVE AN OPINION” 
During casual discussions in Fransfontein, the one thing that residents highlighted as 
a central characteristic of the postindependence period was the freedom to express 
oneself. On weekday mornings in Fransfontein it is very common to find people lis-
tening to a phone-in radio program on the national broadcaster in which listeners call 
in to talk about their opinions, worries or problems. The program is aired in all major 
Namibian languages, including Khoekhoegowab. One morning, as my friend Silvia 
and I were listening to the program, a man called in to offer some quite conservative 
views on the role of women in society. Silvia’s reaction took me by surprise: she 
                                                 
18 The majority of both male and female professionals, mainly teachers, also stem from this 
middle generation. 
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laughed at him rather than feeling angry or annoyed. With great exuberance she pro-
claimed: “That’s democracy, now everybody can have an opinion,” and, grinning, 
added, “also stupid opinions”. 
In 1990, SWAPO’s “long walk to freedom” – to borrow Nelson Mandela’s fa-
mous book title – finally came to an end. SWAPO had refused to accept an interim 
government and only considered the UN Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978 a 
viable solution. The resolution included a ceasefire, the return of exiled Namibians, 
the withdrawal of South African troops and a general election to determine the com-
position of a constituent assembly. In 1988, South Africa finally accepted the peace 
plan and in November 1989 the first free general election was held, under UN super-
vision. The election was won by SWAPO and Namibia finally achieved its formal 
independence on March 21, 1990 (Jauch 1998: 29; Melber 2014). 
The situation SWAPO had to master after independence was difficult: “At inde-
pendence the incoming SWAPO government inherited a society in which racial, eth-
nic and class differentiation were firmly entrenched, and in which political enmity 
and social distrust were endemic”. (Tapscott 1995: 162) To overcome these divisions, 
the government initiated a policy of national reconciliation (Tapscott 1993). Alt-
hough this policy was politically and economically expedient, in order to forestall the 
flight of skills and capital from the country and given the experiences made in Angola 
and Zimbabwe, “national reconciliation also reinforce[d] the status quo by protecting 
pre-independence gains of the minority, by reproducing existing relations or produc-
tion and by legitimizing patterns of social differentiation that had existed in the colo-
nial era” (ibid: 162). Thus, processes of class formation continued in postindepend-
ence Namibia, and increasingly transcended ethnic boundaries. On the national level, 
Namibian postapartheid elite formation developed in the following way: “What has 
been emerging […] is at best a crypto-capitalist, petty-minded, self-enriching new 
black elite, which expends its energy on exploiting the public purse” (Melber 2014: 
149), a situation similar to what has been described in other newly independent coun-
tries. At first sight it appears surprising that these dynamics have continued under 
SWAPO rule, a party ideologically oriented towards socialism. But, SWAPO is fore-
most “a nationalist movement, composed of a broad spectrum of social strata” (Tap-
scott 1995: 162), suggesting that there is also room for fostering the privileges of 
elites. Thus, “present-day Namibian society is quite different from the one the move-
ment had promised to create”. (Melber 2014: 150) 
In the former homelands, the laws that had constituted the homeland authorities 
were replaced and powers were removed (Rohde 1997: 263). The property under 
Damara authority reverted back to the Namibian state. Today, Namibia is divided 
into administrative regions. The southern part of former Damaraland is now part of 
the Erongo region while the northern part is included in the Kunene region. However, 
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although former chiefs, headmen and councilors of the Damaraland have officially 
lost their positions, their authority has not markedly diminished: “Headmen and 
councilors have lost much of their ‘official’ status, yet in the absence of anything to 
replace their power, they retain a strong advisory role in conflicts over land allocation 
and land disputes”. (ibid: 264) 
Today, state laws regulate traditional leaders and traditional authorities (Kössler 
2005: 15). In Fransfontein, the Traditional Authorities Act, No. 17 of 1995, has ini-
tiated a number of political changes. As described above, Fransfontein had always 
been a multiethnic community, though it is possible to say that before the apartheid 
period the Swartbooi Nama were probably more influential than the Damara. This 
clearly changed with the apartheid establishment of Damaraland. During that time 
most of the important and influential positions (and many minor ones) were given to 
people who considered themselves Damara. In the postindependence period, the 
Swartbooi Nama have managed to regain their influence.  
Unlike the Damara fraction, the Swartbooi Nama applied soon after independence 
to become the traditional authority of Fransfontein. They were supported by Dr. Lib-
ertine Appolus Amathila, a very influential SWAPO politician, member of the Na-
tional Assembly of Namibia since 1990, Minister of Regional and Local Government 
and Housing from 1990 to 1996, then Minister of Health and Social Services, and 
since 2005 Deputy Prime Minister. Dr. Amathila was born in Fransfontein in 1940, 
into the Swartbooi Nama community. As a result of this action, the Swartbooi Nama 
were gazetted as official traditional authority in the 1990s. They maintain a state-
funded traditional authority office with a full-time secretary in Fransfontein. How-
ever, the Damara also continue to maintain an (unofficial) office in Fransfontein. This 
complicated situation, charged also with “politicized ethnicity” (Kössler 2005: 8), is 
not only restricted to questions of representation. The conflicts are inseparably tied 
to very mundane questions, such as control of land, water and grazing (ibid: 16), but 
also government jobs, and they tackle the economic foundations of collective identi-
ties – production and reproduction. Thus, further arenas of contestation are the estab-
lishment of so-called conservancies, namely the practices and institutions of commu-
nity-based natural resource management (CBNRM) (Linke 2017; Schnegg 2016b; 
Schnegg/Bollig/Linke 2016; Schnegg/Linke 2016), but also the maintenance of the 
church and the erection of historical monuments. Similar conflicts have erupted in 
the former Kaokoland where two conflicting groups are each trying to legitimize their 
power claims through specific readings of history that aim to prove their true “tradi-
tionality” (Friedman 2005).  
The new administrative units have also produced new bureaucratic spaces and 
patrons. In terms of gender relations, the new dynamics very much resemble those 
types of exchange I have described for the homeland authorities of the 1970s and 
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1980s. The following example demonstrates these exchange dynamics. In 2006, the 
position of local governor of Fransfontein became vacant when the office holder was 
promoted to another position. It is the responsibility of the governor to manage sev-
eral public services, such as the supply of water to the community and the provision 
of plots for building a house. Given that official communication and correspondence 
takes place in English, fluency in this language and good bookkeeping skills are nec-
essary for the job. And yet, a young woman in her early twenties with limited English 
and bookkeeping skills was employed in 2006, despite the fact that there had been 
several well-qualified candidates. According to rumors, she was the lover of a new, 
influential kai aob in Khorixas. 
New types of corruption and patronage also include the highly politicized land 
issue (Tapscott 1995; Werner 2004; Melber 2014). After independence, land was al-
located to black farmers through the Commercial (Agricultural) Land Reform Act of 
1995 (Werner 2004). Yet, instead of benefiting disadvantaged and poor citizens, as 
the act had envisaged, it was wealthy politicians who managed to gain access to the 
so-called “resettled farmland” (Werner 2004: 302). These wealthy black farmers be-
gan to push the government for further redistribution of land: again, their aim was 
not to make land available to impoverished rural inhabitants, but to enable themselves 
to enlarge their own holdings (Tapscott 1995: 165). It was at this time too that wealthy 
farmers – often business men, former officials of the homeland administration or pol-
iticians – began to fence off communal pasture for their own private use, a situation 
that also developed in the Fransfontein communal area (Schnegg/Welle 2007).  
From this discussion it becomes clear that class dynamics that developed during 
the period of the apartheid homelands continue into postapartheid times. The joy of 
independence is mixed with bitter undertones. This period has also been marked by 
the dramatic spread of HIV/AIDS that has shaken the foundations of gender and other 
social relations. During our fieldwork stints in 2003/2004, 2005 and 2006, HIV and 
AIDS were very present in the community – both as lived experience and as ambig-
uous discourse. Several Fransfonteiners of different genders and age told us that the 
first time they had had contact with the disease was through a “woman from 
Grootfontein”. She had come to Fransfontein where her aunt cared for her until her 
death. This woman, nameless and identified only by the location she came from, left 
a deep imprint on the collective memory of the community. She was the first person 
in the experience of the Fransfontein community who was open about suffering from 
AIDS and about the possibility that she would die.  
After having outlined central facets of the history of the community and the shap-
ing of three generations of Fransfonteiners, I now turn towards contemporary liveli-





FARMING WITH A VISION 
I want to become a farmer with a vision. Then I know 
that I am on my own now, that I have separated from 
my mother. That I am farming here. Everybody will 
see that, even my mother will see it. And she thinks: 
“For him, now, there is no need to assist him, he is 
farming for himself”. 
Robert/fieldwork interview August 15th, 2005 
The morning Robert tells me about his life vision has been a busy one for him. He 
traveled for an hour by donkey cart from his family’s farm on Sukkle Pos to Frans-
fontein. Sukkle Pos is one of the smaller settlements surrounding Fransfontein. On 
arrival, he went to one of the little Fransfontein shops where he bought a bag of maize 
flour, the main staple food consumed in the area, four sacs of Knorr spicy soup, and 
some sugar, black tea, candles and matches. With these goods Robert has purchased 
the main consumer products that the average Fransfontein resident is able to afford 
(Schnegg 2006a, 2015, 2016a; Schnegg/Bolten 2007). At the family farm, his grand-
parents, an unemployed uncle, two of his sisters and half a dozen of Robert’s young 
nieces and nephews are waiting for his return and the goods he has bought. Robert’s 
shopping tour is mainly financed by his grandparents’ pension money and the cash 
that Robert’s mother is occasionally able to put aside from the revenue of her Kho-
rixas shop. Normally he stays overnight with one of his aunts; employed at the state-
run primary school and hostel, they have all been able to build brick houses with 
electricity and running water for themselves in Fransfontein. Today, however, he 
only briefly visits one of his aunts to catch up on news and gossip. 
Before returning to the farm, he visits us. While sipping black tea and sugar, Rob-
ert dreams of what his life could be like. It is mid-August 2005. In April, Robert 
turned 34. He has two sons, one 10 and the other 7 years old, who are both growing 
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up at their mother’s farm settlement Sorris Sorris, approximately 2 hours by car from 
Fransfontein. More than a year ago Robert returned from the industrial port city of 
Walvis Bay to his parental home in Khorixas and then to the family’s farm at Sukkle 
Pos. For three years he had tried to make a living in Walvis Bay. He took numerous 
jobs, as security guard, filling station attendant, cleaner and worker in a fish factory. 
But none of these forms of employment offered a reasonable salary and at least tol-
erable working conditions. Robert is still waiting for payment from his last job as a 
security guard. Frustrated, he left Walvis Bay. Back home, his mother assisted him 
with food and money. At that time, Robert began developing the idea of becoming 
truly independent. He wants to achieve this through what he calls “farming with a 
vision”. He has some livestock of his own and is also taking care of some of his 
mother’s livestock. For his service, he is paid in kind with offspring from his mother’s 
flock. Robert wants to dedicate himself to farming small livestock, thus sheep and 
goats. This dedication, he hopes, will finally bring him autonomy and peace. He does 
not want to be a drain on his mother’s meagre income and is fed up with being chased 
around by employers who treat him without respect. 
This brief description of some of Robert’s life experiences and dreams tackles 
central dimensions of livelihoods in contemporary Fransfontein: inequality/scarcity, 
mobility/flexibility, autonomy/freedom and networks/support. The majority of the 
population has to be flexible and mobile in order to survive. The “flexible Fransfon-
teiner” is not a recent phenomenon; flexibility has been a recurrent theme in research 
on Damara pastoralists (Barnard 1992; Botha n.d.; Fuller 1993; Gordon 1972; Rohde 
1997; Rohde/Hoffman/Cousins 2000; Sullivan 2000) and Nama pastoralists (Klocke-
Daffa 2001). Flexibility in economic, social and political domains can be described 
as a central cultural asset: “This mobility and inter-connectedness reveals an essential 
facet of social and economic relations implicit to Damara pastoral practice: concep-
tualizations of property, rights to natural resources and flexible notions of kinship are 
defined as inherently fluid and contested areas of communal life”. (Rohde 1997: 290) 
Yet, pre-colonial patterns of flexibility and mobility of Damara and Nama pastoralists 
were severely undermined by colonialism (ibid: 261). Land dispossession and re-
strictions on mobility crucially constrained and limited people’s ability to cope with 
crises like droughts (ibid: 258). Thus experiences of scarcity and inequality, includ-
ing chronic hunger, are closely linked to colonialism and apartheid and continue in 
postcolonial times. 
Today, many people in Fransfontein still own at least some livestock. Yet most 
of the time the revenues from animal farming are not sufficient to ensure survival. 
Thus, individuals, families and households combine a range of economic strategies 
to make ends meet (Schnegg 2009). Autonomy, defined as the freedom from the con-
trol of others (Rao 1998; Schlegel 1977: 8-9), is a very central topic in everyday 
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Fransfontein discourse. As experiences of scarcity, the central importance of auton-
omy is closely linked to the pains and injustices people experienced under colonial-
ism and apartheid. Additionally, many Fransfontein people are disappointed by the 
slow pace at which postcolonial changes are taking place (see Melber 2014). They 
realize that their life chances have not increased as much as they had envisaged at 
independence. Many communal Fransfontein farmers still hope for more and better 
land (Schnegg 2007a). The Fransfontein communal area is overstocked and grazing 
conditions are bad when compared with the commercial farms. The communal Frans-
fontein area directly borders on white commercial farms and Fransfontein people can 
see the injustice in land distribution on a daily basis. Although everybody knows that 
pastoralism is a challenging business, many Fransfonteiners like Robert dream of 
becoming a full-time farmers even under postapartheid conditions. In August 2004, 
Silvia, then 54 years old and recently retired, explained that “all I want to do is to get 
a farm – not a farm on my own, but a place on a farm where I can go and start farming 
with goats and cows”. Even Fransfonteiners with good salaries and secure employ-
ment perceive the pastoral way of life as their ultimate goal and source of autonomy. 
One reason for the overstocking of the communal Fransfontein area lies in the grow-
ing herds of the elite, such as teachers and administrators (Schnegg/Pauli/Greiner 
2013). Thus, the legacy of colonialism and apartheid is still very present. 
My ethnographic description of contemporary Fransfontein livelihoods begins 
with some of the main ethnographic characteristics of Fransfontein: ethnicity, reli-
gion, politics and migration. This leads into an examination of local class structures 
and the economic legacy of apartheid. In a final section I discuss the importance of 
kinship and other networks for surviving in insecure postapartheid times. 
LIVING IN FRANSFONTEIN 
Multiethnic Fransfontein 
In the first chapter of the book on culture and shared traditions in Fransfontein that 
Michael Schnegg and I published in collaboration with local researchers (see “Frans-
fontein Fieldwork”), Otto /Uirab reflects on his ethnic belonging and his multiethnic 
family history that includes Damara, Nama, German and British ancestors. He con-
cludes: “Although I regard myself as a Nama (Swartbooi-clan), I am a multiethnic 
human being”. (/Uirab 2007: 19) Otto thus clearly expresses the importance of both 
dimensions of belonging: his particular ethnic identity as Nama and his multiethnic 
being. Ethnic belonging can be a central aspect of identity formation. It can create 
stability and security for an individual. But ethnic belonging does not necessarily 
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have automatic priority over other affiliations such as class, gender, language and 
many other connections (Sen 2006). Indeed, in many situations it is not ethnicity that 
guides Otto /Uirab’s behaviour and perceptions. Often, other social affiliations are 
more important to him, for instance belonging to a specific generation, his religious 
denomination, his political affiliation or being part of a specific work crew.  
Many cultural practices are de facto shared by the multiethnic people of Frans-
fontein. Khoekhoegowab is the mother language of 74 per cent of the population; the 
remaining 26 per cent are fluent in both Khoekhoegowab and what they consider 
their mother tongue, mainly Otjiherero or Otjivambo. Common marriage rituals, 
shared healing knowledge and similar food customs also transgress ethnic boundaries 
(Dawids et al. 2007). Yet despite these cultural similarities, the political discourses 
in Fransfontein all too often stress differences between ethnic groups. 
In postapartheid Namibia, formulating and asking questions on ethnicity is very 
tricky. Following other countries with multiethnic populations and a colonial past 
(Kertzer/Arel 2002), the government even went so far as not to include a question on 
ethnicity in its 2000 census, but only one on the language(s) that citizens speak. And 
yet, despite this, Michael and I decided to include an open question on ethnicity in 
our ethnographic census (see “Fransfontein Fieldwork”), for two reasons: ethnic groups 
and ethnic discourses continue to be central for the understanding of current political 
and power structures; and, as Otto’s quote above shows, ethnic belonging continues 
to be an important aspect of identity formation in present-day Fransfontein. The am-
bivalence around ethnicity in postindependence Namibia is captured by Reinhart 
Kössler (2005: 9) who argues the following: “The issues of tradition and ethnicity in 
southern Africa, particularly in Namibia and in South Africa, while closely linked 
with the bitter and difficult heritage of apartheid, exhibit a dynamic that goes well 
beyond the vestiges of institutionalised racism”.  
Grouping people by ethnicity was a widespread and violent technique of domi-
nation in colonial Africa and was a central aim of the apartheid state in Namibia. Yet, 
despite various postcolonial attempts of nation building in Namibia, the impact of 
apartheid’s “politicized ethnicity” continues. Contemporary lived ethnicity is complex, 
contradictory and difficult to pin down to just one category (i.e. racism), as Kössler 
(2005) reminds us. Further, several ethnic groups formed by colonial administrators 
have successfully appropriated the colonial concepts, as have the Damara (Fuller 
1993; Rohde 1997).  
In our ethnographic census (see “Fransfontein Fieldwork”), we asked what ethnic 
group(s) people feel they belong to. The question is thus an open one with no pre-
fixed categories on offer. People were able to answer whatever they felt most appro-
priate. Out of the 750 individuals interviewed, 88 per cent (656 persons) answered 
with just one term, for example Damara or Herero. The remaining 12 per cent gave a 
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paired answer, mainly Damara/Nama (in 54 cases) or Nama/Damara (in 15 cases). 
Only one person offered three ethnic affiliations (Damara, Nama and Herero). The 
majority (63 per cent) of the interviewees considered themselves Damara, followed 
by Herero (13 per cent) and Nama (9 per cent). A few people classified themselves 
as San. The Fransfontein area is thus clearly multiethnic. The high number of Herero 
and Owambo people can be explained by migration waves into the area dating back 
to the 1930s (Greiner 2008; Miescher 2006; Schnegg 2007a).  
What effects, then, does this ethnic distribution have on reproduction, kinship 
and marriage? Do people have children with partners from the same or from differ-
ent ethnic groups? Do they marry within or outside their groups? Through our cen-
sus, we have information on the ethnic affiliation of both mother and father for 398 
births (see “Fransfontien Fieldwork”). Remarkably, almost half of all births (44 per 
cent) were multiethnic where mother and father belonged to different groups. Fifty-
six per cent of the births were intraethnic with mother and father belonging to the 
same ethnic group. A closer look at marriages further underscores the relevance of 
multiethnic connections. For 209 marriages captured in our census, we know the 
ethnic identification of both bride and groom. Although this number is not as high 
as for the births, the results do give a good indication of multiethnic relationships: 
where 40 per cent of these marriages are multiethnic in nature, 60 per cent were 
between partners from the same ethnic background. Kinship relations through joint 
children and marriages thus overcome ethnic boundaries in a significant number of 
cases.  
Multireligious Fransfontein 
Christianity preceded colonialism in Namibia (Silvester/Wallace/Hayes 1998: 39-
43). The Comaroffs analyze how Western missionaries communicated ideologies of 
individualism, Western capitalism, importance of work, and domesticity through re-
ligious symbols (Comaroff/Comaroff 1991). In 1844 the German Evangelical Lu-
theran Rhenish Mission commenced its work in Namibia, first in the southern parts 
of the country but rapidly spreading also into central Namibia. In December 1891, 
the German Rhenish Mission sent its first missionary named Heinrich Riechmann to 
Fransfontein. Riechmann built a Protestant church and stayed in Fransfontein until 
his death in 1904. He described his life and work in Fransfontein in two booklets 
(Riechmann 1899, 1900). Since then, the Protestant church has been one of the most 
important social institutions in the Fransfontein area. 
The long-term influence of the Protestant church can also be seen in the census 
data we collected. Information on religious beliefs is available for 738 Fransfon-
teiners. Seventy-nine per cent stated that they are Protestants and ELCRN members; 
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15 per cent indicated Roman Catholicism as their religious denomination; and 5 per 
cent answered that they belonged to a Pentecostal church, mainly the “Moria” (tem-
ple mountain) church or the “Eben-Ezer” church (drawing on 1 Sam. 4:1). Only 1 per 
cent stated that they did not belong to any religious group. When analysed in terms 
of gender, more men (19 per cent) than women (11 per cent) indicated Roman Ca-
tholicism as their religion, while more women (83 per cent) than men (74 per cent) 
were Protestants. Regarding Pentecostal believers, there was no difference by gender.  
Unlike other Namibian regions, as for example the town of Outjo where Sonja 
Gierse-Arsten examines Pentecostal reactions to the spread of HIV/Aids (Gierse-Ar-
sten 2005), Pentecostalism is not (yet) common in Fransfontein. The resident Pente-
costals tried to proselytize fellow Fransfontein community members, but the vast ma-
jority of the population remained skeptical. Silvia, an elder in the local Protestant 
church, actively discouraged fellow Protestants from joining Pentecostal churches. 
With verve she told her neighbors that the Pentecostal churches had stolen the bible 
from the Protestants and that it would thus make more sense to go for the “real thing” 
(Protestantism) rather than the imitation (Pentecostal beliefs).  
While our census data attest to how widespread Christianity is in the area, only 
a closer look at religious practices reveals how central it is in the lives of the Frans-
fontein population (Pauli 2012). Protestant church services are among the most 
important social gatherings in Fransfontein. Every Sunday the church fills up with 
believers, often right to the last seat. People wear their Sunday best: it is very clear 
that no matter how poor someone may be, he or she will try to do everything pos-
sible to attend church in an appropriate outfit. Services can last up to three hours. 
When we arrived in Fransfontein in June 2003, the Protestant church still had a 
resident pastor living next to the church, though he was transferred elsewhere a few 
months later. Because of a very active church council of elders who de facto orga-
nized the Sunday services, the loss of the pastor hardly made a difference in terms 
of religious activity. Only for sacraments like weddings and baptisms would a pas-
tor from Khorixas, a town approximately 20 kilometers from Fransfontein, be called 
in.  
One reason for the importance and success of the local Protestant church has been 
its ability to attract people across gender, class, ethnic and generational lines. Two 
institutions in particular fostered this inclusivity: religious choirs and the council of 
elders. Most of the religious choirs have an inclusive character. Even people who are 
not members of the congregation are allowed to participate. Religious choirs are ex-
tremely popular in Fransfontein. The majority of the local youth is active in one of 
the choirs. They rehearse during the week and perform on Sundays. The active par-
ticipation of a number of choirs (several youth choirs, a women’s choir, a mixed choir 
of senior villagers) during Sunday mass significantly lengthened church services. 
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People are nervous and proud when they stand in front of the congregation to sing. 
The centrality of choirs and church services within the community is also due to the 
fact that besides soccer, which is played solely by boys and men, singing in a choir 
and performing during Sunday mass is the only organized leisure activity in Frans-
fontein. By and large, thus, the Protestant church is perceived as the church of the 
whole community. During our field stay in 2006, however, Catholic Fransfonteiners 
began building their own church. 
ELCRN church elders are elected by the congregation and serve for a six-year 
term. In August 2006, I collected information on the thirteen elders active at that time. 
All language groups (indicators for “ethnic” categories) are represented on the coun-
cil. Wealthier Fransfonteiners were more dominant on the council, though it includes 
several unmarried and less-affluent villagers. Almost half (6) of the elders are wom-
en. Although most (8) of the elders are of an advanced age (55 years or older), some 
are only in their thirties. Two female elders, one the daughter of a Protestant pastor, 
are especially active, influential and visible, often preaching during Sunday services. 
While men dominate other local fields of influence and power, especially traditional 
political authority, the religious field is very much shaped by these two women and 
their preaching. Both have an above-average level of education, having finished sec-
ondary education, and are very eloquent. They used to work as domestic workers in 
government institutions but are now retired and spend most of their time with church 
activities. They are rather outspoken regarding moral issues. One of the female elders 
told me that she is very harsh toward women “stealing” married men and having 
children with them out of wedlock.  
While the overwhelming majority of Damara and Nama people indicated Protes-
tantism as their religious denomination, more than one third of the Herero and 
Ovambo people answered that they belonged to the Roman Catholic church. Together 
with several Damara families they were pushing for the building of a Catholic church 
in Fransfontein. One elderly Catholic told us that she could not attend the Protestant 
church anymore (as she had done for many years) because party politics had taken 
over there. The trigger for this assessment was the renovation of the Protestant church 
around 2000. A plaque displayed at the entrance of the church pronounces that a big 
sponsor of the renovations had been Dr. Libertine Appolus Amathila. Dr. Amathila 
is not only an engaged Protestant but also an influential and highly respected SWAPO 
leader and a supporter of the Swartbooi Traditional Authority. This appropriation of 
the church by a very prominent affiliate of the Swartbooi Traditional Authority was 
not accepted quietly by members of the Damara fraction of the community. In 2005, 
the #Aodaman, a subgroup of the Damara, inaugurated a monument at Fransfontein’s 
public cemetery remembering their “fallen heroes”. Like the plaque at church, this 
monument caused both anger and public debate in Fransfontein. The conflict between 
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the Nama Swartbooi and the Damara mentioned in the previous chapter continues to 
the present. Contrary to apartheid times, religious spaces like the Protestant church 
and the cemetery have become contested terrains.  
Multiparty Fransfontein 
Unlike religious and ethnic affiliation, we did not ask for political party affiliation in 
our census. Participant observation indicates that the majority of the population fa-
vors the UDF, led by Justus //Garoeb, former head of the Damara Council. Until 
today, many Damara people perceive this party as defined on ethnic terms and as 
“their” party. In contrast stands the new political leadership represented by the Swart-
booi Traditional Authority. The Swartbooi Traditional Authority is mainly (though 
not completely) affiliated with SWAPO. Other political parties, like the DTA, are 
also present but not as important as the UDF and SWAPO. 
Several of the Swartbooi traditional leaders stress that political party affiliation 
does not influence their performance as traditional authorities. Indeed, when we 
asked a traditional leader at the Swartbooi Traditional Authority’s office in Fransfon-
tein in 2003 whether there were any connections between the Swartbooi Traditional 
Authority and SWAPO, he stood up and, pointing to the door, declared: “Party poli-
tics? Oh, no! No party politics here. Party politics, out of that door!” The rhetoric 
strategy to separate (party) politics from traditional authority is similarly witnessed 
elsewhere in Namibia. In Kaokoland, a traditional authority representative pro-
claimed: “But that is another issue, that is politics. We do not want to discuss politics 
in this office. Politics and the Traditional Authority are two separate issues, two to-
tally different things”. (Friedman 2005: 43) Like Friedman (2005: 47), we were aston-
ished by the intensity with which the traditional leader denied what to us was an 
obvious political nature of the traditional authority. To understand this rhetoric strat-
egy, a brief look at the legitimization of traditional authorities in postapartheid Na-
mibia is instructive.1  
Simplified, traditional authorities are either viewed critically as a problematic co-
lonial legacy and a central hindrance to democratization (Mamdani 1996) or as a 
flexible institution complementing modernizing process like democratization (Bollig 
2008; Krämer 2011). Whatever stance one takes, in order to justify the existence of 
                                                 
1 There is a range of different terms used in the literature to describe the institution classified 
here as “traditional authority”. Some researchers prefer terms like “chief” (Bollig 2008) or 
“neo-traditional chief” (Krämer 2011), others use the Afrikaans hoofman (headman) or 
king, or even extensions of these terms such as paramount chief. Despite the various clas-
sifications, the positions they name are all connected to colonial rule. 
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traditional authorities in postcolonial Namibia, one has to separate them from party 
politics, even if there are multiple overlaps between the different institutions. Such a 
discourse highlights “custom” and “culture” and differentiates them from “politics” 
and the “state” (see Friedman 2005 for a detailed analysis of such discursive strate-
gies). Without such a rhetoric, the role and relevance of traditional authorities in post-
colonial Namibia would be even more contested.  
What was remarkable, however, was how detached these political conflicts were 
from the everyday lived experiences of most people in Fransfontein. This was one of 
the incentives for our joint ethnographic project on the culture of everyday sharing 
and joined traditions (Dawids et al. 2007). Comparable to our ethnographic research 
and writing project, both Kössler (2005: 12) and Fuller (1998: 212) find that in the 
everyday life ethnic categories are often blurred. In their everyday lives, people in 
Fransfontein often ignore ethnic, religious and political differences. So far, multiple 
collective identities in Fransfontein have been described. The next section provides 
information on different territorial belongings and movements. 
Moving to and staying in Fransfontein 
The Fransfontein region consists of three intertwined livelihoods: the community 
Fransfontein, 25 surrounding settlements in the communal area and four worker’s lo-
cations on white commercial farms bordering the Fransfontein communal area. All 
three livelihoods are interconnected through multiple relations, especially kinship ties. 
In July 2004, the point of reference for our census, we counted 1257 people living in 
this area, 634 men and 623 women. Half of the population (637 persons or 51 per cent) 
lived in Fransfontein itself, 43 per cent (538 persons) lived on the settlements, and 6 per 
cent (82 persons) were employed as workers on one of the commercial farms bordering 
the communal area. The 1257 residents lived in 329 households, of which 137 were 
located in Fransfontein itself, 161 in settlements and 29 in the locations of the commer-
cial farms. Households in Fransfontein itself were thus larger (with on average 4,6 
household members) than households in the settlements (on average 3,3 members) and 
households of the commercial farms (on average 2,8 members). There are several rea-
sons for these variations. Herders in the communal area are often not related to their 
employer’s household and stay there without their own families. We have thus counted 
them as single households. This explains why the number of households was larger in 
the settlements than in Fransfontein. The small household size on commercial farms is 
largely due to the fact that workers were generally not allowed to bring relatives such 
as parents or siblings to live with them on the farms. Further, when a worker retires, he 
or she has to leave the commercial farm so that households do not grow in size inter-
generationally. In contrast, Fransfontein households are relatively large.  
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Migration is a central feature of Fransfontein livelihoods. It is determined first of 
all by the avenues of education that people pursue for their children. It is very com-
mon for parents, for example, to work in one of Namibia’s urban centers, such as 
Windhoek or Walvis Bay, and to leave their toddlers and young children in the care 
of family members in the Fransfontein area (Greiner 2008, 2011). Once children 
reach school-going age, wealthier parents prefer to send them to primary and second-
ary schools in urban areas such as Windhoek, as state-run schools in rural areas, like 
in Fransfontein, do not have a good reputation. Nevertheless, the building of schools 
in the homelands during the 1970s and 1980s has substantially enhanced educational 
opportunities. While the older generation received little or no education, from the 
birth cohort 1955-1964 onwards more than 50 per cent of the pupils irrespective of 
gender completed primary school.  
If parents are financially unable to send their children for schooling to Wind-
hoek or another urban center, their children will attend primary school in Fransfon-
tein. There is no secondary school in Fransfontein. Thus, for their secondary edu-
cation most of these children then move to Khorixas or Braunfels and stay in school 
hostels. If their families can afford it, they will remain in secondary school for six 
years and complete their education with the matriculation certificate. The majority 
of teenagers from Fransfontein, however, never finishes Grade 12 (Pauli 2017b). 
Similar to other rural areas, most scholars fail Grade 10 and drop out of school. For 
them this means returning to their parental homes in Fransfontein and searching 
for a job. This is a development quite common elsewhere in Namibia too, as Rich-
ard Rohde (1997: 278) observes for Okombahe: “The majority of school leavers 
have few options and unemployment levels in Okombahe village were at least as 
high as fifty percent”. 
The few Fransfontein pupils who manage to complete their secondary education 
are almost always children of the elite (Pauli 2009, 2017a, 2018). As the postapart-
heid education system has undergone few reforms since independence and still re-
tains its roots in apartheid education, it continues to deepen existing class divisions 
(Pauli 2017b). Without Grade 12 and the matric certificate, entry into university and 
college is impossible. Well-paid jobs, as those offered by government and NGOs, are 
very often out of reach for school dropouts. What remains is either unemployment or 
unskilled, low-paying occupations. Robert’s job experiences in Walvis Bay, re-
counted above, capture the indignity und frustration associated with such occupa-
tions.  
For adults, the decision to move or to stay in Fransfontein is thus connected to 
age and employment. As soon as someone receives a permanent income, either 
through a pension or a regular wage, they are likely to stay. Women and men of the 
older generation all receive a monthly pension payment. They have lived in the area 
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for a long time. Most of them also run extended households and take care of grand-
children and the family’s livestock (Greiner 2008). For the middle generation, the 
number of years they have permanently lived in the area decreases. An exception is 
formed by the women from the middle generation employed at the school and hostel 
who have also lived in Fransfontein for a long time. The younger generation has 
lived in the area for only brief periods of time. Its members are constantly searching 
for new income opportunities and take jobs whenever and wherever they are avail-
able. This often implies personal hardship, like leaving behind a baby or a sick rel-
ative. During our fieldwork it was common that someone we had chatted to in the 
evening had left town by the next day. This happened one day with Barbara, a twenty-
two-year old who was staying at her mother’s one-room house with her boyfriend, 
their two small children, her mother and her stepfather. One morning one of Bar-
bara’s relatives (MZDH), an influential traditional authority, received a call from a 
friend from Rehoboth in central Namibia. The caller was urgently searching for a 
nanny for his toddler son. Barbara’s mother instructed Barbara to take the job. But 
Barbara was reluctant; she wanted to stay with her own small children. Yet her bar-
gaining power was minimal: she had no permanent income and was dependent on 
her mother who worked as a temporary cook on a safari farm. So Barbara packed 
her few belongings, a blanket, a few clothes and some cosmetics. Within the hour 
she was gone.  
Occupation thus strongly structures the length of time someone lives in Fransfon-
tein. Teachers and nurses, pensioners, hostel workers and traditional authorities have 
all lived in the area for approximately 20 years: all of these occupations are govern-
ment-financed and secure. Every Namibian who reaches the age of 60 is entitled to a 
monthly pension. During our fieldwork in 2003 and 2004, the amount was 250 Na-
mibian dollars (NAD) per month. Compared to the wages of traditional authorities 
and teachers, this seems little. The majority of the population, however, does not 
receive any permanent income. Because of widespread poverty, NAD250 can mean 
a lot for a household. Wages of teachers, nurses or traditional authorities start at 
roughly NAD700 for hostel workers, and rise to more than NAD4000 for the head-
master of the local primary school. In addition to their salary, government employees 
receive health insurance, low cost housing and old age pensions. For most of these 
jobs, initial employment took place in the late 1970s until the mid-1980s. The people 
occupying these positions have lived in the Fransfontein area since that time. Again, 
class formation and social stratification that commenced with apartheid is clearly vis-
ible in the links between occupation and sedentariness or mobility.  
A number of families have been able to stay in the area as communal farmers and 
pastoralists. Given the harsh climatic and ecological conditions of the region, diversifi-
cation is crucial: “The single most important climatic feature of this area is its absolutely 
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low rainfall and the associated unpredictability of the rainfall through time and space”. 
(Sullivan 1996: 25) A complete reliance on pastoralism is thus risky and many commu-
nal farmers attempt to diversify their income, in particular through remittances (Greiner 
2008; Schnegg 2009). As Schnegg (2009) has shown, most pastoral households in 
Fransfontein mix different economic strategies; only some pastoralists are unable not 
do so because they are too poor and do not have sufficient start-up resources.  
The migrants I have described so far all have limited bargaining power to decide 
where they want to live. They leave Fransfontein because they have to. Their migra-
tion is triggered by their economic desperation (for similar observations for Malawi, 
see Englund 2002). At the opposite end is a group of migrants that has comfortably 
resettled in the urban areas as part of a middle class that emerged with independence 
when the politico-economic landscape of Namibia became more diverse and fluid. 
Urban and “black”, these successful migrants are largely located in the national cap-
ital of Windhoek and in other larger urban agglomerations (Melber 2014; Pauli 2018). 
Most hold white collar employment in one of Namibia’s industries, government in-
stitutions or in the service sector, or else they are successful entrepreneurs. For most, 
they are part of the urban Namibian middle class, characterized by an intermediate 
position between the upper and the working class. Yet they retain strong links with 
the rural areas from which they originated, “commuting” between the urban middle 
class when in town and an elite livelihood when in the rural area for holidays or 
extended weekends. In Fransfontein, this group of migrants tends to blend into the 
local elite of pastoralists when visiting the town. The mobility between different lo-
calities and varying structures of stratification makes a simple classification of the 
class status of these successful migrants difficult.  
This group of successful migrants impacts village affairs and livelihoods in dif-
ferent ways. They own a disproportionately large share of the livestock grazing on 
Fransfontein’s communal land (Schnegg/Pauli/Greiner 2013). This can lead to con-
flicts with pastoralists who live in the region and rely on grazing livestock for their 
livelihoods and see the livestock of the absent “class commuter” migrants as only a 
“hobby” or investment. The “class commuters”, on the other hand, see themselves as 
part of village life. They celebrate their weddings in Fransfontein and they want to 
be buried in the village. Some of them build a rural house, to supplement the house 
they have in the urban area where they work. These practices – owning livestock and 
a house and celebrating important rituals – are a way in which these migrants stay 
connected with their “homelands” (Appadurai 1996: 196). They are also ways of se-
curing themselves against possible economic crisis and ensuring a place for retire-
ment (Ferguson 1999).  
In Part II, I show that, for both the “class commuters” and the local elite, cele-
brating splendid weddings in the village is an important way of creating belonging 
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and cultural identity. Weddings of wealthy middle class migrants returning to the 
village form a significant proportion of the few weddings that take place in Frans-
fontein today. Of the eight weddings Michael and I followed in depth between June 
2003 and October 2004 (half of all weddings in these two years), three were cele-
brated by migrants. They came to the village solely for their wedding and left im-
mediately again after its completion. While I discuss these weddings in greater detail 
in Part II, here this short introduction suffices to examine how these urban migrant 
elites are embedded in the local rural class structure and relate to the permanent rural 
elite. 
FRANSFONTEIN CLASS STRUCTURES 
The permanent local elite in Fransfontein consists of regional politicians, traditional 
authorities, teachers and administrators. If one takes the national level as a frame of 
reference, this local elite can be defined as part of the middle class. However, in the 
local context of Fransfontein, it is not middle class but clearly part of the upper class 
strata. 
To better understand Fransfontein class structures, I take a closer look at occupa-
tion and consumption patterns. In Table 5, only households in Fransfontein itself are 
included. For the economic stratification in the settlements in the communal area, I 
draw on Schnegg (2009). Contrary to the diversity of occupations one finds in Frans-
fontein, people living in the communal area all share one livelihood, namely livestock 
farming. Many of these households attempt to diversify their income strategies, mix-
ing pastoralism with pensions or remittances (ibid.). Only very few farmers are 
wealthy. The colonial system has also transformed the lives of these communal pas-
toralists. But class formation is less pronounced in the settlements than in Fransfon-
tein. As indicators for economic stratification, Table 5 presents the occupations of 
Fransfontein household heads, their gender and the distribution of several selected 
consumption items. Information is incomplete for eight households, reducing the 
number of households included in the total to 129. 
On the basis of the occupations of the Fransfontein household heads presented in 
Table 5, it is possible to categorize the 129 Fransfontein households into three groups: 
wealthy elite households, middle class households and low to no permanent income 
households.2 The first three rows of the table, representing teachers and nurses, rep- 
                                                 
2 One might argue that the occupation of only the household head is not enough to classify 
the households. Other household members might have additional sources of income that 
could change the picture. However, additional information on other household members – 
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Consumption items per  





tricity TV Fridge Car 
Teacher/nurse 5  3,9 20 100,0 80,0 100,0 60,0 
Trad. authorities 6  4,6 17   83,3 83,3 83,3 67,7 
Local govt*/ 
police 
9  7,0 0   88,9 55,6 77,8 22,2 
Hostel worker 16 12,4 88   62,5 31,3 25,0 12,5 
Penny economy 68 52,7 44   22,1 11,8 13,2 17,7 
Pensioner 25 19,4 76   12,0 16,0 16,0 16,0 
Total 129 100 50   35,7 24,0 26,4 20,9 
*Govt = government 
resentatives of traditional authorities and employees of local government offices and 
the police, all have relatively high and permanent incomes, though the salaries of 
traditional authorities deviate slightly from this pattern. At approximately NAD1000 
per month, they are not much higher than the salaries earned by hostel workers. How-
ever, most traditional authorities can count on further income sources, especially 
through their ownership of livestock. That traditional authorities form part of the eco-
nomic elite is also clearly underscored by their consumption patterns, as shown in 
Table 5. Like teachers and other government employees, the overwhelming majority 
of traditional authorities have electricity in their homes and own a TV, a fridge and 
                                                 
especially conjugal partners and adult children – only underscore the results presented here. 
For instance, most teachers are married to other teachers and their children receive excel-
lent education opportunities qualifying them for equally well-paying occupations, while 
the economic activities of household members from households with heads living on penny 
economic activities are comparable to those of the head. 
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at least one car (many owning more).3 In sum, only 16 per cent of all households fall 
into the category of wealthy elite households.  
The middle-class category consists of the households of the hostel workers. This 
is also the category with by far the highest proportion of female heads: 88 per cent of 
these households (14 of 16) are headed by unmarried women. With approximately 
NAD700 income per month, ownership of commodity goods among these 12 per cent 
of the total of 129 Fransfontein households is much more limited than among the 
wealthy elite households. Yet, as shown in Table 5, ownership of commodity goods 
is like possessing a fridge or even having a TV is more common for hostel workers 
than among the majority of all households. Hostel workers rarely, however, own ve-
hicles. The majority of hostel worker households occupy houses with electricity 
(these houses have often been constructed by the government and not the workers 
themselves). However, in the overall scheme, this group forms a very small local 
middle class (in contrast to the urban middle class mentioned above).  
The last group consists of households with a low or no regular income. Seventy-
two per cent of all Fransfontein households fall into this category. As Table 5 shows, 
this group contains households headed by pensioners and those that have to live on 
penny economic activities. The overwhelming majority of these households (88 per 
cent) do not have access to electricity. Almost all of them occupy houses constructed 
of wooden beams and cow dung plastering rather than made of bricks. Only very few 
of these households own a fridge or a TV (powered by solar energy). Although the 
number of car owners is relatively high in this group, most cars are very old and rusty 
or not in use at all. This stands in stark contrast to the luxurious and expensive Toyo-
tas and Nissans owned by the wealthy elite.  
This class structure is also inscribed into the landscape and the housing structures 
that people occupy, the focus of the next sub-section.  
Gender, class and housing 
The colonial and later the postcolonial state have both played a crucial role in provid-
ing, or not, groups of people with living space and housing. In Fransfontein, gender, 
occupation and marital status strongly influence where one lives (Pauli 2007a). De-
pending on the geographic location of a house, access to water, sanitation, transport 
or electricity infrastructure can vary tremendously. During the 1960s and 1970s, sev-
eral streets and brick houses were constructed in Fransfontein to provide housing to 
government employees. Up to today, these houses are highly valued. Only 12 per cent 
                                                 
3 The relatively low percentages of car ownership for police and local government officials 
stem from the fact that some of these household heads have access to government vehicles. 
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of the village houses fall into this category. The rent is very low and the houses have 
running water, electricity and several rooms. Figure 4 shows a photograph of a gov-
ernment-built house of a wealthy married couple.  
Both partners of the couple that lived in this house worked as teachers and as such 
had access to government housing. With three bedrooms, a living room, kitchen and 
bathroom, their house is at the upper end of government housing. There are also much 
smaller government houses with four small, equal sized rooms and an outside toilet. This 
type, also called the “matchbox” house, is very common in apartheid-initiated urban 
townships. Most Fransfonteiners, however, lived in houses that are locally called “tradi-
tional”. They are made of cow dung, sand and mopani sticks, called tsaura-haigu ‡hau-
i ‡oab in Khoekhoegowab, sometimes with a corrugated iron sheet roof (see Figure 5)  
Some, but not all, plots on which government houses were built are equipped with 
piped water, and some have electricity. The plots are allocated by the local govern-
ment; everybody may apply for one and will, eventually, get one. Of the 137 Frans-
fontein households, 49 per cent are female headed. A female-headed household is 
defined as a residential, economic and social unit where the major decision-maker is 
female (Iken 1999). Male-headed households significantly differ from female-headed 
ones with respect to the civil status of the household head. Almost all male household 
heads live with a female partner, either the wife or a long-term girlfriend. The oppo-
site is true for female-headed households. More than two thirds of all female heads 
are single. They have no male partner, either because they are widows or because 
they are not in any kind of long-term relationship. The community is thus split into 
Figure 4: Government house of a wealthy couple 
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households of male heads with their partners, especially wives, and households of 
single women. This divide is also manifest in the spatial distribution of households: 
as Figure 6 shows, households are not randomly distributed in space but form spatial 
clusters of male- and female-headed households (Pauli 2007a). Figure 6 shows the 
distribution of different combinations of gender and civil status of household heads.  
Five groups can be distinguished: households headed by married men (marked in 
mint green); unmarried men (dark blue); widows (red); single mothers with no per-
manent income (yellow); and hostel workers (also yellow).  
Households headed by married men are mainly located in two areas: one cluster 
includes numbers 173, 194, 307, 308, 309 and 311 and the other numbers 64, 70, 71, 
86 and 99. The house of the married wealthy couple shown in Figure 4 is part of the 
first cluster. Both clusters are located in the center of the village. In these houses the 
elite resided. The two clusters differ insofar as the houses in the first cluster are rented 
from government whereas the houses in the second cluster are privately owned and 
built, albeit heavily subsidized by government funds. Four of the women for whom I 
collected life stories belong to this group. Claudia and Mona from the middle generation 
are both teachers and live in beautiful, well-kept and rather large government houses. 
Claudia has three children, Mona two. Claudia is married to a fellow teacher; Mona’s 
husband does not have a permanent job. Vanessa (from the younger generation), the 
third woman interviewed from this group, is Claudia’s daughter. She finished matric. 
When she became pregnant with her son, she returned to Fransfontein. She is unem- 
ployed and stays in her parent’s house. Lisa, also of the younger generation, is the 
Figure 5: House built with local materials 
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daughter of an influential traditional authority. Like Vanessa, she is unemployed and 
stays in her parent’s large house. Because of her unplanned pregnancy, Lisa did not 
finish Grade 12. 
Households headed by unmarried men, the second group identified above, hardly 
form clusters and are rather spread all over the map. These heads are a very hetero-
geneous group, ranging from the unmarried and relatively wealthy extension officers 
employed by the agricultural company AGRA with ample money and girlfriends, to 
the long-term couple which is unable to afford a wedding, and the lonesome male 
pensioner who has no family left in the community. The nature of this group might 
explain why it does not form a spatial cluster. None of the women from whom I 
collected a life story belongs to this group. 
On average, widowed household heads, the third group identified above, are 71 
years old and receive the monthly government pension that all Namibians aged 60 or 
older are entitled to. In general, widows live together with some of their children and 
Figure 6: Location of male- and female-headed households in Fransfontein 
Postapartheid Livelihoods | 117 
 
especially with their grandchildren. Contrary to the large government brick houses of 
the elite, all widows live in “traditional houses” with only one or two rooms and an 
outside fire for cooking. The widow Tama from the elder generation, whom I have 
also interviewed, belongs to this group. Because of their secure, albeit low, monthly 
pensions, households headed by widows are in general not as vulnerable as house-
holds headed, for example, by single mothers with no permanent income. Households 
headed by widows are geographically dispersed. One part of the explanation for this 
is linked to the history of the village. When the primary school was built in 1964, 
some of the residents who had lived in the center of the village had to move to the 
periphery. This move affected several of the households headed by widows in the 
mid-2000s.  
The area around household numbers 266, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272 and 296 is 
called ‡oabatere (go out). This area is mostly occupied by single mothers. Most of 
the houses have only one or two bedrooms and lack electricity. Only some have a 
water tap on the plot. All of the women living in ‡oabatere have children with dif-
ferent men but none of them is living together with a man (Pauli 2007b, 2010b), often 
because of quarrels relating to alcohol abuse, cheating and domestic violence. The 
women survive by having diverse economic strategies. Some take in washing from 
wealthier, married women, though the pay earned is very low. Others have older chil-
dren who support them temporarily. From time to time most women receive assis-
tance from the fathers of their children, in the form of food, a goat, clothes or cash. 
Often, the women share these sporadic resources with neighbouring female house-
hold heads that have similar difficulties in making ends meet. Indeed, the women rely 
on each other for support on a daily basis forming networks that are locally called 
augu (Schnegg 2015, 2016a; Schnegg/Bolten 2007).4 Four women with whom I con-
ducted life story interviews were living in ‡oabatere. Tanja from the younger gener-
ation has five children and survives by taking in washing and sharing food with her 
neighbours. Molly, also from the younger generation, has four children and sells 
hand-made handicrafts. Dina from the older generation has eight children and worked 
as domestic worker and cook on several commercial farms. Finally, Isabel, Dina’s 
daughter and also from the younger generation, has one daughter and takes on tem-
porary jobs on commercial farms. 
For the hostel workers, these augu sharing networks are far less important. Two 
main clusters of this group of female-headed households are indicated can be seen on 
the map in Figure 6. One cluster consists of the household numbers 313, 315, 316, 
                                                 
4 Rita Schäfer stresses the importance of female networks within and beyond the household 
for the survival of Ovambo-speaking female-headed households in northern Namibia and 
Zimbabwe (Schäfer 2004). 
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320, 321, 68, 66, 65, 304 and 305. The second cluster is much smaller and encom-
passes household numbers 222, 237 and 211. Although several hostel workers live in 
houses built in what is considered a “traditional way” and mainly made from local 
materials, these houses have more rooms and are better maintained than is the case 
for the “traditional” houses inhabited by widows and single mothers with no perma-
nent income. Four middle-aged and three younger women from whom I collected life 
stories are part of the hostel worker group: Ofelia, Hertha and Jana (all middle gen-
eration) are all hostel workers who received their jobs in the 1970s and 1980s. Each 
of them have four living children. Ofelia is already retired and receives a monthly 
pension. Silvia (also middle generation, with four children) worked as a receptionist 
for a health clinic, though the security and income levels of this job are comparable 
to hostel work. Two of the women of the younger generation are daughters of hostel 
workers: Petra (one daughter), whose mother worked at the hostel, but passed away 
in 2005; and Anna (one child), whose mother still works at the Fransfontein hostel 
and who is the only married woman in this group.5 The third younger woman is Sil-
via’s daughter Mara who has no children. 
The effects of apartheid and the class dynamics that started in the 1970s still per-
meate Fransfontein everyday life. The continuous negotiations and conflicts about eth-
nicity, religion and politics can only be understood when taking the long-term effects 
of colonialism and apartheid into account. Contemporary migration patterns are closely 
linked to occupation and education, themselves direct outcomes of the homeland sys-
tem. After independence, educational reforms have been minimal. The current Frans-
fontein settlement pattern is also a legacy of homeland policies: the distribution of plots 
and the quality of housing are the result of class structures that emerged with the home-
land, leading to class divisions and different forms of exclusion.  
I want to conclude this chapter with a discussion of the practices that help over-
come the divisions and mechanisms of exclusion. Sharing and caring, especially but 
not only within kin relations, present a counterbalance to the harshness of Fransfon-
tein class structures. 
SHARING AND CARING 
Sharing and caring are central concepts in the so-called new kinship studies, a rather 
broad terminological umbrella for a number of contemporary approaches in the study 
of kinship (Alber et al. 2010; Alber/Coe/Thelen 2013; Alber/Drotbohm 2015; Böck/ 
Rao 2000; Carsten 2004; Thelen 2015). Sharing and caring create relatedness, to use 
                                                 
5 Not all women with whom I conducted life stories fit into these five categories.  
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Janet Carsten’s term (2004). She defines relatedness broadly as “the ways in which 
people create similarity or difference between themselves and others” (ibid: 82). Re-
latedness is not the only term that has been suggested to replace or supplement kin-
ship. Janet Edwards and Marilyn Strathern (2000: 152) use other “connective terms”, 
such as belonging and association. Edward Lowe (2002), arguing from a cognitive 
anthropological perspective, works with yet another set of concepts. In his analysis 
of Chuuk social life, attachment is what binds people together. Attachment, like re-
latedness or belonging, is based on sharing, giving, caring and supporting. As Lowe 
stresses: “The point here is not that ‘real’ kin relationships are genealogical whereas 
‘created’ kin relationships are based on interpersonal histories of reciprocal acts of 
assistance and nurturance. All social relationships in Chuuk are defined, in part, by 
the quality of mutual acts of nurturance and support”. (ibid: 128, emphasis in origi-
nal). What exactly creates the ties that bind varies and depends on the cultural con-
text. It can be the sharing of food and milk in Malaysia (Carsten 1997) and the Andes 
(Weismantel 1995), the sharing of space in Asian and Latin American house societies 
(Carsten/Hugh-Jones 1995) or the sharing of time and emotionally charged experi-
ences in California (Weston 1991).  
Common forms of sharing in Fransfontein include the sharing of food, shelter and 
experiences like violence and hunger (Pauli 2013, 2015; Schnegg 2015, 2016a; 
Schnegg/Pauli 2010). The sharing of a (social or biological) parent not only creates 
relatedness between the parent and the child but also among children. This is the case 
for the numerous groot maak kinders (Afrikaans for “the children one raises” or chil-
dren fostered on an informal basis) but also for the high number of children growing 
up in “patchwork” families (Pauli 2007b, 2015). To understand social relations in 
Fransfontein, one thus has to ask how much and what forms of sharing lead to what 
kind of relations. 
In 2004, Michael and I collected personal network data by asking 750 men and 
women about the people they trust most and would ask for emotional and material 
support. In addition to information on kinship terminologies that I collected through 
genealogies and situational vignettes elicited through ethnographic observations, 
these network data provide systematic information on the perceptions and practices 
of relatedness. Neighbors, friends and relatives are most often mentioned (Schnegg/ 
Pauli 2010). Kin from the mother’s side is much more important than paternal kin. 
Female-headed households are widespread in Fransfontein. This residential pattern 
has also been described for southern Namibia and South Africa (Iken 1999; Kuper 
1987; Preston-Whyte 1978; van der Vliet 1984). Adam Kuper (1987: 147) compares 
the South African situation with Caribbean matrifocal patterns. Felicia I. Ekejiuba’s 
(2005) concept of the “hearth-hold”, developed for the West African context and fo-
cusing on the mother-child bond as the most central unit of the household (and also 
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as a substitute for the concept of the household), grasps the situation of many Frans-
fontein households quite well. But for a substantial number of these households, sis-
terly ties are as important as mother-daughter links (Pauli 2013). An extension of the 
concept of matrifocality is thus needed to better understand these household patterns. 
I propose the term femifocality to highlight the centrality of women within these 
household networks and to overcome the matrifocal bias of perceiving central women 
in these households as only mothers or daughters (ibid: 32).  
Most Fransfontein children are raised by female relatives from their mother’s 
kin group. Later in life those people one grew up with often remain very central. 
Here, sibling relations are especially important. It is common that women (and men) 
have children with four, five or even more consecutive partners. As a result, many 
people have a large number of half-siblings. Further, male and female parallel cous-
ins (children of the MZ or the FB) are also classified as brothers and sisters. They 
are addressed in the same way as siblings or half-siblings: younger brothers are called 
!gasab; elder brothers abutib; younger sisters !guisas; and elder sisters ausis. Ter-
minologically, parallel cousins, half-siblings and siblings are all of one kind – broth-
ers and sisters. In everyday practice, the naming might be simplified. The kin term 
!gasab (for a man) or !gasas (for a woman) may be applied to indicate a brother/ 
sister relation. On the other hand, cross cousins (children of the MB or the FZ) have 
their own kin terms: /gamareb and /aisas. Here, no age differentiation is used. Un-
like the sibling relations, relations with cross cousins are often joking relationships 
and might have sexual connotations. People still comment that marriage between 
cross cousins used to be preferential. By the 2000s, this type of marriage has become 
rare. Contrary to the cross cousin relation and in line with the classification of par-
allel cousins as siblings, sexual relations with parallel cousins are perceived as in-
cestuous.  
The same logic just described for siblings also applies to the ego’s parental gen-
eration. The MZ is also a mother. Mother’s younger sisters are small mothers (maros) 
and mother’s elder sisters are big mothers (makeis). Father’s brothers are small fa-
thers (darob) or big fathers (dakeib). Mother’s and father’s cross siblings are again 
termed differently (FZ is mikis, MB omeb).6 
Out of a rather large pool of potential siblings, only a relatively small number of 
relations are actually perceived to be close. Shared experiences, especially during 
childhood, are very important for the creation of these relations. Contrary to this, 
levels of consanguinity (e.g. a B compared to a MZS) are not central in order to 
                                                 
6 For additional information on Khoekhoegowab kinship terminology (including discus-
sions of variations between Damara, Nama and Hai//om), see Barnard (1992) and Widlok 
(1999). 
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estimate the closeness of a brother (!gasab) or a sister (!gasas). John’s narration 
provides some insights into these dynamics of sibling relatedness. Thirty-eight years 
of age at the time of our research, John was born in one of the communal settlements. 
He finished high school and after independence worked for a number of years as a 
teacher. John’s mother, Ofelia, was one of the women I interviewed for her life story. 
She had been a hostel worker and was now retired. Her household is a typical ex-
ample of a Fransfontein matrifocal household: she owns a brick house where she 
lives together with several grandchildren, a number of groot maak kinders (mainly 
those of her sister), and her youngest son with his child and his girlfriend. John, her 
oldest son, and his family inhabit his mother’s former house that stands adjacent to 
her new house. The old house is much smaller and is made of local materials. 
John’s mother has four children with three different men. John himself has no full 
siblings. On his mother’s side, there are 19 people John considers as his siblings, 
12 sisters and 7 brothers. His two half-sisters are not living in the village but in Wind-
hoek and Walvis Bay respectively. John gets along well with them. Both have been 
supportive during his marriage, sending money and buying different goods. With his 
half-brother, however, relations are tenser and there have been fights and quarrels. 
So who are John’s close siblings? In terms of trust, reciprocity and sympathy, the 
person John considers his closest brother is Robert, a MBS. In Damara kinship ter-
minology, Robert is a /gamareb, a cross cousin (MBS), and not a brother. John nev-
ertheless calls and considers him his elder brother, abutib, and not a /gamareb. What 
binds the two together are shared (negative and positive) experiences, shared food 
and shared time. Both spent significant parts of their childhood together at their 
grandparent’s farm. When I interviewed them on their relationship, they explained 
their brotherhood and closeness with the local concept kai//are, growing up together 
(Pauli 2015). These types of important and long-lasting relationships are formed dur-
ing childhood. Even smaller children are not supervised by parents or guardians as 
much as I was used to from Germany. Many Fransfontein children are left by them-
selves for considerable stretches of time. It was indeed common to observe two or 
three children of pre-school ages walking around and even leaving the village or the 
settlement. Food, often only maize flour, is served to children in one bowl and all 
children eat together. Many children share their beds or sleeping places. Corporal 
punishment is very common. If children are abused, they do not search for relief from 
their parents or other caretakers but from other children, the ones they grow up with. 
This is captured by 41-year-old Mona when she explained why Christina, her MZ 
who was of the same aged as she, is her most important sister: “We ate together, we 
slept together, she helped me when I was beaten, I helped her, when she was beaten. 
She feels the same pains as I do; she washes me when I am sick, she makes food for 
me when I am sick”. 
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Kai//are, growing up together in Fransfontein means sharing the pains of hunger, 
beating, coldness and excessive heat; but also the joys of meat eating, rain dancing 
and nightly plays. Out of a pool of possible brothers and sisters, this experience most 
strongly shapes whom one feels close to. The opposite applies as well. At various 
occasions Michael and I observed Petra hardly greeting Henry, her half-brother. 
When we asked her whether she did not consider Henry her brother, she replied: 
“No, not really. You see we are not close. We didn’t grow up together [tama kai// 
are]”. Not growing up together means not sharing. And not sharing means no relat-
edness. 
Clearly, the relations resulting from kai//are are long-term, often lifelong relations. 
Because of the complexity of these long-term bonds, only few such ties are maintained, 
often not more than three or four relations per person. Remarkably, the two kai//are 
relations discussed above are both not genealogical sibling relations. However, they are 
presented, perceived and lived as sibling relations. Why do John and Mona not simply 
use the “correct” kin terms, thus in the case of John and Robert /gamareb for cross 
cousin, and in the case of Mona and Christina maros for small mother? Such a flexible 
use of kin terminology has also been observed in the Okombahe settlement: “Flexible 
notions of kinship are defined as inherently fluid and contested areas of communal life”. 
(Rohde 1997: 290) John and Mona have chosen sibling terms because the meaning of 
sibling relations best expresses the content of their kai//are relations. The use of kin 
terms is a way to express social bonding and to establish new bonds. This central aspect 
of lived Khoekhoe kinship is also described for Hai//om social and economic relations: 
“Hai//om kinship can rightly be called an idiom not simply because it frequently ma-
nipulates genealogical links, but above all because it serves as a communicative aid for 
establishing common ground”. (Widlok 1999: 188) 
Contrary to these long-term relations, social interactions on the level of neighbor-
hoods are more short-term oriented. Augu or demand sharing, based on explicitly 
asking for goods, is widespread. The items exchanged on a daily basis include sugar, 
fire wood, maize flour and matches. Mainly women are involved in augu networks. 
Female-headed households living in ‡oabatere (as described above) are a good ex-
ample of such a female sharing network. All of the households in ‡oabatere have an 
eye on their neighbors’ activities. If someone from a household buys sugar in one of 
the little stores, for example after having received some financial support from a 
child’s father living in a distant town, children and other members from adjacent 
households will quickly visit the household and ask for a share. This sharing of goods 
is complemented by emotional support. Often neighbors are considered as friends. 
Barbara, one of the women living in ‡oabatere, said that a friend is someone with 
whom she can share food and stories. If relatives live nearby, augu networks include 
them. The underlying structure of augu, though, is not kinship but locality. 
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Augu is also a local form of risk minimization. The female networks buffer the 
many injustices women, and especially single mothers, have to endure in Fransfon-
tein. In contrast to the hierarchical and gendered patron-client relations maintained 
by big men since the 1970s, augu networks are formed among equals. This charac-
terstic can also have disadvantages. The solidarity expressed in augu relations can 
turn into distance, mistrust and even conflict if one of the parties feels that the other 
is not being honest about the resources she has available and does not want to share. 
But sometimes the demands from neighbors and kin are so great that hardly anything 
is left to the original owner (Klocke-Daffa 2001; Kuper 1995; Rohde 1997: 293). 
Then one has been “eaten up”, as a local expression states.  
Sharing not only structures everyday life but is also an essential part of life cycle 
rituals (Pauli 2018; Pauli/Dawids 2017). Weddings and funerals (and the subsequent 
/umis family negotiation to deal with the inheritance of the deceased) are the two 
most important social occasions for kin groups to share and perform collectively. An 
especially impressive demonstration of kin collectivity can be observed during the 
engagement ritual, locally called the “asking ritual” (!game-#gans). The following 
chapter provides a detailed description of the different stages in contemporary Frans-
fontein marriage rituals. Here we need to know that, during the !game-#gans, the 
bride’s and the groom’s kin groups debate the pro and cons of the potential marriage 
over the course of several nights. In extensive, partly standardized monologues, rep-
resentatives of the two kin groups question each other’s sincerity and pertinacity. 
These collective performances of kin persist despite a widespread increase of indi-
vidualism that can also be traced in marriage celebrations (Solway 1990, 2016) (ex-
amined in Part II). The process of individualization is countered by the collective, 
kin-based enactment of local (“traditional”)7 marriages. Even wealthy grooms who 
could easily afford and choose a wedding without kin do not want to marry without 
their relatives. The great majority of couples opt for local marriages, which include 
the asking ritual and elaborate ritual slaughtering for which an extended kin group is 
required. Marriages are thus based on sharing relations. 
While historic processes of class formation have resulted in high levels of strati-
fication and inequality, social and economic institutions like kai//are relations and 
augu networks counter these developments by expressing equality, trust and sharing.  
This chapter has discussed in particular how class dynamics have shaped and re-
configured educational, residential, occupational, ethnic, religious and political pat-
terns of affiliation in Fransfontein. The following two chapters focus on marriage and 
                                                 
7 The term “traditional” marriage is widely used in Fransfontein to differentiate Fransfontein 
marriages from “modern” (“white”) marriages. In fact, however, Fransfontein marriage cele-
brations are complex hybrids merging an array of cultural practices. 
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analyze how this institution has been thoroughly transformed by class formation pro-














A few days after her wedding celebration in April 2004, I visited Anna at her mother’s 
house. She was in an excellent mood and joyfully described her emotions: “I am 
feeling like being a big woman now. They are saying this to a married woman. Also 
at the job, when guys are coming there, our boss, he is also saying: This one is a married 
woman”.  
All women whose marriages Michael and I attended during our stay in Fransfon-
tein were extremely proud after their wedding celebrations. In their personal tri-
umphs, the women were rather expressive. In the days after her wedding, Nala, who 
married in 2005, only graciously raised her hand with her new wedding ring and 
smiled triumphantly as she passed her neighbors. People would smile back at her and 
address her with the formal noun sadu (or the Afrikaans U) to express their respect 
for her new status, instead of the informal sats or sas (or the Afrikaans jy). Many 
women mentioned that to be treated with respect (!goasib) is the most important and 
valued consequence of marriage. Respect is not only shown in the ways married peo-
ple are addressed but also in how they are treated at public events like weddings and 
funerals. The importance of marriage as a status marker becomes visible when com-
paring marital status with other social categories like education and occupation. Dur-
ing all rites of passage, there are certain ritual practices that should only be performed 
by married Fransfonteiners.1 For several of these rites of passage (e.g. the first hair-
cut), this norm is not applied too strictly and exceptions are allowed. At weddings, 
however, the married are clearly separated from the unmarried and no transgressions 
are accepted. During an interview in September 2004, Mona, a teacher born in 1963 
and married since 2000, expressed indignation that despite her high level of education 
and prestigious occupation she had not been treated with the same respect that mar-
ried people received when she had still been unmarried: 
                                                 
1 The most important rites of passage in Fransfontein are a newborn’s first haircut, baptism, 
school graduation, 21st birthdays, weddings and funerals (see Pauli 2018). 
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Every time during a wedding they would say: “Ah, the people who are not married, they cannot 
sit here. Only the married people can come and sit beside the groom and the bride. And the 
people who are not married must go outside”. So, I am a teacher and I am coming with my 
friends and they say to me: “Ah, you people must go to that side, only the married people are 
allowed into this house”. How did I feel? It was very bad. They would say: “Oh, the unmarried 
people cannot eat the wedding cake. Only the married people eat that cake”. 
Several practices mark the difference between the married and the unmarried during 
weddings. For instance, during the final handover of the bride to the groom’s family 
on the last day of the wedding, only married people are allowed to sit near the couple 
(often in the bride’s parental home), eat from the wedding cake and receive a special 
portion of one of the slaughtered cattle. Hardly hiding their envy, unmarried partici-
pants observe these ritual practices, often peeking into the house through the win-
dows. Most of them will never marry. Because of tremendous increases in wedding 
costs, marriage rates have rapidly declined during the last decades. The large crowd 
of unmarried men and women in front of the windows can hardly imagine being in 
the place of the bride and groom. They are restricted to watching the happy few cel-
ebrating their marriages and their distintions. 
Yet marriage is also loaded with ambivalence for the happy few who do manage 
to marry. Apart from the triumphs of marriage, so pointedly expressed in Nala’s 
raised hand, there are also traumas and tests involved. Many men and women, in-
terviewed on their marriages and observed during their weddings, expressed frus-
tration about these tests and infringements. All weddings are made up of two basic 
components, the asking ritual that leads to the engagement, and the wedding cele-
bration, generally following many weeks later. Below I will give a more detailed 
description of this marriage process; for the purposes of the discussion about the 
traumas and tests of the marriage process here, we need to focus briefly on some 
aspects of the asking ritual. During the many nights of discussion during the asking 
ritual, the couple’s and each individual partner’s faults and vulnerabilities are dis-
cussed vigorously and at great length; the groom-to-be is required to sit quietly 
with his kin group and the bride-to-be has to listen to the debate from inside her 
family’s house. Personal characteristics like bodily appearance and (dis)abilities of 
the bride and groom are pointed out shamelessly. Many women have commented 
that they felt humiliated by what they hear about themselves during the asking rit-
ual. One woman said that until today, years after her marriage, it is painful for her 
to remember the event. Inversely, the interaction between the two kin groups some-
times gets out of control “with unnecessary comments from the woman’s family, 
humiliating the man’s family” (Dawids 2007: 63). During these debates, the groom’s 
family is in an inferior position and has to follow the demands of the bride’s fami-
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ly, even if this leads to postponements of the proceedings (potentially expensive  
in both time and money to the participants) (Dawids et al. 2007; Pauli/ Dawids  
2017).  
Marriage is a complex process, involving groups, couples and individuals with 
varying interests and aims. For everybody involved in a Fransfontein marriage, tri-
umphs, tests and traumas might be rather closely related, unraveling the different 
aspects of marriage. In this chapter, I analyze the social and ritual practices of mar-
riage (the next chapter, in turn, focuses on the transformation of marriage and links 
the changes to class formation processes). As a conceptual basis for the analysis of 
marriage practices, I first define what is perceived as marriage in Fransfontein. I 
then give a brief review of the data collected on marriage and present some basic 
information on Fransfontein marriages. An account of the first wedding ceremony 
that we witnessed in Fransfontein leads to a detailed description of the main ritual 
elements of engagement and wedding ceremonies. On this basis, I explore, first, the 
different types of marriage in terms of generational, economic and religious varia-
tions, and their distribution and, second, some of the legal aspects of marriage. The 
chapter concludes with a discussion on how the spread of school holidays, initiated 
by the apartheid state, has changed the timing of marriage. 
DEFINING MARRIAGE IN FRANSFONTEIN 
For the local population of Fransfontein, marriages are a clear-cut category. There 
are Christian marriages (mostly Protestant, but also some Roman Catholic and Pen-
tecostal), civil marriages conducted by a magistrate, or marriages in terms of cus-
tomary law. Of the 123 marriages for which Michael and I were able to collect 
information, 91 per cent are Christian marriages, 5 per cent are civil marriages and 
4 per cent are marriages by customary law. In Namibia, all church marriages are 
also registered as civil marriages so that there is no difference between them from 
a legal perspective. Despite a civil marriage’s significantly lower cost, it is gener-
ally not considered a favorable alternative to a Christian marriage, an observation 
also made by other researchers (e.g. Pendelton 1993; Tersbøl 2002). Locally, civil 
marriages are described as !nari !game, stealing a marriage. Marriages by custom-
ary law are not practiced in Fransfontein. People who were married by customary 
law are recent migrants, mainly Himba from the area around Rundu, working in 
Fransfontein as hired herders for local communal farmers. Yet this does not mean 
that Fransfontein marriages are “only” Christian and thereby “modern” marriages, 
nor that the people from Fransfontein have somehow lost “traditional marriages”, 
namely those practiced by customary law. This misconception – a simplistic duality 
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posing seemingly traditional (i.e. customary law) marriage versus modern (i.e. Chris-
tian) marriage – is pointedly demonstrated in Chris de Wet’s observations on Xhosa 
marriages: 
In 1980 I was asking an old woman a naive question, which a number of people had kindly an-
swered in a naive manner for me – well either that, or the categories in my question had some 
salience to them. I asked her: did you marry in the church, or by Xhosa rites, or both? She gave 
me a wonderful answer. She said she was married by Xhosa custom, in the church. For her, a good 
Methodist – who was also a number of other good (and not so good) things – that made perfect 
sense. There had been a Methodist church in the settlement for a hundred years. Almost everyone 
in the settlement was a professing Methodist (as well as a practicing ancestor acknowledger). 
IsiXhosa – our custom – does not necessarily mean “tribal” belief and practice. It is another way 
of saying “our way of doing things”. And going to church is part of our way of doing things – and 
has always been so. It is traditional. So it is isiXhosa. Hence ndatshatisXhosa; ndatshatecaweni 
(I was married by Xhosa custom; I was married in church). (de Wet 2008: 4) 
A similar response would probably be given by most Fransfonteiners (see Mupotsa 
2014, 2015; for a South African perspective, see also Schmidt 1981/82: 67-68). With 
the Lutheran church having been built in Fransfontein already in the late 19th century, 
church marriages are part of the local custom and are perceived as such. Though by 
far not the only element of a Fransfontein marriage, as I show in detail below, it is a 
crucial one. 
A second critical characteristic of marriage in Fransfontein is that marriage is con-
sidered very different from cohabiting unions. Many demographers treat cohabitating 
unions as equivalent to official marriages, a practice that might make sense if one 
wants to understand the risk of pregnancy. From a local Fransfontein perspective, 
however, marriage is seen as a valued and honored institution, while cohabitating 
unions are scorned as #nu gomans omi (black cow marriage or black cow house). The 
house a cohabiting couple lives in might be called !hai-omi (bad house). The differ-
ence between couples is thus not based on residence (a criteria that would distinguish 
couples residing together – no matter whether married or not – from couples not re-
siding together), a criteria demographers take as central, but solely on civil status. 
Married couples are treated and perceived as different from unmarried couples – ir-
respective of residence. 
A third identifying characteristic of marriage in Fransfontein is that the marriage 
process does not take years, unlike in other parts of Africa where the advancement of 
bridewealth payments defines the status of a marriage (Comaroff 1980b; Hunter 
2016; Radcliffe-Brown/Forde 1987 [1950]; White 2016). Research in South Africa 
has shown, for example, that it can take years of bridewealth payments to finalize a 
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marriage and legitimize the children (Murray 1981b), leading to various forms of 
marriage difficulties (Hunter 2016; White 2016). Though there are some marriages 
in Fransfontein where bridewealth is also requested during the opening asking ritual, 
the status of a couple as married is only determined by the completion of the wedding 
celebration and the final handover of the bride, not by any bridewealth payments. 
Before I describe the details of the marriage process ethnographically, I briefly sum-
marize the sources on which I draw.  
Marriage data 
In “Fransfontein Fieldwork”, I described the data Michael and I collected during our 
fieldwork from 2003 to 2005. Here, I want to outline the different kinds of infor-
mation I use for my analysis of marriage in greater detail. The ethnographic descrip-
tion of the marriage process draws on five different types of sources (for a detailed 
discussion of these sources, also see “Fransfontein Fieldwork”):  
 
(1) data on the conjugal histories of 361 men and 364 women (725 in total), collected 
in an ethnographic census in 2004;2 
(2) information on 123 marriages between the 1940s and 2005, elicited through a 
marriage questionnaire in 2004;  
(3) church registers on marriages from the 1890s until 2002;  
(4) narratives of marriage ceremonies and marriages given in 20 life stories and 2 fo-
cus group interviews; and  
(5) ethnographic observations and thick descriptions of 8 weddings.  
 
Data from the ethnographic census enables me to describe the distribution of mar-
riage on an individual level and by using a time-cohort analysis. As Table 6 shows, 
marital status is clearly connected to age. 
Of the 364 women interviewed on their conjugal histories, only 32 per cent (115 
cases) are or have ever been married, while 68 per cent (249 cases) have never been 
married. The number of men who are or were married is even lower: of the 361 men, 
only 25 per cent (89 cases) ever married, 75 per cent (272 cases) have never been 
married. Thus, less than 30 per cent of the whole population is or has been married. 
As Table 6 demonstrates, while the overwhelming majority of elderly men and 
women (up until the 1935-1944 birth cohort) is or has been married, from the 1945- 
 
                                                 
2 Although a total of 750 interviews (362 men and 388 women) were conducted, yet those 
with incomplete information are disregarded. 
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Table 6: Marital status of 361 men and 364 women 
Birth cohort 
Married (at any one 
point in their lives) Never married Total 
Women Men Women Men  
1915-1924 10 11 1 1 23 
1925-1934 25 15 1 7 48 
1935-1944 24 19 17 11 71 
1945-1954 14 16 33 22 85 
1955-1964 22 16 37 43 118 
1965-1974 15 11 50 56 132 
1975-1984 5 1 84 103 193 
1985-1994 0 0 26 29 55 
Total 115 89 249 272 725 
 
1954 birth cohort onwards, the majority of the population is unmarried. The dynamics 
behind this pronounced change are discussed in the chapter “From Decline to Dis-
tinction”. Divorce and separation are extremely rare in Fransfontein. Of the 89 men 
who had married in their lives, 87 per cent (77 cases) are currently married (i.e. at the 
time that the ethnographic survey was conducted in July 2004), 10 per cent are wid-
owers and only 3 per cent are separated (2 cases) or divorced (1 case) from their 
wives. As in other regions of the world, the number of widows is much higher than 
the number of widowers: of the 115 women who had married in their lives, 67 per 
cent are currently married (77 cases), 3 per cent are either separated (2 cases) or di-
vorced (2 cases) from their husbands, and 30 per cent are widows.  
For most marriages, we were able to elicit information on the rituals the individ-
uals underwent during their weddings. This was done in a questionnaire that dealt 
exclusively with marriage and asked questions on support and consumption during 
the marriage celebrations. Of the 132 interviews conducted, 123 cases are valid and 
can be analyzed.  
Unfortunately, it was not possible to establish the exact number of marriages that 
were conducted in Fransfontein in the decade or so prior to the field research. There 
is some indication of the numbers up to 2002 from the church register at the Frans-
fontein Lutheran church, though there were no commensurate numbers available for 
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Pentecostal and Roman Catholic weddings for this period. Yet, as the majority of 
Fransfonteiners is of Protestant faith, the weddings celebrated at the Lutheran church 
or by the Lutheran pastor from 1995 to 2002 at least allow an approximation of the 
absolute numbers.  
On average, 11 marriages were celebrated per annum in the Fransfontein church 
or by the Fransfontein pastor. The differentiation is important because some of the 
marriages recorded in the church book were not celebrated in the church but on set-
tlements in the Fransfontein communal area. From the late 1980s until the late 1990s, 
the Fransfontein pastor at the time aimed at marrying all elderly couples who had 
lived together most of their lives but had never married. To reach these couples, the 
pastor decided to keep the ritual as inexpensive and simple as possible. This con-
trasted sharply with the complex and costly marriage celebrations that had by then 
developed in the area. Most of these elderly couples were married in 1997.  
For 2003 and 2004, we were able to observe and document seven Fransfontein 
weddings in detail, thus about half of the marriages that take place in an average year. 
For three of these and for another wedding in 2005 (Pauli/Dawids 2017), we observed 
both the complete asking ritual and the wedding celebration.  
Three out of the eight marriages we observed were celebrated by wealthy mi-
grants who came to celebrate their weddings in the wife’s community. In Fransfon-
tein it is the norm to marry in the wife’s community. The few Fransfontein locals 
who were able to tie the knot during our fieldwork all had permanent employment. 
An exception was an elderly couple in August 2003 whose two successful children 
financed them a splendid wedding to express their gratitude towards them. This wed-
ding was the first marriage we attended in Fransfontein and became the baseline for 
our later inquiries. It is with this wedding that I start my description of contemporary 
Fransfontein marriages. 
Our first Fransfontein wedding 
At the end of July 2003, Michael and I received our first wedding invitation: we were 
invited to attend the wedding reception of Mr. and Mrs. G. at 4 p.m. in the Lutheran 
church hall.  
On our way to the church hall on the day of the wedding, we passed an other-
wise abandoned house that was now filled with music and people. A delicious smell 
of food saturated the air. Women were cooking the meat and bones of a cow, 
slaughtered the previous day, in huge cast-iron pots. One woman saw us passing 
by and waved. We approached her and she explained that this was the traditional 
way of celebrating marriage: sitting in front of the house, singing, listening to mu-
sic and eating meat. The woman was part of the groom’s kin group. Lacking any 
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family ties in Fransfontein, the groom’s family had rented the house for the occa-
sion. After a little while we proceeded to the church hall. Here two teenage boys 
were controlling the potential guests: only people with a wedding gift and an invi-
tation card were allowed to enter. On one side of the rectangular hall stood a large, 
decorated table, elevated on a wooden platform. At its center sat the bride and the 
groom. They were flanked by the bridesmaids and groomsmen, two couples on 
either side, all dressed in shades of purple. The wedding guests were seated at ta-
bles at floor level spread out across the hall. The setting arrangement gave a strong 
impression of performance and theater: what was staged was the best possible ver-
sion of a marriage celebration, one expressing wealth, abundance and distinction. 
We were struck by how this part of the marriage ritual stood in direct opposition to 
the informal celebrations that we had observed at the groom’s parental house a few 
minutes earlier. 
A young woman told us to place our wedding gift in front of the bridal table. 
There, several other gifts were already on display. Most of the gifts were of impres-
sive sizes. We had bought some cutlery as a gift and, seeing the other large presents 
lying next to our quite modest box, I was worried that this might not have been ap-
propriate. With relief I later learned that our present was indeed very welcome. Some 
of the big presents contained only very small items, such as a bag of instant soup, or 
nothing at all. Because of this, some wedding parties have started to label all presents 
at receipt with the name of the giver.  
At the time of the wedding, we were not yet acquainted with the bride and the 
groom. The couple lived in a settlement on one of the communal farms. Our friend 
and research assistant Jorries, a remote relative of the bride, had been kind enough to 
provide us with a wedding invitation. This was not an easy undertaking as weddings 
are important family events and some people are very skeptical of why strangers 
should participate in them. In the months following this weeding, we received further 
engagement and wedding invitations. One important reason for this was Michael’s 
reputation of being a good photographer. We decided that for every couple that al-
lowed us to participate in their asking ritual and/or wedding celebration, we would 
prepare a photo album with pictures of the ceremonies as gift. This gave us a chance 
to reciprocate and a clear, understandable role at the events.3  
After greeting the other guests at our table, we looked more closely at the wedding 
couple. With surprise we observed that both the groom and the bride were in their 
                                                 
3 This position was aptly described by Gediminas Lankauskas, who acted as photographer 
during his fieldwork in Lithuania: “I now had an identifiable role with a responsibility to 
visually capture some of the most important moments in the lives of the newly-weds and 
their families”. (Lankauskas 2015: 45; see also Pauli 2006) 
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sixties. I asked the person sitting next to me, a young woman who was working as a 
secretary in the town of Otjiwarongo, why the couple was marrying so late in life. 
She smiled at me and said that it had been the wish of the couple’s grown-up children 
to finally marry their parents. In fact, the groom would have preferred an investment 
into livestock instead, yet the bride was very pleased with the suggestion. Most of 
their lives, the couple had worked for white commercial farmers and had found it 
very difficult to accumulate any money to marry. On one occasion a white farmer 
had agreed to support them but they had to leave the farm before the event took place 
place.  
It was a Saturday, and the couple had married in church at noon. Now, several 
hours later, it was obvious that everybody was quite hungry. The designated master 
of ceremonies, a teacher, announced that food would soon be served. He then intro-
duced the waitresses, seven young women who entered the hall from the adjacent 
kitchen. All of them were part of either the bride’s or the groom’s kin groups. They 
first served the bridal table, placing large bowls of meat and so-called Christmas sal-
ads on the table from which the bridal couple and their bridesmaids and groomsmen 
helped themselves. We learnt later that the salads – carrot and pineapple, potato, and 
noodle salads – were thus called because they are very common at the Christmas 
dinners that white farmers prepare for their workers.4 After the bridal table had been 
served, the waitresses attended to the other guests: each person received a piece of 
meat and three scoops of salad on a paper plate. After everyone had finished eating, 
the master of ceremonies moderated a short program including a wedding waltz after 
which drinks were served. Rather quickly, people began leaving the hall.  
On our way back home, we passed the groom’s parental home again. There, peo-
ple were in high spirits. Many were dancing and singing in front of the house. Unlike 
the rather stiff and theatrical atmosphere in the hall, here the guests seemed much 
more at ease and enjoying themselves. At home, we tried to make sense of what we 
had observed, learned and heard. Our dominant impression was one of puzzlement. 
At the time we saw the two ritual elements at the groom’s parental home and at the 
reception as unconnected and unscripted and they did not make much sense to us. 
Only over the course of the next months would we gain the understanding of how 
they fit into a much larger complex. The following section offers a more detailed 
description of the stages of this complex.  
                                                 
4 Since the 1970s, Fransfonteiners have increasingly appropriated and incorporated this type 
of food into their wedding receptions. 
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AN OUTLINE OF CONTEMPORARY  
FRANSFONTEIN MARRIAGES 
After attending this first wedding, we found out that an extended asking ritual, called 
!game-#gans (marriage asking) or just #gans (asking), takes place as the first step of 
every wedding. If everything works well, this ritual leads to the engagement, the 
reng-#nûis (putting on the ring). Then, after several weeks or even months of prepa-
ration, the wedding celebration commences with the !hae-om #nûis ritual, a weeklong 
seclusion of the bride in a darkened room in her parents’ house. On the Friday of the 
bride’s seclusion and the day before the church ceremony, the !gameb-#as ritual is 
performed where the two kin groups exchange cattle, driving them from one house 
to the other and slaughtering them. Each kin group will prepare its meat inde-
pendently in preparation for the celebrations on the Saturday which each kin group 
will hold separately. The !gameb (marriage) on Saturday begins with the dressing of 
the bride and bridesmaids, and the groom and his groomsmen, at their respective 
houses. This is followed by the ritual of the bride leaving her parents’ house, the 
church service with several associated ritual activities, and finally the reception of 
the invited guests in one of the town halls. Thus, a Fransfontein wedding celebration 
takes place at three locations, each for a different group of people: the bride’s parental 
home for the bride’s relatives, the groom’s parental home for the groom’s relatives, 
and the hall for the wedding reception for the invited guests. The official wedding 
ends when all central actors from both kin groups congregate at the bride’s parental 
home for the /hui-eis ritual (taking off the bride’s veil). This ritual includes married 
couples and respected elders giving the newly married couple advice on married life. 
The wedding is finalized the next morning when the bride is handed over to the 
groom’s family. Table 7 gives an overview of the timing, content and varying loca-
tions of the marriage process. 
The structure presented in Table 7 is only a “script” for how marriage should be 
performed in Fransfontein. Gediminas Lankauskas (2015: 30) reminds us, “although 
most rituals are scripted, they never follow the script to the letter, leaving room for 
interpretation, invention, and improvisational ‘sketching’”. The “script” is similar 
to what Lilia Abu-Lughod calls an outline when she discusses Egyptian Bedouin 
marriages: “Over the years, I attended many weddings, all of which followed this 
outline, yet each of which was distinct”. (Abu-Lughod 1991: 156) Thus, it is crucial 
not just to study the outline of marriages but also the variations instantiated in each 
individual marriage. This section develops an outline of contemporary Fransfontein 
marriages, presenting and interpreting the various elements and stages of the Frans-
fontein marriage ritual, while the next scrutinizes variations and different kinds of 
weddings.  
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Table 7: Strucure and content of the asking and marriage rituals 
1. !Game-#gans and reng #nuis (Marriage asking and engagement) 
Time Wednesday to Saturday (short version) / Monday to Saturday  
(long version) 
Content Abba gomas (discussion of marriage and bridewealth between  
the kin groups), beginning after sunset and ending with  
the reng #nuis (engagement) on Saturday night 
Place Bride’s house 
Wedding celebrations can commence on the subsequent Sunday, though this  
is seldomly practiced. It is more common to wait several months between  
the reng #nuis and the !gameb. 
2. !Gameb (Marriage) 
Time Sunday Friday Saturday Second  
Sunday 
 (altogether one week) 
Content Kieri-erie-#gas 
and !Hae-om 
#nuis (Stage 1) 
Procession from 




tion (with !nau-i) 
and preparation 
of bride  
!Gameb-#as 
(Stage 2)  
Exchange of 
cattle between 
kin groups and 
slaughtering; 
hanging up of 
meat 
!Gameb 
(Stage 3)  
Church + photos;  
(Stage 4) money 
walk;  




(Stage 6) /hui-eis 


















houses of both 
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The description of marriage here focuses on Damara and Nama marriages.5 For back-
ground information and historical comparative material, I draw on two sources in 
particular: Sigrid Schmidt’s (1981/82) description and interpretation of Nama and 
Damara marriage, based on two marriages from the 1970s, and Sabine Klocke-
Daffa’s (2001) analysis of marriage rituals among the Nama of Berseba, southern 
Namibia. In addition, I draw on Bennet Fuller’s (1993) discussion of cross-cousin 
marriage in his ethnography on Damara livelihoods in Otjimbingwe and Sesfontein; 
on Ursula Dentlinger’s (1983) discussion of aspects of marriage in her analysis of the 
social mobility of the Topnaar of the Kuiseb River; Robert Gordon’s (1972) reflec-
tions on marriage in his work on verbal communication in Okombahe; and Wade 
Pendelton’s (1993) discussion of marriage in his study on the Windhoek township of 
Katutura. 
The description and interpretation of the marriage process follows the chronolog-
ical order presented in Table 7. While all ritual activities during the asking ritual and 
the engagement are concentrated in one location – the family compound of the bride-
to-be’s parents – the seven stages of the wedding celebration are enacted in different 
locations. Each stage commences with a description of the Fransfontein situation, 
drawing on both what Michael and I observed during our fieldwork and on Francois 
Dawids’ description of his and other Fransfontein marriages (Dawids 2007; Pauli/ 
Dawids 2017). In a second step, I discuss and compare our findings to other descrip-
tions of Nama and Damara marriages. 
The asking ritual (!game-#gans)  
The decision to marry is not influenced by a couple’s parents or wider kin groups. 
Both Schmidt (1981/82: 56) and Klocke-Daffa (2001: 149) mention that in earlier 
times arranged marriages probably existed but that they were not being practiced an-
ymore. However, the contemporary decision to marry is not only guided by love and 
other “modern” concepts of individual passion (Thomas/Cole 2009). Current Frans-
fontein marriages have a very real material basis: apart from love, the decision to 
marry is a way to communicate elite status.  
                                                 
5 While it would be of significant value to compare these to marriage outlines available for 
other regions and ethnic groups – such as Ngamiland Herero (Gibson 1958) and contem-
porary Ovambo (Tersbøl 2002) – such an in-depth reading and complex comparison is 
beyond the scope of this chapter. There are some interesting similarities with Fransfontein, 
for example a variation of the asking ritual in the Herero context, but also substantial dif-
ferences, such as in the limitation of bridewealth in Fransfontein. 
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If a couple decides to marry, they inform their parents. In several instances, we 
observed couples planning much more modest and inexpensive weddings than the 
ones they eventually celebrated and had to pay for (Pauli/Dawids 2017). Often, fam-
ily members argue that if they should go through all the trouble of preparing for and 
celebrating a marriage, then a small wedding did not make any sense – the payoffs in 
terms of prestige and status would not be worth the effort. Small weddings and espe-
cially civil marriages look “as if you do not have a family”, two sisters commented 
ahead of their brother’s asking ritual in March 2004. Whenever a marriage takes 
place, the kin groups pull their resources together. And yet, despite much discussion 
that marriages are expressions of great solidarity among kin, there are limits to kin 
support. Repeatedly we observed how kin did not in fact support each other during 
weddings. At one wedding, for example, relatives stole meat from the wedding 
slaughtering. Our systematic data on the wedding support networks show that kin 
finance only a fraction of the actual wedding costs. Relying on kin support only, a 
couple would thus not be able to finance a marriage. The couple, and especially the 
groom, has to have sufficient independent income to pay the major share of the costs.  
The !game-#gans always starts at night. In general, the ritual takes three days, 
from Wednesday night to Saturday night. Both Dawids (2007) and some elder Frans-
fontein informants report that the asking ritual often stretched over more days in the 
past. Shortening it to three days makes it easier for those working in other towns to 
attend the event, having to take leave for only two days (Thursday and Friday). If the 
groom and bride have been living together before their wedding, it is necessary for 
the bride to return to her parents’ house the latest by the night before the asking starts. 
In such a case, the groom’s family might bring along some goods (e.g. sugar, tea, 
maize-meal, candles) wrapped in a white cloth (!uri-!heib) as gifts to “appease the 
woman’s family” (Dawids 2007: 62). Also, if the couple already has children togeth-
er, the bride’s family might ask for compensation from the groom’s family.  
The actual asking ritual will start the night following the bride’s return to her 
parental home. The ritual takes place outside the house of the woman’s family. One 
word captures the essence of the asking ritual rather well: toxoba (please). Without 
doubt, toxoba is the most frequently used word in the communication between the 
two kin groups. Different members of the man’s kin will say toxoba in varying ways 
in the course of the three nights. Thus, at times the negotiation in the asking ritual 
comes to resemble begging rather than asking. The first toxoba is articulated right at 
the beginning of the process when the man’s kin group stands in front of the gate of 
the woman’s parental house and asks for permission to enter. Sometimes, it can take 
hours until the woman’s kin group will grant permission. When the man’s kin is fi-
nally allowed inside, they are often not offered any chairs but have to sit on the 
ground in the yard, facing the woman’s kin group. As Dawids (2007: 63) writes, 
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reflecting on his own experience undergoing the asking ritual as a groom, “sitting in 
front of them, on the ground, is a way of subordination, a sign of humiliation”. Once 
seated on the ground, the woman’s kin ask the man’s kin to provide a light, usually 
given in the form of candles, petroleum lamps, firewood or even a generator. If the 
man’s kin is unable to satisfy the demand, the asking ritual is immediately be broken 
off and postponed to the next evening. Once this demand is fulfilled, the man’s kin 
begins to plead with the woman’s kin for their approval of the marriage. The woman’s 
family refuses this demand for a long time, discussing in detail all the risks they per-
ceive this union would pose. Figure 7 gives an impression of this verbal exchange 
between the two kin groups.  
Michael took this photograph in December 2003 during the asking ritual of two 
migrants who had returned to Fransfontein after having worked in Walvis Bay for a 
number of years. He was sitting behind the man’s family, facing the woman’s kin 
when he took the picture. On the right hand side of the photo is the man’s father. He 
is a well-respected man in the community, as a reason of which he has been offered 
a chair by the woman’s kin. Facing the groom’s father are the woman’s mother and 
one of her makeis (big mother), obscured by two kneeling men. Moments before, the 
woman’s family accused the groom-to-be of not being able to provide for a wife be-
cause of his reputation as someone who drinks too much alcohol. To counteract this 
accusation, the groom-to-be approached his future mother-in-law and the makeis on 
Figure 7: Asking for the bride at the !game-#gans 
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his knees and with bowed head, pleading for forgiveness. He is accompanied by one 
of his brothers. 
This is just one example of the many accusations the man’s kin group has to mas-
ter. It is also common that (perceived) errors of other members of the man’s kin group 
are mentioned and discussed, such as a criminal record or even a probable illness. 
The woman’s kin also identify and discuss the flaws and vulnerabilities of the bride-
to-be, which she, secluded in her family’s house, can hear. Her kin might say that she 
is not a worthy housewife, is untidy and does not know how to cook, or that she is 
too young for marriage. In one case, the woman’s family argued that because of AIDS 
it was too dangerous to give away their daughter to strangers. Members of the man’s 
kin group counter these accusations in long monologues, with many rhetoric breaks, 
though the speakers will never denunciate the woman’s family. The man’s kin group 
has to endure the charges and continuously repeat the request for permission for the 
marriage. 
Daisy, who married in 1999 when she was 22, explained that it is mostly the 
makeis who brings forward the accusations and insults during the asking ritual. One 
reason that she identified for this is the jealousy the makeis feel at the fact that their 
younger sister will soon have a married daughter while their own daughters are still 
unmarried (Pauli/Dawids 2017). Fuller identifies another reason for the tensions be-
tween the two kin groups during the asking ritual, namely the fact that the marriage 
is not only about creating a bond between two individuals but one between two larger 
entities. The result is that “future economic bonds, future reciprocal obligations (and 
possibilities) are discussed openly with an honest brutality not seen in any other sphere 
of Damara/Nama life” (Fuller 1993: 234). 
Bridewealth in Fransfontein? 
One part of the asking ritual can also be the request by the woman’s family for a cow 
from the man’s family, the so-called abba gomas. Abba means to carry someone on 
one’s back, such as how mothers or other female caretakers carry babies and small 
children on their backs. Gomas, in turn, is the term for cow. When the woman’s fam-
ily asks the man’s family for an abbas gomas during the asking ritual, it is in fact 
asking the latter to compensate the woman’s family for all the years the woman had 
been “carried”, thus supported, by her family. The abba gomas should be handed 
over between the engagement and the wedding, but often this does not, in fact, take 
place. Even years later, this can be considered as an open debt still owed by the hus-
band and his kin. 
This opens the question of the relationship between the abba gomas and Da-
mara/Nama bridewealth. In how far the abba gomas can be understood as bridewealth 
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is contested in the literature. According to Fuller (1993: 231), “Damara/Nama people 
do not ascribe to bride-price payments”. The groom and his family might pay the 
wedding feast but nothing additional. He does not, in fact, mention the abba gomas 
at all. Klocke-Daffa (2001: 159), who offers a detailed description of the abba gomas 
practice, argues explicitly that it should not be perceived as a kind of “bride price”. 
Bridewealth, she suggests, rather needs to be understood as compensation for the loss 
of a daughter or to legitimize children already born to a couple, both not practiced 
among the Damara/Nama. Schmidt (1981/82: 65) similarly concludes that the abba 
gomas of the Nama and Damara is not a kind of bridewealth because it did not legit-
imize a marriage or children born within the marriage, the role that bridewealth ful-
fills among the Herero or other Southern African polities (Gibson 1962: 5).  
Yet Klocke-Daffa and Schmidt might define bridewealth too narrowly: as Dom-
inique Meekers describes for the Shona of Zimbabwe, bridewealth may include the 
roora stage where a cow is handed over to the bride’s mother in acknowledgement 
of her efforts in raising her daughter (Meekers 1993). And, in contrast to Fuller, Klocke-
Daffa and Schmidt, Pendelton (1993: 88) states explicitly that it is indeed customary 
for Nama and in more recent times also for Damara to pay bridewealth. Reporting on 
marriage practices in the Windhoek township of Katutura, the transfer of bruidie 
(possibly derived from the Afrikaans word for bride) requires the parents of the groom 
to bring a cow called apagomas, a transfer that cannot be substituted by money. Simi-
larly, Dentlinger (1983: 153) mentions the institution of “bride-payments” for the 
Nama Topnaar of the Kuiseb river in the 1970s, again in compensation to the wom-
an’s parents for raising the bride (ibid: 154). Gordon (1972: 133) marks the rise of 
bridewealth transfers (which he calls braidie) in Damara marriages in Okombahe in 
the 1960s that began with the incorporation of Okombahe into a wider cash economy. 
Connecting these wider socio-economic changes to class formation processes at the 
local level, Gordon argues that “social performances were increasingly evaluated in 
monetary terms” (ibid: 134). Braidie became part of these dynamics and was per-
ceived as a “payment for bringing up and educating the girl” (ibid). Interestingly, 
Gordon does not mention the abba gomas but only states that there are no definite 
rules concerning the amount of braidie and that it varies from case to case.  
Thus, the question whether the Fransfontein abba gomas might be perceived as 
some kind of bridewealth cannot be answered straightforwardly.6 The ambiguity of 
the concept is also realized locally. Some people in Fransfontein linked the abba 
                                                 
6 The situation is further complicated by the fact that the Damara practiced bride service, 
where the groom worked for his father-in-law for a specific period of time, rather than 
bridewealth (Schmidt 1981/82: 58). Yet, as none of the people we interviewed on marriage 
in Fransfontein mentioned bride service, I do not consider this aspect here. 
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gomas to the institution of lobola as practiced by the Xhosa of South Africa, as ex-
pressed in Dawids’ (2007: 65) explanation that “people who are familiar with the 
South African cultures, traditions, and norms, will recognize this practice because in 
isiXhosa this is referred to as ‘lobola’”. Others argued that the man’s family should 
also receive an abba gomas to compensate them for the raising the groom. This ar-
gument runs in parallel to how the marriage slaughtering changed from a ritual per-
formed only by the groom’s family in the early 20th century to one performed by each 
side with an exchange of cattle (Schmidt 1981/82: 63). A similar development for the 
abba gomas would clearly identify it as something different from bridewealth.  
In my view, the current institution of the abba gomas does include some aspects 
of the bridewealth concept, though there are signs that it might in future become 
completely separated from it. I view the abba gomas as both a gift for the bride’s 
mother acknowledging her role in raising the woman, and as symbolic compensation 
for the reproductive potential that the bride represents: it is only through the repro-
ductive capabilities of the bride that the groom’s family is able to reproduce itself. 
Such a link between marriage and reproduction is very much in line with the broader 
bridewealth concept. The exchange and equation of cattle and women is a recurrent 
topic throughout the Fransfontein marriage process and a general theme throughout 
Southern Africa, most pointedly captured by the title of Adam Kuper’s famous mon-
ograph Wives for Cattle (Kuper 1982, 2016; Pauli/van Dijk 2016). It is, in fact, a theme 
that comes up explicitly in the celebration of the engagement which ends off the ask-
ing ritual.  
The end of asking: The reng #nuis 
The relief felt by the man’s kin group and the bride and groom when the asking ritual 
approaches its end cannot be overstated. After (at least) two nights of accusations 
from the woman’s side and begging, asking, discussing, challenging and pleading for 
forgiveness from the man’s side, the asking ritual is finalized with the reng #nuis 
(engagement).  
The reng #nuis begins with the two kin groups finally agreeing on the marriage. In 
a plain dress, the bride leaves her parents’ house and sits down between the two kin 
groups. She has to pass one final test. She is asked a number of questions on the differ-
ent aspects of her potential new status, in order to ascertain that she is indeed willing to 
take care of her new family (see Dawids 2007: 64) Once she has answered these ques-
tions to the satisfaction of both sides, her relatives hand her over to a female relative of 
the man’s kin group, usually an elderly, married woman, while the groom is handed 
over to the bride’s family. At this point respected individuals from both kin groups will 
issue //namadi (advice) to the couple on how to behave as husband and wife. 
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The next preparatory stage for the engagement involves one of the leitmotifs of 
Fransfontein marriages. The woman’s family presents a new enamel cup to the crowd 
and gives it to the groom’s kin with the remark that the cup is complete and does not 
have any stains. The cup symbolizes the bride and indicates that, like the cup, the 
bride is given to the groom’s kin without any stains or marks. The theme of com-
pleteness plays a similarly crucial role during the marriage slaughtering when all 
parts of the slaughtered cattle are presented and hung up in public. 
The engagement proper with the exchange of rings can then proceed. While the 
bride changes and returns to the yard in a fashionable outfit, a beautifully decorated 
table with food and drinks is prepared. The couple is seated at this table. During the 
subsequent ceremony, two acts have to take place: one is setting the date of the 
wedding; and the other is for the groom and his family to “mark” the bride. The 
“marking” is done by giving the bride jewelry. Often, one of the groom’s makeis 
will “mark” the bride with a pair of earrings, though a necklace, bracelet or watch 
can also be used for this. The reng #nuis per se, when a ring is placed on the bride’s 
finger, is, however, always done by the groom. In general, the bride also marks the 
groom with a watch. Each marking is accompanied by comments by the marker. 
The groom might say that he marks the woman bride as his bride with the ring. The 
theme of “marking” the bride comes from the close symbolic connection between 
women and cattle and the fact that marking in cattle indicates ownership. Jorries, 
whose asking and marriage we observed in 2004, explained the link in the following 
manner: “Like cattle, the bride is marked so that everybody can see that she is not 
free anymore”. The marking is followed by speeches and songs. This often includes 
a champagne contest during which the bride and groom have to compete in opening 
a bottle of champagne and drinking from the other one’s glass. The serving of food 
to all participants marks the end of the formal part of the ritual and the beginning of 
the celebration.  
Detailed descriptions of the asking ritual are only provided by Schmidt and 
Klocke-Daffa. In southern Namibia, the ritual is called the mā-//na (give-away) ritual. 
It has several similar stages to the ones I have described for Fransfontein, though 
Klocke-Daffa does not discuss the marking stage at all and gives the engagement 
little attention (Klocke-Daffe 2001). Similar to our local informants, Schmidt (1981/82: 
58) underscores the symbolic equation between women and cattle in the marking 
ritual, claiming that the marking of the bride has a long tradition and can also be 
observed among other ethnic groups, as for example the Herero. She concludes: “It 
is plausible to assume that this is an old custom that through the influence of the 
country’s white population has been gradually changed”. (ibid) Though the items 
used for the marking have been “modernized” (for example, watches), it thus seems 
very likely that the practice itself has more historic depth. Schmidt makes the critical 
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point that the asking ritual and the engagement should not be perceived as equivalent 
to a European engagement. She argues instead that these rituals go further and are 
already a variation of marriage, “much more comparable to a modern civil marriage” 
than an engagement (ibid: 59).  
The expenses for the asking and the engagement are rather high. Transport and 
accommodation for all relatives on both sides have to be organized and paid for. The 
husband has to buy the jewelry for the marking, often spending an amount equivalent 
to the value of a cow. In addition, a goat has to be slaughtered and drinks have to be 
bought for the celebration, all of which has to be financed by the groom and his family 
(the chapter “From Decline to Distinction” discusses the dissemination of asking rit-
uals and engagements as well as the increased wedding costs in greater detail).  
The time that elapses between the reng #nuis and the marriage ceremony itself 
can vary quite widely. Theoretically, the wedding could proceed immediately after 
the conclusion of the engagement on the Saturday, with the separation of the bride 
commencing on Sunday after the church service. Most commonly, however, several 
months elapse before the wedding is held, not least to give the groom and his kin a 
chance of recovering financially and preparing for the expenses of the wedding.  
The marriage (!gameb) 
The wedding celebration can be divided into seven different stages (see Table 7). The 
wedding commences with the seclusion of the bride for six days, beginning after mass 
on the Sunday before the wedding (Stage 1).7 On the subsequent Friday, the marriage 
slaughtering is conducted (Stage 2). Late in the morning on Saturday, the church cere-
mony takes place (Stage 3). After church, the couple and their wedding party take offi-
cial pictures and do the “money walk” (Stage 4). From here, they proceed to the wed-
ding reception (Stage 5). Either immediately after the wedding reception or on the 
next morning, the bride’s veil is removed (Stage 6). On Sunday, the bride is finally 
be handed over to the groom’s family (Stage 7). 
Seclusion of the bride (kieri-erie-#gas and !hae-om #nuis) 
On the Sunday before the wedding, the !hae-om #nuis (to be put in a darkened room) 
of the bride commences. As the bride is sitting in church, women of the groom’s kin 
group cover her head with a veil. Singing and ululating, they walk her from the church 
to her parents’ house (see Figure 8). The name of the ritual derives from the “kieri-
erie” sound of the ululation and the word #gas (to put inside).  
                                                 
7 Some families have shortened this period to three days, secluding the bride only after the 
Wednesday service.  
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Although the bride is confined to her parents’ house during the seclusion, and often 
to just one room, it is the responsibility of the women of the groom’s kin group to 
take care of her. The groom’s sisters and other close female relatives bring food and 
beauty products for her. This underscores the liminal character of the seclusion phase: 
the bride no longer belongs to her own kin group anymore but is not yet fully attached 
to groom’s kin group. By feeding her, the groom’s sisters grow a new kinship bond 
and create relatedness between themselves (as representatives of their kin group) and 
the bride.8 The aim is for the bride to gain weight during her seclusion. One of the 
grooms we interviewed explained to us that he wants his bride to look “beautifully 
fat at her wedding day”. Meat, milk and fat should be given to the bride. Again, there 
is also an equation between cattle and wife: neither thin cattle nor thin women are 
seen as desirable. Younger brides have begun to contest this beauty ideal. Influenced 
by Western television and soap operas that portray a very different idea of beauty, 
they do not want to gain any weight; some even want to lose weight. During her 
seclusion, the bride applies a red cream called !nau-i to all parts of her body, and 
especially to her face and neckline, to even and lighten the skin. The cream is made 
from a red stone sourced in the area around Opuwo, finely ground and mixed with 
animal fat.9 During the entire seclusion, the bride is not allowed to go outsideand the 
groom is also not allowed to come inside. However, several of the women I inter-
viewed indicated to me that they tried to sneak out at night to meet their grooms.  
                                                 
8 Feeding to create and maintain relatedness (and kinship) is a central topos in recent kinship 
research (Weismantel 1995; Carsten 2004, 1997). 
9 Fiona Ilonga, who produces and sells this cream in Fransfontein, has written a chapter re-
flecting on local conceptions of beauty (Ilonga 2007). 
Figure 8: Secluding the bride  
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Only Schmidt (1981/82: 59) describes this part of the marriage process. Like our 
Fransfontein informants, the women whom Schmidt interviewed report the use of 
!nau-i and explain the seclusion of the bride in a darkened room with the aim of 
lightening her skin (1981/82: 60). Schmidt notes that earlier reports do not include 
any information on a bride’s seclusion shortly before the wedding ceremony. She 
does indicate, however, that Winifred Hoernlé describes a comparable seclusion pe-
riod as part of girls’ initiation ceremonies. There are indeed some striking parallels 
between the ritual marking a Nama girl’s first menstruation, for example, and the 
Fransfontein seclusion of brides (Hoernlé 1918, 1923: 523-524). According to Ho-
ernlé, first time menstruating girls where secluded in a menstruation hut. During the 
day, they were not allowed to leave the hut and were taken care of and fed with meat. 
Hoernlé writes: “For one of the chief things required of a girl in the hut is that she 
should get fat, with smoothly shining skin”. (Hoernlé 1918: 71) While the girl was in 
the hut, her skin was being treated with something Hoernlé calls !naop, “a face paint 
made by grinding a soft red stone to powder and mixing it with fat” (ibid). Today, 
neither girls’ initiation ceremonies nor menstruation seclusions still take place in 
Fransfontein. But it seems very likely that some of the ritual elements of these former 
puberty rites, especially the seclusion, have been transformed into the marriage ritu-
als.  
Ritual slaughtering (!gameb-#as) 
In Fransfontein, the!gameb-#as (marriage slaughtering) is always done very early on 
Friday morning, ideally at dawn. It begins with the groom and his male relatives 
driving a cow from their house to the bride’sparental home. Once they arrive there, 
the groom kills the cow while his relatives hold the animal down. This can be done 
in various ways, as we observed during the rituals we witnessed. Sometimes the grooms 
stabbed the cow, while at other times the animal’s throat was cut. Once the animal 
has been killed, the groom runs into the bride’s parental home and his relatives pro-
ceed with cutting up the meat.  
Once the meat is cut up, it is hung up (see Figure 9), a practice discussed in detail 
by both Schmidt and Klocke-Daffa. The hanging up of the meat represents another var-
iation of the central symbolic themes of Fransfontein marriage: the equation of cattle 
and wives and the completeness of both. The groom’s family has to present all parts of 
the slaughtered animal – including its blood, its skin and the contents of its intestines – 
to the bride’s family. The soft parts of the animal are displayed in large bowls while the 
large pieces of meat on the bones are hung up on a wooden frame. One of the influential 
female relatives of the groom’s kin identifies all animal parts by naming them, to show 
the bride’s relatives that they are all there. The bride’s family pays painstaking attention 
to the presentation; if any piece were to be found missing, the bride’s family could 
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refuse the animal and force the groom’s family to slaughter another cow. The im-
portance of the completeness of the slaughtered animal is a variation of the equation 
between cattle and women: just as the complete cup presented during the engagement 
symbolizes the untarnished bride, the entire cow symbolizes the groom who enters mar-
riage complete and without a stain. At this point, other goods will also be given to the 
bride’s family, such as sugar, tea and Knorr soup.  
While the bride’s family starts to prepare the meat, several other ritual activities 
take place. Sometimes a married female relative covers the heads of the bride and 
two of her married female relatives with the fat of the cow’s stomach (see Fig-
ure 10).10 It is critical that it is a married woman who performs this, as only a woman 
like her is able to pass on the luck that is necessary to make a marriage work. Schmidt 
(1981/82: 64) and Klocke-Daffa (2001: 171) also mention the custom, highlighting 
the high value fat has for most of Namibia’s ethnic groups and how it symbolizes 
fecundity. Thus, both the fat and the fact that it is a married woman applying it bring 
luck and fecundity to the marriage.  
Another ritual activity done as the meat is being prepared is the #gui-/hamises 
(tearing of the stomach) ritual. During this, two respected, elderly and married 
women from each of the kin groups tear one of the stomachs or the intestine of the 
cow to symbolize that, from now on, the two kin groups have to share. Interestingly, 
                                                 
10 According to Michael Bollig (personal communication July 2009), these practices resem-
ble those among the Herero and Himba.  
Figure 9: Hanging up the meat  
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this practice is not mentioned in any of the literature on Nama and Damara marriage. 
After these additional ritual activities are completed at the bride’s parental home, the 
groom’s kin group returns to the groom’s parental house and awaits the bride’s kin 
group to arrive and to present it with its cow. The ritual practice of slaughtering and 
presenting the cow at the groom’s parental house is very similar to the one at the 
bride’s parental house, yet the slaughtering will be performed by one of the bride’s 
brothers. For the rest of the Friday, both kin groups will stay at their respective houses 
and prepare for the wedding day. 
Schmidt (1981/82: 63) reports that the practice of the reciprocal slaughtering by 
the bride’s family appeared in the first half of the 20th century. Beforehand, only the 
groom’s kin group slaughtered a cow. She also mentions a further custom that con-
tinues to be practiced in present-day Fransfontein, namely placing a white flag on the 
roofs of each of the two parental homes to indicate the marriage (ibid). Schmidt as-
cribes this practice to white Afrikaans marriage rituals.11  
The church wedding 
In Fransfontein, the church wedding is always celebrated late on Saturday morning. 
The morning until then is spent by the groom and his groomsmen and the bride and 
her bridesmaids to prepare themselves for the church ceremony in their respective 
                                                 
11 Already in the 1950s, Laura Longmore (1959: 94) observed white flags as a symbol for 
upcoming weddings in a township of Johannesburg. 
Figure 10: Putting fat from a cow’s stomach on the bride’s head 
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parental houses. Women of the groom’s kin take the wedding dress to the bride and 
help her to get ready.  
The bride and the groom have asked siblings and friends to be their bridesmaids 
and groomsmen. Both Khoekhoegowab terms – strei-aon for groomsman and strei-
taras for bridesmaid – are derived from Afrikaans words: strei is a variation of the 
Afrikaans strooi (straw), while aon means man and taras means woman in Khoek-
hoegowab. Like the practice of placing white flags on the parental houses of bridal 
couple, the appropriation of these words indicates the influence of Afrikaans culture 
on Nama and Damara marriages (cf. Schmidt 1981/82: 65). In Afrikaans the bride’s 
male attendant is called the strooijonker (literally, straw boy) and the bridesmaid the 
strooimeisie (literally, straw girl). Bridesmaids and groomsmen always form couples. 
The number of couples at a wedding varies – while some weddings might only have 
four couples, others can have as many as eight. Critically here is that the bridesmaids 
and groomsmen are all dressed the same way.  
The church wedding follows common Christian practices. Interestingly, several 
important family members on both sides do not attend the church wedding. They 
are busy celebrating and preparing food at the respective parental homes and at the 
reception hall. Compared to the number of people celebrating at the two parental 
homes and also later at the reception, the number of people attending the church 
wedding is rather small. While the church wedding is an important element of a 
Fransfontein marriage, the low attendance indicates that it is certainly not the only 
highlight. Other ritual practices, especially the asking ceremony, the wedding 
slaughtering and the asking-out of the bride ritual at the end, are as important as the 
church wedding. The couple will sign the marriage register during the church ser-
vice. The marriage will later be reported to the magistrate in Khorixas. Thus, all 
Fransfontein church marriages are always also civil marriages (and registered as 
such). After exchanging the rings, the couple will kiss and then turn to the congre-
gation. This is the first time that they introduce themselves as !game-aob (marriage 
man or husband) and !game-taras (marriage woman or wife). After mass, the new-
lyweds come out of church and the congregation throws rice and confetti. Although 
this practice is of European origin, Klocke-Daffa (2001: 171) comments that its 
symbolism has older roots. She links it to the practice of covering the bride’s head 
with the cow’s stomach fat, with both practices believed to bring luck and fecundity 
to the marriage.  
In comparison, Schmidt (1981/82: 65) mentions the church wedding only briefly. 
Her two key informants did not give any details on their church wedding because 
they assumed that these Christian ritual practices were well known. Klocke-Daffa 
(2001: 170-172), in turn, is much more explicit than Schmidt, though her description 
does not vary much from my own description. The only difference is that weddings 
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in Berseba, where she did her fieldwork, tended to take place on Sundays, rather than 
Saturdays as in Fransfontein (ibid: 173). 
After church: Photos and money 
After the church service, wedding photographs are taken. In Fransfontein, newly-
wed couples either take their pictures at the Fransfontein Fountain, a natural foun-
tain at the outskirts of the village, or in the lush and beautiful garden of one of the 
traditional councillors. Figure 11 shows a typical motive used for wedding pic-
tures. 
It is likely that these gardens play an important role in marriage photos because 
of the symbolic value of water in this water-scarce region. Most other places in Frans-
fontein are dry and dusty, lacking plants and water. Already in the early 20th century, 
Winifred Hoernlé (1923) marked the centrality of water for Nama speaking groups, 
among others also the “Zwartboys” of Fransfontein and Windhoek. While considered 
valuable and essential for life, it is also believed to be able to cause sickness and 
death if not handled appropriately. These potential dangers have to be controlled 
through rituals and prohibitions. While Hoernlé does not examine water in relation 
to marriage rites, the emphasis she places on the symbolic value of water can also be 
traced to the importance that water, fountains and gardens have for Fransfontein wed-
dings. 
Figure 11: A typical wedding picture  
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After the wedding pictures have been taken, the couple and their bridesmaids and 
groomsmen walk to the groom’s parental house. Their walk has to be encouraged 
with gifts of money: only when coins are thrown at their feet will the newlywed con-
tinue to walk. The coins are collected into small baskets by flower girls and boys. At 
the groom’s parental house, a bedroom has been beautifully decorated with curtains 
and bed covers brought from Windhoek. Upon their arrival, the couple, their entou-
rage and as many wedding guests as possible cram into this room. The air is very hot 
and people start sweating. Two respected members of the two kin groups ask the 
wedding attendants to throw as much money as possible on the bed. Only when they 
perceive the amount on the bed as sufficient will the bride be allowed to sit down on 
the bed.  
After a short break, during which food and drinks are served at the groom’s pa-
rental home, the couple and their bridesmaids and groomsmen proceeds to the bride’s 
parental home, again enticed by coins thrown at their feet. At this house, too, all 
wedding participants and guests congregate in a bedroom where the guests are again 
asked to throw money on the bed. Later, all the money collected in this way will be 
handed over to the newlywed couple. Pendelton (1993: 88-89) discusses a similar 
practice among the Ovambo and and calls it the Owambo “marriage walk”. Yet, nei-
ther Schmidt nor Klocke-Daffa mention a comparable practice for the Nama/Damara. 
The Fransfontein money walk reflects a Frazerian magical thinking, such as that en-
countered by Lankauskas at Lithuanian weddings: “Weddings provided arenas for 
metaphoric money making – for creating imaginaries of its abundance and ready 
availability”. (Lankauskas 2015:94) Yet, the money given during the two money 
walks and on the two money beds is little when compared to the large wedding costs 
that the couple and their kin have to muster. Many people in Fransfontein are needy, 
living on very little and often having no money at all. There is thus not much money 
to be given at a wedding. The importance of the wedding money thus lies not so much 
in its financial contribution to the wedding costs but rather in its symbolic value as 
representation of a wedding’s capacity to express and even generate wealth and abun-
dance. This is all the more astonishing as most people in the village have so little 
money. 
Staging marriage (onthals) 
For their wedding reception, couples in Fransfontein either rent the church hall, the 
school hall or the community hall. The church hall is the smallest of the three build-
ings while the school hall is the largest. The community hall is the cheapest option: 
built in the 1980s during the apartheid period, it is not in a very good shape. The 
wedding reception is called onthals in Khoekhoegowab, an appropriation of the Af-
rikaans term onthaal (reception).  
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Globally, weddings have become central sites for the negotiation of what is lo-
cally constructed as “traditional” and as “modern”.12 These dynamics are especially 
evident when looking at food and clothing. Reflecting on clothes and clothing in Af-
rica, Hildi Hendrickson observes: “When we see Africans using our products to cre-
ate their identities – and vice versa – we learn that the meaning of body or commodity 
is not inherent but is in fact symbolically created and contested by both producers 
and consumers”. (Hendrickson 1996: 2) All ingredients for the Christmas salads of-
fered at weddings are expensive and often hard or even impossible to get in Frans-
fontein. One needs a car to bring large amounts of potatoes, carrots or pineapples to 
Fransfontein. Such difficulties increase the value of the salads, turning them into food 
for very special occasions. Meat, the other highly valued and central ingredient at 
weddings, is also costly but locally available. For a wedding, one needs both types of 
food. Together they form what people construct as “traditional food” at a Fransfon-
tein wedding. It is not so much the origin of the Christmas salads, their “whiteness” 
or “modernity”, that makes them special and thus appropriate for a wedding. It is 
rather the difficulty in acquiring their ingredients. Similarly, it is the cost of the meat 
that makes it special. Both are thus well suited to mark the exclusivity and tradition-
ality of wedding food. 
As described above, the couple and their bridesmaids and groomsmen are sit-
ting on an elevated platform in the reception hall, facing the tables with the wed-
ding guests situated below them (see Figure 12). This placement has a certain sim-
ilarity to the high table that can be found in some prestigious British universities. 
A master of ceremonies, who has already introduced the waitresses, moderates the 
reception program. The “champagne competition”, already introduced for the reng 
#nuis, is performed again. The programs can be quite varied: most couples have a 
wedding waltz, some ask a choir to sing, sometimes a group of relatives performs 
a dance, the guests and the couple may pray together, and respected elders may 
hold speeches and give further advice to the newlyweds. Dawids writes about the 
weddings he has attended: “The handing out of the drinks usually signifies the be-
ginning of the end”. (Dawids 2007: 75) After the newlyweds and their guests have 
finished their drinks, everybody starts leaving. Although the reception is one of the 
most expensive moments in a Fransfontein wedding, it is quite short, often lasting 
less than two hours.  
 
                                                 
12 In comparative global perspective, this seems to be a crucial theme for many contemporary 
weddings (see Mupotsa 2014 for South Africa; van Dijk 2017 for Botswana; Debevec 2007 
for Burkina Faso; Lankauskas 2015 for Lithuania; Argyrou 1996 for Cyprus; Bristol-Rhys 
2007 for UAE; and Kendall 1996 for Korea). 
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Schmidt (1981/82: 65) does not mention the reception at all. I suggest that this as a 
sign for the changes in marriage practices. The weddings of the 1960s and 1970s that 
Schmidt’s informants reflect upon take place well before the thorough transfor-
mations of the late 1970s and the 1980s (see “From Decline to Distinction”). Recep-
tions are not yet an integral part of marriage for Schmidt’s informants. At that time, 
the wedding celebration and the wedding meal take place first at the bride’s parental 
house and then at the groom’s parental house. This is similar to the movement be-
tween the two parental homes during the marriage slaughtering in present-day wed-
dings. According to Schmidt, the marriage is finalized with the asking-out of the bride 
at her family’s house. By the time Klocke-Daffa (2001: 172) writes twenty years 
later, reflecting on marriages of the 1990s, wedding receptions are a central part of 
Nama marriages. First, newlyweds in Berseba celebrate at a hall in very similar fash-
ion as I have described above. Then, they celebrate at the groom’s and finally at the 
bride’s parental home. There the asking-out ends the marriage feast. 
According to Schmidt (1981/82: 65), it is very likely that, at the beginning of the 
20th century, weddings were only celebrated at the bride’s parental home. This is con-
firmed by our wedding interviews with elderly couples and widows. The counter-
slaughtering was introduced in the first half of the 20th century, thus extending the wed-
ding celebration to both houses. Then, at the end of the 1970s, weddings began to in-
clude a celebration at a rented hall. In contrast to the greater informality and lower cost 
of the celebrations at the two houses, this reception is expensive and very formal. 
Figure 12: The wedding reception  
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Showing the bride (/hui-eis) 
We observed a certain flexibility regarding the practice of the /hui-eis, when the 
bride’s veil is removed and the bride is presented. The //hui-eis takes place at the 
groom’s parental house. The newly-weds are seated at a table, with married elders 
congregating around them. These elders proceed to give //namadi (advice) to the 
couple, advice that can sometimes be rather harsh. During one /hui-eis we attended, 
a local kai aob got so enraged about the freedom women had gained in recent years 
that he almost had to leave the /hui-eis. He had started with giving advice on how 
married women should behave and ended with a condemnation of gender main-
streaming that, according to him, is propagated at local workshops organized by 
various NGOs. One of the main features of the ritual is the lifting of the veil, yet 
there seems to be some space for flexibility with how this is done. Sometimes the 
bride’s veil is simply lifted before the //namadi, sometimes it happens afterwards. 
At one wedding we attended, the lifting of the veil turned into a practice similar to 
the money bed when the master of ceremonies spontaneously announced that the 
veil would only be lifted if enough money was given to the couple. He encouraged 
the guests’ generosity by emphasizing the necessity of controlling that the bride 
was still complete and nothing of her was missing. He thus re-introduced the Frans-
fontein marriage leitmotif of “completeness”. After the veil is lifted, the bride chang-
es into an ordinary dress, which underscores that her status has now changed from 
bride to wife. Sometimes, the lifting of the bride’s veil is followed by the opening 
of the wedding presents. It seems that the lifting of the veil is a new introduction 
as none of the earlier discussions of Nama and Damara weddings mentions this 
event. 
Asking-out of the bride (#gan-# ûis) 
A Fransfontein marriage ends with the #gan-#ûis, the asking-out of the bride at the 
bride’s parental house. This is the last time that the groom’s family has to ask the 
bride’s family, this time for permission that the wife can formally move to her hus-
band’s place. Often, some more //namadi will be given to the couple. It is also com-
mon that the new wife will be asked to prepare and serve some tea to the guests in 
order to demonstrate her new status. In many families, the wedding cake is eaten at 
this stage. Only married people are allowed to eat from the wedding cake.  
Similarly, the meat of the #gaus (hip bone) of the cows slaughtered during the 
marriage slaughtering will only be distributed among the married wedding guests at 
the final asking-out of the bride. The hip bone has been cooked seperatley from the 
rest of the wedding food. Later, the bone is rubbed with the same !nau-i cream that 
the bride used during her seclusion and, after the wedding, is hung up at the bride’s 
parental home. Figure 13 displays a #gaus (the bone on the right side). 
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Schmidt (1981/82: 65) and Klocke-Daffa (2001: 173) both view the asking-out ritual 
as the final stage of Damara and Nama marriages, and interpret it as the last remains 
of the former practice of bride service. During that practice, the Damara/Nama hus-
band and his family had to gather for a final asking-out ritual after the husband had 
completed several months or even years of bride service. While neither Klocke-Daffa 
nor Schmidt found any proof anymore for the practice of bride service in their areas 
of research (Okombahe and Berseba), they noted that the final asking-out ritual had 
remained. In Fransfontein in the early 2000s, none of our interlocutors ever men-
tioned bride service or saw a link between bride service and the asking-out ritual. For 
them, the asking-out ritual was rather linked to the asking-ritual at the beginning of 
the marriage process. They saw these two rituals as framing the wedding and the 
asking-out ritual as that stage that closes the cycle of marriage. 
Tracing the marriage ritual through the evidence given by Schmidt and Klocke-
Daffa in particular, we can see that the present-day Fransfontein marriage process is 
a complex performance of hybrid rituals. Different cultural practices – Nama, Da-
mara, Herero and Ovambo, but also Afrikaans, German and British – have merged 
and produced the unique form of marriage rituals that I have labeled “Fransfontein 
Figure 13: Marking the end of the wedding 
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marriage”. Danai Mupotsa (2014: 186) has noted a similar cultural multiplicity in 
contemporary South African weddings when she states that they are “both modern 
and traditional, communal and individualistic, representative of freedom and unfree-
dom, romantic as well as obligatory”. The result of this merging, this hybridization 
is African (de Wet 2008; Mupotsa 2014, 2015). Any attempt at classifying these mar-
riages into “true” (i.e. “traditional”) or “modern” (i.e. “new”) marriage types would 
completely miss the form, content and dynamic of African (and Fransfontein) mar-
riage. Fransfontein marriages are “remotely global”, to borrow Charles Piot’s (1999) 
insightful term. They are shaped as much by “indigenous” culture as by colonial and 
postcolonial forces. 
MARRIAGE VARIATIONS 
Every single wedding introduces variations to the general outline given above of cur-
rent Fransfontein marriages. People, events, strategies, desires, vulnerabilities and 
hopes are never the same (Abu-Lughod 1991: 156). Yet, regardless of these idiosyn-
crasies of expression and events, some of the variations can be classified systemati-
cally. By analyzing these variations in terms of central social categories such as gen-
eration, class and religious affiliation, it is indeed possible to identify forms of clus-
tering amongst Fransfontein marriages. I will start with an analysis of Fransfontein 
marriages in terms of generation.  
There are significant variations in type of marriage by generation. The eldest gen-
eration interviewed, born between 1915 and 1944, celebrated rather simple and af-
fordable weddings. In August 2005, one woman born in the 1930s described wed-
dings before the mid-1970s in the following way: “You know, everything was just at 
one house, at the bride’s house. There was the asking, and then the celebration. In 
between, one went to church. The celebration? What celebration? It was just the 
slaughtering of a goat, sitting together in front of the house, singing”. Some of these 
weddings did not take place in the Fransfontein reserve itself but rather at the couple’s 
place of work on a commercial farm owned by a white farmer. Yet, as the bride and 
groom and their wedding party nevertheless belonged to the reserve’s population, I 
include them in this generation of marriages. I cluster all of the marriages of couples 
born up to the 1940s and celebrated before the mid-1970s under the label “reserve 
marriages”, indicating that most of these marriages were celebrated while Fransfon-
tein was still a reserve. These reserve marriages constitute 39 per cent of all marriages 
(see Figure 14).  
Not all of the couples of the eldest generation (born up to the 1940s) and living 
together as family were able to marry early in life. One factor that played a particular 
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role in preventing marriages was conflict with white farmers. At the end of the 1980s 
and during the 1990s, the local Lutheran pastor decided to marry all such older unmar-
ried couples. These wedding celebrations were very modest and affordable. I label these 
marriages “old age marriages”. Eight per cent of all marriages we recorded belong to 
this category. Given the similarities between reserve marriages and old age marriages, 
it is clear that they are both variations of a more general form of marriage: simple and 
affordable weddings.  
From the 1970s onwards, the ritual practices of weddings started to change. Local 
kai aogu emerged. They occupied prestigious jobs at the time of the wedding (politi-
cians, administrators or professionals) and were considered wealthy by local standards 
(Pauli 2010b). In some cases the wife also had a good-paying occupation at the time of 
her wedding, in particular if she was a teacher. These marriages first began to appear in 
the later 1970s. The couples involved were generally born after 1945. These marriages 
extended and transformed the previously modest form of Fransfontein marriage, lead-
ing to the current lavish practices. I group these marriages under the label “big man 
marriage”. Today, only a few big man marriages take place, celebrated by the few new 
professionals and politicians that have come into office during the last 10 to 15 years 
or, more frequently, by wealthy migrants returning to the village. I include these elite 
weddings in the big man marriage category that makes up 17 per cent of all marriages.  
Although the changing marriage practices initiated by big man weddings have sig-
nificantly increased marriage costs, not everybody lacking the financial means for lavish 
weddings has stopped marrying. People of local middle class status, including drivers at 
the ministries in Khorixas, police sergeants, domestic workers, or road construction 
workers, hope to further climb the social ladder and get ahead by celebrating costly wed-









Figure 14: Types of marriage of 139 couples 
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they are locally labeled as “struggle marriages”. Dawids and I have analyzed his own 
wedding as a struggle for recognition and security (Pauli/Dawids 2017). Within the Na-
mibian context, the term struggle has a specific, historically situated meaning. It is first 
and foremost associated with the liberation struggle against apartheid and for independ-
ence. Henning Melber (2014: 26-28) observes a “struggle mentality” characterizing Na-
mibian postcolonial society and argues that the heroic narrative of the struggle for free-
dom is very much present in everyday life. To struggle may then not only capture the 
pain of working towards a purpose, but also the relief and even pleasure of achieving it. 
It was thus striking when, during our fieldwork in Fransfontein, we repeatedly heard how 
the concept of struggle was applied to describe wedding preparations for couples with 
limited financial means. Today it is no longer the struggle for political freedom but the 
struggle for a dignified and economically secure life that preoccupies most people in 
Fransfontein. Marriage as a central indicator of adult status (see Pauli 2011) has become 
a tremendous struggle to achieve. Thirty-six per cent of all marriages fall into this cate-
gory (see Figure 14). These are weddings of couples who want to marry like the elite 
even though they are not (yet) part of the elite themselves. For this type of marriage, 
support from kin is essential (Pauli/Dawids 2017) but is often not sufficient. Because of 
their lack of a permanent and sufficiently high income, these couples need additional 
economic incentives to marry. Otto, a construction worker in his thirties, explained his 
motivation to get married in the following way: “At the time I started to think about 
marriage I was having some nice contracts. Money was coming in. I think the birth of 
the son was also influencing the decision; she was also pregnant at that time”. Our two 
closest research assistants, Jorries and Francois, both married while we were living in 
Fransfontein. At several occasions, both of them expressed that they would not have 
married without the extra income and support they had received from us. For us it was a 
welcome opportunity to reciprocate something for their great support of our research. In 
an interview in August 2005, Francois clearly linked his marriage plans to our research 
project: “We were thinking about marriage, but not so seriously because we did not have 
any income. But when you employed us that was when we started thinking seriously 
about marriage. […] I think that this is the trend; the rich men are getting married. You 
will not find a poor man like me married”. 
It is remarkable how much Francois distances himself from his new status as a mar-
ried man and thus in some ways a man from the “elite”. He still feels like a “poor” man. 
He can only explain his new status in terms of luck, similar to finding money on the 
street.13 Remarkably, the expenses and practices of the struggle weddings hardly differ 
                                                 
13 The way we saw our role in the lives of our research assistants stands in stark contrast to 
how Victor Crapanzano (1980) dealt with Tuhami, his assistant during research he con-
160 | The Decline of Marriage in Namibia 
 
from the lavishness of big man or elite weddings. My analysis of marriage in terms of 
generation thus demonstrates how marriages have gotten more lavish and expensive 
over time, and with that a clear marker of elite status within the community.  
Another way of analyzing Fransfontein marriages is by religion. Lutheran and 
Roman Catholic marriages are still the norm in Fransfontein (86 per cent of all mar-
riages) and prior to the 1990s there were no Pentecostal marriages at all in Frans-
fontein. However, by the end of the 1990s, twelve per cent of all marriages were 
Pentecostal (calculated from the 1940s onwards, this makes five per cent in total). 
As there is no Pentecostal church in Fransfontein, Pentecostal wedding services take 
place in the same halls as those that are rented for the wedding receptions. Compared 
to Roman Catholic and Lutheran weddings, the church service plays a much more 
central role for Pentecostal weddings. Virtually every guest involved in a Pentecos-
tal marriage attends the church service, in comparison to the small number we ob-
served in Roman Catholic and Lutheran weddings. It is, however, interesting to note 
that still most of the ritual activities, including the ritual slaughtering, are performed 
in a similar fashion, regardless of religious affiliation. This contrasts sharply with 
what Rijk van Dijk (2012a) observed for weddings in Botswana and what I encoun-
tered in urban weddings in Windhoek more recently (2015-2016). While Pentecostal 
churches within these more urban contexts tend to perceive traditional rituals as 
problematic and might even reject them, this is not the case in the rural context of 
Fransfontein.  
A rural-urban difference similar to the one in Pentecostal weddings also becomes 
visible when we consider class in relation to religion. In the urban setting of Wind-
hoek, Pentecostal churches also seem attractive to established upper-middle classes 
and the elite. In contrast, all Pentecostal weddings in the rural context of Fransfontein 
are struggle marriages, celebrated by couples with limited financial means. For these 
economically struggling couples, it is a great advantage that their overall wedding 
costs are reduced due to the prohibition of alcohol by their church. In addition, be-
coming a member of a Pentecostal church has not (yet perhaps) become an issue for 
                                                 
ducted in Morocco. Just like Francois and Jorries, Tuhami wishes to marry and asks Cra-
panzano for financial support. Crapanzano, however, refuses to assist, and rather psycho-
analyses the “material” (the desires, dreams, and narratives) that Tuhami “produces” or 
“constructs” for him. In my mind, these passages of Crapanzano’s otherwise excellent eth-
nography greatly lack empathy on part of the anthropologist. It remains unclear why Crap-
anzano does not support Tuhami – especially given the closeness of their encounter. It is 
more than understandable (even without psychoanalysis) that the individuals on whom an-
thropologists rely and get close to try to make the best of the situation – including drawing 
on the anthropologists in their pursuit of central life projects like marriage. 
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the political and economic elite of Fransfontein; they rather celebrate their weddings 
in the Fransfontein Protestant church (cf. Pauli 2012). 
To sum up, marriage types vary by generation and are embedded in class differ-
ences. Affordable and simple marriages took place before the 1970s and big man 
marriages and struggle marriages have occurred since the end of the 1970s. Religious 
variations exist. However, there are no variations based on ethnicity – despite the 
existence of several different languages and ethnic groups.  
MARRIAGE AND THE STATE 
When it came to marriage, German colonial legislation was mainly concerned with 
the issue of “Rassenmischehen” (racially mixed marriages), thus marriages between 
German men and female colonial subjects (Wildenthal 1997). In 1905, the German 
colonial administration prohibited all civil marriages of this kind, a year later also all 
church weddings, and in 1907 the Windhoek high court declared all “mixed” mar-
riages entered into before 1905 as invalid (Engel 1973; Essner 1997; Sippel 1995). 
The issue stirred up a significant amount of debate in Germany (Acker 1912; Fried-
rich 1909; Grentrup 1914). One particular aim of the legislation seemed to have been 
the removal of the rights of children born to “mixed married” couples (Engel 1973: 
121), in particular their inheritance rights. Gordon explains: “If Mischlings were born 
in wedlock they gained their father’s citizenship, whereas according to German (and 
later South African Roman-Dutch) law, illegitimate children were legally related only 
to their mothers”. (Gordon 2005: 57) The rights of these children remain a continuous 
theme in marriage legislation throughout the German administration. In contrast to 
the intense and well-documented debates on so-called “mixed marriages”, however, 
information on legislation for all other marriages is rare for the German colonial pe-
riod.  
Marriage law in South West Africa under South African rule was determined 
most critically by the Native Administration Proclamation, 15 of 1928, that came 
into effect on January 1, 1930 (Becker/Hinz 1995: 29). It was based on the Black 
Administration Act, 38 of 1927, that had been instituted in South Africa itself. The 
legislation established two types of marriage property regimes in South West Af-
rica and stayed on the books until the passing of the Married Persons Equality Act 
in 1996.14 The Native Administration Proclamation meant that all civil marriages 
                                                 
14 South Africa had already reformed its legislation on marriage in the 1980s, though this was 
not reproduced in Namibia at the same time (Sippel 1997: 395). The 1996 legislation in 
Namibia to a large extent followed the South African lead. 
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(this included all Christian marriages, as these were automatically entered as civil 
marriages) outside the so-called Police Zone, were marriages out of community of 
property unless the parties made a recorded declaration to the opposite (which 
would then result in a marriage in community of property) (Becker/Hinz 1995: 30). 
All “indigenous marriages” within the Police Zone were not affected by this proc-
lamation; by default, these marriages were marriages in community of property.  
Fransfontein marriages that were entered into before the law reforms of the 
1990s, the discriminatory Roman-Dutch common law concept of marital power 
still applies. It places wives in the position of minors, while husbands have the right 
to administer the property of both spouses (Hubbard 2007: 102; Sippel 1997). Har-
ald Sippel (1997: 385) differentiates three elements of marital power: the husband’s 
power over the person of his wife, the husband’s power over the property of his 
wife, and the husband’s power as head of the family. All three elements have been 
abolished with the new Married Persons Equality Act of 1996. As Diane Hubbard 
writes: “Couples married ‘in community of property’ must now consult each other 
on most major financial transactions with husbands and wives being subject to 
identical powers and restraints”. (Hubbard 2007: 102) The provision that the law 
will no longer recognize the husband in civil marriages as the “head of household” 
resulted in much controversy both inside and outside parliament (Hubbard 2007: 
102-104). It still had strong echoes in Fransfontein during our fieldwork in 2003 
and 2004. Though several radio programs had been aired to inform the general 
public of the new law and on their new rights, Fransfontein men and women were 
confused by the terms “in community of property” and “out of community of prop-
erty” and felt that these were some kind of Western NGO inventions aimed at 
changing “traditional communities”. However, separation and divorce are extreme-
ly rare in the Fransfontein area with only about three per cent of all marriages end-
ing in separation and/or divorce. This means that only a tiny proportion of the pop-
ulation will ever go through property conflicts common during separation and 
divorce. Thus, the material consequences of the type of marriage contract (whether 
in community or out of community of property) are of only minor importance for 
most Fransfonteiners.  
A low divorce rate does not mean that marriages are happier in this area than 
elsewhere. Several married women told me about being mistreated by their hus-
bands, through physical abuse, physical and emotional neglect, and the fear of be-
ing infected by sexually transmitted diseases, especially HIV, because of the hus-
band’s continuous cheating. Yet, despite these difficulties, almost all women re-
mained in their marital relationships and did not leave their spouses. One of the 
main reasons for this lies in the great difficulties and tremendous costs of getting 
married in the first place. As a female teacher in one of the focus group interviews 
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remarked: “After so much trouble, one does not want to lose it all again,” referring 
to the social status, respect and prestige she had acquired through marriage.  
Two other aspects covered by the Namibian law reforms since the 1990s, how-
ever, have stirred wide public interest in Fransfontein: maintenance and the inher-
itance rights of children, both for those born “inside” and those born “outside” of 
marriage.15 It is important to note that, legally, cohabitation is not treated as marriage, 
thus that cohabitating partners have no rights on each other. The only exceptions are 
common children: “Namibian law makes all parents responsible for the maintenance 
of their children in proportion to their financial resources, and there is no distinction 
between children born inside marriage and children born outside marriage for this 
purpose”. (Hubbard/Zimba 2004: 17) In contrast, children born inside marriage and 
children born outside marriage continue to be treatead differently when it comes to 
inheritance rights: “Children born outside of marriage are still disadvantaged when it 
comes to inheritance – in terms of civil law, such children may not inherit from their 
fathers or father’s families unless they are named in a will, even if paternity is proven 
and acknowledged”. (ibid). This legislation is reflected in local usage in Fransfontein 
where married elite men and women distinguish between children born “outside” and 
“inside” marriage in terms of inheriting from a father’s estate (Pauli 2012). I discuss 
these developments in more detail in Part III. 
The last issue that shapes marriage on the ground is the education system. An anal-
ysis of this brings this chapter on marriages in present-day Fransfontein to a close.  
Marriage and school vacations 
When we received our first wedding invitation at the end of July 2003, school vaca-
tions had already started. At that time we were still living in one of the empty hostel 
on the Fransfontein school ground. With the beginning of the holidays, the school 
ground had become quiet and empty. Outside the school yard, the village was filled 
with music and movement. From all over the country, people had returned to Frans-
fontein to celebrate important rites of passage, especially engagements and wed-
dings.  
In present-day Namibia, there are three major school vacations, all of several 
weeks in length: the first one in March after the rainy season, the winter break in July 
and August, and the summer break from December into early January. Our first ex-
perience of a wedding fell into the winter break. Many of our acquaintances were 
                                                 
15 A child born “outside of marriage” in general means that its mother is not married. The 
father may be married but then not to the child’s mother (see Part III for a discussion of 
how ideas of illegitimacy have entered local discourses).  
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traveling around the country, attending engagements and weddings, or receiving fam-
ily and guests in Fransfontein. All three holiday breaks are marked by this type of 
travel for engagements and weddings. For many families, school holidays mean 
movement: picking up children from different hostels and bringing them to places 
where they can spend the vacations. Communal farms fill up with young people stay-
ing over with their rural kinfolk. Having to be on the move anyway, people try to 
combine the needs of their children with other family obligations like attending wed-
dings. As white-collar workers such as teachers often support weddings financially 
and their active participation is highly valued at marriage events, the state’s influence 
on the timing of wedding celebrations is channeled through the institutions of schools 
and holidays.  
The emergence of state-funded schools and the spread of education was con-
nected to the establishment of homeland governments in the 1970s. Remarkably, the 
spread of these public institutions had an almost immediate effect on the timing of 
weddings. For 66 of the 123 weddings in our census, we recorded the month in which 
the wedding events were held. The concentration of weddings into only a few months 
started in the 1970s. In the 1990s, December began to emerge as the favorite wedding 
month. This is remarkable insofar as December had previously been the least pre-
ferred month for wedding celebrations because of its heat and humidity. Indeed, none 
of the couples who married before the 1980s married in December. Because of the 
spread of state-controlled formal education, more than half of all current weddings 
are celebrated during school holidays. Unfortunately, we do not have information on 
the engagement months. Nevertheless it seems plausible that the timing of these would 
have changed comparably. 
Church registers available for the Fransfontein, Khorixas and Outjo ELCRN par-
ishes confirm the results from our census. The preference to celebrate weddings in 
December clearly emerges in the 1970s. Before then, the winter months and espe-
cially July were preferred. Thus, state sponsored institutions have subtly shaped and 
changed the timing of weddings. Beyond the Fransfontein region, Klocke-Daffa 
(2001: 173) has observed comparable changes in the timing of weddings. She reports 
that in Berseba, southern Namibia, the church service after which the bride is se-
cluded has been rescheduled from Monday to Sunday so that working guests would 
not have to take another day leave. Martine Segalen (1990: 145) describes a similar 
shift in timing of weddings in France from February and November, the months with 
the least work for agricultural workers in the 17th and 18th centuries, to the summer 
months from the 19th century onwards when the newly urbanized and industrialized 
workers had their holidays. 
Contemporary Fransfontein marriages are shaped by a multiplicity of forces: the 
state and its laws and institutions; the community and its norms, values and sanctions; 
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and individual actors with their aspirations and anxieties. In this chapter I have fo-
cused on a detailed description of the current social, religious and legal practices of 
weddings and engagements, followed by a discussion of the different variations of a 
normative wedding. In the next chapter I analyze how marriage has changed from an 




















From decline to distinction 
Weddings and marriages, 1940s-2000s 
 
THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE IN FRANSFONTEIN 
Conspicous weddings emerged in Fransfontein around the 1970s. During that decade, 
the apartheid regime established the artificial Damaraland. Concurrently, marriage 
rates started to decline. According to recent demographic and ethnographic research 
in Southern Africa, marriage rates have substantially declined throughout the region, 
age at marriage has strongly increased, premarital fertility has also significantly in-
creased and HIV/AIDS prevalence rates are among the highest in the world. These 
demographic trends are especially distinctive in four Southern African countries: 
Botswana, Swaziland, South Africa and Namibia (Bongaarts 2007; Garenne/Toll-
man/Kahn 2000; Garenne/Zwang 2005; Therborn 2006).  
To describe changes in marriage raises several methodological and conceptual 
challenges. Unlike analyzing fertility trends, which can take for granted that women’s 
fecundity declines with time and eventually ceases (new reproductive technologies 
left aside), for marriage, literally speaking, it is never too late. Thus, unlike the de-
mographic approach that takes women with so-called completed fertility histories and 
then analyzes variations in the number of births by, for example, education or eco-
nomic status of the women, for marriage there is no such thing as a “completed mar-
riage history”. Consequently, to conclude that marriage is declining might be errone-
ous. The number of marriages may not be declining, but the age at which people 
marry might be rising. Additionally, if marriage is a process rather than an event, the 
unaware and biased observer may think that conjugal relations are rather fluid and 
not structured by marriage. This is exemplified in Robert Gordon’s (2002) analysis 
of the perceptions and instances of prostitution during German and South African 
colonial times in Namibia. This raises the question of what definitions, data and meth-
ods are necessary to analyze whether marriage has declined. 
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First of all, one has to clarify when people are considered as married. In Southern 
Africa, marriage has often been defined as a process and not as a single event (Helle-
Valle 1999; Hunter 2016; Murray 1981b; Radcliff-Brown 1987; White 2016). In such 
a processual approach to marriage, the marital status of a person depends on the ad-
vancement of bridewealth payments. This dynamic conceptualization of marriage 
makes calculations of “proportions married” or “median age at first marriage” prob-
lematic. Census figures might have to be viewed with caution, as recent research from 
South Africa shows (Hosegood 2013; Mhongo/Budlender 2013). In Fransfontein, 
however, marriage is happening during a brief period of time and as an event. Some-
one is considered married after completing either a civil marriage at the magistrate’s 
office or a Christian marriage in the church (or both). It is, thus, possible to distin-
guish married and unmarried people in Fransfontein. 
To analyze whether marriage rates are declining, one can compare the number of 
married people within a population at two (or more) points in time. This is done, for 
example, in historical demography and demography. However, if one does not have 
comparative data for two points in time, one might instead (or also additionally) use 
cohort analysis and compare in how far the median age at marriage and the percent-
age of those married has changed for different birth cohorts. For Fransfontein, we 
have census data for only one point in time, rendering a comparative approach unvi-
able. However, on a national level there is a decline in the percentage married as a 
comparison of the Namibian Demographic and Health Survey for 1992 and 2000 
shows. While in 1992, 27 per cent of all Namibian women between the ages 15-49 
were formally married, by 2000 it had declined to 23 per cent (MOHSS 2003: 80). 
Thus, considering this lack of comparative data for Fransfontein, I take a closer 
look at the median ages of marriage and the percentage of married women per cohorts 
as basis from which to understand marriage dynamics. The information is taken from 
the ethnographic census we conducted with 750 men and women (see “Fransfontein 
Fieldwork”). Table 8 presents a comparison of the percentages of married couples 
for eight ten-year birth cohorts. 
The percentage of people marrying has steadily declined since the 1970s. As can 
be seen in the last row of the table, only 32 per cent of the 364 interviewed women 
15 years and older are or have been married. The number of men who married is even 
lower, at only 25 per cent. Thus, less than 30 per cent of the population 15 years and 
older is or has been married. As the table shows, while the majority of older men and 
women (until birth cohort 1935-1944) is or has been married, from birth cohort 1945-
1954 onwards, the majority of the population is unmarried. For all cohorts, divorce 
and separation are extremely rare. Of the 89 men who married at one point in their 
lives, 87 per cent are currently married, 10 per cent are widowers, and only 3 per cent 
are separated or divorced. Among the 115 women who were married at one point in 
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Table 8: Percentage married and median age at marriage 
 
their lives, 67 per cent are still married, 3 per cent are separated or divorced, and  
30 per cent are widowed. Consequently, the number of married Fransfonteiners has 
consistently declined, but the few who have married have almost always remained 
married. Comparable low rates of marriage have been reported for South Africa 
where Dorrit Posel and Stephanie Rudwick (2013) showed that in 2010 only 41 per 
cent of what they classify as “African” women had ever been married, in contrast to 
81 per cent of “white” women. Victoria Hosegood (2013) mentioned even lower fig-
ures for KwaZulu-Natal. Only 10 per cent of the women in the age category 20-
45 years were married in 2009. Further, the majority of women in their late 40s had 
never been married (see also Hunter 2010: 93-94). 
As elsewhere in Southern Africa, the declining percentage marrying might also 
be the result of a substantial increase in the age at marriage (Bongaarts 2007; 
Garenne/ Zwang 2005). In 2003, the Namibian Ministry of Health and Social Ser-
vices published a report with the main findings of the 2000 Namibian Demographic 
and Health Survey (MOHSS 2003). Regarding developments in the age at marriage, 
it states:  















1915-1924 11 91 36,5 12 92 34 
1925-1934 26 96 26 22 68 38,5 
1935-1944 41 58 33 30 63 34 
1945-1954 47 30 35 38 42 35 
1955-1964 59 37 32 59 27 37 
1965-1974 65 23 28 67 16 30 
1975-1984  89 6  104 1  
1985-1994 26 0  29 0  
Total 364 32 30 361 25 35 
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Marriage occurs remarkably late in Namibia. Only 12 per cent of women age 25-49 marry 
before age 18 and only 43 per cent have married by age 25 […]. The median age at first mar-
riage is 26,2 among women age 30-49. Comparison with data from the 1992 NDHS shows an 
increase in age at marriage. For example, the median age at first marriage for women 30-34 
was 25 in 1992, compared to 27 in 2000. (MOHSS 2003: 82) 
In Fransfontein, the median age at first marriage is also late. However, as the above 
table demonstrates, the median age at marriage has not increased for the different 
birth cohorts, and it suggests no clear trend toward an increase or decrease of the 
median age at marriage. For a long time, marriage has occurred late in Fransfontein 
as people have rather lived in cohabitating unions. The decline in marriage rates can-
not be attributed to a change to a later age at marriage and longer periods of cohabi-
tation. Independent of cohort and generation, if people marry, they prefer to do this 
at the end of their twenties and during their thirties. Despite this late age at marriage, 
most women have born children before they marry. There is very little stigmatization 
of children born out of wedlock (Pauli 2012). It is generally accepted for men and 
women to have different partners independent of marriage and also to have children 
with them. A group discussion I had in 2004 with four women between 35 and 50 
years of age illustrates this norm: 
Julia: What would be a good age to marry?  
Hazel: Maybe, thirty. 
Mona and Claudia: Yes. 
Julia: Not younger? 
All for women: Not younger. 
Mona: You must experience something; have friends, good friends and experience things in 
life before you decided to get married. Also men have to do that. 
Thus, the decline of marriage in Fransfontein represents a de facto decline of mar-
riage rates and not an increase in the age at which people marry.1 The question that 
requires an answer is thus not why people marry increasingly late in life in Fransfon-
tein; this has, after all, been the case for a long time. The question that has to be 
understood is rather why so many people do not marry at all.  
                                                 
1 See Hosegood/McGrath/Moultire (2009) for comparable results from KwaZulu Natal, 
South Africa. 
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EXPLANATIONS FOR THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE 
Although the history of marriage decline in Fransfontein is a specific one, there are 
nevertheless important parallels to developments in other Southern African regions 
(Claassens/Smythe 2013; Hunter 2015; Pauli/van Dijk 2016). Already in the 1930s, 
Isaac Schapera (1933, 1939) observed changes in marriage practices among the Kgatla 
of Bechuanaland, today’s Botswana. His findings on increasing numbers of unmar-
ried women and children born out of wedlock were first signs of the substantial trans-
formations underway in social organization in Southern Africa. Since then, several 
reasons have been put forward for this decline of marriage. 
One way of explaining the decline of marriage is to argue that marriage as a sys-
tem of alliance and social organization has increasingly lost its meaning due to the 
substantial economic and social transformations that took place during the colonial 
period. In this context, kin-based alliances through marriage were becoming less im-
portant and were being substituted by other kinds of relationships, such as friendship 
or political affiliations. Jaqueline Solway tellingly named her 1990 article on rela-
tionships “Affines and Spouses, Friends and Lovers”. Class formation in Botswana 
resulted in new social relationships, making the reliance on and alliance with kin only 
one option among others. Solway concluded:  
As class and kinship have come to coexist as principles of association, the political and eco-
nomic links once solely expressed in the idiom of kinship and frequently solidified through 
affinal ties are now often formed on the basis of friendship. (Solway 1990: 61) 
Clyde Mitchell (1961) and Philip Mayer (1961) also commented on the changing 
nature of kinship and marriage in urbanizing societies of Southern Africa since about 
the 1940s. Very similarly, Adam Kuper (1987, 2016) placed the formation of new 
economic elites center stage in his explanation of marriage transformations. In addi-
tion, forced and voluntary labor migration in many parts of Southern Africa resulted 
in locally “absent” migrants. Research on Lesotho migrants showed that a substantial 
number of these migrants preferred to invest in their father’s family and not in bride-
wealth and affinal ties. Kuper concluded: “With the disappearance of its political ra-
tionale, preferential marriage on kinship lines is rapidly becoming a thing of the past”. 
(Kuper 1987: 138) Ørnulf Gulbrandsen’s (1986) research on male Tswana migrants 
came to similar conclusions. Contrary to the argument by John Comaroff and Simon 
Roberts (1977) that affinal ties continued to be an important resource and with the 
passing of polygyny were created through “serial monogamy”, Gulbrandsen thor-
oughly doubted the ongoing relevance of affinity: “I have argued, on the contrary, 
that affines are rarely of particular importance to young men, and that prospective 
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affinal relationships are challenged rather than cultivated”. (Gulbrandsen 1986: 24) 
Instead, he turned the Comaroff and Roberts argument upside down by suggesting 
that it is not the men that need affines but the affines that need the young men due to 
the latter’s access to a cash income earned through labor migration: “It is the young 
men, rather than the affines, who represent a scarce resource”. (ibid) Gulbrandsen’s 
findings show how social class formation permeates various social relations, includ-
ing kin and marital, but also generational relations.  
Another line of understanding the transformations in marriage focuses on chang-
ing gender roles and relations. In his analysis of the 1992 Namibia Demographic and 
Health Survey, Orieji Chimere-Dan (1997) underscored the high incidence of non-
marital teenage pregnancies in Namibia (and other Southern African countries) and 
linked these developments to the long-term effects of colonialism and forced labor 
migration which pressured many Namibian families to split and live in separate lo-
cations. He argued that this increased the number of female-headed households in 
both rural and urban areas. The necessity for formal marital unions declined while 
motherhood remained valuable. He noted that “many unmarried but socially success-
ful mothers became important role models especially to young women who found 
this a reason to believe that childbearing outside a conventional marital union is no 
longer stigmatised and makes social and economic sense” (ibid: 9). Similarly, Elea-
nor Preston-Whyte linked the extensive South African apartheid labor migration sys-
tem (including the demand for female labor, especially in the form of domestic ser-
vices) to the rising numbers of female-headed households of unmarried mothers in 
the Durban area in the 1960s (see also Hosegood/McGrath/Moultire 2009; Hunter 
2010; Preston-Whyte 1978). Also accepting that labor migration to South African 
mines is a central trigger for change in the marriage system, Gulbrandsen argued that 
young Tswana male migrants enjoyed an increased independence from their fathers’ 
control because of their cash income and were able to delay marriage in order to enjoy 
prolonged periods of sexual freedom and consumerism. In a different context, Jane 
Guyer (1986: 196) termed a comparable reconfiguration of prestige and esteem as a 
preference for “wealth in things over wealth in people”. Gulbrandsen further ob-
served that, while Tswana men only delayed marriage, increasing numbers of Tswana 
women stayed single. 
Women started to question marriage and some women even decided against mar-
riage. In her research on Xhosa women in a township of Grahamstown, South Africa, 
in the 1970s, Virginia van der Vliet described their choice against marriage: “the 
women who were opting to remain single were by no means necessarily rejected – 
all were wage earners, often educated and keen to have children and with eligible 
suitors lined up: their unmarried state was a real and deliberate choice”. (Van der 
Vliet 1984: 4) The women pondered reasons for and against marriage and came to 
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the conclusion that they did not want “a man who will tell her what to do, wanting to 
know where she stands financially” (1984: 4). Preston-Whyte came to very similar 
conclusions in regard to Zulu women who migrated to a Durban township in the 
1960s: “Some of them would prefer to be married, but others regard marriage with 
mixed feelings, predominant amongst which is a fear of losing the independence and 
freedom they experience as wage earners in town”. (Preston-Whyte 1978: 58) In their 
recent review of the literature, Christine Mhongo and Debbie Budlender summarized: 
“Both more recent and older literature suggest that over time women increasingly 
found themselves able to decide whether or not to marry, as they no longer needed to 
depend on a man’s resources”. (Mhongo and Budlender 2013: 189) 
Both lines of thinking, the affinal and the gender explanation, connect the decline 
of marriage to a loss in the meaning and importance of marriage for everyday life and 
social organization. For the new political and economic elites, kin and affinal ties 
have lost in significance. Women may favor independence and do not want to rely 
on marriage ties. Finally, many men only invest half-heartedly into marriage or may 
even be unable to do so because of their meager economic standing. But why then 
are contemporary weddings in Fransfontein, and elsewhere in Southern Africa, cele-
brated in such a fancy fashion? Throughout the sub-continent, ethnographic research 
has observed substantial changes in wedding rituals and a dramatic increase in wed-
ding costs (Mupotsa 2014; Pauli 2011; Solway 2016; van Dijk 2012, 2017).  
A third line of argument thus focuses on a very different cause for the decline in 
marriage rates, namely accelerating costs for performing a marriage. There are many 
voices throughout Africa that see an increase in bridewealth payments as cause for 
why so few people are able to marry. Adeline Masquelier has observed that there 
exists  
a widespread sense in Niger that a growing thirst for the prestige earned through the staging of 
extravagant wedding celebrations has contributed to the spiralling bridewealth inflation and, 
by implication, the postponement of marriage for many. (Masquelier 2005: 62-63) 
Equally, Isiugo-Abanihe (1994) cited a strong increase in bridewealth costs as the 
main reason for declining marriage rates in Nigeria, and Johnson-Hanks (2007b: 264) 
remarked that marriage went from a general prerequisite for adult status into a “sign 
of pecuniary honor” in southern Cameroon. Finally, Parkin and Nyamwaya have ob-
served: “On the one hand, the absence of marriage payments in urban areas has often 
resulted in matricentric family units. On the other hand, among the urban elites, huge 
marriage prestations are commonly documented”. (Parkin and Nyamwaya 1987a: 16) 
In a series of articles, Posel and Rudwick have shown how South Africa’s very low 
marriage rates are connected to changes in lobolo (bridewealth) (Posel/Rudwick 
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2013, 2014; Posel/Rudwick/Casale 2011; Rudwick/Posel 2015). They concluded: 
“Delayed marriage and low marriage rates among Africans, therefore, may reflect a 
tension between men’s inability to pay bridewealth and their respect for the custom 
as an integral part of the marriage process”. (Posel/Rudwick 2013: 178) 
The increase in brideweath is sometimes linked to the change from a payment 
with cattle to one of money. In her overview on marriage and family in Southern 
Africa up to the 1960s, Lucy Mair (1969: 37) remarked that the payment of bride-
wealth in cash “has undoubtedly introduced a commercial element into marriage”. 
The effects the labor migration system has had on marriage and local economies is 
vividly expressed in the title to Basil Sansom’s (1981) article “Cash Down for 
Brides” (see also Murray 1981b; Sansom 1981). And yet, although the increase and 
commercialization of bridewealth are important elements to explain the decline of 
marriage, Rijk van Dijk (2017: 32) has recently pointed out that it is suprising that, 
“in the public debates about the high costs of getting married that people currently 
face, little mention is made of the enormous resources that the couples have to muster 
in order to provide for all the glamour that is expected”. Van Dijk (ibid: 33) shows 
for marriages in Molepolole, Botswana, that, compared to the tremendous costs of 
celebrating a wedding, “the costs for lobola/bogadi are becoming an almost insignif-
icant element thereof”. Unlike bridewealth, which the older generation of parents (at 
least partially) pays for, the vast share of all other wedding costs is shouldered by the 
marrying couple. This leads to new forms of conjugality that van Dijk (ibid: 36) aptly 
calls “monetary intimacy”. Indeed, many couples have to go into debt to finance their 
wedding (see also James 2015: 53 for South Africa). 
With or without bridewealth, getting married is nowadays very expensive in Na-
mibia. High wedding costs and a decline in marriage have been observed in different 
parts of the country. In her study on Kwanyama people in rural Ohangwena region 
and urban Walvis Bay, Britt Tersbøl (2002) showed that costly church weddings are 
today perceived as the most ideal and prestigious of all marriage types. Yet, few peo-
ple are able to afford these weddings, especially given the high unemployment rates. 
In his study on Damara people from Otjimbingwe and Sesfontein in the 1980s, Ben 
Fuller came to very similar conclusions: “Also, I noticed how few couples in Otjimb-
ingwe were married, a fact that I can only attribute to the inability of people to pay 
for weddings. During my stay in Otjimbingwe only one resident couple who were 
not employed as teachers got married, and they held a painfully small wedding cele-
bration”. (Fuller 1993: 23) Fuller’s conclusions are further supported by Gordon 
when he clearly describes marriage among the Damara people of Okombahe in the 
1960s as an expression of elite status: “Teacher’s daughters marry teachers or 
wealthy men, not only because of common philosophical interests, but also to in-
crease the potential of resource combination […] Marriage alliances now tend to be 
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made with people who have above average, or potentially good resources, in an effort 
to achieve maximal utilization. Kinship alliances become an important criterion for 
demarcating superior lifestyles because of this family-centeredness”.2 (Gordon 1972: 
79) This goes hand in hand with Fuller’s (1993: 234) observation that the ideal is to 
marry someone whose family is at least of equal economic and social status.  
This chapter engages with this question by taking a close look at how ritual and 
consumption practices during weddings have changed over the last sixty years. I do 
so by comparing six weddings that took place over the course of this period. I discuss 
the results against the background of all 123 marriages on which detailed information 
about wedding practices is available. In my analysis, I link the changes in wedding 
practices to the emergence of a local elite. I argue that weddings have changed from 
a universal rite of passage into a celebration of the class distinction of a new elite. 
Pierre Bourdieu (1984 [1979]) has shown how people try to achieve class mobility 
through the appropriation of tastes of higher classes than the ones they belong to (also 
see Bourdieu 1993: 273). The chapter concludes with a discussion of a set of ques-
tions: Why is this mechanism not used in Fransfontein? Why has the majority of the 
Fransfontein population not reappropriated marriage? Why are there not more afford-
able types of wedding in the village?  
SIXTY YEARS OF WEDDING PRACTICES: 1940-2004 
In his “French ethnography” on class distinctions, Bourdieu described the continuous 
demand for new markers of distinction by the elite/upper class. Having a distinctive 
taste that differs from the tastes of lower classes legitimizes class positions (Bourdieu 
1984 [1979]; see also Erlank 2014; Kaplan 2013). Taking a closer look at the transfor-
mations in marriage rituals in Namibia, similar practices become visible. At the heart 
of Namibian class formation processes is a desire for distinction and exclusivity. Mar-
riage celebrations have become central arenas to express and perform such distinctions. 
Constantly, new indicators of a distinct taste are added to the marriage rituals, such as 
new and expensive types of decoration, food or clothing. The earliest weddings we have 
recorded were celebrated in the 1940s. I then formed marriage cohorts on the basis of 
10 year periods, starting with marriages that were celebrated between 1940 and 1949. 
The last marriage cohort includes fewer years than the other cohorts. As Table 9 shows, 
one marriage can be presented in detail for every decade except for the 1960s.  
                                                 
2 Laura Longmore (1959: 33) made the following observation in a Johannesburg township 
the 1950s: “Many educated women, especially teachers, prefer, however, to marry teach-
ers”. 
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Occupation at marriage Asking/ 
Engage-
ment Husband Wife 
1945 Titus & 
Tama 




1958 Petrus & 
Jocoline 
36y / 30y Farm worker Unemployed A.: No 
E.: No 
1975 Isaac & 
Emma 






1985 Moses & 
Teresa 
36y / 34y Damara Coun-
cil Authority 
Hostel matron A.: Yes 
E.: Yes 
1993 Adam & 
Carol 
32y / 33y Teacher Teacher A.: Yes 
E.: Yes 
2004 Josef & 
Anna 
36y / 25y Filling station 
attendant 
Shop assistant A.: Yes 
E.: Yes 
 
Table 9 again shows that the age at marriage is not increasing. All couples throughout 
the cohorts married at a rather late age, while in their thirties. The two oldest couples 
spent most of their productive lives as workers on commercial white farms. The four 
younger couples were employed in various blue and white collar occupations at the 
time of their marriages. Almost all couples performed the !game-#gans asking ritual 
before their wedding. During the asking ritual, marriage was negotiated between the 
two kin groups. Only the four younger couples had an engagement. This is a first 
indicator for the directions in which weddings have changed. I now describe and dis-
cuss each of these six weddings, in chronological order.  
Titus and Tama’s marriage in 1945 
One of the earliest weddings we recorded is Titus and Abertine’s marriage in 1945. 
This marriage is typical for the marriages at that time. When Titus met Tama, he was 
working for the German farmer Kurt Claasen who owned a farm not far away from the 
Fransfontein reserve. Tama was living with her mother in Fransfontein. Through his 
brother, Titus asked Tama if she would agree to marry him. When she gave her consent, 
From Decline to Distinction | 177 
 
a date for the formal !game-#gans was set. Titus gathered his family from both his 
mother’s and his father’s side and all went to Tama’s parental house to ask for Tama. 
At the end of the ritual, both families agreed upon the payment of a cow as abba gomas 
compensation to the bride’s mother. They also fixed a marriage date for one month 
later. Titus and Tama did not, however, celebrate a reng #nuis (engagement).  
On the Saturday before their marriage, a cow provided by the husband’s brother 
was slaughtered. The couple married the following Sunday during the regular church 
service. After the service, the couple and its guests proceeded to the bride’s mother’s 
house to eat and sing together. The husband’s family gave the abba gomas to the 
wife’s mother one week later. The overall expenses of the wedding were relatively 
moderate: Titus himself paid the church fee and bought inexpensive wedding rings 
and a new black jacket, grey trousers and black tie for himself; his sister (HZ) bought 
a white dress for Tama and one of his brothers (HB) paid for the cow for the wedding 
feast. Tama herself bought her shoes for the wedding. As the discussion below shows, 
when one compares this modest wedding with the expensive and elaborated practices 
of contemporary Fransfontein weddings, the difference is very marked. 
Petrus and Jocoline’s marriage in 1958 
When Jocoline and Petrus married in 1958, both of them were working for the same 
white farmer in the nearby Kamanjab area. They celebrated their wedding on his farm 
and not in Fransfontein. Maybe because of these circumstances they did not have an 
asking ritual, nor an engagement, which were not yet common in the 1950s. There 
was also no abba gomas.  
Petrus and Jocoline’s wedding was even more modest than Titus and Tama’s cel-
ebration. No cattle were slaughtered. The wedding food consisted mainly of two 
goats, sponsored by an aunt (HFZ) and the wife’s mother. The husband paid for some 
vegetables. There were no soft drinks and no alcohol. The bridal couple’s wedding 
clothes and shoes, the flowers for the bride, the church fee and the rings were all paid 
by the husband. In total, the amount the husband had to pay was very modest. Jo-
coline described her wedding celebration as very simple and typical for her time. She 
stressed that her many brothers and sisters married the same way. Jocoline also ex-
pressed her dissatisfaction with how marriage has changed: for eight out of her ten 
children, it is financially impossible to marry. 
Isaac and Emma’s marriage in 1975 
In the 1970s, weddings gradually started to change, illustrated by Isaac and Emma’s 
wedding. As is visible in the wedding pictures they took, Emma did not cover her head 
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with a so-called “traditional” Damara/Nama headscarf that had commonly been worn 
by brides like Tama and Jocoline. Instead, Emma wore a westernized white veil. At the 
time of their marriage, both Emma and Isaac were permanently employed. Emma was 
working for the Lutheran church while Isaac was employed in road construction. Soon 
after their marriage, Isaac entered the police force. The couple was rather affluent at the 
time of their wedding. This was expressed in the high costs of their wedding. The couple 
held both an asking ritual and an engagement. The bride’s mother received the abba 
gomas six months after the wedding. Nevertheless, Emma and Isaac’s engagement was 
still rather modest. Only 20 people attend the engagement celebration and were served 
sheep meat, but no additional drinks were bought. There was only an engagement ring, 
which was later taken as the wedding ring, and no additional engagement jewelry.  
The wedding itself, however, was celebrated on a much bigger scale than the 
weddings of the two earlier cohorts as described above. Both the husband’s and the 
wife’s kin slaughtered and exchanged cows. The animals were sponsored by an uncle 
of the husband (HMB) and the father of the wife respectively. The wife and her sisters 
paid for the salads and the cool drinks. The wife and husband bought their wedding 
garments for themselves, the bride wearing a plain white dress that she later wore at 
other special occasions. There were no uniform dresses for the wedding escort of 
bridesmaids, groomsmen and accompanying children. Further, no hall was rented for 
the celebration. After the church service, the couple celebrated at the two parental 
homes. This wedding illustrates the changes in wedding practices that were starting 
to take place and the direction these changes hint at. They were the beginning of even 
larger transformations. 
Moses and Teresa’s marriage in 1985 
The wedding of Moses and Teresa in 1985 was one of the big events of the 1970s and 
1980s. It was an expression of the power and possibilities of the new political elites. At 
the time of the marriage, the groom was part of the then ruling Damara Council and the 
bride was in charge of one of the school hostels in Khorixas. For their wedding, workers 
sewed a huge tent to be erected on a large field on the outskirts of Fransfontein to ac-
commodate the hundreds of invited guests who could not fit into any of the halls avail-
able in Fransfontein. The couple celebrated an asking ritual and an engagement, and 
paid abba gomas two weeks after the wedding. The engagement was financed by the 
husband and was relatively small (when compared to the extensive wedding): only sev-
eral dozen guests were invited and enjoyed the meat of a slaughtered cow, cool drinks 
and beer; the bride was marked with earrings, a necklace and a watch. 
Before the wedding, the couple’s kin exchanged and slaughtered cattle. A number 
of goats and sheep were slaughtered, dozens of salads were prepared and soft drinks 
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and alcohol was served in abundance. All food and drinks were paid by the husband, 
except for some salads that had been prepared by the wife’s female kin. The husband 
also bought all wedding garments, with a fancy wedding dress made just for the oc-
casion. After the wedding, the bride kept this in her closet as a memento of the wed-
ding. This wedding was the first wedding in Fransfontein to have uniform dresses 
and suits sewn for the bridesmaids and the groomsmen, again paid for by the husband. 
The husband also hired a professional band to entertain the guests. Clearly, this wed-
ding differs from the weddings of the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s.  
This wedding also marked a notable shift in form and meaning of the alliances that 
are formed through marriage. It is at this point that the importance of kin as basis for 
alliances and reciprocal support begins to dwindle (Solway 1990). As shown in this 
wedding, the help of kin was no longer necessarily required to stage a ceremony: the 
husband paid the wedding largely himself. In contrast, a wedding became an important 
arena for a novel type of alliance: Moses and Teresa’s ceremony illustrated how the 
new political and professional elite of the homeland used weddings to meet, socialize 
and form alliances. Describing their wedding to me some twenty years later, the couple 
proudly underscored that everybody important in Damaraland had attended their wed-
ding. 
Adam and Carol’s wedding in 1993 
By the 1990s, not only politicians had the financial means to celebrate increasingly 
more conspicuous weddings, but teachers also celebrated comparably luxurious wed-
dings. This is illustrated by the 1993 marriage of Adam and Carol, both employed as 
teachers since the 1980s. Both their asking and engagement rituals were held on a 
larger scale than the engagements of the previous decades: approximately 50 people 
attended and significant quantities of meat, soft drinks and alcohol were served. The 
food was financed by the wife’s kin whereas the engagement rings, necklace, watch 
and earrings for the wife were all bought by the husband. The engagement did not 
include the payment of an abba gomas, however.  
For the wedding, the husband purchased another ring, a wedding ring. Buying 
two separate rings was a novelty at the time, increasing the costs. Cattle for slaugh-
tering were given by the relatives, the wife’s cow by her brother, and the husband’s 
cow by his father. The wife’s mother provided for a number of additional small stock 
as well as the salads. The wife’s sisters bought soft drinks and alcohol. The husband 
paid the wedding garments for himself and his wife, with a special dress to be used 
only for the wedding. Like Teresa, Carol has kept her wedding dress in a closet and 
has never worn it again. The wife and her brothers and sisters paid for the clothes of 
the wedding escort, while the husband paid the rental for the hall.  
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It is interesting to note that all practices and items that marked Moses and Teresa’s 
wedding were also present at Adam and Carol’s wedding. But the two weddings dif-
fered significantly in the way they were financed. While Moses and Teresa’s was 
basically a “one-man-show” with Moses featuring as the big spender, matching and 
expressing his status as one of the central political figures in Damaraland, the ex-
penses of Adam and Carol’s wedding were shared between the couple on a much 
more egalitarian basis, also incorporating a number of relatives. 
Josef and Anna’s wedding in 2004 
Josef and Anna’s marriage shows that the new style of wedding that has been increas-
ingly performed since the 1970s and 1980s has become the contemporary way of 
celebrating a Fransfontein wedding. During our fieldwork, we did not observe any 
tendency of reducing a wedding’s costs. In Josef and Anna’s case, the couple had an 
asking ritual and an engagement, but no abba gomas was given. Both their engage-
ment and their wedding were attended by approximately 100 people. At the engage-
ment, some sheep were slaughtered and soft drinks and alcohol were served. The 
costs were shared by the husband and the wife’s mother who had permanent employ-
ment as a hostel worker. The husband paid for the engagement ring, necklace and 
earrings for the wife, and a watch for both the wife and himself. 
The families exchanged and slaughtered cattle, with the wife’s cow sponsored by 
the wife’s father and the husband himself paying for his cow. The wife’s brother paid 
for additional small stock. The wife’s family also paid for the salads, the soft drinks 
and the beer. The husband bought the wedding dress for his wife, while the wife 
bought the husband’s wedding clothes. The husband bought the wedding rings. 
Though the couple had a uniform dress style for the bridesmaids and groomsmen, the 
latter paid for their clothes by themselves. The husband and wife shared the rental for 
the hall. Thus, as in Adam and Carol’s wedding, the wife shared some of the costs of 
the wedding and both kin were substantially included; similarly too, however, the 
husband shouldered the largest share of the costs.  
Analyzing changing weddings 
The chronological reading of these six weddings provides a first impression of the 
kind of changes wedding practices have gone through. The marriage ritual has trans-
formed from a common, albeit special event into an exclusive celebration of class 
distinction. While couples willing to tie the knot in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s were 
mainly faced with the problem of buying their wedding clothes and slaughtering a 
cow, couples from the 1970s onwards had to shoulder a multiplicity of costs. Even  
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Table 10: The wedding’s ritual core – wedding garments through time  
 
Percentage per cohort having specific marriage items 
Bride Groom 
Marriage 
cohort N Dress Shoes Ring Flowers Suit Shoes Ring 
1940-1949    6 100 100 83,3 33,3 100 100 83,3 
1950-1959  16 87,5 87,5 87,5 37,5 93,8 87,5 87,5 
1960-1969  12 91,7 83,3 91,6 33,3 90,9 81,8 75 
1970-1979  21 90,5 90,5 90,5 71,4 90,5 85,7 80,9 
1980-1989  18 83,3 83,3 88,9 72,2 77,8 77,8 88,9 
1990-1999  25 84 80 96 64 80 84 92 
2000-2004  25 92 92 92 76 88 88 92 
Total 123 89 87 91 61 87 85 87 
 
with supporting kin groups in the background, increasingly only permanently em-
ployed grooms and, to a lesser extent, brides found themselves capable to do so. The 
new elite, especially the political kai aogu (big men) of Damaraland, and their desire 
for distinction gradually changed wedding practices.  
There is a core of goods for ritual consumption that all six weddings have in com-
mon. All six couples bought their wedding garments and in all six cases the husband 
paid for the rings. In fact, Table 10 shows that new wedding garments and wedding 
rings are essential not only to the six exemplary marriages but to most of the 123 mar-
riages in our sample. 
Throughout all seven marriage cohorts, covering more than sixty years of Frans-
fontein wedding practices, more than 80 per cent of all couples invested in a wedding 
dress for the bride, new shoes for bride and groom, new trousers for the groom and 
wedding rings. Flowers for the bride are not as common throughout all cohorts. Only 
about a third of all couples until the 1970s spent money on bridal flowers. Since the 
1970s, more than two thirds of all weddings include flowers. In an arid environment 
like Fransfontein, flowers are a luxury good. Wedding foods and beverages are not 
as standardized as wedding garments and the rings. Table 11 provides an overview 
of the food and beverages preferences for the different marriage cohorts. 
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Table 11: Optional wedding items – food and beverages through time  















1940-1949 6 33,3 66,7 83,3 66,7 83,3 50 
1950-1959 16 50 75 37,5 75 18,75 43,75 
1960-1969 12 33,3 66,7 58,3 75 33,3 16,7 
1970-1979 21 52,4 61,90 52,4 80,9 66,7 76,1 
1980-1989 18 44,4 61,1 83,3 88,9 88,9 88,9 
1990-1999 25 44 56 76 100 80 80 
2000-2004 25 66,7 84 44 88 92 80 
Total 123 49 68 60 85 69 68 
 
Some of the wedding consumption goods become more popular over time. Salads 
and vegetables were already common in the 1940s with more than two thirds of all 
weddings including them up to the 1960s. However, since the 1970s they are even 
more widespread. Similarly, cool drinks and alcohol, mainly beer, were served at 
some weddings already in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s. But it is only since the 
1970s that the vast majority of weddings include these goods into their celebrations. 
Throughout all marriage cohorts, the majority of weddings consumed a slaughtered 
cow from the groom and his family. The numbers that had a cow slaughtered by 
the bride’s family were much smaller. Small stock was also slaughtered throughout 
all marriage cohorts, with no clear tendency for an increase or decrease of the prac-
tice. Small stock is used as a flexible substitution or supplement if there are no 
cattle available or if additional meat is needed to cater for all guests. Thus, through-
out all marriage cohorts, meat has been served at weddings, with a certain level of 
flexibility regarding the kind of meat served. Only in the last decades have food 
and beverages become more standardized and expensive. Today couples are con-
fronted with the expectation that a wedding has to include soft drinks and salads 
for all guests. 
The discussion so far has focused on a wedding’s core elements (garments and 
rings) and on some of the optional wedding goods, such as food and beverages. I now 
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turn to those practices and goods that hardly existed before the 1970s or not at all. 
The most obvious extension of the wedding’s ritual core is the engagement ritual. To 
judge from the six exemplary marriages, only weddings from the 1970s onwards cel-
ebrated engagement parties. Equally, of the 123 marriages, only 42 per cent (52 mar-
riages) had an engagement. Engagements were rare until the 1960s: only about 10 to 
20 per cent of all marriages celebrated an engagement prior to the 1960s. Since then, 
however, the number of engagements has steadily increased. In the youngest mar-
riage cohort, with marriages celebrated between 2000 and 2004, more than 70 per 
cent included an engagement celebration. As Figure 15 shows, this ritual extension 
is not only one in kind but also one in scale.  
From the 1970s onwards, engagements became more common and their scale and 
cost increased. Figure 15 plots the year of marriage against the number of people 
invited at the engagement ritual. The visual impression of a strong increase in the 
number of guests invited to engagements since the 1970s is supported by a highly 
significant Pearson correlation of 0,408**. At some of the engagements around the 
turn of the millennium, more than 200 guests were welcomed. This has led to a dra-
matic increase of costs for the couples and their kin, not only because of the increased 
number of guests, but also because of the addition of the engagement ritual itself. The 
exemplary marriages above show that is has become common since the 1970s to 
Figure 15: Number of engagement guests for 52 weddings 
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“mark” the bride with excessive jewelry at the end of the engagement. While neck-
lace, earrings and watches for the couple were nonexistent until then, they have since 
become an integral part of the engagement ritual (see the chapter “Contemporary 
Fransfontein Marriages” for a detailed description of these ritual practices).  
Engagements are not the only costly change of the wedding outline to have taken 
place. During the 1970s, affluent couples began to have matching garments for 
their bridesmaids and groomsmen. The first weddings to start with this practice 
were the weddings of the new professional, administrative and political elites of 
Damaraland. Both Moses and Teresa’s and Adam and Carol’s weddings exemplify 
this style setting (Plotnicov 1970: 293). Today, the practice has become ubiquitous 
at weddings. In addition, the number of bridesmaids and groomsmen has increased 
since the 1970s: it is now common for wedding couples to be accompanied by up 
to six couples. The exact garments provided for the escorts vary in style and cost: 
some of the weddings we observed used what was called traditional Nama and 
Damara materials for these outfits, with the bride and her friends sewing them 
themselves, whereas other couples preferred to buy expensive satin robes imported 
from South Africa.  
Before the 1970s, not a single Fransfontein marriage included a wedding recep-
tion at a hall. Up to the end of the 1960s, weddings were celebrated at the houses of 
the bride’s and groom’s kin groups. In the 1970s, five per cent of the weddings in-
corporated a wedding reception: these were all elite weddings, celebrated by wealthy 
politicians, administrators, and teachers. By the 1980s, 28 per cent had a wedding 
reception, by the 1990s almost half, and from 2000 to 2004, 60 per cent staged a 
reception at a hall. To entertain and impress the guests, the hall is decorated with 
flowers and sometimes a band is hired. Unlike the informality at the two parental 
homes, the reception at a wedding hall is a formal ceremony and, although one of the 
most luxurious moments of the wedding, often lasts less than two hours. Usually, 
hundreds of guests are invited to the wedding reception and huge amounts of food 
and drinks are served. This novel practice has substantially increased the wedding 
costs. It includes the rental of the hall, providing decoration, hiring a professional 
band and renting an adjacent kitchen for the preparation of the food. It also encom-
passes organizing and paying for the transport of the wedding guests. 
To summarize the changes in wedding practices, one can differentiated three dif-
ferent sets of wedding practices and goods. There is the core that consists of the 
clothes and rings of the bridal couple: 80 per cent of all wedding celebrations included 
these goods. Then there are optional goods and practices such as soft drinks and al-
cohol: these goods existed before the 1970s but only became commonplace from the 
1970s onwards. Overall, between 50 and 70 per cent of all marriage celebrations in-
cluded these goods. Third, there are the items and practices that have emerged since 
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the 1970s, such as the wedding reception at a rental hall and matched garments for 
the wedding escort: only 20 to 30 per cent of all 123 marriage celebrations included 
these goods and practices. 
Clearly, from the 1970s onwards, Fransfontein weddings have changed from a 
modest ritual for everyone into a conspicuous celebration by the elite. The emerging 
Fransfontein bourgeoisie (Wallace 2011: 267) of the 1970s and 1980s increasingly 
expressed its status through their weddings, and this process has continued. Much in 
line with Thorstein Veblen’s (1994 [1899]) reflections on conspicuous consumption 
and class, contemporary Fransfontein weddings stimulate envy and emulation. At the 
weddings we attended, wealthier Fransfonteiners, for example, were impressed by 
the use of new media such as digital cameras, and talked about using such devices 
for their or their children’s weddings. The changes in wedding practices are thus 
closely linked to the emergence of new political, administrative and professional 
elites since the 1970s.  
PERFORMING DISTINCTIONS 
The new elites of the 1970s emerged with the establishment of Damaraland. Before 
this, economic stratification was mainly based on the number of livestock a house-
hold owned. The racist German and South African policy of land dispossessions 
throughout the 20th century made it very difficult for indigenous Namibians to accu-
mulate livestock. As a result, wealth variations were not very pronounced among the 
Fransfontein population until the 1970s. Most people lived meager lives and were 
forced to work for white commercial farmers. During the 1970s, however, a new 
political and administrative elite emerged. Some of the most powerful members of 
this elite worked for the Damara Council, while others were employed in the educa-
tional or health sectors. Indeed, there is a certain degree of flexibility between these 
occupational spheres: many influential politicians started their careers as teachers, 
one of the very few academic options available for indigenous Namibians at that time 
(Fumanti 2016). 
This mainly male elite established a gendered patronage system. This does not 
mean that women had no agency (Pauli 2010b) nor that all men gained in power. 
Rather, the power and patronage system that emerged in the 1970s favored a few 
influential men while marginalizing the majority of both men and women. There are 
two aspects of the male elites’ behavior that are of special interest for my argument: 
on the one hand, their love relations with several women and their maintenance of a 
number of out-of-wedlock children and, on the other hand, their celebration of in-
creasingly conspicuous marriages. 
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The establishment of Damaraland did not only create occupations for emerging 
male elites. It also saw the creation of many unskilled and long-term jobs in the do-
mestic sector. This included occupations as domestic cleaners, hostel workers, ma-
trons and cooks in the newly built health posts, administrative buildings, schools, 
hostels and the clinic (in Khorixas). Many of these jobs were given to the young 
female lovers of the new political and administrative elite. Some of these female do-
mestic workers, hostel matrons and cooks in time also became wives, as was the case 
in the marriage of Moses and Teresa described above. I cannot yet explain why some 
women became wives and other remained unmarried. There does not seem to be, for 
example, a marriage strategy comparable to the one Bourdieu (1976) describes for 
rural France. Thus, in terms of education, wealth, honor (e.g. indicated by virginity) 
and number of children, the wives of the political and administrative elite had the 
same background as the women who did not marry. Ethnicity is also not an explana-
tion: some of the wives had the same ethnic background as their powerful husbands 
(mainly Damara), while others did not. Teresa, for example, had been born in Na-
mibia’s northern region (“Ovamboland”) and spoke Oshiwambo as mother tongue, 
while her powerful husband was a Khoekhoegowab (Damara) speaker. Teachers, 
though, seem to be an exception: there is a tendency for them to marry fellow teachers 
(Longmore 1959: 33), as exemplified in Adam and Carol’s marriage. All kai aogu of 
this new elite married and, like in the case of Moses and Teresa, their weddings were 
central social events in Damaraland’s political landscape of the 1970s and 1980s, 
performances of power and distinction.  
Next, I turn to these performances of power and ask in how far a man’s occupa-
tion at the time of his marriage is linked to the wedding practices and items that have 
become indicators of distinction since the 1970s. Given my above results of the trans-
formations in wedding practices and goods, I focus on the following indicators of 
distinction: performing an engagement ritual; having matching garments for the wed-
ding escorts; and holding a wedding reception additional to the celebrations in the 
paternal family houses. I classified male occupations at the time of the wedding into 
six categories. The first category, “white collar government”, represents all profes-
sionals employed by the state, such as teachers, civil servants and politicians. The 
second category, “blue collar government”, includes unskilled government occupa-
tions, mainly jobs as driver for the different government institutions. The third, “other 
employment”, holds occupations such as mechanic, builder or employee of a road 
construction operator. All of these occupations can be found in the Fransfontein and 
Khorixas area, differentiating these three categories from the fourth, the “migrant” 
category, that includes occupations outside this area, mainly industrial work for min-
ing or fishing companies. The fifth category, “farmers”, refers to farmers who work 
in the communal Fransfontein area and are the owners of their livestock, whereas the  
From Decline to Distinction | 187 
 
Table 12: Male occupation at time of marriage, wedding items and age 

















  73   55 55 64 55 50 
Blue collar 
government 11 
  64   36 36 36 46 58 
Other  
employment   7 
100   57 57 43 43 56 
Farmer  11     9   27 27 18   9 61 
Farm worker  10   30   10 10 10 20   58,5 
Migrant    3   67 100 67 67 67 44 
Total 53   53   40 38 36 36 56 
 
last, “farm workers”, refers to people employed by either a communal or a commer-
cial farmer. They do not own the livestock they are herding. 
Table 12 shows that there are three occupational groups that tend to celebrate 
their weddings with the new indicators of distinction. These are white collar govern-
ment employees, other employees and migrants. For all wedding goods and practices, 
these groups have above-average percentages, while the three other occupational cat-
egories, thus blue collar government employees, farmers and farm workers, have be-
low-average percentages. However, it is critical to consider age in this context of 
class distinction, so that I have also included the median age in 2004 for all occupa-
tional categories in the table (see last column). Those occupations with the lowest 
scores on the wedding goods are also the ones with the highest median ages in 2004. 
Many of them celebrated their weddings before the wedding changes of the 
1970s. White collar government employees, other employees and migrants are young-
er. Their weddings are more likely structured by the new wedding outline that 
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emerged from the 1970s. This includes engagements, matched garments for the wed-
ding escort and the renting of a hall for the wedding reception. In sum, wedding prac-
tices have changed substantially in Fransfontein since the 1970s. The new political, 
administrative and professional elite has been the central force behind these changes. 
Clearly, it was not the intention of this elite to make weddings, and thus marriage, 
almost impossible for the rest of the population; yet this unintended consequence has 
very real effects on the lives of the rest of the Fransfontein population.  
To understand these transformations, it is thus necessary not only to analyse the 
“married class” and its display of conspicuous consumption (Veblen 1994 [1899]), but 
also to examine the audience of the conspicuous celebrators and the boundaries created 
between these two groups (Campbell 1995). In his work on the bachelors of Béarn, a 
rural community in the French Pyreneans, Bourdieu (2008) showed how urbanization 
and individualization in French society increased the difficulties of rural men who 
wished to marry. A key scene in his analysis is a Christmas ball at which a rather large 
crowd of bachelors stands on the fringe to watch the guests dancing, flirting and joy-
ously celebrating. Bourdieu’s description exhibits some remarkable similarities with a 
scene we observed during a wedding ceremony in Fransfontein in the summer of 2005 
(Pauli 2011). A crowd of people had gathered in front of the barred windows of the 
bride’s parental home, eagerly trying to catch a glimpse of what was going on inside. 
Seeing the crowd, I wondered whether something might have happened, perhaps a con-
flict between the two kin groups involved in the marriage? But then a women at the 
back of the crowd explained that they just wanted to watch the married people inside 
the house celebrating the final asking-out of the bride. Only married people were al-
lowed to attend this part of the ceremony and they received wedding cake and meat, 
served by the bride. As in France, the unmarried Fransfontein crowd watching the wed-
ding of an elite couple visibly demonstrated their own exclusion: “they are and they 
know they are ‘unmarriageable’” (Bourdieu 2008: 82). In both Béarn and Fransfontein, 
elite celebrations exhibit the boundaries between the different classes.  
Given what is at stake, it is remarkable how little these marriage- and class-based 
boundaries are contested. Many unmarried people have accepted that they are living 
in a state of “waithood” (Honwana 2012), waiting to marry and waiting for a better, 
middle-class life. People unable to marry will not marry at all, rather than change the 
wedding ritual (see also Hunter 2016; Posel/Rudwick 2013; White 2016). They do 
not mock “bourgeois weddings”, as do the French peasant communities (Reed-
Danahay 1996), nor do they vary the wedding outline to match their economic pos-
sibilities (Argyrou 1996; Kendall 1996).3 Such acts of copying, appropriating and 
                                                 
3 For Southern Africa, Mair mentiones variations of wedding outlines based on economic 
means (Mair 1969: 39-41; see also Levin 1947). 
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resisting are almost completely absent in Fransfontein. Only occasionally will a 
“struggle” wedding take place in Fransfontein (Pauli/Dawids 2017) at which the mar-
rying couple does not clearly belong to the local elite or the urban, “commuting” 
middle class and has only recently acquired some income. Some Fransfonteiners 
question the financial basis of such struggle weddings and challenge the wedding 
couples for the sense of entitlement their ceremonies portray (Pauli/Dawids 2017). 
Yet the question should rather be why there are not more such attempts at redefining 
and reappropriating marriage?  
WHY NOT A CHEAPER COPY? 
That the explosion of wedding costs and with it the exclusion of large parts of the 
population from a previously common social institution is ongoing and not resisted 
represents a cultural conundrum. I suggest that agency and structure theories can pro-
vide crucial insights to solve this conundrum. Sherry B. Ortner’s concept of “serious 
games” describes the interplay between agencies and structures. A “serious game” is 
an “intense play of multiply positioned subjects pursuing cultural goals within a ma-
trix of local inequalities and power differentials” (Ortner 2006: 144). Such a matrix, 
or structure as William Sewell (1992, 2005) terms it, has a dual character: it is com-
posed of both resources and of schemas. There are two types of resources, namely 
human resources (e.g. physical strength, knowledge etc.) and nonhuman resources 
(i.e. objects, animate or inanimate, naturally occurring or manufactured) that can be 
used to enhance or maintain power (Sewell 2005: 133). Yet resources do not simply 
exist by themselves: “What they amount to as resources is largely a consequence of 
the schemas that inform their use”. (ibid: 135) Schemas, defined as cognitive and 
cultural procedures of meaning making that are both “generalizable” and “transpos-
able” (ibid: 131), thus enable and form the use of resources. Consequently, how sche-
mas and resources lead to structures is a dialectic process that Sewell describes as 
follows:  
Schemas not empowered or regenerated by resources would eventually be abandoned and for-
gotten, just as resources without cultural schemas to direct their use would eventually dissipate 
and decay. Sets of schemas and resources may properly be said to constitute structures only 
when they mutually imply and sustain each other over time. (Sewell 2005: 137) 
Where can the acting subject be placed within this conception of structure? How 
much influence can actors and groups of actors actually exercise on structures? The 
answer to this question will strongly influence the empirical analysis. This becomes 
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especially evident in Jean and John Comaroffs’ introduction to Ethnography and the 
Historical Imagination (1992), where they formulate a deep skepticism of and cri-
tique against the overemphasis of the concept of agency. They argue that this empha-
sis continues Eurocentric perceptions of the person and may lead to oversimplifica-
tion of historical processes. The Comaroffs stress that a focus on the motivations of 
actors can be misleading as these are often “only” reflections of past actions. They 
also argue that an emphasis of agency does not take the unintended consequences of 
any historical process sufficiently into account. In their own work, the Comaroffs 
thus do not focus on individual actors and their agencies but instead on the “the pulse 
of collective forces” (Comaroff/Comaroff 1992: 36). If one were to place the dialectic 
between agency and structure on a continuum, the Comaroffs’ work would clearly be 
aligned on the side of structure.  
In a critical engagement with the Comaroffs, Ortner argues for a more central 
consideration of agency within an understanding of social process that are shaped 
by structure and the “the pulse of collective forces”. Agency, according to Ortner, 
is part of the process and has to be understood carefully: “‘Agency’ is never a thing 
in itself but is always part of a process of what Giddens calls structuration, the 
making and remaking of larger social and cultural formations”. (Ortner 2006: 134) 
What then is agency? Sewell (1992: 20) defines agency as “the strivings and moti-
vated transactions that constitute the experienced surface of social life”. Thus, agency 
is the human capacity for desiring, forming intentions and acting creatively (Sewell 
2005: 20). Some theorists argue, in clear opposition to the Comaroffs, that all an-
thropological analysis should start with individuals and their agencies. One exam-
ple of this is Martin Sökefeld who concludes his article on self, identity and culture, 
in which he has presented a detailed individual history, with the following plea for 
a new methodological reorientation, yet to be created: “It requires giving real im-
portance to the actual individuals we work with while studying ‘culture’”. (Söke-
feld 1999: 431) 
Here I want to follow Ortner’s and Sewell’s approach on agency and structure. 
This requires that I discuss one final point of this dialectic, namely the question of 
how agency and power are interwoven. Again, Ortner’s reflections are helpful:  
In probably the most common usage “agency” can be virtually synonymous with the forms of 
power people have at their disposal, their ability to act on their own behalf, influence other 
people and events, and maintain some kind of control in their own lives. Agency in this sense 
is relevant for both domination and resistance. People in positions of power “have” – legiti-
mately or not – what might be thought of as “a lot of agency”, but the dominated too always 
have certain capacities, and sometimes very significant capacities, to exercise some sort of in-
fluence over the ways in which events unfold. (Ortner 2006: 143-144) 
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Like Ortner (2006: 165), I am not going to discuss the concept of power in its theo-
retical complexity but instead use it mainly as a structure-dependent means that actors 
use to (1) “act on their own behalf” to pursue culturally defined goals and projects, 
(2) “influence other people and events” for these projects, and (3) “maintain some 
kind of control of their own lives” and not be dominated by the projects of others. 
Thus, Sewell’s structures (2005: 145) empower actors differently, which again has 
effects on an actor’s agency to transform or reproduce structures.  
This finally brings me back to the reflection of the conundrum of why no cheaper 
versions of weddings have arisen in Fransfontein. I want to start with some brief 
remarks on structural forces, “the pulse of collective forces”, before I take a closer 
look at the different agencies of actors within Fransfontein.  
One line of thinking about the decline of marriage concentrates on structural 
forces. Simply argued, colonialism and apartheid reconfigured the political and social 
landscapes and reduced the centrality of kin relations. In their place, other types of 
power relations emerged, most prominently patronage structures dominated by male 
elites. Their power was strongly connected to the apartheid state and depended on 
their capacity to redistribute central resources. As Abner Cohen (1981) and Bourdieu 
(1984 [1979]) have shown, elites are in constant need to legitimize their privileges. 
Weddings have become a central arena to do so, leading to an explosion in costs of 
wedding ceremonies. Yet the explanation that an explosion of costs has made it im-
possible for most people to marry describes, metaphorically speaking, the symptoms 
but not the causes of the problem. On a broader scale and taking inspiration from 
Sewell, I suggest that the schema for a wedding is being changed. Weddings are 
transformed into highly valuable resources accessible only to those actors with much 
agency. Thus, it is the enhanced agency of some male actors, itself clearly embedded 
in wider political, economic and social forces, that sets the local structural changes 
of the marriage system in motion. Their agency transforms the object, marriage, so 
deeply that those with lesser agency are also increasingly less able to participate. 
Such a dynamic of distincton works through exclusion. But why do most Fransfon-
tein people, those with lesser agency, accept that they are unable to marry? Why do 
they accept that marriage has turned into such a rare resource? After all, Ortner (2006: 
144) reminds us that “the dominated too always have certain capacities, and some-
times very significant capacities, to exercise some sort of influence over the ways in 
which events unfold”. To understand why this is not the case in Fransfontein, it is 
necessary to understand who “the dominated” are and what their “projects” or their 
goals are.  
“The dominated” are of course not a homogeneous group. In order to illustrate 
this, I differentiated four different social groups with different perspectives on the 
marriage transformations: (1) men and their kin groups, (2) women and their kin 
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groups, (3) the couple of husband and wife, and (4) institutions beyond the local level, 
mainly the church and the state. Obviously, these four social groups are not clear-cut 
categories but do overlap. However, I hope that this analytic separation can shed 
some light on the conundrum of why no cheaper version of the wedding has arisen in 
Fransfontein (see also Gulbrandsen 1986). 
I want to start with the first group, men and their kin. Here it is essential to dif-
ferentiate between the powerful and the not-so-powerful men. The perspective of the 
male in power, his agency and his ways of legitimating his power has been already 
discussed above. Regarding these men, it will be interesting to see how they try to 
hand down their privileges to the next generation. Michael and I were, in fact, able 
to observe the wedding of a legitimate son of a very influential Damara politician in 
2004. It was absolutely obvious that virtually the whole event was sponsored by the 
father and that the bride and the groom were only actors in a play directed by the 
powerful man. Yet, the parental habitus also influenced the performance of the son: 
the more the wedding progressed, the more self-confident he became. 
In informal interviews with non-affluent men who most likely will never marry, 
some stressed that it is more important to father children than to be married. Simi-
larly, men may create alternative masculine identities that are not based on marriage 
but on having (many) lovers and children (Schaumburg 2013). Yet, although several 
of the men expressed resignation about their inability to marry, none suggested as 
solution to stage a cheaper wedding in order to marry at all. Clearly, such a proposi-
tion would require the bride and her kin group to agree.  
As the interviews with women showed, however, they and their kin (the second 
group) were often opposed to the proposition of a cheaper wedding. To them a 
cheaper marriage implied being a “cheaper wife”, namely one who lacked strong kin 
ties or whose kin could negotiate sufficiently strongly on her behalf during the mar-
riage negotiations. This is a very negative view of women and their kin and thus not 
a position women would strive for. I will demonstrate this through the example of 
the wedding of Francois and Namaku in 2005 (Pauli/Dawids 2017). Namaku’s family 
is not very wealthy and we had imagined that the family would be very happy about 
her marriage to a reliable, hard-working, employed man. We certainly did not expect 
them to make things too difficult for him and his family. The opposite was the case. 
The bride’s kin group chose the unmarried sister of the bride’s mother (MZ) as its 
representative. Her first act was to force the male’s kin group to stage an asking and 
engagement ritual on a farm far away from Fransfontein. This imposed a heavy strain 
on the man’s wedding budget. At this location, the bride’s kin did not offer the man’s 
kin any place to sleep and they finally ended up resting in a small goat pen. The 
asking ritual thus became a very tough process. In another step, the bride’s kin de-
manded that the groom build extra rooms on the bride’s mother’s compound for the 
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wedding event. When I later asked the married couple what this had meant for them, 
the wife indicated that it proved to the wife’s kin group that the man and his kin 
would continue to take care of all of them after the wedding. To achieve this com-
mitment, the wife’s kin had to make punishing demands on the man and not give in 
easily. I opposed this with the reflection that it was exactly these multiple demands 
that made it difficult for men and women to marry, exemplified not least by the 
bride’s MZ and her daughters who were all still unmarried. Despite this, it was ex-
actly the bride’s MZ who was especially hard on the groom and his family, and pos-
sibly giving her own daughters’ current boyfriends nightmares.  
What does this vignette show regarding the conundrum of cheaper versions of 
weddings and the dialectic of structure and agency? Above, I started my reflections 
with Ortner (2006: 144) theorizing about the “multiply positioned subjects pursuing 
cultural goals”. The multiple positions in which actors are embedded can force them 
to act within conflicting normative structures. In the situation above, the bride’s MZ 
has a lot of agency and uses it for her specific, culturally informed goals, yet in the 
long run her actions severely limit her own and her daughters’ agency regarding mar-
riage. Comparable to Gulbrandsen’s (1986) observation, it seems that it is not only 
the groom who needs affines but also the affines who need the groom and his em-
bodiment of the hope for long-term support.  
The third group I want to look at is the couple. For three marriages we were able 
to observe how, as one groom has described it, “things got out of hand”. All three 
couples started small, thinking of a modest civil marriage at the magistrate’s office, 
with a meal afterwards. Romantic ideals of the unity of a man and a woman and their 
love as the most important essence of marriage were mentioned – and not spending 
huge amounts of money on a conspicuous wedding. Yet, none of these couples was 
able to pursue their “romantic” wedding goal. During the whole time of our fieldwork, 
there was only one couple that celebrated a simple wedding. This was a bi-national 
couple, the wife having been born in Fransfontein and the husband having migrated to 
Namibia from Sweden. Soon after the wedding the couple left Fransfontein. 
What then happened to the goals and agencies of the three Fransfontein couples 
that did not manage to keep their weddings simple? As soon as their kin groups heard 
of the marriage plans, they deeply involved themselves into the process. Some of-
fered financial support, others mainly “advice”, yet both often made things even more 
complicated for the couple (Pauli/Dawids 2017). During one of the weddings, an aunt 
of the wife (MMZD) declared that it was inappropriate to slaughter and exchange a 
black cow at a marriage. Her opinion caused a cascade of problems, with the couple 
being forced to buy another cow for the slaughtering. Asked why they do not allow 
the couple to marry on a lower budget, a couple of the groom’s (unmarried) sisters 
replied with indignation: “That looks as if you do not have a family!” The answer 
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illustrates how the needs and wishes of marrying couples and those of their kin are 
embedded in multiple and conflicting structures. While it made sense for the groom’s 
unmarried sisters to ensure that their brother would celebrate a luxurious and big 
wedding, these actions simultaneously reduced their own chances of marrying. 
One has to differentiate between couples. None of the Fransfontein couples took 
the decision to marry without a solid financial base. To a large extent, this base stemmed 
from of the groom’s permanent income for, unlike in South Africa (James 2015), people 
in Fransfontein did not go into debt to finance their wedding. In Fransfontein, it is very 
difficult to borrow even small amounts of money, let alone the huge amounts necessary 
to pay for a wedding. But not all couples marrying are wealthy and some struggle hard 
to marry. Locally, these weddings are labeled “struggle marriages” (Pauli/Dawids 2017). 
In contrast to elite weddings, couples that struggle into marriage receive a lot of support 
from their kin. The way these couples celebrate their weddings is thus only partially 
based on their own decisions and agency; they are much more strongly embedded in 
the cultural goals of other actors, goals that might strongly alter their personal intentions 
and plans (such as those for a modest wedding). In addition, their agency is often struc-
tured and further limited by ideas about kinship. This is expressed in an interview I 
conducted with Robert, a 34 year old unmarried man: 
Julia: Can you imagine marrying in the magistrate only? 
Robert: No, I would never just marry in the magistrate. When my girlfriend and I love each 
other, then people must know that this person loves this other person. If we only went to the 
magistrate, no one would know that we have married. But with our traditional marriage, even 
someone in Otjikondo knows. 
Julia: Everyone knows. 
Robert: Even someone in Windhoek will know that I have married, or someone in Tsumeb. 
Then there are many witnesses.  
Later in the interview, Robert also stressed that “marrying in the magistrate” is cheap, 
like “stealing marriage”. His reasoning demonstrates how strongly the new way to 
celebrate weddings has already being internalized and normalized. Indeed, it is likely 
that he would not recognize his own grandparents’ modest wedding as what he ima-
gines a “traditional marriage” to be. The critical feature here is that lavish weddings 
are public weddings, a characteristic of great significance to people in Fransfontein: 
it can only be the public eye that can certify the new kin relations (see also Schareika 
2010; Smith 2001).  
Finally, I want to reflect on the role of institutions beyond the local level, thus the 
churches and the state (the fourth group). Although there is a general public aware-
ness that marriage is on a decline in the country, neither the state nor the churches 
From Decline to Distinction | 195 
 
have initiated or sponsored any “marriage program” to promote marriage. To my 
knowledge there are also no such attempts in any of the other Southern African coun-
tries that have similar declining marriage rates,4 unlike countries like the USA that 
has introduced a program aimed specifically at the African-American population 
(Lane 2004). The Lutheran church in Fransfontein is very aware of the situation and 
some, albeit localized, action is being taken, such as encouraging “old age marriages” 
that I described in “Contemporary Fransfontein Marriages”. This occurred under the 
auspices of the local pastor who felt that old couples who had lived together for a 
long time and had children together should be married. He started his own personal 
campaign and married many of these couples in a rather modest fashion. Apart from 
this, no other actions are observable in Fransfontein.  
Yet, the growth of Pentecostal churches might change this. We observed how a 
woman pressured her boyfriend into marriage by joining a Pentecostal church and 
moving out of the joint household, returning to her mother’s house with their two 
children. The woman argued that living together without marriage was now a sin for 
her. The man tried to convince her that without him having permanent employment, 
it did not make any sense to spend money on a wedding, but his argument did not 
convince her since she knew that he owned almost a dozen cows. While he wanted 
to use the cattle to build up his stock, she saw it as a great opportunity to invest in a 
wedding. After months of doubts and loneliness, the man finally decided to sell most 
of his livestock to pay for the wedding. The Pentecostal community also helped to 
facilitate the wedding by sponsoring food.  
Thus, solving the condundrum of why there is no cheaper version to a wedding 
in Fransfontein is rather complex, involving many actors, cultural goals and power 
relations. I realize that the interpretations I offer here are only fragments and aspects 
and do not give one central cause. However, I think that this is part and parcel of a 
theoretical perspective that allows for multiple agencies and structures, considering 
both the “pulse of collective forces” (Comaroff/Comaroff 1992: 36) and the “actual 
individual” (Sökefeld 1999: 431). 
                                                 
4 However, Hosegood, McGrath and Moultire (2009) have recently stressed that the post-
apartheid South African government now accepts different forms of marriage (also cus-
tomary marriages) as official marriages. This “marriage-friendly” policy, nevertheless, 
does not halt the decline in marriage rates observable in many South African regions, 













The second part described contemporary marriage practices and analyzed the decline 
of marriage rates during the last decades. This third part of the book tackles the con-
sequences these changes have for other social relations. This chapter takes a closer 
look at kinship and reproduction. The next chapter scrutinizes how the decline of 
marriage has reconfigured relationships outside marriage.  
ENTANGLEMENTS OF MARRIAGE AND REPRODUCTION 
Julia: Can children be more important than the boyfriend, husband or partner? 
All four girls with strong impetus: Yes. 
Julia: Why? 
Ella: Because it’s your child. 
Petra: Your blood. 
Isabel: Everyone is someone else. 
Vanessa: He can even, when he comes in your life, he must accept you and your child – 
otherwise … 
Isabel: … he goes away …  
Vanessa: … when he says “I will not accept your child”. 
Petra: If I come into his house and he says he is not accepting my child, so I will leave with 
my child. 
Isabel: You are just the same; you and your kid are the same person. 
Vanessa: Even if I love him, I will go with my child, so my child is more important than 
him. 
Isabel: Yes, is more important. Because that child will stay with me until I am old and die. 
(Group discussion, Fransfontein, August 2004) 
In Khoekhoegowab, a pregnant woman is called a /gam /khaa khoes, literally ‘two in 
one female body’. This description is telling as it indicates the perceived closeness of 
200 | The Decline of Marriage in Namibia 
 
a mother and her child. This ideal unity of mother and child is understood to continue 
after birth. Isabel, one of the four young women between 20 and 30 years whom I 
interviewed in several group discussions in Fransfontein as cited above, expressed 
this entanglement of mother and child as sameness: “You are just the same; you and 
your kid are the same person”. Similarly she stated: “Everyone is someone else,” thus 
reflecting the conception of an endless chain created through continuous mother-
child relations. Throughout our group discussions, “men”, whether integrated into a 
woman’s life as father, lover, boyfriend or husband, were not conceptualized as part 
of this unity. Men could perhaps be supportive, responsible, caring for the mother/ 
child/mother-and-child; or could be the very opposite – violent, unfaithful and care-
less. However, men were perceived as being outside of this close bond and, if in a 
situation where they had to chose, the young women declared that they would decide 
for the child and against the man. Of course, these expressions are part of a normative 
discourse that idealizes the mother-child bond. Indeed, we witnesses a number of 
instances during our stay in Fransfontein where women decided to stay with a new 
partner and leave their child with a female relative, often the child’s maternal grand-
mother.  
Childbearing and childrearing are crucial for the reproduction of society. When 
to get a child and with whom, how to raise it, what to demand from it – these are 
central and often contested social issues. Powerful institutions, like the state and 
its laws, frame what at first sight appear to be intimate actions and private deci-
sions: “Reproduction is simply too important to be left to the whims and fancies of 
individuals”. (Robertson 1991: 16) Such a perspective on human reproduction is a 
rather recent development. Although reproduction has always been discussed in 
anthropology, an in-depth treatment of the social and cultural dimensions of human 
reproduction is only a few decades old (Greenhalgh 1995; Johnson-Hanks 2007a; 
Kertzer/ Fricke 1997; Lang 1997; Pauli 2010a; Tremayne 2001). Soraya Tremayne 
(2001) shows that until the 1960s reproduction had been perceived as a rather sim-
ple biological phenomenon. With the onset of feminist, technological and demo-
graphic discussions in the 1970s, the perspective on reproduction gradually 
changed. Today, researchers agree that an understanding of reproduction has to be 
culturally embedded: “The attempt to understand reproduction in isolation from its 
broader context is a barren exercise”. (Tremayne 2001: 22; also Lang 1997) Alt-
hough the four young women cited above might perceive their reproductive deci-
sion-making as rather autonomous, they are nevertheless formed, enabled and re-
stricted by a complex web of cultural, social, legal, political and economic 
structures. Following Faye Ginsburg and Rayna Rapp, I define reproduction as “the 
events throughout the human and especially the female life-cycle related to ideas 
and practices surrounding fertility, birth and child care, including the ways in which 
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these figure into understandings of social and cultural renewal” (Ginsburg/Rapp 
1991: 311).1 
What then frames reproduction in Southern Africa? How are families formed, 
how is kinship reproduced? Listening to the four young women above, marriage and 
long-term partnership do not seem to be especially important for reproduction. Such 
a disentanglement of marriage from reproduction stands in stark contrast to the prom-
inence marriage has for a long time had in demographic discourse: “Demographers 
have long recognized marriage as one of the principle determinants of fertility”. 
(Bongaarts 1978: 108) Marriage is taken as an indicator of exposure to sexual inter-
course and the “risk” of pregnancy (Pauli 2010a). By measuring the proportion of 
married people in a population and the age at which they first marry (assumed to 
show when they become sexually active), demographers estimate the children likely 
to be born in the future.2  
Such a conceptualization of marriage matches well with the metanarrative of the 
stable and universal Southern African marriage systems already discussed in the in-
troduction (Gulbrandsen 1986; Krige/Comaroff 1981; Kuper 1982; Oheneba-Sa-
kyi/Takyi 2006). Both marriage and reproduction are virtually universal in these de-
scriptions. Fatherhood is here defined socially and not necessarily biologically. Both 
fatherhood and marriage may depend upon the status of bridewealth payments. Many 
children and high fertility are especially valued (Arnfred 2004: 73; Preston-Whyte 
1999; Upton 2001).  
But as I discussed in the previous chapters, in many parts of Southern Africa this 
system not longer exists. Marriage rates have significantly declined. The increase in 
the never-married population is paralleled by an increase in the number of children 
born premaritally3:  
Premarital fertility is prevalent in other parts of Africa, especially among adolescent women, 
in countries as diverse as Liberia, Kenya and Madagascar. However, high levels such as those 
noted in Namibia, Botswana and South Africa, as well as late average age at marriage and 
                                                 
1 Fertility might be more narrowly defined as the birth histories of women (and men). An-
other related term not discussed here is fecundity. Fecundity means the biological capacity 
to reproduce (Pauli 2000: 1). 
2 Often demographers and demographic surveys define marriage rather broadly, such as in 
Namibia’s Demographic and Health Surveys. I discuss this in more detail below. 
3 The term “premarital” is rather common in the demographic literature to describe out-of-
wedlock births. It is misleading insofar as the “pre” implies that eventually a marriage will 
occur. Given the demographic and marital situation in many parts of Southern Africa, for 
many women all children they will give birth to will be “premarital”. 
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premarital fertility at older ages, seem to be a feature of modern South Africa, and especially 
in the former apartheid areas. This intriguing phenomenon calls for further research on marriage 
markets and the determinants of late age at marriage. (Garenne/Zwang 2005: 166) 
Thus, the two main characteristics of a transformed Southern Africa system of mar-
riage and reproduction are that marriage is not universal anymore; and, if it happens 
at all, that it happens rather late in life. 
Critical, however, fertility does not seem to have developed along similar lines, 
as Michel Garenne and Julien Zwang’s comment on premarital fertility above indi-
cates. Unlike marriage, childbearing is still universal and widespread. Despite the 
deep and encompassing transformations of the marriage system I described in the 
previous chapters, this thus does not seem to have affected fertility (Gulbrandsen 
1986). In most regions of Southern Africa today, births and children are welcomed 
and desired independently of their parents’ marital status at their birth (Gordon 1972: 
132; Naidoo 2007; Pauli/Schnegg 2007; Upton 2001). In a study from north-central 
Namibia, Mari Tarkkonen (2017) has shown how adulthood is interwined with 
parenthood, a theme mirrored by Rebecca Upton who highlighted the connection be-
tween fertility and identity:  
If we are to be successful in understanding the cultural significance of fertility in southern Af-
rica, a central concern should be an understanding of how concepts such as fertility and 
childbearing, versus infertility and lack of children, relate to the negotiation of identity. (Upton 
2001: 362) 
In a study on KwaZulu-Natal, Eleanor Preston-Whyte (1999: 143) describes the stig-
matization women face when they are not able to fall pregnant: “the fear of being 
branded ‘barren’”. Similar to Upton’s (2001: 352) findings on infertility in Botswana, 
Preston-Whyte shows that fertility is a central feature of identity – for both men and 
women. It is infertility that is stigmatized, not out-of-wedlock births or being unmar-
ried. Regardless of whether married or unmarried, men and women are expected to 
desire to have children: “Fertility is thus not only approved: it is expected”. (Preston-
Whyte 1999: 149) Further, the Christian perception of marriage followed by child-
bearing may be turned upside down: “one may need to have a child in order to get 
married”. (Upton 2001: 354, emphasis in original) 
Preston-Whyte (1999: 147) views the positive attitudes towards childbearing 
and the absence of long-term sanctions against out-of-wedlock births as reasons 
why contraceptives are relatively unimportant for teenagers. This is mirrored in a 
study on reproductive decision-making in a Namibian town by Martina Gockel-
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Frank (2007, 2008) who reports that use of contraceptives is not only of little im-
portance to teenagers, but to many women of different ages. Having a child as a 
teenager is also not considered as preventing a young woman’s schooling as there 
is in general no problem to find someone to care for the baby, most often the teen-
ager’s mother. Thus, while there are almost no sanctions on teenage pregnancies, 
in later phases of her life a woman is firmly expected to bear children. This situa-
tion is reflected in the 1992 Namibia Demographic and Health Survey that found 
that the total fertility rate of unmarried women is only one child lower than that of 
all women, and that many women give birth before marriage (Raitis 1994: 116). 
These perceptions and practices may lead to weak or even non-existing links be-
tween marriage and childbearing, an observation Upton has made for Botswana: 
“Marriage and childbearing have become increasingly separate domains of life”. 
(Upton 2001: 354) In line with this, the opinions of the four young women featured 
at the beginning of this chapter reflect a comparable disentanglement of marriage 
and reproduction. 
It seems as if marriage has thoroughly changed in Southern Africa while repro-
duction seems to be characterized by continuity despite these changes. However, for 
several decades now, Southern Africa has been experiencing what demographers call 
a “demographic transition”: a decline in mortality rates and a decline in fertility rates. 
Recent research locates the beginning of the fertility decline in the 1970s (Garenne/ 
Zwang 2005; Moultrie/Timaeus 2003). Namibia’s demographic situation has been 
characterized as follows: “Compared with other African countries, Namibia in 1992 
appeared as rather advanced in the demographic transition, with average levels of 
fertility (TFR=5,4)”. (Garenne/Zwang 2005: 151) The main reason for the decline in 
fertility is seen in the spread and use of so-called Western contraceptives (Garenne/ 
Zwang 2005; Kirk/Pillet 1998: 4; Raitis 1994). In how far are these changes then 
connected to the transformations of the marriage system?  
Working in a comparable demographic context of a society with both declining 
marriage and fertility rates, Jane I. Guyer (1994) offers some important analytic con-
cepts to understand the entanglements and disentanglements of marriage and repro-
duction in Southern Africa. In long-term ethnographic research on marriage and 
parenthood in western Nigeria, Guyer (1994: 236) differentiates the “logics of fertil-
ity and marriage” into a “lineal” and a “lateral logic”. Drawing on the work of Jack 
Caldwell (1976) and Cain (1984), Guyer describes the lineal logic of fertility as the 
intergenerational wealth flow between the younger and the older generation. Children 
are obliged to support their parents, especially in old age. According to Guyer, mar-
riage consolidates the rights to parenthood and thus long-term support. In Southern 
Africa, this seems to be more important to men than to women because women’s 
claims on parenthood are less debatable.  
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The second logic is classified by Guyer as “lateral”. Here, Guyer builds on the 
work of Esther Goody (1978). Kinship is not only about lineage reproduction, the 
lineal logic, but also involves lateral network building. Goody finds that social, 
economic and political opportunities increase in proportion with a person’s net-
work. Child fostering is a very important mode of this type of network building in 
West Africa (see also Alber 2018). Through the exchange of children, both new 
ties are created and old ones are maintained. Here, the children are the cement that 
binds. The procreative link between a woman and a man – visible in the child – is 
extended and transformed into social links and social parenthood with other women 
and men.  
Guyer describes another form of lateral network building. As her study of the 
Yoruba in Western Nigeria shows, many mothers cultivate co-parental ties with more 
than one father of their children, resulting in an arrangement that Guyer terms “pol-
yandrous motherhood” (Guyer 1994: 231). Again, children are the cement that binds 
– but the units they connect differ: a mother and the men she is having children with. 
To understand this type of female network building, Guyer distinguishes the ad-
vantages of having joint children from other types of male/female relations, namely 
sexual relations and marriage relations. Through a child, the depth and time horizon 
of a sexual relation is expanded: “with a child, a woman may be able to make con-
siderable claims even on a fairly casual relationship […] the child as a key to stabi-
lizing an otherwise fleeting relationship”. (ibid: 237) The tie created through mar-
riage, in contrast, is long-term and stable, but it also limits the woman: she can only 
be in one union at a time. Children with different men thus combine the positive 
aspects of a sexual relation with those of a marriage while reducing the negative ones: 
“Through a child there is a basis for claims over a fairly long time period along with 
some flexibility in the numbers of unions one can envisage”. (ibid) Thus, through 
children women might gain both flexibility and stability.  
Guyer’s lateral and lineal logics serve as analytic devices for my analysis of re-
production, kinship and marriage in the Fransfontein area, helping me to understand 
some of the variations observed there. I use it in particular to analyze the high number 
of different reproductive partners that women tend to have there, or what Guyer calls 
“polyandrous motherhood”. Guyer argues that there is a direct connection between 
reproduction and marriage, on the one hand, and changing economic conditions, on 
the other, and argues that “what needs research attention is potentially new practices 
of parenthood under new economic conditions” (ibid: 248, emphasis in original). 
Following Guyer’s approach, this chapter analyzes the consequences of changing 
economic and political conditions on practices and perceptions of parenthood, fertil-
ity and marriage in Fransfontein. Despite Guyer’s (1994: 250) observation that “mar-
riage has always been conceptually and organizationally distinct from parenthood in 
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Africa”, I would rather distinguish different constellations of gradual entanglement 
(and disentanglement) of marriage and reproduction. In the Fransfontein region, fam-
ilies have been formed both within and outside of marriages. My approach is inspired 
by Jennifer Johnson-Hanks’ suggestion not to take marriage as one among many 
other independent variables to explain fertility differences but rather to gain an un-
derstanding of the different social contexts that marriage creates and does not create 
for reproduction:  
When we calculate birth rates separately for the married and the unmarried, rather than including 
a marital status variable in a regression model, we are explicitly claiming that marriage constitutes 
a key factor of the social context relevant for childbearing. (Johnson-Hanks 2007a: 13) 
My main analytic question in this chapter is, thus, when marriage does and when it 
does not provide a frame for reproduction.4  
FERTILITY DECLINE IN NAMIBIA: MACRO AND  
MICRO PERSPECTIVES 
Demographic research locates the beginning of the Namibian fertility decline around 
the 1970s (Garenne/Zwang 2005; Moultrie/Timaeus 2003). Kirk and Pillet (1998) 
classified Namibia as part of the group of African countries with a steady fertility 
decline. The total fertility rate (TFR) in Namibia declined from 6,1 children per 
woman in 1991 to 4,1 children per woman in 2001 (Namibia 2003: 63).5 Analyzing 
Namibia’s first national census (of 1991) and the first Demographic and Health Sur-
vey (of 1992), Rikka Raitis (1994: 113) discovered several variations in fertility lev-
els. Of special importance here, she found that marriage affects fertility: although 
never-married women have a high total fertility rate of 4,4, this rate is nevertheless 
one child less than the TFR of all women.  
                                                 
4 I am only analyzing the fertility of women. In this, I follow demographic and also anthro-
pological practices that perceive the data gathered on female reproduction as more reliable 
than data gathered on male reproduction. However, in our surveys we did also collect male 
reproductive histories. 
5 The total fertility rate is a commonly used rate to describe and compare fertility levels 
between populations and population subgroups. The total fertility rate is the sum of all age-
specific fertility rates multiplied by the size of the age groups (Pauli 2000: 220-222). The 
rate gives the number of children a woman will have born by the end of her reproductive 
life if fertility rates remain the same. 
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Table 13: Total fertility rates of 364 Fransfontein women 
Birth Cohorts N Percentage of sample 
 
TFR 
1915-1924 11 3,0 3,5 
1925-1934 26 7,1 7,0 
1935-1944 41 11,3 6,6 
1945-1954 47 12,9 5,7 
1955-1964 59 16,2 4,8 
1965-1974 65 17,9 4,6 
1975-1984 89 24,5 2,7 
1985-1994 26 7,1 0,6 
Total  364 100 5,2 
 
The micro-demographic data we collected for the Fransfontein region follow the na-
tional trend of declining fertility rates. During in-depth interviews with elder woman 
and their daughters and granddaughters, the decline in fertility was often commented 
upon. The women clearly perceived the decline and in general linked it to the avail-
ability of contraceptives. Younger women expressed relief about not having to go 
through the burden of as many births as their grandmothers. Table 13 gives an over-
view of the development of achieved parity for eight birth cohorts recorded in our 
ethnographic census data.  
The first cohort (1915-24) is much smaller than the other cohorts. The low total 
fertility rate for this cohort thus needs some critical adjustment, as it is likely to be 
subject to other influences (e.g. patterns of survival not available in the data). The last 
cohort is also problematic. When we conducted our census interviews in 2004, we only 
interviewed women 15 years and older. This means that the last cohort actually ends 
with the year 1990 and only covers five rather than ten years. If we thus exclude these 
cohorts from the analysis, a clear trend becomes visible, as indicated in Table 13. The 
population is indeed experiencing a fertility decline, at least amongst the women who 
have finished their reproductive phase6: for these women, total fertility rates have 
                                                 
6 Women who have finished their reproductive phase are defined as those 40 years and older. 
Only few births occur after the age of 40. 
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dropped from a high of 7.0 for women born around 1930 to a moderate level of 4.8 for 
those born in the 1960s and 1970s.  
To better understand these declines and their possible interconnections, I now 
discuss those factors that centrally frame fertility, thus age at first birth (the onset of 
a woman’s reproductive life), birth intervals (the time between a woman’s births) and 
age at last birth (the end of a woman’s reproductive life) (Bongaarts 1978). The report 
of the 2000 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) by the Namibian Ministry of 
Health and Social Services (MOHSS) states that the median age at first birth has not 
changed from 1992 to 2000 (MOHSS 2003: 53). Further, the report finds that the 
median age at first birth is twenty-one years. The MOHSS report (ibid: 51) also finds 
an increase in the length of birth intervals from a median birth interval of thirty-four 
months in 1992 to one of forty months in 2000. An increase in the median length of 
birth intervals can be observed independent of a woman’s age and parity (Moultrie/ 
Sayi/Timaeus 2012). Unfortunately, I have no information at the national level for 
the age at last birth. The DHS only interviewed women of childbearing age. However, 
I include a discussion of the age at last birth in my analysis of the Fransfontein data 
below. 
Demographers agree that the spread of Western-type contraceptives was the most 
important factor for the decline in fertility in Namibia (Garenne/Zwang 2005; 
Moultrie/Sayi/Timaeus 2012; Raitis 1994). However, the spread and use of this type 
of birth control since the 1970s was often not voluntary; rather, family planning was 
part of a racist population policy by the colonial South African state (Lindsay 1989). 
Jenny Lindsay has stressed that the euphemistic term “family planning programme” 
is actually not very well suited to understanding the scope of the South African pro-
gramme: “population control policies” is more fitting, underscoring the central goal 
of controlling the African population by the “white” community and state.  
The establishment of South Africa’s population control programme in Namibia 
during the 1970s was shaped by multiple factors. During the 1960s and 1970s, the 
international perception of a “Third World population explosion” or “population 
bomb”, threatening the wealth and livelihoods of the so-called developed world, led 
to the establishment of numerous population programmes throughout the so-called 
developing world (Szreter 1996: 21-44). As Lindsay (1989: 3) shows, South African 
population policies varied this general theme insofar as the arguments for control 
over the “black” African population were highly racist, focusing on limiting the swart 
gevaar (black threat) that might result in the loss of white minority power.  
The population programme of the 1970s was mainly based in state-run hospitals 
and clinics. Until today, it provides contraception to women at no cost. The most 
common contraceptive for “black” women has been Depo-Provera, a hormonal in-
jection with often strong side-effects (Lindsay 1989: 26-43). Sterilization has also 
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been practised as birth-control method, sometimes hormonal pills are available, but 
the intrauterine device, or the “loop”, has been very uncommon. During apartheid, 
“black” Namibian women had very little effective choice on whether to use a birth-
control method and which one to choose (ibid: 26). With the dramatic spread of 
HIV/AIDS since the 1980s, condoms (previously used primarily by “whites”) have 
become common throughout Namibia. The DHS survey showed that in 2000 the most 
commonly used methods were the hormonal injection (39 per cent), the male condom 
(28 per cent) and the pill (24 per cent) (MOHSS 2003: 59). The same survey estab-
lished that 61 per cent of all Namibian women age 15 to 49 had used a “modern” 
contraceptive method at some time in their lives (ibid: 59-63). This percentage in-
creases slightly to 63 per cent when one includes other, “traditional” methods (ibid: 
59).  
Like in the national results, there is a remarkable stability in the average age at 
first birth across time in Fransfontein. First births for Fransfontein women of all gen-
erations occur between 19 and 20 years of age (average 19.5). Time between births 
has increased. While women from the older cohorts on average gave birth every two 
years, the time between births for women from the younger cohorts is on average 
three years. The average age at last birth has dropped from 38 years for women born 
between 1925 and 1934 to 36 years for women born between 1955 and 1964. The 
changes in the length of birth intervals and the average age at last birth have been 
gradual, every cohort slightly extending the birth interval while progressively reduc-
ing the age at which reproduction ceases. 
REPRODUCTIVE DYNAMICS OF MARRIED AND 
UNMARRIED WOMEN 
After having described the general development of fertility during the last few dec-
ades for both the macro-context and the micro-context, I now compare married and 
unmarried women. As I have described in previous chapters, marriage has changed 
substantially in Fransfontein. While marriage was the common frame for women’s 
reproduction until the 1970s, with the emergence of new elites and the parallel de-
cline in marriage rates, most reproduction is now taking place outside of marriage. 
To be married has turned into a marker of class distinction, and today it is mostly 
people from local elite families who marry. This leads to the question of how far and 
since when the fertility of the unmarried majority began to differ from the fertility of 
the married elite minority? 
Of the 364 women for whom I have information on marital status, 32 per cent 
(115 women) are or have been married, and 68 per cent have never been married   
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(249 women). Similarly to the national statistics discussed above, unmarried women 
in the Fransfontein area have approximately one child less than women who have 
been married at one point in their lives. The total fertility rate for married women is 
5.9 compared to 4.7 for never-married women. Major differences in age-specific fer-
tility rates between married and unmarried Fransfontein women can be found be-
tween the ages of 25 and 40. 
Figure 16 shows that marital status affects fertility only after the beginning of 
childbearing. Unsurprisingly, then, there is no difference in the average age at first 
birth between married and never-married women. After the onset of reproduction, 
fertility is higher for married than for never-married women. From the 1970s on-
wards, never-married mothers have spread their births across the reproductive span 
more than their married counterparts. These longer birth intervals also lead to a lower 
overall fertility level of never-married women. Further, never-married women in-
creasingly had children with three or more reproductive partners, the pattern that 
Guyer (1994) has described as “polyandrous motherhood”. This reproductive prac-
tice further increased the average time between births for never-married women be-
cause it took them time to meet new partners. From the 1970s onwards, the average 
age at last birth also started to differ between married and never-married women. 
Married women born between 1945 and 1964 on average gave birth for the last time 
between the ages of 37 and 38, while their never-married counterparts did so at age 35. 
The fertility decline of the 1970s and 1980s described above has thus mainly resulted 
from changes in the reproductive practices of never-married women. 
Figure 16: Age specific fertility rates for married and never-married women 
210 | The Decline of Marriage in Namibia 
 
Having established these demographic dynamics as basis on which to understand 
how families in Fransfontein have been formed throughout the 20th century, I now 
turn to life stories of 20 Fransfontein women. Ginsburg (1987) showed how life sto-
ries can be used to study the intersection between lived experiences and historical 
change. Life stories are especially insightful at critical transitional points in the life 
course, like giving birth:  
In situations of rapid change when the normative rules for an assumed life trajectory are in 
question, these life-cycle shifts are experienced as crises, revealing contention over cultural 
definitions. In other words, when the interpretation of a particular life event – abortion or more 
generally the transition to motherhood, for example – becomes the object of political struggle, 
it indicates a larger disruption occurring in the social order as well. (Ginsburg 1987: 625) 
Through the life narratives of the women I want to unravel how they construct their 
own lives vis-à-vis larger political changes. 
My approach is also inspired by Thomas Schweizer’s (1999) work on qualitative 
and quantitative data. Schweizer shows that both qualitative data on the experiences 
and perceptions of situations and events, such as life stories, and quantitative data, such 
as demographic data, are needed for a holistic ethnographic account. The combination 
of qualitative and quantitative information is certainly a main characteristic of anthro-
pological demography (Axinn/Pearce 2006; Kertzer/Fricke 1997; Kreager/Bochow 
2017; Pauli 2010a, 2017a). However, only few anthropological demographic studies 
have combined life stories and demographic events (e.g. Johnson-Hanks 2002, 2006). 
In the previous chapters, I divided the life trajectories of women into three gen-
erations, each of which gave birth to their children under very different economic and 
political circumstances. The first generation, that of the elderly women born between 
1915 and 1944, bore most of their children by the end of the 1960s and before the 
establishment of the Odendaal plan. Almost all of these women are married. This 
generation is probably the most homogeneous of all three. The lives of the second 
generation of women, born between 1945 and 1964, are much more heterogeneous. 
These women started their childbearing years during the establishment of the South 
African homeland politics. The majority of their children were born during the 1970s 
and 1980s, times of political turmoil and the implementation of apartheid. By 2004 
when I conducted the census interviews, almost all of these women had completed 
their reproductive years. Finally, women of the third generation, born from the late 
1960s onwards, started their reproductive lives during the era of Namibian independ-
ence and were still in their childbearing years by the time of the interviews.  
It is remarkable that, despite significant economic and political changes between 
these three generations, the age at first birth has hardly varied over the last 60 years. 
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Although this indicates much demographic continuity at the beginning of the 
women’s reproductive lives, the life stories below reveal that the circumstances under 
which women have come of age vary strongly by generation. 
BECOMING A WOMAN AND A MOTHER 
First menstruation 
The spread of formal education and school hostels since approximately the 1960s has 
significantly influenced the experiences of puberty, the first menarche, the first sexual 
intercourse and the first birth. The majority of women of the oldest generation, who had 
finished their childbearing years at the beginning of the 1970s, never attended school. 
Most of them were educated at home by their families, especially by female relatives. 
Only a few women of this generation attended a local church school for a few years. 
One such church school existed in Fransfontein until the 1960s, run by the ELCRN. 
The women of the oldest generation thus never had to leave home in order to attend 
school: either they did not attend school at all, or they attended the local church school.  
When these women reached puberty, seclusion at the first menarche was commonly 
practiced. Menstruation in general and first menstruation more specifically are some-
times called khârus in Fransfontein and menstrual blood is referred to as kharub. Some 
elder women also told me that khâru-oms had been the term used to describe a men-
struation hut (or the partition inside a family’s house or hut for the girl’s seclusion). 
Winifred Hoernlé (1918) described this khâru-oms and the seclusion of Nama girls at 
the beginning of the 20th century. Today, the expression //khaa /aesen (sick body) has 
become more common for menstruation, especially among younger women.7 
Albertina, born in 1920, remembers that when she got her menstruation for the 
first time in the early 1930s, she was secluded in her parents’ house for two weeks. 
She was not allowed to leave the house or talk to any men. Her mother brought her 
food and gave her instructions on how to behave as a woman. To make her beautiful, 
!nau-i, a red cream, was rubbed on her face.8 Before Albertina was allowed to leave 
the house after her seclusion, her female relatives cleaned her with cow dung. Then 
                                                 
7 There is significant regional variation in the terms used. A woman who described herself 
as a Damara and had been born and raised in the Windhoek area told me that //khaa /aesen 
is the expression used in Fransfontein. She said that khârus was more common in the area 
where she grew up.  
8 !Nau-i is a mixture of ground ochre and fat. Hoernlé (1918: 71) mentions a similar face 
paint that she calls !nnaop. 
212 | The Decline of Marriage in Namibia 
 
a goat was slaughtered to celebrate Albertina’s womanhood. Her makeis, her mother’s 
eldest sister, was the one who killed the goat and who was responsible for Albertina 
from now on. 
Sigrid Schmidt (1981/82) discusses in how far the puberty seclusion might be an 
antecedent of the seclusion women undergo during the week leading up to their mar-
riage (see “Contemporary Fransfontein Marriages” above). Puberty rites used to be 
very central rites of transition for women (Barnard 1992; Hoernlé 1918; Lebzelter 
1934; Vedder 1923).9 Schmidt (1981/82: 59) summarized earlier forms of the puberty 
rite as follows:  
In earlier times, this was a very important event in the life of a Nama or Dama woman. As soon 
as the first menstruation commenced, the girl received a place within the parental hut, separated 
with furs or bags, where she had to stay for several days or weeks until she could come out for 
the celebration and her entrance into the adulthood.10  
Schmidt pointed out a number of similarities between the puberty seclusion and the 
marriage seclusion, as for example the use of !nau-i as a skin lightener and normative 
advice given to the initiate. However, she rejected the hypothesis that puberty and 
marriage celebration might have been the same in earlier times. She argued, rather, 
that the seclusion period has only been added to the marriage ceremony more re-
cently. The puberty seclusion, not practiced anymore, dates back further. Schmidt 
thus concluded that for some time both customs were practiced in parallel, after 
which the puberty rite ceased and only the marriage seclusion rites continued.  
This interpretation has been supported by the life stories I collected. As discussed 
in “From Decline to Distinction”, marriage seclusion is only a few decades old in the 
Fransfontein area. Indeed, most of the older women I interviewed underwent puberty 
seclusion. The main reason for the decline in the puberty rite is the increased amount 
of time young women have to spend at schools and in hostels, often far away from 
their families. Thus, Silvia, born in 1950, was attending school in Walvis Bay when 
she experienced her menstruation for the first time: 
I was scared and I even didn’t go to school that day. I told my stepmother. She said: “No, you 
must not go to school. You are now a big woman and you must stay at home”. But it was only 
for some time, the other day I went again to school. And I was also outside. In the afternoon, 
                                                 
9 Male initiation rites (but not circumcision) were also practiced in earlier times. These rites 
differed from the female puberty rites in that they were collective events (Barnard 1992: 
210; Lebzelter 1934; Vedder 1923). 
10 My translation. 
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I went out and I told my father’s other daughter who was also working for the church. So I was 
going there and she also told me. 
Silvia’s experience was thus quite unlike Albertina’s as she had to continue to attend 
school and did not undergo seclusion. Several other women who also experienced their 
first menstruation while attending school were similarly allowed to take a day off but 
had to return to school the next day. When Silvia had her first menstruation, she al-
ready knew through her friends and peers what was happening with her body. She did 
not receive this kind of advice and information through seclusion and the intensive 
instruction by older female relatives. Her experience is typical for all interviewees 
born after the mid-20th century. Claudia, born in Okahandja in 1964, was twelve years 
old when she menstruated for the first time. She was living in a hostel run by nuns in 
the town of Omaruru. She told me: “It was very difficult – there were no parents. When 
I saw the blood, I went to my bed. I was hiding it, I didn’t want to tell anyone”. Almost 
all women who experienced their first menstruation while staying in a hostel expressed 
feelings of loneliness, shame and fear at what was happening to them. They had to rely 
on female friends or fellow learners for help during this difficult time. Unlike older 
generations, they did not have any caring relatives who accompanied them on their 
transition to womanhood and celebrated this as achievement.  
Yet attending school and living in a hostel framed not only the first menstruation. 
Most women born from the 1950s onwards had their first sexual intercourse with a 
school mate. Often, these first sexual encounters resulted in pregnancy.  
First sex, first pregnancy, first birth 
The experience that first sexual intercourse resulted in a pregnancy was something 
narrated by women of all ages. Many of the elder women interviewed, born before 
the 1940s, had a premarital child with a man who was not to be their husband. Thus 
Jocoline, born in 1928 on a white commercial farm in the Kamanjab area, had two 
daughters, Ramona (born 1942) and Jocelyn (born 1946) from different men before 
she met Petrus. She and Petrus had three boys (born 1952, 1954 and 1956) before 
they married in 1958, after which they had five more children. When I asked Jocoline 
and other women of the older generation whether they had realized as young women 
that their sexual encounters with their first boyfriends could result in pregnancy, they 
just shrugged their shoulders. Such an early pregnancy was not considered as a prob-
lem. Iken made a similar observation in her study on Nama woman-headed house-
holds in Southern Namibia: “A first child born out of wedlock is generally considered 
by the community to be the result of ‘ignorance’ and not an obstacle to finding a mar-
riage partner”. (Iken 1999: 183) 
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To have sexual intercourse is called //goe/khaos in Fransfontein, first sexual in-
tercourse ‡guro //goe/khaos. Younger women, however, more often use the expres-
sion “to sleep (with someone)”, //oe, to describe sexual intercourse. In the ethno-
graphic census, we asked women how old they were when they had their first sexual 
intercourse (answered by 351 of 364 women): on average, the women were 18 years 
old (median age 18 years, average age 18.5 with a standard deviation of 3.5). Younger 
women reported a slightly lower age. These results are similar to John Bongaart’s 
findings: “The median ages at first sexual intercourse for women in 33 countries of 
Sub-Saharan Africa fall within the relatively narrow range of 16,3-20,8 years”. (Bon-
gaart 2007: 75) Also my life stories show that a first sexual intercourse around the 
age of 18 is common.  
How then does schooling affect first sex and also first pregnancy? On average, 
the women in our sample attended school for 6 years. Their life stories reveal, how-
ever, that school attendance was very flexible. Several women who started schooling 
in the 1970s narrated that they stayed at home until the age of 9 or 10 to help their 
mothers and were only then allowed to start primary school. Primary school in Na-
mibia includes seven grades, with secondary (or high) school spanning five grades, 
after which learners sit for the matriculation examination. However, drop-out rates 
are high. Several of the women I interviewed dropped out of school in order to enter 
again a few years later. A number of others had to repeat a grade. Thus, for all the 
interviewees who were born in the second half of the twentieth century, their first 
sexual experiences were in some way or another structured by their school attend-
ance.  
I want to differentiate two groups of women here, those where their first sexual 
encounter led to pregnancy, and those where it did not. For both the first encounter 
took place while they attended school. In the first group, many of the women down-
played their own agency in the ways they told their narratives. Claudia, born in 1964, 
for example, simply described the situation as follows: “It happened that I got preg-
nant when I was in school”. In these situations, the pregnancy (/gam /khaa khoes) 
was perceived as something that just occurred in the lives of these women without 
much reported action on their parts.  
Most women of the first group did not use contraception when they had sex for 
the first time. For the older women of this group, contraception was not yet available 
when they got pregnant the first time. Silvia, born in 1950, narrated that contraception 
became available for her only after the birth of her second child, in the mid-1970s. 
She became pregnant the first time in 1971 while attending Grade 10. She finished 
this grade, but did not return to school after giving birth to her daughter. Instead, she 
got a job in Windhoek while her family took care of her baby. A year later she started 
training as a primary school teacher. In 1973, Silvia became pregnant with her second 
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child and was forced to leave the teachers’ training course: “That time it was not 
allowed. When you were pregnant, you could not go back to school”. Luckily, after 
the birth of her second daughter, she found employment at a health clinic. 
Claudia also fell pregnant while attending school. She was 19 years old and in 
Grade 12 when she fell pregnant for the first time. Unlike Silvia in the early 1970s, 
Claudia was able to return to school after the birth of her child in the mid-1980s: “It 
was the last year of the high school. So I went back to our house and I stayed there. 
And when I had finished delivering, I went again to school”. Some women even ex-
perienced the break from school due to their pregnancy as a relief. Molly, born in 
1967, was very unhappy in school. She had started school late and was in Grade 5 
when she realized that she was pregnant. Eighteen years old at the time, she decided 
not to return to school:  
Molly: I have not finished school, I found my first-born. Then I left school. 
Julia: Oh, you got pregnant? 
Molly: Hm. 
Julia: And you were not allowed to return to school? 
Molly: No, I wanted that, I did not want to go back to school. 
Most of the women who fell pregnant while attending school did not use any contra-
ception.Two young women said, however, that they did indeed use a condom, but for 
both the condom had burst. Lisa, born in 1985, became pregnant in Grade 12 in 2004. 
It was the first time she had sex:  
We were using contraception but the condom burst when we were busy. So he didn’t know that 
the condom burst and after, he just left afterwards. So I was angry about that. After a month, I 
skip my period the first month, and I wonder. What? It didn’t come to my mind. It’s nothing. 
Then, the second month and then I went to the hospital for the pregnancy test. They told me 
that I am pregnant.  
Lisa did not finish school. She moved back to her parents in Fransfontein and gave 
birth. Before, she had lived in school hostels in Outjo and Okhandja. During the in-
terview, she was very sad and depressed, crying at her situation. She said that she 
wanted to leave Fransfontein and her son and search for a job and more independence. 
When I asked her if she ever thought of marrying the father of her son, she looked 
astonished: “Not now! I’m too young for marriage. Because I’m having a child 
doesn’t mean that I have to marry!” Other women have expressed a similar disentan-
glement of marriage from the first pregnancy and birth. Lisa also narrated that her 
father had demanded compensation from the boy’s family for making his daughter 
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pregnant. Other women also recounted that their parents went to see the boy’s family 
after they learned of the pregnancy, yet their accounts indicated that compensation 
was seldom an issue. The fact that Lisa’s father insisted on compensation might relate 
to the fact that he was one of the traditional authorities in the region. 
In conclusion, the agency of a woman surprised by pregnancy after her first sex-
ual intercourse varies. While Claudia and Silvia felt rather overwhelmed by being 
pregnant and still in school, Molly welcomed the pregnancy. And Lisa, who actively 
used a contraceptive to avoid falling pregnant, had circumstances stack up against 
her; she describes her pregnancy while attending school as an accident.  
Let me now turn to the second group of women who had sex for the first time 
without getting pregnant. Women in this group are generally younger than women in 
the first category. These four women, all born between 1975 and 1981, described 
their first sexual intercourse as a desired and planned action. All four women are 
mothers today. However, unlike the women in the first category, none of them got 
pregnant with their first boyfriend. Anna, born in 1979, had her first boyfriend at age 
15 when she was attending grade 9. Before she slept with him, she went to the local 
health clinic and demanded contraception. Anna decided to leave her boyfriend two 
months later because he was beating her. She met her current husband in 1999. She 
became pregnant in late 1999 and she gave birth to a son in 2000, at age 21. Both 
Anna and her husband have salaried occupations and in 2004 were able to marry. 
Lotta, born in 1975, also met her first boyfriend at school. The couple separated when 
he finished school and left the region. After the end of this relationship, Lotta had 
several other partners. Then, at age 26 and in her last year of tertiary education, she 
decided that she wanted a baby:  
I wanted a baby, because, Julia, I was already 27; no, I was turning 27. And I decided: 27 
without a kid! And these days even a nineteen- or a sixteen-year-old lady or girl is having a 
kid. So let me have a kid, because now at least I am studying, this is my last year and then I 
will be able to support my baby. 
Like Lotta and Anna, Isabel, born in 1979, had her first boyfriend at high school. She 
was 18 years old and staying in the school hostel in Opuwo. Before they had sex, 
they decided to use condoms. The relationship only lasted a couple of months. A few 
years later and while working in Windhoek, Isabel met the father of her daughter. 
During pregnancy the child’s father cheated on her with another women and Isabel 
left him. Vanessa too, born in 1981, met her first boyfriend while both were attending 
their last year of high school. Because he was attending school in Windhoek and she 
in Okahandja, they only met during weekends and holidays. She was 17 years old 
when they slept together for the first time:  
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He was nice, he was really nice, and I felt, I really felt I was prepared now, you know, ya, I 
didn’t have any problem as long as I really I felt I’m prepared. And then I see, really, he has 
condoms and so on. I already knew about condoms, you know, I already knew. I learnt at 
school. 
Vanessa and her first boyfriend only stayed together a short period of time. After 
school, Vanessa started software training in Windhoek. She became pregnant in 2000 
at the age of 19. 
What are the differences between the women of the first and the second group? 
Where the women of the first group became pregnant after their first sexual experi-
ences while still at school, the women of the second group had finished their school-
ing when they fell pregnant. By the time women of the second group did fall pregnant, 
they had had several sexual experiences and the pregnancies and births happened in 
a work context. Lotta was working in the health sector, Isabel as a waitress and nanny 
in Windhoek and Anna was selling groceries in a small shop. Only Vanessa was still 
being educated, but at tertiary level. None of these women was living in a hostel 
anymore when they fell pregnant – in contrast to the women in the first group. Thus 
for women of the second group, attending school certainly framed their first sexual 
encounters but not their first pregnancies and births.  
Yet none of the women of either group was married when they got pregnant and 
none of them saw the necessity of being married before the child was born. As Upton 
(2001) has shown for Botswana, fertility is a very important expression of identity in 
the region: being infertile is often considered a personal catastrophe. I would argue 
that the disentanglement of marriage and reproduction is especially visible for the 
first birth, as Lisa’s exclamation underscores: “Because I’m having a child doesn’t 
mean that I have to marry!” Only four per cent of the 115 married Fransfontein wom-
en did not had a child before they married! Or, inversely, 96 per cent of the married 
women had at least one child before marriage. When one takes all 364 women as a 
reference, only one per cent had their first child only after marriage. Thus the disen-
tanglement of marriage and reproduction at first birth is not only discourse but lived 
expierence.  
The first birth is thus an important moment of identity formation independent of 
marriage. This applies to women of all ages and generations, demonstrated by the 
extremely low percentage of women who do not have a child before marriage. De-
spite the many variations in livelihoods that different generations of women have 
experienced, especially related to formal education, their coming of age as mothers 
around the age of twenty is an important milestone in the formation of female iden-
tities across generations. 
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This specific dynamic of becoming a woman is increasingly being questioned in Na-
mibia. Urban middle- and upper-class families have begun to celebrate the twenty-
first birthday of a daughter with an especially splendid birthday party. During these 
occasions, the birthday child receives one or more keys, symbolizing the child’s 
bright future (Pauli 2017a, 2018). The giving of a “key” does not only represent fu-
ture possibilities but also past accomplishments, especially in moral and reproductive 
terms (see Figure 17).  
I first heard of the “key” in May 2004 when I was visiting our neighbours. As we 
were talking about pregnancy and giving birth, I asked what the women considered 
a good age for a first pregnancy. Without any hesitation, all women present said: 
“twenty-one”. I was surprised. The youngest woman, Isabel, smiled and confirmed: 
“Yes, twenty-one, because then you get the key”. She went into the house and came 
back with a large silver key mounted on a wooden stand with a plate on which her 
name had been engraved. “You see, Julia, I got the key at twenty-one and my daugh-
ter was born at twenty-two”, she explained. She stressed that if she had become preg-
nant earlier, she would not have received “the key” at her twenty-first birthday.  
Isabel received the key from her mother’s younger sister, her maros. Isabel’s 
mother explained, however, that the key can be given to a girl by anyone in the fam-
ily; it does not have to be the maros. Isabel’s maros also organized a celebration for 
Figure 17: The key to fertility  
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her. Isabel’s mother explained that the key means that a woman is now open, that she 
can have children. However, she continued, most Fransfontein women do not receive 
a key nor do they celebrate a twenty-first birthday party as they do not have enough 
money to celebrate. Furthermore, at the age of twenty-one, most Fransfontein women 
are already mothers.  
The key connects the first birth to age and not to marriage. What is being re-
warded is not Christian “purity”, a notion that is strictly linked to marriage, but a later 
age at pregnancy and birth. Actually, in my interviews on “the key”, marriage was 
never mentioned. Although an average age at first birth around nineteen years has 
been the norm for most of the 20th century in Fransfontein, this pattern is subtly being 
questioned by “the key”. While the social becoming of most Fransfontein women is 
marked by their first pregnancy and their first birth (see also Upton 2001), younger 
women from wealthy Fransfontein families now define their entrance into adulthood 
not through pregnancy, but through non-pregnancy, symbolized by “the key”. At the 
age of 21, only the daughters of the elite are still studying, often in the country’s 
urban centres, and delaying their first pregnancies. Like the four young women in-
troduced above, they earn their own money and enjoy being the one who decides how 
to spend it. At a certain point in their lives, they feel that it may be time to give birth 
to a child. This decision is vastly different from the first pregnancy of their mothers 
and grandmothers, as well as their less educated peers. The above cited Lotta, for 
example, waited another five years after receiving her twenty-first-birthday keys be-
fore she got pregnant for the first time.  
Parallel to this recent development of class distinction through (non)fertility, the 
reproduction of the vast majority of women is becoming a public issue of concern 
and even an object of stigmatization (Schneider/Schneider 1996). For example, grow-
ing awareness of “teenage pregnancies” as a social problem is being debated both in 
public and academic forums. On July 25, 2012, the most important national newspa-
per, The Namibian, featured a cover story entitled “Gov’t Revamps Policy on Preg-
nant Schoolgirls”. Deputy Minister of Education David Namwandi stated: “We 
should let these girls continue with their education. We cannot afford to terminate 
their future at an early stage”. Similarly, demographers have been worrying for some 
time about Namibian teenage pregnancies (Chimere-Dan 1997; Gage 1998). I cer-
tainly do not want to play down the difficulties that teenage pregnancies can cause 
for young women. Moreover, educating teenagers about HIV/AIDS and other sex-
ually transmitted diseases is of great importance in Namibia. However, what is con-
ceptualized as “the new problem of teenage pregnancies” is not a new development. 
As stated above, an early age at first birth has been common in Namibia and beyond 
for a long time. Thus, it is not so much the reproductive behaviour of the majority of 
Namibian women that has changed, but its moral evaluation. Young women today 
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who, like their mothers and grandmothers, have their first child before the age of 20, 
are being turned into demographic “others” (Kreager 1986), a category of concern 
for the new political, economic and intellectual elites. These transformations are em-
bedded in class formation processes and generational dynamics.  
Contrary to the first birth, marital status does make a difference when looking at 
subsequent births and later dynamics of family formation. I turn to this in the next 
section.  
FAMILIES WITH AND WITHOUT MARRIAGE 
According to Johnson-Hanks (2006: 25), in order to interpret family formation and 
reproductive decision-making, we have to understand the structures of possibilities, 
the specific conjunctures and also the “kind of futures [that] are imagined, hoped for, 
or feared”. The decline of marriage from the 1970s onwards has resulted in new ways 
of forming families and imagining the future. Increasingly, married and unmarried 
women’s reproductive trajectories diverged. Gender categories were being reconfig-
ured. The establishment of apartheid and the creation of “homelands” resulted in a 
strong increase in power and possibilities for a few influential men. Many of the 
wives of these kai aogu (big men) increasingly stayed at home, following the new 
gender ideal of the housewife (Pauli 2017a, 2018). 
In many respects, Lina’s life is a typical example of the elite married Fransfontein 
housewife. Lina was born in 1959. She finished primary school but did not complete 
high school. In the mid-1970s, she met her later husband Edward in Khorixas, the 
administrative centre of the homeland, approximately 20 kilometres away from Frans-
fontein. He was five years older than her and an influential and wealthy politician 
and provided Lina with a job as a hostel worker in Khorixas. At the age of nineteen, 
she became pregnant for the first time. Her next child was born three years later, in 
1981. Edward and Lina married in 1982 in what was one of the biggest wedding 
celebrations of the time. At this point, Lina stopped working in the hostel and became 
a housewife. She gave birth to four more children, born in 1985, 1990, 1991 and 1993. 
On average, Lina’s birth intervals are 2.5 years. The time from her first to her last 
birth spans fifteen years. In the 1990s, the family built a beautiful and (compared to 
local standards) luxurious house and moved to Fransfontein. Almost throughout the 
marriage, her husband cheated on Lina and fathered several out-of-wedlock children. 
When I met her in 2003, she had somehow accepted the situation. She did tell me, 
however, that she had tried to commit suicide a few years earlier out of a feeling of 
hopeleness. She never used any contraceptives between births. For her, she said, 
every child was a gift from God and nothing should prevent that. With her decision 
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to become a married woman, she also decided on having her husband’s children. 
However, when her doctor suggested sterilization after the birth of her last child, 
when she was 34 years old, Lina agreed.  
Except for her sterilization, Lina’s fertility history to a large extent resembles that 
of her mother’s generation. Women like Lina’s mother, born up to the mid-1940s, 
also married, had a high fertility, short birth intervals and never used contraceptive 
methods. Jocoline, for example, born in 1928, gave birth to 10 children. The time from 
Jocoline’s first to her last birth spans 27 years, an average birth interval of 2.8 years. 
The last eight children are from her husband, two daughters born premaritally have 
different fathers. They married in 1958, after their third joint child had been born. 
Although Lina’s reproductive behaviour thus resembles an older fertility pattern, the 
underlying motives are nevertheless new, only emerging from the 1970s onwards: 
despite the fact that there was now the option of using contraception, a housewife 
was considered to have no real need to control her fertility. This also hints at the 
moral dimension of this category of woman. For the married housewife, fidelity is 
the central value. Alexa, a 50-year-old married housewife, stated that unlike all those 
unmarried women “running after men”, housewives are “faithful to their partner” (for 
comparable moral dynamics in northern Namibia, see Becker 2004). Lina, Alexa and 
other married housewives construct a moral discourse distinguishing the faithful mar-
ried woman from the uncontrolled unmarried woman. One central difference between 
the two groups is their fertility. While married women like Lina and Alexa have many 
children with one man, unmarried women have fewer children with several men, 
among these the unfaithful husbands of the married women.  
In many instances, women told me that they were dreaming of a “one-woman-
man”, a man who would be completely devoted to them and not also to other women. 
However, real life often differed rather markedly from this ideal. In all of the life 
story interviews, women narrated how their partners had cheated on them. Very of-
ten, they referred to witchcraft as an explanation for this behaviour. Remarkably, the 
logic of a “one-woman-man” was not extended to the women themselves: none of 
them was, indeed, a “one-man-woman”. Almost all of them had sexual experiences 
with several men and very often also children with more than one partner. These 
unmarried women are “polyandrous mothers”, following a “lateral logic of fertility” 
(Guyer 1994).  
The average number of reproductive partners differs significantly between mar-
ried and unmarried women. While married women on average have children with 
two fathers, unmarried women expierence joint parenthood with on average three 
men. How then may the average number of reproductive partners influence fertility? 
Hertha’s narrative provides some insights. I already discussed some aspects of Her-
tha’s life story in the chapter “History through Biography”.  
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Hertha, born in 1956, was one of the very few women I interviewed who said that 
she did not want to marry. She stressed that she had had enough of men. Almost com-
pletely on her own, she raised five children by five different men. At the age of seven-
teen, while still in school in Fransfontein, she became pregnant with her first child and 
quit school. A few years later, she met the father of her second child, an influential 
politician. In 1978, she gave birth to his child. With his help, she received permanent 
employment in the Fransfontein school hostel. Up to this point, her life story is similar 
to that of Lina, as narrated above. However, while Lina married the influential big man 
with whom she had had a child and later quit working in a hostel, the relationship be-
tween Hertha and her kai aob did not last much longer than the birth of their child. 
Nevertheless, she continued to receive maintenance for their child and the kai aob’s 
child is, in fact, the only one of Hertha’s children who has ever received maintenance 
from its father. The fathers of her four other children never paid any maintenance. Her-
tha’s last son was born when she was 34. Before his birth, she had used both hormonal 
injections and pills to space her children. Since then she has not taken any contracep-
tives, however. Until the time of our interview in 2005, she had no new partner and was 
also not looking for one. The relationships with the fathers of Hertha’s last three chil-
dren, born in 1979, 1982 and 1990, were all short-lived. Like Lina, Hertha’s reproduc-
tive life spans fifteen years. But Hertha’s average birth interval at 3.2 years in average 
is longer than Lina’s 2.8 years. Hertha stressed that, except for the kai aob, all of her 
other partners were poor and tried to live off her money.  
In Fransfontein, women will only sue men that have permanent employment for 
maintenance. Consequently, only few women pursue this option, a finding similar to 
Botswana (Garey/Townsend 1996). If a man is unemployed, the women will apply 
other strategies to receive support from him and his family. She may send the child to 
stay with the man’s kin for a while or may ask him for a goat from his kraal to pay for 
school fees. The maintenance complaints from the magistrate’s office in Khorixas un-
derscore this pattern. Between 1996 and 2005, the office recorded a total of 418 mainte-
nance complaints. Until 2003, the old Maintenance Act of 1960 was applied, in 2005 a 
new Maintenance Act was passed. There is no fixed amount of money a father has to 
pay. All cases are treated individually. For the 418 cases, the findings stipulated that 
fathers had to pay an average of 150 Namibian Dollars (approximately 18 Euros in 
2004) per month. This figure hides a wide range of rulings, however: a high official of 
the state-owned Electricity Company Nampower was instructed to pay NAD3000 (ap-
proximately 375 Euros in 2004) for two children, while another father working for the 
Ministry of Works in Khorixas had to pay only NAD20 per month.  
Hertha told me that with every new man and every pregnancy, she hoped the 
relationship would last. There was a lot of fighting. Hertha’s narratives are charac-
terized by uncertainty, hope and imagination for a better future, disappointment and 
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revision. Tom Moultrie, Takudzwa Sayi and Ian Timaeus (2012) have observed that 
the timing between births is patterned distinctively in sub-Saharan Africa, especially 
in Namibia and South Africa. In Namibia, rather long birth intervals seem to be 
independent of age and parity of women. Women do not space their children but 
rather postpone the birth of the next child, waiting for better times to come. As an 
explanation Moultrie and his colleagues suggest that family-building strategies in 
these countries are confronted with high levels of unpredictability and a lack of reg-
ularity (ibid: 249). The nature of this unpredictability remains unclear. Yet, in their 
study Moultrie and his colleagues do not consider Guyer’s (1994) polyandrous moth-
erhood and they also do not differentiate between married and unmarried women. I 
want to suggest that, at least for unmarried women, the long birth intervals can be 
explained with their “lateral fertility strategy”. As Hertha’s exemplary reproductive 
story indicates, a high number of reproductive partners leads to more time between 
births. Unlike married women, unmarried women with many different reproductive 
partners have to spend a significant amount of time searching for a new partner be-
tween births. This creates high levels of irregularity and unpredictability that are 
absent for married women. 
For Fransfontein, the beginning of a lateral logic of parenthood expressed through 
polyandrous motherhood can consequently be historically situated. Unmarried wom-
en having multiple reproductive partners emerged with the fundamental social, eco-
nomic and political changes of the 1970s. However, the lineal logic of marriage and 
reproduction did not vanish. From the 1970s to the 2000s, monogamous marriages 
have continued to exist and, because of increased exclusivity, have actually flour-
ished. These married couples and their families (their “lineages”) form the new elite. 
But both groups of women, the married and the unmarried, are also intertwined as 
some of the multiple reproductive partners of the unmarried women are the married 
husbands of the new housewives.  
SEVENTY YEARS OF FORMING FAMILIES  
IN FRANSFONTEIN 
The earliest birth we recorded in our census was from 1935 and the last from 2004. 
In the almost seventy years that lie in between, forming families in Fransfontein has 
thoroughly changed. Not only do women have fewer children today, the circum-
stances under which they receive and raise their children are very different from the 
situations previous generations had to cope with. The aim of this chapter has been to 
understand these transformations in relation to marriage. Because of my focus on the 
interplay between marriage and reproduction, I have had to ignore any discussion of 
224 | The Decline of Marriage in Namibia 
 
other aspects of forming families. Forming families is, of course, not only done 
through reproduction and marriage. Two central ways to form families proposed by 
the “new kinship studies”, namely relatedness and belonging, can be rather discon-
nected from both marriage and reproduction (Carsten 2004).  
The differentiation into three “generations” of women – an “older” generation 
(born between 1915 and the mid-1940s), “middle” generation (born from the mid-
1940s to the mid-1960s) and “youngest” generation of women (born from the mid-
1960s to the mid-1980s) – proposed in the chapter “History through Biography” has 
proven to be empirically sound. Women born until the 1940s and having their main 
childbearing years before the 1970s significantly differed in both their conjugal and 
reproductive behavior from the “middle” and the “younger” generations. The lives of 
this older generation of women were very much framed by their employment as work-
ers on white commercial farms. Only very few of these women attended school. Their 
coming of age in terms of first menstruation, first sex and first pregnancy occurred 
within the structure provided by their families and female relatives. Almost none of 
them used Western contraceptives. Most of the women married, often with the help 
of their families and the commercial farmer they worked for (for details on these 
marriages see the chapter “From Decline to Distinction”). However, several of these 
women did not marry or married only late in life (aged 60 years and older). But no 
matter whether the women were married or not, their reproductive behavior was very 
similar. Women in childbearing years before the 1970s generally had a very high 
level of fertility, with an early age at first birth, short birth intervals and a later age at 
last birth. Some of the women had more than one reproductive partner. Yet, most 
women of this generation stuck with their husbands or long-term partners and had 
almost all of their children with one man. 
The reproductive and conjugal patterns changed with the generation of women I 
classified as the “middle generation”. These women were born between the mid-
1940s and the mid-1960s. The political and economic changes of the 1970s, espe-
cially the establishment of the “Damaraland” homeland, ran parallel to their main 
childbearing years. Marriage and reproduction became entangled and also disentan-
gled in a historically very specific way. As I described in “From Decline to Distinc-
tion”, marriage transformations gradually lead to fewer and wealthier married wom-
en. These married women represented both continuity and change. As the emergent 
elite, they stood for deep-going social, economic and political change. Yet as moth-
ers, they continued the lives of their mothers: their reproductive histories resembled 
the reproductive histories of the older generation. Like them, married women of the 
middle generation had a high level of fertility, an early age at first birth, a late age at 
last birth and short birth intervals. If they used contraceptive methods at all, then only 
to stop their fertility through sterilization.  
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This entanglement of marriage and reproduction is contrasted by the behavior of 
an increasing number of unmarried women since the 1970s. This subgroup of the 
“middle” generation exhibits significant differences in terms of reproduction. Un-
married women of the “middle” generation had much longer birth intervals and an 
earlier age at last birth. Different reproductive strategies explain these variations. In 
the 1970s, unmarried women started to use Western contraceptive methods to space 
their children. Additionally, the number of men they had children with significantly 
increased. A pattern of multiple reproductive partners emerged, a reproductive “logic” 
Guyer (1994) has classified as “polyandrous motherhood”. The higher number of 
reproductive partners did not only lead to economically, socially and geographically 
diverse reproductive networks. Regarding fertility, the higher number of reproductive 
partners also resulted in longer birth intervals and an overall lower level of fertility. 
Only the age at first birth remained the same for the different generations and sub-
groups within the generations. 
The “youngest” generation, women born between the mid-1960s until the mid-
1980s, continued to bear their first child at the same age as their mothers and grand-
mothers. It seems empirically plausible to understand the age at first birth as still 
mostly disentangled from marriage. Becoming a mother continues to be one of the 
most central ways in which adult identity is formed in many regions of Southern 
Africa. This disentanglement of marriage and reproduction at the beginning of repro-
duction is also reflected in the quote from the group discussion that opened this chap-
ter. The continuity of a widespread early age at first birth in Namibia confirms this 
marker, as this pathway to adulthood remains the most common route taken by Na-
mibian women. However, as I have tried to show, this common reproductive practice 
is being subtly contested both ideologically and demographically: for the youngest 
generation of Fransfontein women, waiting before first pregnancy is beginning to 
emerge as a value. The giving of symbolic keys at the twenty-first birthday of these 
young elite women publicly rewards their break from previous forms of social be-
coming through reproduction. Fertility continues to decline. Young married women 
from the elite will very likely reduce their number of children further and concentrate 
on the development of few, highly educated children. In contrast, the large number 
of unmarried, economically marginalized women is even more likely to develop re-
productive networks through multiple parenthood.  
What do the roughly seventy years of entanglement and disentanglement of mar-
riage and reproduction analyzed here mean in a long-term perspective? As I discussed 
in previous chapters, there is only scarce historical information on marriage and re-
production for the Fransfontein area (and “Damaraland” in general). However, Guyer’s 
caution not to perceive every change in marriage and reproduction as something 
novel also seems to be true for Fransfontein. She summarizes her findings on the 
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shifts from a more lineal logic of reproduction towards a more lateral logic as follows: 
“If one pieces together the historical development of all these elements, much of the 
present configuration can best be seen in terms of continuities with shifting emphasis, 
rather than sharp change or transformation”. (Guyer 1994: 249) Guyer shows that the 
more homogenous model of marriage is very much the result of the colonial situation. 
The recent change she finds in marriage may thus just be a “return” to previous pat-
terns. Similarly, the reproductive and marital behavior of the women I have described 
as the “older” generation is by no means a representation of a “traditional” way of 
life. Like Guyer’s observation of Yoruba society, the earliest reproductive and mari-
tal patterns I was able to describe are thoroughly formed and structured by the colo-
nial state, especially the “white” settlers community and the Protestant missionaries. 
In how far (in parallel to Guyer’s results) the increase in the number of reproductive 
partners and the resulting family patterns in the 1970s might be a re-emergence of an 
earlier marriage and reproductive order cannot be said with our data. Indeed, further 
research on entanglements and disentanglements of marriage and reproduction thus 
is not only needed for the youngest generation and in comparative perspective 
(Garenne/Zwang 2005) but also for earlier time periods, in particular the 19th century.  
 
 




The decline of marriage has also reconfigured intimate relations. To marry is still 
what many people desire. Nevertheless, because of its contemporary exclusivity, 
marriage does not frame how most people intimately relate to each other. Instead, 
other ways of forming and consolidating intimate relations are sought out. Living 
together or having a child together are some alternatives to deepen heterosexual re-
lations beyond marriage (Hunter 2016; White 2016). Furthermore, some women and 
men decide not to marry at all and stay single (James 2017; Niehaus 2017). In this 
chapter, I will trace these reconfigurations of intimate relationships outside marriage.  
In his review of James Ferguson’s (1999) seminal monography Expectations of 
Modernity, Owen Sichone notes: “An ethnography of decline must, of necessity, be 
a study of resilience, of survival and even of victory; because if one only sees rever-
sals (de-industrialisation or de-modernisation or re-traditionalisation) one merely 
ends up with a reverse teleology”. (Sichone 2001: 378) This chapter acknowledges 
the great varity of intimate relations outside and beyond marriage. The chapter is also 
an attempt to be critical of what Doreen Setume (2017) has called “nuptialism”, a 
bias that sees all intimate relations only within the framework of marriage. I will start 
with a discussion of cohabitation. Demographers often treat living together as an al-
ternative or even equivalent to marriage. This will lead to a description of the making 
and unmaking of love and sexual relations outside marriage. In the last part of the 
chapter I try to understand those women, and to some extent also the men, who have 
chosen to stay single. I conclude with an analysis of the increasing stigmatization of 
children born out-of-wedlock. 
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BLACK COW MARRIAGES:  
COHABITATION WITHOUT MARRIAGE 
Many demographers argue that cohabitation can be treated like marriage (Bongaarts 
1978). Cohabitation and marriage are seen as social institutions framing the birth of 
children. In Fransfontein, however, intimacy, sexuality and birth very often occur out-
side marriage and cohabitation. Many women are polyandrous mothers (Guyer 1994), 
like Silvia, born in 1950, who has given birth to four children from three different men. 
Silvia is unmarried and has never lived together with any of her intimate partners. 
Demographers would classify Silvia’s children as “premarital fertility” (e.g. Garenne/ 
Zwang 2005). This implies that marriage occurs at some point in time. The opposite 
is true for Fransfontein as well as other parts of Southern Africa (Pauli 2010a, 2016; 
Pauli/van Dijk 2016). Marriage is declining. “Premarital fertility” is better viewed as 
fertility without marriage.  
Demographers often classify women like Silvia as “unmarried” and distinguish 
them from formally married and cohabiting women. I suggest classifying them to-
gether with cohabiting women and distinguishing them from formally married 
women. Figure 18 summarizes the spread of cohabitating, marital and non-residential 
intimate relations. The figure compares the Fransfontein data with data collected by 
the Namibian Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) of 2000 (MOHSS 2003: 79). 
To make the comparison with the DHS data more valid, I differentiate the Fransfon-
tein data into two groups: first, all 362 women that were interviewed, born between 
1915 and 1994 (blue) and, second, a subgroup of 238 women who were aged between 
15 and 49 in 2004 (purple). The DHS only collects data for women between the ages 
of 15 and 49 (yellow). The percentages of women formally and currently (i.e. 2004 
for Fransfontein and 2000 for Namibia) married are around 20 per cent for all three 
groups. The categories of divorced, separated and widowed women have very low 
percentages for all three groups (below five per cent). The category “living together” 
category also exhibits similar values for the three groups. The national percentage is 
slightly lower (16 per cent) the percentage for all Fransfontein women (17 per cent) 
and for Fransfontein women aged 15-49 (22 per cent). If a woman did not live together 
with a boyfriend at the time of the DHS and had never cohabited with a partner, the 
survey did not ask her whether she had a boyfriend. This explains the large size of the 
“never married” category for the DHS data in the figure. Over 54 per cent of all women 
in the DHS fall into this category. In our census, we differentiated this category and 
asked whether a woman currently had a boyfriend or whether she had separated from 
him. For all Fransfontein women, 30 per cent had a boyfriend in 2004 and 21 per cent 
had separated from their partner. If one only looks at Fransfontein women between 15 
and 49 years, the percentages change slightly: 40 per cent had a boyfriend in 2004 while  
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20 per cent had separated from one. These distributions help to explain the 54 per 
cent of women that the DHS subsumes under “never married”. At least in Fransfon-
tein, women falling into this category are sexually active, sometimes have long-term 
intimate partners without living with them, and have children with these partners. To 
subsume them under “premarital” or “never married” does not cover the diversity of 
the intimate and reproductive trajectories of these women. 
If a woman did not live together with a boyfriend at the time of the DHS and had 
never cohabited with a partner, the survey did not ask her whether she had a boy-
friend. This explains the large size of the “never married” category for the DHS data 
in the figure. Over 54 per cent of all women in the DHS fall into this category. In our 
census, we differentiated this category and asked whether a woman currently had a 
boyfriend or whether she had separated from him. For all Fransfontein women, 30 per 
cent had a boyfriend in 2004 and 21 per cent had separated from their partner. If one 
only looks at Fransfontein women between 15 and 49 years, the percentages change 
slightly: 40 per cent had a boyfriend in 2004 while 20 per cent had separated from 
one. These distributions help to explain the 54 per cent of women that the DHS sub-
sumes under “never married”. At least in Fransfontein, women falling into this cate-
gory are sexually active, sometimes have long-term intimate partners without living 
with them, and have children with these partners. To subsume them under “premari-
tal” or “never married” does not cover the diversity of the intimate and reproductive 
trajectories of these women. 
Figure 18: Types of intimate relations – local vs. national level 
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age in 200* 
Average length of 
current relationship  
Average age 
first sex* 
Currently married  76 52,6 (16,0) 18,88 (16,3) 19,1 (3,7) 
Living together  62 36,2 (11,2)           8,9 (8,1) 18,7 (5,9) 
Boyfriend,  
not living together 
105 31,0 (12,8)           6,2 (6,9) 17,7 (2,8) 
* Standard deviation in brackets 
What then is the status of living together? Table 14 indicates that currently married 
women are much older then women living together with a partner and women having 
a boyfriend but not living together. Contrary to the married women, the women living 
with a boyfriend and the women having a boyfriend but not living together are much 
closer in age. 
The average length of the relationship is comparable between women living with 
their boyfriend and women having a boyfriend but not living together; it is different, 
however, from that of married women. The age at first intercourse does not vary sig-
nificantly between the three groups. These averages indicate that women in the “liv-
ing together” category are more similar to unmarried women then to formally married 
women. In Fransfontein, the co-residential union is rather fluid. This fluidity, for ex-
ample living together with one man, separating and then living together with some-
one else, has no negative effects on a woman’s reputation. The same flexibility that 
applies to other aspects of Fransfontein livelihoods like kinship and migration also 
holds true for residence. Many people are constantly on the move, searching for em-
ployment, income opportunities and also new intimate relations. Women (and men) 
move in and out of households. This high level of residential and intimate mobility 
is an expression of the pervasive economic insecurities most people have to cope with 
(Pinho et al. 2016; Setel 1999: 238). 
 “Living together” thus has a very different meaning from being formally married. 
It is by no means perceived as a substitute for formal marriage. Marriage reduces the 
necessity to adapt and be flexible. “Living together”, however, can be a rather tem-
poral state. During our stay we observed many movements of unmarried men and 
women in and out of a partner’s life and house.  
Further evidence for not classifying couples living together as married comes 
from local discourse. There are different terms used locally for “living together”, 
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none with a positive connotation:!hai-omi, meaning “bad house”; or ‡nu gomas omi 
(or ‡nu gomas !gameb), meaning “black cow marriage” or “black cow house mar-
riage”. Both in public events and in everyday affairs, a couple that lives together is 
treated similarly to a couple that does not live together. Only a formally married cou-
ple is treated differently. This becomes especially evident during marriage celebra-
tions during which only formally married couples are allowed to participate in certain 
rituals. Many women told me that living together is just a waste of time: the woman 
has to bear the problems that may result from co-residence, such as alcohol abuse, 
domestic violence or a man “living off a woman’s money”, without being treated 
with the respect or enjoying the security a married woman receives.  
Zitha Mokomane’s (2005, 2006) research on nuptiality patterns tackles very sim-
ilar issues for Botswana. She shows that the number of cohabiting couples has 
strongly increased in Botswana during the last decades. Mokomane (2005: 20) asks 
in how far cohabitation has to be understood as an alternative or as a prelude to mar-
riage, and differentiates three possibilities: first, cohabitation reflects a rejection of 
marriage and a “true alternative”, thus that people prefer cohabitation over marriage; 
second, cohabitation is a prelude to marriage, hence that marriage is only delayed, 
for example because of life circumstances; and third, cohabitation is an alternative to 
being single but with the same sexual “freedoms”. The first and third possibilities are 
rather similar. After analyzing both quantitative and qualitative data, Mokomane con-
cludes that in Botswana cohabitation is not equivalent to marriage. Her informants 
did not perceive cohabitation as a substitute for marriage, ruling out the first and third 
possibilities. Like women in Fransfontein, Mokomane’s interview partners stressed 
the many difficulties and risks cohabitating women had to experience, such as a lack 
of legal security in terms of maintenance and inheritance when compared with their 
married counterparts. As in Fransfontein, cohabitating women in Botswana are more 
similar to unmarried, not cohabitating but sexually and reproductive active women 
than to married women. 
Mokomane’s informants perceived cohabitation as a temporary phase before mar-
riage, a prelude: “The results clearly show that in Botswana marriage is the ‘ultimate 
goal’ for virtually all cohabitants while cohabitation is a compromise living arrange-
ment for those who are not yet ready for marriage, and may not be for a considerable 
period of time, mainly due to economic reasons”. (Mokomane 2005: 33) But is co-
habitation really always a prelude to marriage?  
Like Mokomane (2005), we posed the question in our census whether people wanted 
to marry. Only about two thirds of the cohabitating and the non-residing women with a 
permanent boyfriend perceived marriage as the “ultimate goal”. Several of the women 
who cohabitated but did not want to marry said that their boyfriends just came and left 
as they wished, leaving them alone with all the problems. They did not want to marry 
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the boyfriends because of their lack of steadiness and responsibility. Thus, cohabitating 
women in Fransfontein did not always perceive cohabitation as a prelude to marriage. In 
addition, many women and men who expressed a wish to marry were very skeptical that 
they would ever be able to do so. Mokomane also describes a marked increase in wed-
ding costs and the resulting difficulty for economically marginalized couples to marry 
(ibid: 26). She further states that the proportion of never married people in Botswana has 
significantly increased (ibid: 19). Nevertheless, she assumes that cohabitation is simply 
a prelude to marriage. But, if the situation of Fransfontein is taken as guide, then this will 
not be the case: even if cohabitating couples dream of marriage, the chance that their 
economic situation were to improve is indeed very slight. Cohabitation thus stands in 
between the “married” and “never married” categories. In some cases it might be a prel-
ude to marriage, as Mokomane has shown for Botswana. But often, it is a variation of 
the “never married” category. This category includes approximately 70 per cent of all 
Fransfontein women who are having intimate relations outside marriage. Their intimate 
relations are formed on other premises than the stability that marriage might offer. 
INTIMACY AND LOVE IN TIMES OF AIDS 
He would spend half of the night with me and in the 
morning hours he would hike to work. That type of 
relationship. I knew that he belongs to someone else, 
the one we were cheating. Okay, that type of relation-
ship. But one has to decide. I did not want to be in 
the shadow any longer. I wanted to be seen with him, 
to be seen by people. That is why I decided I cannot 
stay in the shadow. I heard that the lady whenever 
she finds out that he is dating someone else will fight. 
But I will not just be the one to be with at night and 
during the day he is with the other one. I want him to 
be next to me, to walk next to me during the day so 
that the others can see. That is how it became public.  
Life narrative of a woman in her late twenties, Feb-
ruary 2004 
During the first half of our stay in 2003/2004, the community of Fransfontein was in-
tensively debating a court case that was running at the time. Just after our arrival, a 
young woman had attacked and severely injured another young woman with a broken 
bottle while spending the evening in one of Fransfontein shebeens (pubs). Because of 
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complicated head injuries that threatened her life, the attacked women had to be hospi-
talized for several weeks. The woman who attacked her was arrested and imprisoned in 
Khorixas. In the court case, she received a mild penalty. Several months after the act, 
she was able to start working again, in a state-financed occupation. The bone of con-
tention for the argument between them had between a 25-year-old man, father of the 
child of the attacked woman. They had been a couple for several years. A few months 
before the attack, the man had found a well-paying job in Khorixas and shortly there-
after started dating the other woman. Unlike the mother of his child who had left school 
with grade 7, the new woman had finished high school and had worked in several well-
paying jobs. At the beginning, the new woman was satisfied with the secret relationship. 
But with time, she wanted to leave this “shadow”. One evening, the three of them met 
in the local shebeen. The new woman started touching the man, expressing her affection 
so that everybody could see. This public demonstration of affection led to a rather im-
mediate response by the betrayed woman. The two women started fighting, first ver-
bally and then physically. In the course of fight, the new woman grabed a bottle of beer, 
battered it and slammed its cut-off neck into the other woman’s head. 
Of course, intimate relations in Fransfontein were very seldom as violent as in 
this narrative. Nevertheless, in a context of HIV/AIDS, economic insecurity and high 
rates of mobility, many Fransfontein intimate relations are contested, sometimes with 
violent undertones. With marriage out of reach for most people in Fransfontein, mar-
riage has been replaced by other forms of intimacy, foremost intimacies based on the 
concept of love. This is especially true for the youngest generation, with women born 
between 1965 and 1984. Only 11 per cent of these women were married by 2004. 
One has to distinguish different types of conjugal relations outside marriage (Pinho 
et al. 2016). Roughly, one might differentiate between short-term relations and 
longer- and long-term ones. While many longer-/long-term relations start as one-
night stands, not all brief sexual encounters eventually result in longer-lasting rela-
tions. Many women I talked with stressed that they only agreed to have sex with their 
partners because they had believed their promises of love and devotion. The possi-
bility of a longer-lasting relation is often a central motiv for women to agree to sex 
(Wojcicki 2002). But “all those nice words”, as 25-year-old Isabel summarized the 
communication she had with her former lover at the beginning of their relation, evap-
orated into thin air. She soon realized that her lover was cheaeting on her with her 
best friend. When I asked Isabel whether they had planned to marry, she replied that 
at the moment /nammi (love) was more important to her than marriage. /Nammi 
meant that someone cared for her and supported her, also financially. Marriage was 
only a distant dream, but love was real.  
Isabel described how an intimate relation typically starts and develops in Fransfon-
tein. A man or a woman spots someone he or she likes in the village streets or in one of 
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the shebeens. This is called sen in Khoekhoegowab. Either the man or the woman can 
propose a tē-am (relation): for this, they ask the desired person to become their so-
reb/sores (boyfriend/girlfriend).1 It is not very common, however, for a woman to pro-
pose to a man. In some cases, the person will not ask the desired partner himself or herself 
but will ask a friend to approach him or her. If the proposed person agrees, the two will 
start an intimate relation. Life stories with women and men show generally that the time 
between sen, tē-am and having sex for the first time is brief, often only one or two weeks. 
If the relation continues, the two become sores and soreb in the eyes of the general pub-
lic, a process called //a-gu. During this phase of the relationship, the exchange of presents 
in the form of gifts, cash and livestock is very important (on economic aspects of love, 
see Cole/Thomas 2009; Hunter 2009a). While the woman will only give small and rela-
tively inexpensive signs of affection, the man is expected to give on a larger scale. By 
supporting the woman and her family, the new boyfriend expresses his love. A next step 
of intimacy is reached when the couple starts #nu gomans omi (living together), literally 
a black cow marriage or a black cow house. Sometimes the Afrikaans term saam lewe 
can also be used to describe this stage. The last stage of an idealized conjugal relation is 
!gameb (marriage). The wish to marry (!game #gao), is followed by the many ritual ac-
tivities that I have described in the previous chapters. This is the stage that the vast ma-
jority of people in Fransfontein will never reach. 
While most Fransfonteiners never marry, many engage in short-term casual rela-
tions and longer-term love relations. There exists an extensive anthropological literature 
on the question of how far the concept of romantic love is universal or a result of colo-
nialization and “modernization” (Hirsch/Wardlow 2006; Jankowiak/Fischer 1992; 
Padilla et al. 2007; Smith 2001). In his research on love, fertility and marriage among 
Igbo men and women in Nigeria, Daniel Smith (2001) shows that romantic love as a 
criterion to start an initimate relation, eventually leading to marriage, and an increased 
importance of conjugality, such as joint decision-making between the partners, are ra-
ther recent phenomena. However, feelings of love have been known for a long time 
(ibid: 130). For my discussion here it is important to note that love is very much a pre-
marital event among the Igbo and stands in contrast to marriage relations. Love will 
eventually lead to marriage and then get transformed into something else. Such prac-
tices and perceptions of love only apply if virtually everybody marries. In Fransfontein, 
in contrast, most people are never going to marry. Consequently, love as a frame to 
structure conjugal relations has a more central and lasting meaning here than in cultural 
                                                 
1 In Khoekhoegowab, “b” indicates a male ending while “s” stands for a female ending. 
Sometimes, the terms /hob (boyfriend) or /hos (girlfriend) are also used, terms that are more 
sex neutral than soreb/sores. While the words /hob and /hos can also apply to a same-sex 
friend, soreb/sores can only be used for a relationship between lovers.  
Intimacy outside Marriage | 235 
 
contexts where marriage is still the norm and general practice. In some ways, love sub-
stitutes marriage in Fransfontein (and elsewhere in Namibia, see Mufune 2005; Tersbøl 
2002). Mufune’s research on myths of condoms and HIV/AIDS among Oshiwambo-
speaking residents in rural northern Namibia describes this development:  
With declining marriage rates and increasing divorce rates, sex for women is justified on the 
ground of love. Sex is used by men to pressurize girlfriends to show that they are in love (and 
are therefore a trusted partner) and not just after material goods. Conversely, women who want 
a serious relationship will quickly stop using condoms as a demonstration of their love, stead-
iness, and trust. (Mufune 2005: 680) 
To understand intimate relations beyond, before or besides marriage in Fransfontein, 
it is thus necessary not only to analyze different types of relations (short, longer, long 
term) and to realize that love has substituted marriage, but one also has to reflect upon 
the meaning of trust and risks in times of AIDS (Hunter 2010). In Fransfontein, in-
volvement in brief sexual encounters is often characterized by low levels of trust, 
high awareness of risk of a possible HIV infection, and a high likelihood of condom 
use. Contrary to this, longer-term unions (and also those imagined as such) have to 
cope with the ambiguities of trust. Trusting one’s partner is both a critical but at the 
same time also potentially dangerous essence of long-term relations. Trust has be-
come even more necessary, but also problematic and ambiguous in the midst of a 
crisis like the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Negotiating trust and risk is a general character-
istic of intimate relations in times of AIDS and certainly not restricted to sub-Saharan 
Africa (Hirsch et al. 2009). Gausset (2001) has convincingly argued against the “Af-
ricanization” of HIV/AIDS (see also Setel 1999). Worldwide, the use of condoms is 
the safest way to protect oneself against AIDS. But in many regions of Africa (and 
also other parts of the world) they are perceived as inappropriate for long-term inti-
mate relations as they are seen to signal promiscuity and immorality (Dilger 2003; 
Smith 2003). Smith’s research on young rural-to-urban migrants in two Nigerian cit-
ies explicitly connects morality, sexuality and risk of infection:  
Essentially, young people believed that if they chose partners of good moral character and if 
their relationships were founded on love, then they would face little risk of contracting HIV. 
Both young men and women said that they were much more likely to use condoms consistently 
in relationships that were considered short-term, unstable, or based on something other than 
love. (Smith 2003: 356) 
Hansjörg Dilger has researched how Luo living in rural and urban regions of Tanza-
nia survive the AIDS crisis:  
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The interviewees distinguished between the types of relationships they had. They agreed that 
it is easier for both sexes to insist upon the use of condoms if a relationship is based on 
“money”; this is because if it is based on “love” (mapenzi), then the use of condoms is inap-
propriate. (Dilger 2003: 39) 
Finally, Eleanor Preston-Whyte describes similar ideas of love, trust and intimacy in 
her research on situational barriers to HIV protection in South Africa. Again, condom 
use is acceptable in casual but not in “love” relations:  
While this form of protection is reportedly gaining acceptance in casual relationships, very little 
headways has been reported in introducing condom use in heterosexual, conjugal and longer-
term “love” relationships. As elsewhere in the world, the issue of trust is paramount. (Preston-
Whyte 1999: 142) 
The use of condoms contradicts what long-term love relations are all about. Within 
love/trust relations, the risk of infection is often perceived as low. Different types of 
knowledge of one’s partner, as for example his or her moral and physical appearance, 
and not condom use are perceived as protective measures against infection. This prac-
tice was, for example, described by John during our fieldwork. When we asked him 
how people protect themselves against infection with HIV, he told us that “they do 
blood tests with the eyes” (Pauli/Schnegg 2007). One could add that blood tests are 
also being done with the ears, meaning that an evaluation of a partner is based on 
“observations” of physical appearance and “investigations” of past intimate and sex-
ual behaviour. These “investigations” focus on the question in how far a person is 
known to //om-mara (“sleep around”) or go-mara (“look around”/”look at the other 
side”). Both are expressions that describe people that have many different sexual 
partners. The “testing” of a partner, however, is not a phenomenon linked only to 
AIDS. Practices of “testing” a partner have been common even before the dramatic 
spread of the pandemic (e.g. Bledsoe/Pison 1994; Gulbrandsen 1986). These prac-
tices continue until today and are adjusted to the new situation.  
“Testing” also goes beyond issues of health, sexual behaviour and AIDS. Sincer-
ity and commitment of a partner are also crucial. How engaged a partner is in an 
intimate relation is tested by his or her supportiveness, for example by providing 
money in times of need. Love is often constructed as the result of successful testing 
(Johnson-Hanks 2007b; Lewinson 2006; Pauli/Schnegg 2007). Bledsoe and Pison 
(1994: 5) underscore that the prolonged phases of “testing” a partner are also an ex-
pression of the procedural character of “African” marriage. Yet, while “testing” con-
tinues to be an important element of intimate relations in Fransfontein, marriage after 
“successful testing” is no longer a certain outcome for most Fransfonteiners. 
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Most intimate relations in Fransfontein now happen outside marriage. The previous 
chapter has discussed how reproduction and the birth of children largely take place out-
side marriage. Despite the spread of Western contraceptives and massive family plan-
ning campaigns, the average age at first sex and first birth has not changed for decades 
in Fransfontein (Pauli 2017a). Independent of marriage, becoming a mother or a father 
remains crucial for gender identities: “the importance of seeing women not only in the 
moment of sexual negotiation, but as mothers and would-be mothers: that is, in the 
context of their highly valued reproductive capacity”. (Preston-Whyte 1999: 140) 
Throughout the region, children are highly valued (Bochow 2012; Upton 2001). Use of 
contraception and especially condoms is often a contested topic within intimate rela-
tions. Some contraceptives are easier to hide then others. This explains the popularity 
of hormonal injections in Southern Africa (Preston-White 1999). Unlike hormonal pills 
or the loop, injections offer long-term protection and are rather easily kept secret. Pres-
ton-Whyte concludes: “We have yet to develop the equivalent secret protection against 
HIV”. (Preston-Whyte 1999: 149) Condoms, and also so-called femidoms (Mufune 
2005: 676), are not secret protections. Quite the opposite, condoms are the most visible 
contraceptive method. They are a visible sign of mistrust and only acceptable in casual 
but not in longer-term love relations. Trust and having children together are important 
aspects of such long-term relations and condoms disrupt this central element of intimate 
life. Condoms, thus, prevent both HIV – and pregnancy. Situations which may be sub-
sumed under the label “casual sex” lack such pregnancy aspirations – neither trust nor 
children are central, and condom use is very likely (Gausset 2001: 516).  
Economic insecurities, the necessity to be mobile, a high value placed on children 
and specific forms of trust and risk, especially those associated with AIDS, frame the 
intimate relations of the younger and middle-aged Fransfontein men and women 
(born after 1964). To extend my analysis of intimate relations beyond, before and 
besides marriage, I next turn to the making and unmaking of intimate relationships.  
THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF INTIMATE RELATIONS 
In Fransfontein, the making of a new conjugal relation very often implies the break-
ing of an already existing one. This common constellation makes it difficult to see 
women only as victims of male betrayals. Nevertheless, public discourse focuses 
more on male than on female cheating. In all life stories I elicitated, a cheating male 
partner is part of the narrative. In Khoekhoegowab, cheating or betraying is called 
/hōagao. All women narrated how they discovered that their partners betrayed them. 
Most highlighted their role as victim of betrayal and not as actor in the betrayal of 
other women or of their existing male partners. A common beginning of an intimate 
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relation is the story of how Frieda and Tom2 fell in love. We observed the ups and 
downs of their relationship from 2003 to 2004. 
In late 2003, Tom sen (spotted) Frieda in a Fransfontein shebeen. Only a couple of 
days later he proposed a relationship to her, tē-am. He was having a lucky streak at the 
time: after a long period without a steady income, he had recently found a well-paid 
occupation 20 kilometres away in Khorixas. However, Tom was not single when he 
proposed to Frieda; he was in a long-term relationship with Rita. Both were living to-
gether with Tom’s mother, a pensioner who raised several grandchildren and so-called 
groot-maak (foster) children in her large stone house. Tom and Rita were parents of a 
four-year-old son. Frieda, in turn, was a single mother who lived in her mother’s house-
hold with her three-year-old daughter. Tom, Rita and Frieda were all in their twenties. 
In the first couple of weeks of their relationship, Tom and Frieda only met se-
cretly. Then, Tom publicly split up with Rita. Tom’s and Frieda’s mothers did not 
consent to the new relationship. Frieda’s mother commented that she thought Tom 
was unreliable and selfish. Tom’s mother perceived Frieda as snobbish. Tom moved 
out of his mother’s house and started staying in his office in Khorixas. Most nights 
he spent with Frieda in her room at her mother’s house. Rita, meanwhile, continued 
to live with Tom’s mother. While Tom and Frieda tried to consolidate their relation-
ship, gossip was running high. Rita’s and Tom’s mothers spread rumours about 
Frieda’s HIV status. One evening, a sad and frustrated Rita drank heavily at a local 
shebeen. Tom’s mother was deeply disappointed about this behavior and kicked Rita 
out of her house the very next day. Together with her son, Rita left Fransfontein and 
went to live with relatives in a faraway town. 
Some months later Frieda had to leave Fransfontein for a week. Tom took this as 
an opportunity to visit his ex-girlfriend Rita and their son. When they met again, Tom 
and Rita still felt attracted to each other. They revived their initimate relation and 
returned to Fransfontein together. Frieda was furious. This lead to fights between 
Frieda and Tom. Eventually, Rita was tired of all this love turmoil. This time, she left 
Tom. In the end, all three were left without an intimate partner. Frieda continued her 
life as a single mother in Fransfontein. Both Tom and Rita left the village and moved 
to different towns in Namibia.  
The betrayal of Rita is rather typical for the beginning of a new intimate relation. 
Often, the betrayed woman is in a more vulnerable position than the new female part-
ner. The betrayed woman might be economically dependent or pregnant. When Isa-
bel, for example, discovered that her boyfriend was cheating on her, she was five 
months pregnant. She found out about the relationship when she returned from a visit 
                                                 
2 Because of the sensitivity of the topic, I have changed not only all names but also other 
information relating to persons and places. 
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to her sister in southern Namibia. The father of her child had promised to pick her up 
at the train station in Windhoek where they were living at the time. When he did not 
appear, Isabel took a taxi to meet up with him at his home. There, she encountered 
her boyfriend in bed with another woman. He had mixed up the dates of Isabel’s 
return to Windhoek. Isabel said:  
When I saw him with the lady, I was thinking: “What are you doing?” He says he is not feeling 
okay. But the lady is also angry. I tell her: “Don’t be angry with me. I will go back to my house. 
I am pregnant, I cannot fight. I cannot do anything”. He tells the lady: “You must go back, my 
girlfriend, she is coming back now”. But I say: “I go back”. And I take my bags.  
Isabel and the father of her child continued to stay in touch. When their daughter was 
born, he sent clothes and food. During a phone call, he wanted to revive their relation. 
Isabel narrated: “He was asking for forgiveness. But I told him: ‘No problem, I am 
not having any problem. Now I am okay. I’ve got your daughter. You can visit her. 
And after the visit, you can go back to your girlfriend!’” There are a number of sim-
ilarities between Rita’s and Isabel’s reaction to betrayal. Both stayed in touch with 
their child’s father. In Isabel’s case, her child’s father paid her material support for 
their child, whereas Rita received support from her ex-boyfriend’s mother and for a 
while even continued to live in her house. Rita and Isabel were both economically 
vulnerable and dependent on financial support. While both felt personally and emo-
tionally hurt, they nevertheless had to keep going on.  
When asked whether they had ever cheated whilst being in a fixed relationship, 
relatively few Fransfonteiners said yes. By far the highest percentages of self-re-
ported cheating can be found among young men: almost half of the 58 men between 
15-24 years in our survey said that they had cheated, yet only about one fifth of the 
77 women of the same age category admitted the same. At this point it is necessary 
to ask what people mean when they speak about cheating. Clearly, there might be 
some underreporting. Some women posited that if a partner was physically absent, 
sex with another partner was not considered an infidelity (see also LeBeau et al. 2001: 
58). It is also unusual for women to engage in more than one intimate relationship at 
a time, leading to lower levels of overall female cheating. Men, and especially young 
men, are much more likely to have multiple intimate partners concurrently and to talk 
about their multiple relations, as such behaviour is often perceived as a sign of mas-
culinity.  
Economic aspects can influence the making and unmaking of intimate relations 
(see also van Dijk 2017). A new, well-paying job often coincides with the beginning 
of an affair which might later develop into a longer-lasting relationship. If a man 
moves up the economic ladder, it is also likely that his new girlfriend will be of a 
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higher economic status then his previous girlfriend. When I asked Frieda, for exam-
ple, whether she saw any difference between herself and Rita, she said yes. Frieda 
explained that, unlike Rita, she was economically independent. Frieda stressed that 
scrutinizing a potential partner’s educational and professional achievements was part 
of testing a new partner. Another highly educated women reflected at length on the 
role of the economic standing of both partners in a relationship. Commenting on her 
partner’s previous girlfriend, she noted how “material” this girlfriend had been, only 
thinking of “cash, car and cellular”, a local expression to describe a money-grabbing 
woman. With disdain in her voice, she noted the less educated status of this woman: 
“She even quit school after grade seven! Primary school! I mean, both hands should 
bring something into the relation”. 
Tom’s behavior after finding a new job illustrates this. Gossip spread in Fransfon-
tein when Tom and his new girlfriend Frieda left the shebeen arm in arm. Tom’s brother 
commented that Tom’s behaviour is typical for men in the area. During Tom’s long 
unemployment, Rita had also supported him financially. Now that he had found a new 
job and his own money, he turned down his former girlfriend and looked for someone 
“better”, with more education and working experience. This points to an implicit norm 
that intimate partners should be more or less of an equal economic status. If a change 
in economic status occurs, it is likely that an “intimate adjustment” will follow.  
Although both men and women left their partners, in the local perception it is the 
man who leaves the woman. In our ethnographic survey, we asked our interviewees to 
list the reasons they thought were acceptable for leaving a woman. There were only 
slight differences between the answers given by men and by women. Only about a third 
of Fransfontein men and women thought it proper to leave a woman who demands too 
much money. Different forms of support, including material and financial support, were 
not considered to be in opposition to love but were rather perceived as expressions of 
love and intimacy. Thus, to demand money and other resources from a male partner 
was not considered wrong. An issue on which men and women differed was the evalu-
ation of a woman perceived to be drinking too much. Many more women than men 
thought that this is an adequate reason for a man to leave. One possible explanation 
might be that women perceived drinking too much alcohol are considered to be “risky”: 
there were numerous stories going around about drunken women having unprotected 
sex. Why most men did not perceive this as a reason to leave is unclear, however.  
Once a new intimate relationship has been started, the bond needs to be consoli-
dated. Often, this was difficult and challenging for newly formed couples. Frieda’s 
mother, for example, disliked Tom and did not approve of her daughter’s relationship 
with him. Indeed, she threatened to kick Frieda out of her house, leaving Frieda sad 
and frustrated. She described how she had been single for two years, feeling lonely 
and abandoned. Now that she had finally found someone to love, everybody seemed 
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to be opposed to the relationship. Frieda’s love for Tom was not bound to marriage 
or children: for her what was central was the feeling of love, though she added after 
a while that she would not be against marriage. It was the feeling of love that made 
the relationship special and true for her. Frieda’s perceptions are very similar to Isa-
bel’s comments about love and marriage. Both said that their love for their partners 
had made them stop using condoms. Frieda continued to use hormonal injections, 
however, to prevent a pregnancy. When asked about the risk of being infected with 
HIV, she replied that she now knew Tom as she had done the “blood tests with the 
eyes”. Tom did not have any dubious spots or sores which could have suggested an 
infection with haga (AIDS).3 Frieda not only knew her partner’s “surface”, however. 
Their love was also a form of trust: she knew that he would not harm her.  
Feelings of trust but also of fear and danger depend on the stage of an intimate 
relationship (Preston-Whyte 1999). Feelings of insecurity, risk and danger are prom-
inent at the beginning of intimacy. With time, perceptions of risk and danger are sub-
stituted by feelings of love, trust and security. This also helps to explain why, despite 
widespread risk awareness, HIV infection rates are still high in Namibia (Pinho et al. 
2016).  
To understand the unmaking of intimate relations, two major themes, mobility and 
(sometimes violent) conflict, are important. Employment opportunities are extremely 
rare in Fransfontein so that people have to be flexible and mobile to make a living. 
Young people in particular are very mobile. In such a situation it is rather difficult to 
keep in contact with people left behind. Given the lack of public transport in large 
parts of Namibia, visits are difficult to organize and costly. To make telephone calls 
is also beyond the economic possibilities of most people.4 
Intimate relations very often not only include love and pleasure but also conflict, 
sometimes even domestic violence. A few women reported being subjected to severe 
physical and psychological violence. However, it is important to note that many men 
in Fransfontein are very caring and not violent at all. More research should focus on 
these men (Pauli 2007b).  
Further, in Fransfontein, violence within gender categories is also common. The 
narrative with which I opened this section describes an extreme act of violence between 
two women. Much social science research and studies of HIV/AIDS overlook conflict 
that arises within gender categories, especially between women (Pauli 2007b). A high-
ranking police officer indicated in 2005 that there had been a strong increase of severe 
                                                 
3  Haga literally means “four” in Khoekhowgowab, the way in which people referred to the 
four-lettered word “AIDS”.  
4 This might have changed since my fieldwork from 2003 to 2006 when access to mobile 
phones and the internet was still very rare in Fransfontein. 
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violence among young women in Fransfontein. These developments are related to a 
multiplicity of factors, among them substantial economic insecurities and the fear of 
AIDS. As the making and unmaking of Frieda and Tom’s intimate relationship shows, 
couples have to cope with many insecurities and ambiguities. In this situation, there are 
people in Fransfontein, especially women, who have decided that they have had enough 
of these ambiguities and that chose to remain single. It is to them that I now turn.  
WOMEN STAYING SINGLE 
Research indicates that the category of unmarried women is not a new category 
(Gulbrandsen 1986; Hunter 2002; Mayer 1961; van der Vliet 1991: 235). According 
to Philip Mayer (1961: 85), so called amankazana (free women), thus unmarried 
women living at their father’s homestead and bearing their children there, provided a 
model for independent unmarried mothers in the townships and some rural areas in 
South Africa. Isaac Schapera and Simon Roberts (1975: 267) describe a similar cat-
egory of unmarried women living in their father’s ward in Rampedi, then Bechuana-
land, in the 1970s. The women Virginia van der Vliet interviewed in the 1970s who 
deliberately chose to stay single were not confined to their fathers’ compounds. Ra-
ther, they often lived on their own and raised their children by themselves: “Like so 
many women, from the elite to the humblest hawker or domestic worker, this option 
[of staying single] had become possible with the chance the towns offered for finan-
cial independence”. (van der Vliet 1991: 236-237) 
Although these women chose to stay single, they were not socially isolated. They 
formed the core of female family networks and households (Hellman 1974; Preston-
Whyte 1978). The family households of these wage-earning women represented new 
forms of female cooperation, with households including wage-earning and non-
wage-earning women that were connected through uterine kin ties. Preston-Whyte 
(1978: 59) calls these families “female linked” (cf. Jackson 2014). Men only tempo-
rarily participated in these households as sons, brothers, lovers and providers of chil-
dren. Preston-Whyte (1978: 55-58) and Adam Kuper (1987: 147) underscore the sim-
ilarities these units had with Caribbean matrifocal family systems but also how they 
deviated strongly from rural Zulu social organization:  
The cooperation between women, that is, between mothers and daughters, between sisters and 
even between grandmothers and their grandchildren, which I have described in this essay, pre-
sents a marked contrast to the structurally important linkages between agnatically related males 
upon which Zulu homestead composition and local organization were based. (Preston-Whyte 
1978: 82) 
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The female perception that it can be an advantage not to marry, along with declining 
marriage rates, is reflected in accounts throughout Namibia. In their study of eight 
congregations in the Omusati and Oshikoto administrative regions, north-central Na-
mibia, Riikka Shemeikka, Veijo Notkola and Harri Siiskonen (2005: 103) find that 
many young women try to protect their independence by remaining unmarried. Iken 
(1999: 179-183) cites a number of reasons why Nama women in southern Namibia 
prefer to remain unmarried. A critical one among the women who have regular in-
comes and well-paid jobs is the fear of loosing decision-making power, especially in 
economic matters. These women had definite views about marriage and the require-
ments for a marriage partner, with the result that they did not perceive all men to be 
equally suitable. Iken (ibid: 181) stresses that such arguments “point to the potential 
for conflicting gender roles and new directions in gender relations”. Situating these 
developments in a historical perspective, Iken writes: “Single motherhood reportedly 
became a more common feature among the Nama and other communities in Namibia 
and southern Africa after 1918, and went hand in hand with a declining marriage 
rate”. (Iken 1999: 172) However, until the 1960s, marriage remained a rather norma-
tive event in the life course of most women she interviewed (ibid: 180). It was only 
in the last decades of the 20th century that the percentage of never-married women 
and men became increasingly visible. Thus, there is substantial evidence that some 
Southern African women have gained agency from the structural changes in marriage 
systems. But how did the situation change for men?  
Only in recent years have in-depth interpretations of Southern African male gen-
der roles and masculinities emerged (e.g. Hunter 2004, 2005; Morrell 2000; Ouzgane/ 
Morrell 2005; Richter/Morrell 2006). Similar to earlier feminist research (Di Leo-
nardo 1991), this line of investigation highlights the multiple dimensions – political, 
economic, cultural and social aspects – that form male identities. Material power and 
economic disempowerment play an especially prominent role in current construc-
tions of masculinity in Southern Africa.  
One of the first to analyze the effects of the labour migration system on male iden-
tities and marriage was Ørnulf Gulbrandsen (1986) in his research on Tswana migrant 
communities in the 1970s in Botswana. According to him, young male Tswana mi-
grants gained significant agency and prestige in the 1960s and 1970s through their par-
ticipation in the labour migration system to South African mines into which their home 
communities were linked. The young men continued to marry, yet later in life and no 
longer on their fathers’ terms: now it was the groom himself and not the lineage or the 
groom’s family that was responsible for the bridewealth. The migrants’ cash incomes 
led to strong increase in bridewealth amounts. This led to a rapid and thorough trans-
formation of the definition of male identity, one tightly linked to economic success and 
spending power. The essence of manliness turned into an economic asset, gradually 
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excluding those men without the necessary financial resources. In his long-term South 
African ethnography, Mark Hunter (2009b, 2010) describes comparable transfor-
mations of notions of masculinity for Mandeni, KwaZulu-Natal, from the 19th century 
until today. He traces how the image of “man as provider” emerged only with the strong 
increase in labour migration in the first half of the 20th century (Hunter 2004, 2009a). 
Yet this notion in a way also “trapped” men into the migration system: “Once men were 
married, their dependency on migrancy meant that gifts became rerouted to support the 
homestead and became signifiers of men’s continued love for their wives and families”. 
(Hunter 2009a: 143) Some decades later and with steeply rising unemployment rates, 
masculine identities based on the material expressions of love and marriage became 
increasingly less viable. Hunter (2007) convincingly argues that the economic crisis of 
the last decades has deprived most men of the means to fulfil the role of the homestead 
provider, among other factors contributing to the strong decline in marriage rates. Ob-
viously, the entanglement of class and gender has produced new masculinities. Elite 
and middle class men are still able to fulfil the image of the male provider, declaring it 
as “traditional”. This discourse makes the constraints of poorer men to express their 
mascunilities even more evident and humilitating. However, masculinities of econom-
ically marginalized men have also been reconfigured.  
Several authors have argued that the economic marginalization of increasing num-
bers of African men has created a kind of “cultural limbo” (Cole 2004; Cornwall 2002; 
Johnson-Hanks 2007b; Masquelier 2005; Parkin and Nyamwaya 1987a; Tersbøl 
2002). For instance, Adeline Masquelier (2005: 60) has observed for men in Niger that 
“young men without the means to marry find themselves condemned to a kind of limbo 
life”, and Britt Pinkowsky Tersbøl (2002: 367) comments on the situation of poor men 
in Namibia’s northern regions in the following way: “Without resources, without a 
job, and without a house, a man cannot marry. This situation leaves men in a social 
and cultural limbo. The basic building stones of male identity and masculinity are un-
available to men”. How then is this “cultural limbo” filled? Margrethe Silberschmidt 
(2001) was among the first to analyze the effects unemployment and economic depri-
vation have had on masculine identities in East Africa. Multiple partners and violence 
against women figure prominently in these new male identities. Hunter (2004: 145) 
comes to very similar conclusions: “Men celebrating multiple sexual partners, widely 
seen as an ‘innate’ feature of African sexuality, are in their present form, a product of 
an economic crisis that has ripped the core out of previous expressions of manhood – 
working, marrying, and building an independent household”.  
Gender identities have comparably been reconfigured in Fransfontein. Some 
Fransfontein women have deliberately chosen to stay single. This expression of fe-
male agency is not a simple resistance story with an economic independent woman/ 
mother as the heroine fighting patriarchy. Although some women have expressed 
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awareness of male domination and female resistance, these women are as much 
formed by gender structures as they form them. In the chapter “Forming Families”, I 
turned to agency-structure theories to understand why the poor do not reappropriate 
marriage. Here, I want to build on Ortner’s (2006) discussion of agency, power and 
gender. Although stressing that questions of agency are not only gendered issues (but 
go beyond gender), Ortner (ibid: 139) writes that gender relations nevertheless often 
provide “the most vivid examples”. I want to scrutinize the “intense play of multiply 
positioned subjects pursuing cultural goals within a matrix of local inequalities and 
power differentials” (Ortner 2006: 144) by distinguishing three types of women: wom-
en as wives; women who have chosen to stay single; and unmarried women who 
would like to marry. The women who want to stay single have to be subdivided into 
two generations: the generation of “single” mothers who raised their children in 
1970s and 1980s; and the women born in the late 1960s or later who came of age 
with Namibia’s independence (I am not discussing the oldest generation of women 
here whose marriage choices predate the changes of the 1970s). Further, the perspec-
tive of men is only presented through the narratives of women. This is a bias which 
stems from the fact that, despite some interviews I conducted with men, my more 
detailed and in-depth understanding of intimacy, marriage, reproduction and sexual-
ity comes from discussions and interviews with women.  
With the changes of the 1970s, the new role of the woman as wife and housewife 
emerged. Fransfontein women largely perceived being a housewife with ambivalence. 
On the one hand they saw it as implying that the husband is wealthy enough to marry 
and finance such a living. Women that classify themselves as housewives generally 
take pride in this status. On the other hand, many women considered being a married 
housewife meant a loss of agency, especially in terms of decision-making. Even mar-
ried women who continued to work after their marriage, especially teachers, stressed 
the many quarrels they had with their husbands about decision-making and issues of 
trust. With the spread of AIDS, these quarrels became fiercer, with many married 
women in fear about the risks their husbands’ potential infidelity would carry for them. 
Even before AIDS, married women could suffer from the infidelities of their husbands. 
One such woman, Lina, was so depressed by her husband’s continuous cheating that 
she tried to burn herself to death. The risks thus involved in marriage was expressed 
most clearly when I asked married women whether they would wish for their daugh-
ters to marry. Most were sceptical or even opposed it, as illustrated in Mona’s re-
sponse: “By my side, I don’t know. My daughter should learn for herself and be inde-
pendent. During marriage, you sometimes have to stay in the house, have to be silent, 
silent until your heart becomes sick. I do not want that for my child”. 
Being a married woman is thus perceived to be a mixed blessing. This partially 
explains why women began to remain single from the 1970s onwards. Especially 
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women with secure, even if low-paying, employment as domestic servants in gov-
ernment institutions opted against marriage. Most of these women received their em-
ployment in the 1970s and 1980s because they were the intimate partners of influen-
tial kai aogu. With time, these relationships came to an end and the women dated 
other men, often also having children with them. Most of these later men had no 
secure employment and were poor in comparision with the kai aogu. Women with 
employment started to perceive these men as a burden and strain on their resources 
and freedom. Hertha and other middle aged women employed in the domestic sector 
of government institutions in Fransfontein explained their unmarried status as a de-
liberate choice against staying with and marrying these economically marginalized 
men. These women had gained agency through a male patronage system that emerged 
with the apartheid homelands of the 1970s. At the same time, their very agency was 
instrumental in the limitation of the agency of economically deprived men who were 
unable to afford expensive weddings and lifestyles or to act as providers of the house-
hold. The unmarried lives of these women can only be understood in relation to the 
tremendous political and economic changes of the 1970s and 1980s and the restruc-
turing of gendered agency. These economically independent women became role 
models for younger women (Chimere-Dan 1997). Thus Gulbrandsen notes for Bot-
swana: “Legitimization of the status of the unmarried mother may stem from the fact 
that high-status women are often in this category”. (Gulbrandsen 1986: 21) Likewise, 
Parkin and Nyamwaya see educated, urban women as role models and primary agents 
of change in marriage and the family:  
In acting as a reference group for other women and requiring men to adapt to their choices, it 
will not be strange if it is such women who will bring about the greatest transformations in 
ideas and practices relating to marriage in Africa. (Parkin and Nyamwaya 1987a: 16) 
Among the youngest Fransfontein generation were several well-educated women 
working in better-paid occupations such as in the health sector. Like the generation 
of their mothers, they expressed scepticism towards marriage (Pauli 2017a). This is 
shown in a group discussion I had with four women in their twenties in 2004: 
Julia: Is it a question of money that so many young people are not married? 
Vanessa: Everything has changed, you know, things have gotten expensive. The parents them-
selves are not married. They are still with a boyfriend or a girlfriend, you know, and they 
still want to get married. And then the child wants to get married, you know, those money 
problems. 
Julia: So if all of you had a lot of money, all of you would be married? 
All four women: No! 
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The four women then elaborated that they were looking for Mr. Right, a trustful, faith-
ful, good looking, educated, wealthy man. All four wanted to keep their economic 
independence after marriage and wanted to continue working. In certain ways, the 
attitudes of these younger women were similar to those of their mother’s generation. 
Just as for the domestic workers of the 1970s and 1980s, marriage was not a necessity 
in life for the young, educated women of the early 2000s. It was only an option and 
then only with the right candidate. But there were also differences between these two 
generations: many more of the young women were educated and they depended to a 
much lesser degree on the benevolence of male patrons. 
Finally, I want to reflect on the situation of those women who wanted to marry but 
were unable to do so. As I described in the chapter “Postapartheid Livelihoods”, many 
of these women lived in the part of Fransfontein called ‡oabatere, meaning “go out”. 
They survived amidst great economic insecurities. Marriage to them was a dream, a 
way in which they could forget their daily struggles for a moment. At the same time 
they knew that their chances of marrying were extremely small. One afternoon in 
2006, single mother Tanja described to me how she walked to the local shop every 
evening. Through the shop window, she could watch her favourite Mexican telenovela 
“When You are Mine”. Like in this series, Tanja dreamed that one day someone would 
marry her out of her misery. Then she laughed. Her daughter commented that this was 
just a Cinderella fairy tale, not real life. All of these dreams, regardless whether imag-
ined by middle-aged domestic servants, young educated professionals or marginalized 
poor women, are about wealthy men. Wealth and money are what transforms a man 
into a husband. Thus, women have increasingly decided not only against marriage, but 
against specific men (see also Boehm 2006: 178). That many men are economically 
and socially marginalized is tightly connected to decades of exploitation by colonial 
powers and the apartheid regime.  
Even if women want or have to stay single, they will most likely become mothers. 
Until recently, children born out of wedlock were not stigmatized. Yet, with the emer-
gence of a new discourse of “illegitimacy” and “illegitimate children”, this is gradu-
ally changing. I turn to this in the last section of this chapter.  
BETWEEN SEX AND SIN: CREATING THE  
“ILLEGIMATE CHILD” 
Attending the Sunday service in the Lutheran church one Sunday in the summer of 
2005, Michael and I witnessed Norbert, Eulalie and Maria publicly asking for for-
giveness (Pauli 2012). There had been a good deal of gossip and popular outrage in 
the community about the relationships between these three ahead of this. Norbert, a 
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wealthy administrator in his late thirties, and Maria, slightly older than her husband, 
had married almost ten years earlier and had four children together, the last one born 
one year earlier. The parents now planned to baptize the child. However, parallel to 
Maria’s pregnancy, Norbert’s girlfriend, Eulalie, in her early thirties, had also be-
come pregnant. Wife and lover gave birth in the same week. Many people pitied 
Norbert’s wife and criticized Norbert and especially Eulalie for the out-of-wedlock 
pregnancy. One of the female church elders described herself as a realist, knowing 
though not approving of the extramarital affairs of almost all of the wealthy married 
male church members. She remarked, however, that it was one thing to have sex with 
a married man, but quite another to get pregnant by him. She and many others were 
outraged by Eulalie’s and Norbert’s behaviour. And rather than using the common 
term !gameb !auka /gôas (outside marriage child) to describe Eulalie’s child, she 
used the term /ai-/gôas (sin child) when talking to me. 
After the children’s births, it took Norbert’s wife almost one year to publicly for-
give Eulalie and allow the baptism of Eulalie’s child. During this time, the church 
only permitted Maria to remain an active member of the congregation and take Holy 
Communion; Norbert and Eulalie were excluded from all church meetings and Holy 
Communion. Only with Maria’s consent did the congregation and church elders agree 
to baptize Eulalie’s /ai-/gôas. During this Sunday service we attended, all three of 
them, crying and clearly emotionally shaken, had to stand in front of the pastor, heads 
bowed. Then, in an almost inaudible voice, Eulalie asked first Maria and then God 
for forgiveness, followed by Norbert. This practice, the !gaes tsî ores tsîra xa (abbre-
viated as ores) is held for a repenting person to receive redemption and become free 
of sin. After the ores, both children were baptized and Norbert and Eulalie were again 
admitted to Holy Communion. However, Maria’s consent came at a cost to Norbert 
and Eulalie. With no close kin in the community, Maria had frequently mentioned 
that she was unhappy in Fransfontein and wanted to move away. Norbert, however, 
did not want to leave the town in which many of his relatives and also Eulalie were 
living. Nevertheless, acknowledging Maria’s forgiveness of his and Eulalie’s behav-
iour, Norbert started looking for another job in a different community. A few months 
after the ores ceremony and the baptism, he was successful and Norbert, Maria and 
their children left the community.  
Stigmatization of children born out-of-wedlock is still rare in Fransfontein. Chil-
dren born within and outside of marriage are in general differentiated by descriptive 
and not pejorative terms (cf. Schapera 1933). Children born to a married couple are 
called !game /gôan (marriage children or inside-marriage children), whilst children 
born out of wedlock are called !gameb !auka /gôan (outside-marriage children). 
However, the story of Norbert, Eulalie and Maria shows that these perceptions are 
changing. During the redemption and baptism mass, the term /ai-/gôan (sin child) was 
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Births to women who never married  739 54% 
Births to women who married later in life 
(out-of-wedlock births) 
422 31% 
Total births out-of-wedlock 1161 85% 
Births to married women 218 15% 
Total births 1379 100% 
Total births to married women  
(including those born before marriage) 
640 46% 
 
sometimes used. There is thus some indication that slowly, yet steadily, a discourse 
on illegitimacy and illegitimate children is being created. 
Given the strong decline in marriage rates and, consequently, the decreasing 
number of married women, it is not surprising that most children in Fransfontein are 
born out of wedlock. We collected information on the birth and conjugal histories 
of 369 women of 15 years of age or older living in the Fransfontein region. These 
women had a collective of 1379 births, with 12 per cent not having given birth yet. 
115 women, or 31 per cent, were married or widowed. There are various ways in 
which out-of-wedlock births can be defined. I first take a birth to be out-of-wedlock 
if the mother was unmarried at the time of the child’s birth. Following this defini-
tion, 85 per cent of all births in the Fransfontein region throughout the last sixty 
years have been out-of-wedlock births (row “Total births out-of-wedlock”) (see Ta-
ble 15). 
Another way of conceptualizing out-of-wedlock births is to differentiate between 
women who married at some point in their lives and those that never married. By this 
definition, a later marriage of the mother legitimizes earlier out-of-wedlock births. 
When this definition is applied to our survey data, 54 per cent of all births are still 
defined as out-of-wedlock births. However, Schapera (1933) already criticised this 
approach in the 1930s when he remarked that the rights of children born out-of-wed-
lock differ from those held by their legitimate siblings, even if the mother should later 
marry. Yet, another figure is of interest here: only 15 per cent of all births occur after  
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% of out-of- 
wedlock births 
% of women  
who married 
1916-1934 35 55 80 
1935-1944 44 81 59 
1945-1954 47 90 29 
1955-1964 57 91 38 
1965-1974* 68 93 (22) 
1975-1984* 90 97  (5) 
* Still in childbearing age 
marriage. These are the only cases where legitimacy, defined in terms of the marital 
status of the mother at the time of birth, is beyond doubt.  
A chronological perspective adds further complexity to these findings. Table 16 
provides information on the development of marriage rates and out-of-wedlock 
births. It includes only women who have given birth, thus reducing the sample to 341 
women. Especially women in the youngest cohort have not yet given birth.  
Table 16 shows that the number of out-of-wedlock births has steadily increased. 
For the last four decades it has remained at very high levels with around 90 per cent 
of all births occurring out-of-wedlock while the percentage of women who married 
at any one point in their lives has continuously declined. Finally, only six of the sam-
ple of 341 Fransfontein women, or two per cent, gave birth to their first child within 
marriage.  
Giving birth outside of marriage is thus the norm in Fransfontein. This normality 
was demonstrated in the way one mother who gave birth to her child out-of-wedlock 
presented herselfself during Sunday mass. As an unmarried mother, twenty-two-
year-old Barbara was required to ask for forgiveness before she could ask for the 
baptism of her newborn. This was the second child Barbara had had with her boy-
friend, Michael, who was eight years older than her. Neither had finished high school, 
and they relied on support from their kin groups and temporary petty economic ac-
tivities like washing clothes and collecting firewood. Barbara and Michael were un-
married, living in a so-called #nu gomans omi (black cow marriage) in Barbara’s 
mother’s house. Barbara hoped that one day they would be wealthy enough to afford 
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a wedding. When Barbara stepped forward in church for the ores, she was rather self-
confident: she barely bowed her head and there was no emotional outburst as in the 
case of Eulalie, Maria and Norbert. Instead, Barbara looked at me and smiled. Neither 
before nor after the service was there any gossip or talk about her behaviour or of her 
and Michael’s relationship. 
Although Barbara’s and Eulalie’s children were both born out-of-wedlock, the 
moral evaluation of the two births differs strongly (Pauli 2012). The “illegitimate” 
birth of Barbara’s child is of little moral concern in the community and her child is 
treated like just another !gameb !auka /gôas (outside marriage child) so common in 
Fransfontein. Eulalie’s sin child (/ai-/gôas), in contrast, stirs moral outrage and emo-
tions. Thus, while in some situations intimacy, sex and children born out-of-wedlock 
are possible and tolerated, in other constellations moral distinctions and boundaries 
between good and bad women and/or children are being drawn. Variations in moral 
treatment of unmarried mothers and their out-of-wedlock births have been noted 
across history. They range from severe punishment of single mothers for their “mis-
behaviour”, as in Victorian England, to a perception of normality of non-marital 
births in an urban US neighbourhood in the 1960s (Stack 1970), a situation very sim-
ilar to Fransfontein. In one of the first anthropological treatises on marriage and le-
gitimacy, Bronislaw Malinowski (1927) concluded that parenthood, and not sexual-
ity, was universally tied to marriage. He assumed that societies risked disintegration 
if they had more than a minimal number of out-of-wedlock births. Peter Laslett and 
others later showed that “social survival was apparently scarcely ever in question”, 
even in societies like some provinces of Austria in the mid-nineteenth century with 
nonmarital birth rates far beyond 50 per cent for over a generation (Laslett 1980: 62).  
Schapera (1933) applied Malinowski’s ideas and especially his “principle of le-
gitimacy” to prevailing changes in attitudes towards premarital pregnancy among a 
group of Sotho-Tswana. He finds that punishment against premarital pregnancy has 
decreased. However, a child born out-of-wedlock is not entitled to the same privi-
leges as his legitimate siblings: “In the case of children, again, they labour under a 
social disadvantage which clings to them until their mother is married, and even then 
they do not always attain to equal rights with legitimate children in regards to suc-
cession and inheritance”. (ibid: 85) Overviews of illegitimacy unquestionably dem-
onstrate the many prejudices and disadvantages children born out-of-wedlock have 
to face (Abrahamson 1998; Reekie 1998; Teichmann 1982): significantly higher in-
fant mortality rates, higher rates of infanticide, little or no maintenance and support 
from the father, and limited or no succession and inheritance rights are among the 
most severe (see also Teichmann 1982: 103-121). 
Legitimacy of birth and inheritance are very often linked. Abrahamson (1998: 14) 
observes that one puzzling question regarding illegitimacy is the use of pejorative 
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terms. He notes that, historically, pejorative terms such as bastard tend to be applied 
to the children of unmarried parents rather than to the parents themselves. He argues 
that the reason for this has to do with inheritance rules, thus the legitimacy of a child’s 
potential claim upon inheritable possessions. The rules that govern which children 
are entitled to inherit and succeed matter especially to wealthy families and “proce-
dures for transmitting wealth are most explicit among the wealthiest, rather than poor-
est segments within any society” (Abrahamson 1998: 15). These procedures are of 
less importance at the other end of the wealth spectrum. Robert Gordon connects the 
widespread poverty of many Namibians to the insignificance of inheritance rules and 
the acceptance of children born out-of-wedlock: “Given the general poverty of mate-
rial wealth in Namibia one could argue that the inheritance of property was not sig-
nificant and thus female autonomy and bastardy was tolerated. Children born outside 
of marriage were simply incorporated into the mother’s family”. (Gordon 2002: 60) 
Similar dynamics can be observed for marriage. For elites, marriage and inher-
itance are closely connected. Some societies have defined marriage as an exclusive 
right of the wealthy, such as the marriage restrictions that applied during the Roman 
empire (Herlihy 1985) or marriage prohibitions for large parts of the German popu-
lation during the 19th century (Mackenroth 1953). Marriage and inheritance can be 
kept exclusive through laws. Where no laws prohibit marriage, de facto exclusion 
from marriage through exorbitant marriage costs, as in Fransfontein, has similar ef-
fects. Framed like this, low rates of marriage, high rates of “illegitimacy”, and inher-
itance rules that tightly link inheritance rights to marriage all support the interests of 
the wealthy. The unmarried and the illegitimate are excluded.  
In August 2006, we collected information on inheritance practices of 23 Frans-
fontein households that had suffered from death within in the last five years. Inher-
itance practices are rather flexible in Fransfontein (Schnegg/Pauli 2006). Most people 
have painstakingly little to give: many people only own some clothes, a few pieces 
of simple furniture, a plate, a cup and a spoon, and some smallstock. Only compara-
bly wealthy people own more than one cow (the majority of the population only own-
ing smallstock) and only wealthy families can afford the high wedding costs neces-
sary to marry. Unlike for most people, it thus plays a role for these wealthy individ-
uals that they identify their legitimate heirs. Consequently, one of the most valuable 
assets, cattle, is almost exclusively transferred to legitimate children. This is particu-
larly crucial in a situation where wealthy married men like Norbert have children 
born out-of-wedlock, either from relationships before marriage (premarital) or from 
relationships parallel to an existing marriage (extramarital).  
Mara, a woman in her thirties, described how challenging it can be for children 
born out-of wedlock to claim inheritance from a deceased father who was married to 
another woman. When her father died, she had hoped to inherit a cow from him. Her 
Intimacy outside Marriage | 253 
 
father, a wealthy school principle, had married a fellow teacher. He had fathered 20 
children, of which only four were with his official wife. Mara’s mother, one of her 
father’s lovers, gave birth to Mara a few years before his official marriage. She had 
four children with three different men and never married. Mara attended her father’s 
funeral. At the /umis (the kin gathering to discuss the inheritance) that followed, there 
was a prolonged discussion whether the !gameb !auka /gôan (outside children) 
should be allowed to participate. Finally, they were allowed in. Each of them was 
promised a cow as their inheritance. Yet four years later, when we spoke with Mara 
she had still not received anything. When she had enquired about the cow from her 
father’s official wife and her father’s mother two years after the funeral, they just 
laughed. Mara felt very humiliated. During our talk she was bitter, lamenting how 
difficult it was for out-of-wedlock children to claim their rights. 
Wives of wealthy men are often especially harsh towards their husbands’ out-of-
wedlock children. Lina, born in the early 1960s and housewife, mother of six and 
married for twenty years, suffered deeply due to her husband’s extramarital affairs. 
He had fathered more than fifteen children outside of their marriage. These relation-
ships so affected her that at one point Lina had tried to commit suicide. Lina was a 
very active churchgoer. I often met her in church and talked with her, but we never 
talked about her suicide attempt. Yet on several occasions during and after church 
services and also at informal gatherings, I observed how she condemned /ai-/gôan 
(sin children) born to married men like her husband.  
Lina was thus one of the women who strongly criticized Norbert and, even more 
so, Eulalie’s behaviour and pregnancy, described at the beginning of this section. Dur-
ing an informal interview in her kitchen in September 2004, shortly after both Eulalie 
and Maria had given birth to their babies, Lina told me that Eulalie had been //om-mara 
(sleeping around) with a married man. For her, Eulalie was the one to blame for the 
situation. To help me better understand her views, Lina used the vulgar term /ai for 
sleeping around, suggesting that Eulalie had prostituted herself and that she was an /ai-
aos (a sinful woman or prostitute). Lina explained that this term, /ai, is contained in the 
description of sin children, /ai-/gôan, thus children stemming from the extramarital af-
fairs of married men. Like other married housewives, Lina perceived herself and also 
the betrayed Maria, Norbert’s wife, as morally superior to unmarried women like Eu-
lalie who have relationships with married men (see van Wolputte 2016 for moralising 
marriage and sexuality in North Kunene). To Lina, such women were almost like pros-
titutes and she was very much in favour of publicly shaming such women. It is as a 
result of this understanding that Eulalie was excluded from all church affairs and activ-
ities, including Holy Communion, after the birth of her child; and if Maria had not for-
given her, Eulalie would not have ever been able to have her child baptized. This would 
have been considered as very shameful for the mother.  
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During our conversation, Lina’s eldest daughter and her out-of-wedlock child, a 
one-year-old baby boy, entered the kitchen. When I asked Lina whether this boy 
would not also be a /ai-/gôab, she forcefully rejected this. While the boy’s parents 
were not married, she explained, the son was a child born outside of marriage, thus a 
!gameb !auka /gôab, but not one born as the result of an extra-marital affair, thus a 
sin child (/ai-/gôab). Sin children were only those children born to married men and 
their unmarried lovers. Both Lina and her daughter underscored that there would be 
no disadvantages for the baby boy for not having been born within a marriage. When 
I continued to wonder how the situation of this boy was different from that of an /ai-
/gôab, the women were unsure how to answer. On the one hand, they stressed that no 
one should blame a child for its mother’s immoralities and that baptism //aa//naas 
(washed away all sin). On the other hand, they denied sin children any claims on the 
property of their fathers.  
In this respect, Lina and her daughter are very much in line with the recent codifi-
cation of “customary law” to cut down any inheritance rights of children born out of 
wedlock. In the early 2000s, the Swartbooi traditional authority gazetted a new “Swart-
booi law of inheritance ‘/umis’” (Swartbooi 2005) that tightly linked inheritance to a 
Christian marriage. When an unmarried person dies, the elders must administer the es-
tate; there is no role given to an unmarried conjugal partner. Further, it explicitly ex-
cludes out-of-wedlock children from inheritance: “In the case where both the father and 
the mother died, the property is shared among all the surviving children. However, chil-
dren born out of wedlock do not have any rights to the property”. (Swartbooi 2005, 63) 
If a husband dies, the widow (thus the officially married wife) inherits everything. Bar-
bara Harrell-Bond (1975) has shown that the acknowledgment of property rights of 
children born “outside” marriage is especially threatening to wives and their “legal” 
children. She describes in detail how elite Sierra Leone wives in the 1960s rallied 
against law reforms that would have equalized the inheritance rights of all children in-
dependent of the civil status of their parents. In Fransfontein these debates have both 
legal and moral dimensions. While unmarried women stress the flexibility of intimate 
relations and separate reproduction from marriage, married women are eager to cement 
the boundaries between the married and the unmarried.  
The moral evaluation and labelling of births is an ongoing process in Fransfon-
tein. Gail Reekie (1998) has shown that during the 19th century European political, 
scientific and social interest groups created and sustained a moral discourse about 
illegitimate births, turning a biological event, a birth, into a social and moral problem. 
Creating illegitimacy and illegitimate children in Fransfontein is also connected to 
wider political economic structures and the aims and agencies of different actors em-
bedded within them. The tension between the still rather flexible and processual char-
acter of intimate relations and the low levels of stigmatization against children born 
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out-of-wedlock, on the one hand, and the boundary-drawing attempts to distinguish 
“good” from “bad” births, on the other, is linked to an accelerated process of class 
and elite formation underway in Fransfontein since approximately the 1970s. Alt-
hough economic inequalities existed before the creation of Damaraland and the im-
plementation of apartheid policies, their extent was much more limited. Since the 
1970s, however, an elite group of professionals, administrators and politicians has 
emerged with a level of wealth that is far out of reach for the great majority of the 
population. Additionally, specific patronage structures have emerged. As described 
in previous chapters, since the 1970s male patrons (kai aogu) not only shaped the 
economic sphere but were also decisive in reconfiguring gender relations. The kai 
aogu celebrated conspicuous and expensive weddings while also having extra-mari-
tal love affairs and fathering out-of-wedlock children (Pauli 2010b). This allowed the 
build-up of significant property, with many potential heirs. Like marriage, inheritance 
thus turned into an issue of debate and distinction. The process continues to the pre-
sent day, as Mara’s story indicates. What is being negotiated is, first, the legitimacy 
of any child’s potential claim on inheritable possessions, especially his or her father’s 
property and, second, the moral status of the birth of a child born out-of-wedlock to 
a married wealthy man. Consequently, for the new elites, marriage, reproduction and 
inheritance are closely intertwined. With the creation of “illegitimacy” and “illegiti-
mate children”, local power asymmetries that have emerged since the 1970s are fur-
ther consolidated. The dynamics of distinction, so vividly expressed in contemporary 












This book has told the entwined stories of marriage transformation and class for-
mation in Fransfontein, a rural community in northwest Namibia. It is part of a small 
but developing field of research that sets out to revive the study of marriage in an-
thropology and African studies. Until the 1980s, marriage was a main concern for 
anthropological research: it was viewed as a central way through which many small-
scale societies studied by anthropologists ordered their social and political life. David 
Schneider’s (1984) critique of such structural-functionalist approaches to kinship in 
the 1970s and 1980s led to a decline of research on kinship and marriage within an-
thropology. In the late 1990s, an interest in kinship re-emerged. New concepts like 
“relatedness” (Carsten 2000) helped to rethink the meaning and practice of kinship 
in everyday interactions. Kinship was not studied as an abstract system of rules and 
regulations anymore but as an open-ended process of negotiations and activities. One 
would assume that marriage would be an especially apt subject for this new research 
agenda as it is all about processes and practices of becoming kin. Nevertheless, until 
recently, little attention has been paid to marriage in contemporary kinship studies 
(e.g. Alber et al. 2010; Carsten 2004; Franklin/McKinnon 2001).1 This is all the more 
remarkable as marriage not only offers intriguing insights into how individuals actu-
ally “do” kinship but can also tell us something about broader societal transfor-
mations, such as changing political regimes, class dynamics and demographic pat-
terns. Marriage is formed by these wider dynamics and at the same time initiates 
changes in these (Pauli/van Dijk 2016). 
In parallel to the general paucity of anthropological studies on marriage, little 
anthropological research has been undertaken on marriage in Southern Africa since 
the 1980s. The Introduction summarized how different anthropological traditions 
                                                 
1 An explanation of this research hiatus is still outstanding. Much kinship research of the late 
1990s and 2000s has focused on filial relations, often created through new reproductive 
technologies or adoption. 
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have perceived and researched African marriage. As a heuristic device, I identified 
four metanarratives of African marriage: stability, destruction, change, and plurality. 
The order of these narratives does not imply any sort of development. Indeed, the 
metanarratives should not be drawn together to form a meta-metanarrative, a story 
that might run like this: In pre-colonial times, African marriage was stable and uni-
versal. With colonialism, kinship and marriage structures were destroyed. This led 
to change and eventually plurality of marriage. Historical research has cautioned us 
against such simplistic assumptions as “traditionality” being substituted by some sort 
of “modernity” (Ferguson 1999; Guyer 1994; Hobsbawm/Ranger 2003 [1983]). Not 
everything that is perceived as change is indeed novel. Jane Guyer (1994: 249) thus 
suggests that it might be more insightful to search for “continuities with shifting em-
phasis”. This implies interrogating how universal and stable African marriage had 
indeed been in pre-colonial times. Catherine Allerton (2007: 3) has observed that 
while anthropologists have extensively debated how to define marriage, they have 
“rarely asked the question of whether marriage is universal within particular socie-
ties”. Universality of marriage within a given society is often simply assumed. These 
insights are also crucial for understanding an emerging, fifth metanarrative on Afri-
can marriage: the exclusivity of marriage.  
Research shows that throughout Southern Africa marriage rates are declining, in 
some cases quite sharply (Claassens/Smythe 2013; Pauli/van Dijk 2016; Posel/Rud-
wick/Casale 2011). Despite this, the value of weddings and marriages has not de-
clined. To marry has become an indicator of elite status, one that less affluent people 
also aspire to but, lacking the financial means, often without success. While this 
emerging metanarrative does not address the universality of marriage in pre-colonial 
times, it illuminates what the end of universal marriage and the spread of exclusive 
marriage mean in contemporary Southern Africa. It is this metanarrative that has in-
formed this work. 
The fifth metanarrative asks why marriage is declining and what the meaning of 
marriage is when only few marry. Not colonialism but class is viewed as the main 
reason for the decline and the reconfiguration of marriage. Like the study of marriage, 
the study of class has experienced a remarkable revival in anthropology (Lentz 2016). 
Until the 1980s, class was thoroughly analyzed in anthropology, most often researched 
through the lenses of the African elites and working classes. In the late 1980s and 
during the 1990s, this interest receded. A focus on class returned to the anthropological 
agenda in the 2000s, though now it is mainly the emergence of local and global middle 
classes that stirs anthropological interest (Heiman et al. 2012a; Kroeker et al. 2018; 
López/Weinstein 2012; Melber 2016; Southall 2016). The new middle classes are of-
ten approached on the basis of their consumption habits and lifestyles. However, only 
few studies so far have tried to understand African class in combination with marriage 
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transformations.2 This is remarkable as weddings are especially well suited for the 
study of lifestyles and class distinctions (Argyrou 1996; Kendall 1996; Lankauskas 
2015; Pauli 2018). With this book on the entanglements of marriage transformations 
and class formations in Namibia, I wish to add to this literature.  
African class formation is part of more general political processes, especially co-
lonialism and postcolonialism. One thus has to ask how varying colonial and post-
colonial histories have shaped class formation processes. This helps to understand 
what is specific about the Namibian situation. Countries such as Ghana (Behrends/ 
Lentz 2012; Budniok/Noll 2018; Lentz 1994) or Kenya (Spronk 2012, 2014) simi-
larly experienced class formation and the emergence of elites, and later of the middle 
classes. But these countries gained independence from colonial rule much earlier than 
Namibia. Namibia’s independence in 1990 was very late. Thus, the dynamics I am 
describing in this book are arguably a lot more in the making than for countries with 
longer histories of independence. Additionally, Namibia is characterized by a unique 
history of white settlement and apartheid. The emergence of new local elites in the 
1970s and 1980s is a direct outcome of racist apartheid and homeland policies. After 
independence, class formation processes have continued. Namibia’s class formation 
thus took place in a comparably short period of time. Unlike countries such as France 
that have very pronounced and long-term class differences (Bourdieu 1984 [1979]), 
the markers of Namibian class distinction are still rather incipient and not yet well 
established. They are, nevertheless, very effective, as my analysis of marriage shows. 
The book started with a vignette: Anna’s and Josef’s joy and triumph on their wed-
ding day, leaving church, and the envy and frustration experienced by some of the 
unmarried spectators watching them. This single moment captures the story of this 
book: class formation through marriage, leading to exclusivity of marriage for the 
elite and exclusion from marriage for everybody else. In Fransfontein, marriage rates 
have substantially declined over the course of the last 60 years. While the majority 
of older people (over 60 years of age) is married, younger Fransfonteiners are mostly 
unmarried. Overall, in 2004, only 30 per cent of all Fransfonteiners had ever been 
married.  
For analytic reasons, I structured my interpretation of the decline of marriage into 
three parts. The first part tackled Namibian class formation and the wider ethno-
graphic and historical background of my case. The second part of the book looked in 
detail at how wedding rituals have changed over time and examined of the de-
mographics of marriage over the last 60 years. I explored how the decline of marriage 
                                                 
2 This lack motivated Rijk van Dijk and me to bring these two research traditions together 
and publish a special issue on marriage and class in Southern Africa in Anthropology South-
ern Africa (Pauli/van Dijk 2016/2017). 
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might be explained. The third and last part of the book focused on the consequences 
of the decline of marriage. Before discussing these consequences here, I briefly sum-
marize my findings on why marriage has declined in Fransfontein.  
While I criticized the assumptions underlying the stability and destruction metanar-
ratives of African marriage, in rather general terms these metanarratives do apply to 
the Fransfontein case. Colonialism had tremendous effects on the lives of Fransfon-
tein people. It was impossible for most to survive in the so-called reserves and later 
homelands. Many were forced to migrate and work under racist conditions on white 
settler farms. Marriage and family life were clearly reconfigured by colonialism. Un-
fortunately, not much is known about Fransfontein kinship and marriage in the pre-
colonial period. The weddings and marriages I have described for the oldest genera-
tion of Fransfontein women and men, which took place between the 1940s and the 
1970s, were “colonial” weddings. These weddings have been my empirical starting 
point. As my analysis of three generations of Fransfonteiners has shown, most people 
continued to marry during the colonial period, despite the terrible living conditions 
they had to endure. Thus, while colonialism without doubt changed marriage and kin-
ship, there is no direct link between this period of colonialism and the decline of 
marriage in Fransfontein.  
The decline of marriage commenced in the late 1970s and with the establishment 
of homelands. It was the apartheid state that fostered the emergence of a local elite 
of politicians, administrators and professionals in Fransfontein, then part of the newly 
established “Damaraland”. I have shown at length how this rural elite reconfigured 
weddings and marriages. Conspicuous and expensive weddings became their central 
field of class distinction. At their weddings, they staged their new lifestyles, their 
power and also their creativity. These performances of elitist distinctions allowed this 
local elite to legitimize its privileged position (Cohen 1981). One can interpret these 
dynamics as an example of the unanticipated consequences of purposive social action 
(Merton 1936). The elite’s intentional changing of how weddings were celebrated in 
Fransfontein made it increasingly impossible for people to marry. Most Fransfon-
teiners just could not afford it anymore. These historically situated class formation 
processes are a major explanation for the decline of marriage in Fransfontein.  
But there are other reasons too. The class formation processes of the 1970s and 
1980s also reconfigured gender relations in Fransfontein. Gender relations of the old-
est Fransfontein generation, couples who married before the 1970s, were relatively 
egalitarian. This changed with the new elites of the 1970s. Now, a few individual 
men advanced into powerful positions. Their economic power enabled them to marry 
women who then became housewives, a new gender role at the time. These male 
leaders often practiced a variation of polygyny. Although polygyny was (and still is) 
prohibited in Namibia, it was common for wealthy and powerful men to engage in 
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several concurrent intimate relations, very often fathering children with several 
women. During the 1970s and 1980s, the government built infrastructure, such as a 
school and a hostel, in Fransfontein, which made low-skilled but permanent jobs as 
domestic workers available. Male elite leaders allocated these jobs to their female 
lovers. Most of these women deliberately decided against marriage. They argued that 
it is better to remain single (and involved with married men) than have to cope with 
unemployed husbands living off their income. Hence, most Fransfontein men lacking 
a stable income became “unmarriageable” (Bourdieu 2008: 82). Another reason for 
the decline of marriage in Fransfontein is thus the enhanced agency of some women 
who purposefully decided against marriage, and the loss of agency of most men. 
Therefore, if non-elite men today decide to marry, it is going to be a substantial strug-
gle (Pauli/Dawids 2017). This leads me to the consequences of the decline of mar-
riage in Fransfontein. 
I focused on questions of conjugality, reproduction and parenthood to understand 
how people have coped with the decline of marriage in Fransfontein. The concept of 
generation has proven useful to compare how marriage and the fertility of women 
(and to a lesser extent men) have varied across time. I distinguished three generations: 
women who married and had children before apartheid (the older generation, born 
before the mid-1940s); women who had children and conjugal partners during apart-
heid (the middle generation, born from the mid-1940s to the mid-1960s); and women 
who started their conjugal and reproductive lives after apartheid (the younger gener-
ation, born from the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s).  
Women of the older generation had many children from one partner to whom they 
were in most cases married. This pattern substantially changed with the middle gen-
eration, changes that are linked to the transformations in the political economy that 
started with the 1970s. Class formation through apartheid fostered the emergence of 
two very different groups of women. Women who from the 1970s onwards became 
the wives of the new male elite continued to have many children with only one part-
ner. Jane Guyer (1994) has classified the “logic” of this type of reproductive behavior 
as “linear”. Women secured their own and their children’s livelihoods through mar-
riage into one kin group, one lineage. In contrast, the increasing number of Fransfon-
tein women who, from the 1970s onwards, did not marry and thus could not rely on 
the “linear” support from one husband and kin group secured themselves and their 
children through “lateral” network building. They had children with several fathers, 
none of whom they married. All fathers and their kin were supposed to support the 
unmarried woman and her children. Guyer calls this “polyandrous motherhood”. Alt-
hough the younger generation is still in childbearing age, it appears that the split into 
these two groups of women – wealthy married women having many children versus 
more destitute polyandrous mothers – endures. 
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Compared to marriage and the linear logic of fertility, polyandrous motherhood 
is more flexible but also more insecure. Unmarried mothers appreciated their intimate 
and economic freedoms. They stressed that for them it is much easier to separate from 
a partner than for a married woman to separate from her husband. But polyandrous 
mothers also complained how difficult it was to receive support from their children’s 
fathers and the fathers’ kin groups. In terms of inheritance, they felt that they and 
their children were often not receiving their fair share. In most instances, children 
born out-of-wedlock and their mothers did not inherit from fathers who had legiti-
mate wives and children. Wives and children born in-wedlock argued that polyan-
drous mothers and their out-of-wedlock children lacked the legitimacy to make a 
claim. Legitimacy is hence the key concept to unravel how the decline of marriage 
has produced new forms of exclusion and inequality.  
Legitimacy creates morally charged categories with clear boundaries. In Frans-
fontein, several new forms of legitimacy and illegitimacy have emerged in the course 
of class formation and the decline of marriage. Couples living together without being 
married are negatively described as living in “black cow marriages” (‡nu gomas 
!gameb). These couples are treated with less respect than married couples. They are 
excluded from rituals that only married people are allowed to perform. Further, stig-
matization of children born out-of-wedlock now occurs in Fransfontein, most obvi-
ous in the increased use of the prerogative term “sin child” (/ai-/gôan) to refer to 
them. Finally, the sexual and reproductive behavior of young, unmarried women is 
increasingly being scrutinized in moral terms. Motherhood is highly valued and 
marks the entrance into adulthood. An early age at first birth of 19 years is the norm. 
However, this norm is progressively being questioned. Younger women from elite 
Fransfontein families now define their entrance into adulthood not through pregnan-
cy, but through non-pregnancy. Their chastity and non-motherhood is being rewarded 
through a new ritual called “the key” and the celebration of a splendid party at their 
twenty-first birthday. The new ritual and celebration undermine the credibility and 
legitimacy of all young women who have given birth before the age of 21. All three 
instances – black cow marriages, sin children and early pregnancies – have in com-
mon that they happen outside marriage. Legitimacy of sex, relations and children is 
thus being achieved only through marriage. The boundaries of legitimacy separate 
the married elite from everybody else.  
Boundary-making is an essential feature of class formation processes. Michèle 
Lamont and Virág Molnár (2002) differentiate symbolic and social boundaries. 
Where symbolic boundaries are necessary to categorize and distinguish entities, so-
cial boundaries are “objectified forms of social differences manifested in unequal 
access to and unequal distribution of resources (material and nonmaterial) and social 
opportunities” (ibid: 168). Black cow marriages, sin children and early pregnancies 
Conclusion | 263 
 
are all expressions of symbolic boundaries that have developed into social bounda-
ries. They manifest how unmarried Fransfonteiners are excluded from material and 
nonmaterial resources and opportunities. By belonging to “illegitimate” categories, 
the immediate consequences of the decline of marriage are felt by unmarried Frans-
fonteiners.  
After having described the immediate consequences of the decline of marriage 
in Fransfontein, I now want to reflect on some of the long-term consequences. In 
Fransfontein, weddings continue to be the central field for the performance of class 
distinctions. Yet other fields are gaining in importance. Class distinctions can now 
also be observed during funerals, in house construction and in the ownership of 
livestock. 
My analysis of marriage transformation exhibits some similarities to research 
on elite formation and funerals (Cohen/Odhiambo 1992; Fumanti 2007; Lentz 1994). 
Mattia Fumanti’s (2007: 482) detailed description of the burial of E.S., a high rank-
ing official in the town of Rundu on the Namibian-Angolan border, unravels prac-
tices of class distinction comparable to the ones I have shown for weddings: “In 
fact, ‘the logistics’, as the elite put it, demanded remarkable efforts. The funeral 
service, the food for the feast, the programme, the invitations, the mourning tents, 
the transport vehicles and the formal and informal announcements, all presented 
pressing requirements for co-ordinated activity on an exceptional scale to represent 
and embody the height of distinction”. In Fransfontein, practices and costs of fu-
nerals have also changed. In September 2003, an Afrikaans-speaking South African 
businessman started selling coffins in Fransfontein. Business went so well that, in 
2005, he moved to the nearby town of Khorixas and opened a bigger shop. Already 
in 2003 a Fransfontein teacher told me that the wealthy were ordering expensive 
coffins for their own funerals. The cost for the cheapest coffin was NAD1800 while 
expensive coffins lined with lace started at NAD3000. Conspicuous consumption 
thus also happened at funerals. Nevertheless, I want to argue that there are signifi-
cant differences between the transformation of marriage and that of funerals. 
While only a fraction of the Fransfontein population marries today, everybody 
will die and need to be buried. In fact, because of the dramatic spread of HIV/AIDS, 
death and funerals were very prevalent during our fieldwork. For those people who 
died as pensioners (60 years and older), as Fransfonteiners told us in 2003, a family 
received a state grant of NAD400 to pay for the funeral. All other burials had to be 
financed by family and friends. Many Fransfontein families were forced to go from 
door to door to ask for financial support for the burial of a relative. Funerals thus 
also express economic stratification and inequality. Nevertheless, the financial and 
personal investments that the elite put into weddings are on a substantially larger 
scale than what is being done for funerals. Conspicuous weddings have ongoing 
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and long-term returns in the form of symbolic and economic capital for the couple 
and their kin (Bourdieu 1984 [1979]). The celebrating couple is often in the prime 
of their lives. Conspicuous funerals have a different return structure. The one “cel-
ebrated” or honored at a funeral is dead. The symbolic capital acquired through a 
conspicuous funeral thus goes to his or her kin group. Wealthy kin groups have 
indeed started to appropriate funerals of their deceased members to express the kin 
group’s distinctiveness. Thus, where until recently gravestones were modest in cost 
and décor, some of the elite’s gravestones are becoming more expensive and ex-
pressive. 
Two other fields that are being reconfigured by class formation are house construc-
tion and the ownership of livestock. Both phenomena are linked to migration. Success-
ful urban migrants continue to invest into belonging to Fransfontein. Although they live 
urban middle-class lives in Windhoek or in towns on the coast, they continue to cele-
brate their weddings in Fransfontein, keep large herds of livestock in the area, want to 
be buried in the village, and build conspicuous houses there at which they wish to spend 
weekends, holidays and their retirement. The migrants’ houses represent new architec-
tural styles, informed by global middle-class aesthetics (Mercer 2014). These houses 
contrast sharply from the common Fransfontein houses that lack water, electricity, mul-
tiple rooms or color. Similarly, many migrants enjoy being “weekend farmers” 
(Schnegg/Pauli/Greiner 2013). The livestock of these part-time pastoralists consume a 
large share of the communal pasture, leading to conflicts with pastoralists who live in 
the region full-time and rely on grazing livestock for their livelihoods.  
For the long-term reproduction of class in Fransfontein, the transmission of prop-
erty, such as houses and livestock, but also of education will be crucial. Material 
assets are increasingly being inherited by legitimate children (!game /gôan). In addi-
tion to the privileges obtained through inheritance, legitimate children also profit 
from the class position of their married parents by receiving a much better education 
than their non-elite peers. Elite class positions are thus passed on to the next genera-
tion. A further way to reproduce class is through marriage choices. It remains to be 
seen whether the privileged younger generation will develop some sort of class con-
sciousness in their marriage choices. Apart from teachers, who have tended to inter-
marry since the 1970s, the spousal choices of the middle generation of the Fransfon-
tein elite were not based on similar considerations of class status. Yet interviews I 
conducted with elite and middle-class members of the younger generation in Wind-
hoek in 2015/2016 suggest that class background may indeed be becoming more im-
portant in the choice of a marriage partner (Pauli 2017b).  
How will marriage and class develop in Namibia? Many scenarios are imagina-
ble. One possibility might even be a disentanglement of marriage and class, a reap-
propriation of weddings by the non-elite and a rise in marriage rates. Time will tell. 
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For now, the vantage point of marriage has enabled me to understand how, over the 
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